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Abstract 
 
This thesis has explored the ways in which young Egyptians construct different 
classed versions of a cosmopolitan imagination while located in the megacity of 
Cairo. In an intense ethnographic study, I have examined the ways in which young 
men and women shape their identities at the juxtaposition of a social reality, which is 
rigidly structured around classed and gendered divides on the one hand, and a diverse 
and fluid system of media representations of the self and others, on the other hand. 
Focusing on everyday life in Cairo has allowed me to examine the contradictory 
social and cultural experiences associated with being young in a megacity of the 
global south. Whilst the daily urban lives of these young Cairenes are located within 
embedded structures that place firm limits on their social and physical mobilities, the 
city is also a more creative terrain where these highly structured limits on the self are 
negotiated. As young people move physically in the city, yet shift imaginatively 
between different systems of representation available to them in the rich mediascapes 
they have access to, their sense of identity expands. Specifically, this 
cosmopolitanism takes the form of a dynamic subjective space and a category of 
imagination from within which identities, drawing heavily on globally circulating 
media products, are reflexively understood and interpreted. Thus, operating from 
within repressive, socially fragmented, yet highly mediated everyday contexts, I 
explore how young Egyptians construct three different versions of a cosmopolitan 
imagination: closed cosmopolitanism as imagined by the upper middle class, critical 
cosmopolitanism relating to the experiences of the lower middle class, and for the 
working class, an implicit cosmopolitan imagination.  
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Communication technologies can function as disembedding 
mechanisms, powerfully enabling individuals (and sometimes 
whole families or communities) to escape, at least imaginatively, 
from their geographical locations. When people’s situation is 
particularly constrained, such escape becomes all the more 
important….. 
                                                                (Morley, 2006: 149-150) 
 
Imagine that for 24 years you don’t ever have hope of things 
getting better. Mubarak is ruling Egypt with an iron fist, while the 
people are captured in a cycle of paralysing fear and hopeless 
apathy. We are kept from even daring to imagine a different 
reality from the poverty, inequity, government corruption and 
indignity we know. The only hope for a fresh graduate like me will 
be to look for chances elsewhere  
 
                                                                 (El Ghayesh, 2011: 84)  
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1 Introduction 
A Cosmopolitan Imagination in Cairo: Between State Repression, Global 
Inequalities and Mediated Alternatives 
 
The first indications that political emancipation and thus social change would ever 
come about in Egypt began in the summer of 2004. The Kefaya movement, literally 
translated as 'enough', was an important grassroots coalition and platform for civilian 
outcry and protest against dictator Hosny Mubarak's plans for a fifth six-year term. 
Taking political protest to the streets of Cairo, Kefaya contested the alarming 
prospect that hereditary rule would be implemented, leading to the possible 
succession of Mubarak's son, Gamal (Singerman & Amar, 2006). Although Kefaya 
made important headway in partly dissolving Egyptian citizens' fear of political 
activism and dissent, Mubarak still won the 2005 presidential race by over 88% of 
the votes in what was publicly acknowledged to be a rigged showcase election. 
Kefaya's unprecedented yet 'explicit cosmopolitan claims on the government' 
(ibid.:7) were an early warning of what was eventually to come in January 2011. In 
what appeared to be a new era in Egypt's political and social history, the aftermath of 
Kefaya's establishment in 2004, witnessed Egyptian protestors from all walks of life 
confidently asserting their demand for 'accountability, legality, and respect for 
human rights' (ibid.: 7). 
 
Despite these landmark political and social developments in Egypt, an overwhelming 
mood of disillusionment and nihilism was still palpable amongst the inhabitants of 
Cairo. Whether speaking to shopkeepers, students, lecturers or labourers, it was not 
hard to detect the sense of pessimism that these Cairenes held towards any prospect 
of real change. 'People come out onto the streets to oppose and protest and whatever, 
but what actually happens as a result? They are usually thrown into jail and life for 
us goes on as normal' one 23-year-old student told me in 2007. Little did anyone 
know that four years later, the 25
th
 of January 2011 to be precise, would mark a 
permanent and unprecedented change in Egypt's history. As the recent revolution 
broke out in Cairo and mass protests took to the streets, Egyptians old and young, 
rich and poor, male and female were united in Tahrir Square demanding their right to 
'bread, freedom and social equality'. This time it was mass dissent and the angry, 
unwavering voices of Egyptian citizens that prevailed triumphantly, and after much 
12 
 
resistance, Mubarak's regime was humiliatingly toppled following thirty years of 
dictatorial rule.  
 
My research, exploring the construction of cosmopolitan identities amongst 
Egyptians aged between 18 and 25, took place over a year from December 2008 to 
December 2009. This marked an important period between the 2005 civilian unrest 
and the 2011 revolution. Following the establishment of the Kefaya movement, the 
public claims it made to human rights and legality meant that a narrow unparalleled 
hope for a better quality of life and a democratic agenda permeated the minds of 
Egyptians. Nevertheless, as Singerman and Amar argue, the political challenges in 
2005 also exposed 'the violent, repressive nature of what has come to be accepted as 
globalization and liberalism in the Middle East' (2006:9).  Indeed, despite recent 
political advancements, Cairo remains a visibly divided city, housing within it a 
plurality of highly unequal and disconnected socio-cultural worlds. Thus, Egypt's 
capital city captures the contradictions and unequal developments characteristic of 
everyday realities in a megapolis of the developing south.  
 
Statistics from the International Monetary Fund point to the fact that since 2004, 
coinciding with its political instability, the Egyptian economy has witnessed an 
escalation of 7%, making it one of the Middle East's fastest growing economies 
(Enders, 2008). A regionally recognized and well-functioning economy has been the 
fundamental bedrock encouraging the proliferation of numerous state-led and private 
sector cultural and social projects, but also attracting grand business ventures by 
foreign investors, both Arab and western. The Egyptian government, since President 
Sadat's era in the 1970s, has forcefully relocated poor urban populations from central 
Cairo, demolishing their humble living quarters, replacing them with more 
'presentable' and 'modern' infrastructure (Ghannam, 2002) as befitting a globalizing 
capital city;  rich businessmen from the Arab Gulf have recently led ambitious 
projects introducing glamorous shopping malls and expensive designer fashion 
houses into Egypt's urban texture (Abaza, 2006); wealthy Egyptian investors have 
embarked upon similar initiatives, building expensive private and foreign language 
educational establishments that have multiplied significantly in recent years (Arvizu, 
2009; Schaub, 2000). Despite these private sector and government induced initiatives 
to 'modernize', however, to what extent do Cairo's inhabitants – living in the world's 
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eleventh most populated city (Demographia, 2011) – benefit equally from such 
ambitious plans? Indeed, beneath Cairo's sleek façade of tall skyscrapers and 
glamorous shopping malls, the 'belly of the city' (Carpentier, 2008) reflects an 
underlying reality of stark contradictions and visible inequalities. In an environment 
where almost 30% of further and higher education graduates face unemployment 
(IDSC, 2009); 10% and 27% of the urban male and female populations respectively 
remain illiterate (EAEA, 2008); and the continuing existence of 75 slum areas in 
Cairo alone (IDSC, 2009), illustrate that the government has embarked upon 
parochial cosmetic changes, channelling resources solely into the private sector and 
the building of modern cultural establishments. 
  
Debilitating socio-economic and gender inequalities continue to underwrite the 
everyday experiences of a polarized city and socially divided way of life. In this 
context, the concerns and tribulations facing normal Cairenes remain yet to be 
addressed by the government's grand plans for building a 'global metropolis that 
would meet the demands of tourists and foreign investors' (Ghannam, 2002: 2). 
Hence, although Cairo's skyline may tell the story of a city embedded in global 
networks of social and cultural development and progress, Cairo looked at from 
‘below’ reveals a gloomier yet increasingly more dynamic and unpredictable 
narrative of struggle; a daily struggle for space, identity and recognition. It is through 
an intense ethnographic examination of Cairo and Cairenes from below, that I have 
come to witness how repression and inequality most definitely shape lives, yet never 
completely dominate them. In particular, representing daily cultural windows, and in 
most cases, young Egyptians' only 'passport' (literally) exposing them to a world 
beyond their own, the media, and especially television, provide important cultural 
resources and thus opportunities for the articulation and negotiation of fresh 
possibilities for novel and often unusual forms of imagination and belonging.  
 
My long-term interest and deep passion for this research project developed from my 
own particular experiences and observations of Cairo that are consistent with the 
unusual urban juxtapositions outlined above. Indeed, through my frequent travels to 
Cairo at different stages of my life since childhood, I have acquired a vast store of 
memories of this wonderful city I consider home. Although I have been raised and 
educated in the UK, throughout my life, my parents insisted that as a family we 
14 
 
spend the long summer break enjoying Cairo’s blistering heat. For my mother and 
father, these trips became an important annual ritual through which my older brother 
and I would both become acquainted with our extended family, and familiarise 
ourselves with the cultural ways and traditions of our ‘homeland’. Nevertheless, what 
began as compulsory family supervised trips, eventually transformed into a personal 
desire to investigate and discover the innards of a fascinating city that to me, 
remained highly enigmatic. Rather than returning for a couple of weeks during the 
annual family holiday, I began to spend extended periods of time in Cairo, without 
my family, which became an important opportunity to establish an extensive web of 
friends and social contacts. Although traveling to Cairo alone was not a problem, my 
parents insisted that I stay with my grandmother. I was told that it would be socially 
unacceptable in Egypt for a young, single woman to rent a flat and live on her own.    
My grandmother’s flat is located in the upper middle class district of Maadi, home to 
many of Cairo’s embassies, diplomatic residences, multinational firms and expats’ 
homes. Initially, my holidays in Maadi gave me a very particular, very sheltered 
experience of everyday life in Cairo. The fact that I did not have an Egyptian driver’s 
license, meant my physical mobility was limited as I had to depend on the safe 
option of a chauffeur driven car, insisted on by my mother (this is normal amongst 
the upper middle class in Egypt). Wishing to welcome me in Egypt and display their 
limitless generosity and hospitality, friends and family in Maadi would take me to 
sample the newly opened Italian restaurant, or try the most popular sushi bar or salad 
bar in the area. Although I was deeply grateful to my acquaintances who made the 
effort to introduce me to this extensive menu of international cuisine, I was not very 
comfortable being treated as a ‘foreigner’ who they wanted to impress by proving 
that their palates are just as cosmopolitan and culturally sophisticated as my friends 
back in London.  
This Cairo I was being forced to experience through my stay in Maadi, existed in 
stark contrast to the image of Egypt being constantly portrayed in the media and in 
human development reports as riddled with poverty, unemployment and lack of 
human rights.  I realised that if I was to ever experience the ‘real’ Egypt, and walk in 
the shoes of the average Egyptian, I would need to come out of my highly sheltered 
urban comfort zone that centred around chauffeurs, fancy cafes and internationally-
inspired menus. In a bid to mingle with more humble Egyptians, I began to regularly 
15 
 
take the underground metro and taxis. To appease my parents, however, I would be 
accompanied by my brother or male cousin to avoid verbal or sexual harassment, 
regularly experienced by Egyptian women in public transport. Keen to embark upon 
an urban exploration of an undiscovered Cairo, my expensive Italian and American 
lunches by the Nile in Maadi became replaced by cheap Kofta (mince-meat skewers) 
and falafel sandwiches in the traditional working class districts of El Hussein, 
Embaba and Sayeda Zeinab. Obviously, my old friends remained central to my trips 
to Egypt. Nevertheless, the more I began to widen my circle of acquaintances to 
include young girls I met on the metro, men who served me in the traditional 
sandwich shops, and taxi drivers who I trusted enough to regularly accompany me on 
my Cairo explorations, I slowly realised how this city truly does exist of hidden 
worlds within worlds. Behind the urban façade of modernity and cosmopolitan 
lifestyles, I witnessed first-hand how poverty, despair and indignity remain a tangible 
everyday reality for the vast majority of Cairo’s population.   
While roaming in some of the wealthiest streets and districts of Cairo, one only has 
to take a wrong turning into a side street to experience a completely different world, 
separated merely by a brick wall. I was truly astounded at how contemporary 
architecture in the form of skyscrapers and glitzy hotels cleverly concealed the dim 
reality of the adjacent overcrowded, badly sanitized, under resourced slum 
settlements. Thus, more shocking than the physical separation, is the vast socio-
cultural and economic expanse that keeps such diverse urban zones poles apart. 
These stark contradictions in lifestyle, intrinsic to Cairo’s urban texture and 
experiences, raised several questions that drove me to conduct this research project. I 
was intrigued as to how poverty and extreme wealth, the symbols of liberal western 
modernity and a strong Islamic resurgence could be juxtaposed so starkly in a single 
city, yet hardly maintain any contact. Additionally, as a student of media-studies, I 
was amazed at how the presence of satellite dishes and the over-concentration of 
television antennas in these very different worlds, was almost the single thread of 
similarity uniting them. I wondered, does television act as a further force for division 
by giving them access to very different programmes and thus cultural worlds? Or, on 
the contrary, is television an important virtual space where they are brought together 
through shared consumption and enjoyment of the same cultural products on screen?       
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Coming to life as a result of the experiences and reflections unfolding above, this 
thesis explores the ways in which young Egyptians move physically in the city, yet 
symbolically move between different systems of televised representation. 
Conducting my research with a balanced number of men and women equally spread 
across the upper middle, lower middle and working class, I examined this research 
question: to what extent are these young Egyptians from different backgrounds 
engaged in the construction of different versions of a cosmopolitan imagination? I 
addressed this through three sub-questions:  
i)To what extent does class play a central role in how young Egyptians articulate 
their different forms of cosmopolitan imagination?  
ii)What is the importance of television in exposing these young men and women to a 
world beyond their reach?  
iii)What role does the city, as the main site of their everyday lives, play within the 
cosmopolitan aspirations of young Egyptians? Is Cairo a static geographical location, 
simply a container in which cosmopolitanism is an everyday lived reality? Or is 
Cairo a dynamic urban terrain, itself being negotiated and reinterpreted in new ways 
through cosmopolitan imagination?  
 
1.1 The Multilayered Onion and Other Reasons for a Cosmopolitan Perspective 
 
Cosmopolitanism, although an ancient term, has recently been re-awakened within 
the social-sciences. Nevertheless, entering or re-entering disciplines that are already 
filled to maximum capacity with conceptual terms that describe the state of our 
modern world, this raises the question of what cosmopolitanism adds in the way of 
analytical value that is new and distinct, particularly in relation to globalization. The 
answer, according to Beck and Sznaider (2006), lies in the onion. The authors use 
this pungent vegetable as a very vivid and visual metaphor for distinguishing 
between the terms cosmopolitanism and globalisation. They suggest that rather than 
seeing globalization as the primary mechanism which invades and impacts upon 
people's intimate spaces in a one-way process of influence, cosmopolitanism allows 
us to shift the emphasis to internal developmental processes within the social world. 
While globalization may refer to an abstract process taking place somewhere out 
there, cosmopolitanism happens from within. Globalization presupposes, yet 
cosmopolitanism dissolves the 'onion model' of the world where the local and the 
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national form the core and inner layer, and the international and the global form the 
outer layers (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 5).  
 
In light of the above, I use the term internal heterogeneity (Elsayed, 2010) to 
describe the process through which cosmopolitanism is exercised on a daily basis. I 
use this in reference to how, through personal strategies and performance (De 
Koning, 2009), individuals and groups embedded within specific localities coalesce 
the local and the global in unique ways that lead to new avenues for self 
understanding. In this context, global culture should not be regarded as a 
homogenous or standardized entity that remains located within the west and the 
upper classes. It is from within the daily practices taking place through the prism of 
particular localities that the global is experienced and thus acquires multiple 
meanings (Massey, 2007). A cosmopolitan perspective, in this light, may allow us to 
invert, or adopt a decentred approach to understanding the everyday impact of 
cultural globalization, where its analysis avoids departing from a macro perspective 
that may automatically assume the unwavering centrality and thus homogenizing 
potentials of global culture. Such an approach may encourage us to examine global 
cultural exchange through a linear Jihad VS McWorld (Barber, 2003) model, which 
presupposes that there can only be a complete assimilation to, or rejection of global 
culture. Cosmopolitanism or inner globalization (Beck, 2002:19) begins its analysis 
from within a particular locality in all its diversity and complex specificity, 
examining how individuals and groups within these places articulate multiple 
networks and complex cultural connections that often surpass the limits of local 
boundaries. 
 
According to some early theorizations within globalization studies, cosmopolitanism 
(Hannerz, 1996) was perceived to be an activity of educated high-status 
professionals, with an ability to acquire the economic and cultural capital allowing 
them to physically mingle with different cultures through patterns of travel and 
mobility. Nevertheless, whereas such theories base a cosmopolitan experience solely 
on physical movement between cultures, in more contemporary times, we are no 
longer required to go out to the world in order to engage with it. The world now 
comes to us via our computer and television screens, and is therefore sensed and 
shaped in everyday spaces and in the midst of our own locality and particular 
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experiences. Indeed, as Morley (2000) argues, for the majority of people, their lives 
continue to be shaped by their experiences in a particular locality, meaning 
geographical place,  whether manifested in domestic space, neighbourhood or nation, 
remains central as a sense of 'home' in an increasingly globalised world. In this 
context, I subscribe to Appiah's (1997:618) 'rooted cosmopolitanism' where one can 
entertain patriotic sentiments, be attached to a home and nation with its own cultural 
particularities, but also take pleasure 'from the presence of other, different places that 
are home to other, different people'.  Indeed, according to the most recent World 
Values Survey (UNDP, 2010), 85% of young Egyptians asked, expressed national 
belonging and a readiness to go to war in defence of their country. These statistics 
reflect findings from my own research where a cosmopolitan openness to the world, 
articulated predominantly through television, does not transcend the nation or 
challenge local forms of belonging, but often provides new resources for thinking 
about and re-imagining the local.   
 
Following on from the above, while the media may expand our cultural horizons and 
experiences beyond the immediate and the familiar, they do not erase the everyday 
significance and importance of place and localized forms of belonging. Using the 
term 'empty space', Giddens (1990) argues that locales are now being shaped in terms 
of social influences that may occur many miles away, uninhibited by space and time. 
Such an approach suggests that place and locality have not disappeared, but remain 
central nodes of experience, although their 'natural substance and boundedness are 
increasingly challenged as permanent characteristics' (Georgiou, 2006: 5). Hence, as 
they are increasingly shaped through disembedded cultural exchanges and mediated 
influences, places become spatial contexts that carry social meanings, thus 'drawing 
geographical and symbolic boundaries of we-ness and other-ness, for experiencing, 
remembering, imagining' (ibid.). In this context, Couldry and McCarthy propose the 
need for 'geographically informed' and 'spatially sensitive' (2004: 4) analyses of 
media influence. Such analyses must recognize that the construction of social space 
through the media takes place in relation to the grounded specificities of cultural 
setting and geographical infrastructure. 
 
Within debates on the changing form and intensity of cultural exchange, particularly 
in the developing south, the 'west' has often been positioned as the instigator of all 
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forms of cultural influence, modernity and progress. Morley argues that within the 
conventional narrative of development, 'all the key events which are taken to 
symbolize modernity are then ascribed to an imagined cartographic area called 'the 
West' ' (2007:157). Nevertheless, according to Janet Abu-Lughod, although in 
contemporary times the west may indeed be the seat of progress and development, 
we must realize that this is a contingent phenomenon arising at a specific point in 
history, as a result of particular economic and geo-political circumstances. Thus, the 
prominent position of the west today is not an 'inherent historical necessity' (J. Abu-
Lughod, 1989:12 emphasis in original).  Abu-Lughod's (1989) own historical 
mapping of the 13
th
 and 14
th
 centuries reveals that in fact, it was the 'Old World', 
consisting of China, Persia, India and Egypt, that maintained hegemony throughout 
this period through its 'increased economic integration and cultural efflorescence' 
(1989:4). Contrary to popular narratives of development, Abu-Lughod contends, 
Europe seriously lagged behind the 'east', entering the fray only much later on. 
Importantly, however, Morley argues that even if we dispel or refute the notion that 
there has always been a single imperial centre and point of power, 'the position of the 
West- and that of other imperial centres- within that system remains a critical 
question' (2007:165). Indeed, patterns of global media production and distribution, 
the universal spread of a hegemonic consumerist culture and relations of global 
politics and influence, point to the overwhelming power that countries of the western 
liberal hemisphere maintain over global relations in the context of contemporary 
globalization.  
 
My research reveals that even on a micro level analysis of everyday life, the west, or 
a mediated representation of the west, continues to be a cultural reference of great 
importance in the daily experiences of young Egyptians. Nevertheless, my long-term 
ethnographic engagement with participants has also revealed the everyday 
significance of religion that filters and negotiates their relationship to western 
culture. Indeed, for the lower middle class, their exposure to, and admiration of some 
of the ideological values they associate with western culture, has become a way of 
negotiating for themselves an identity as cosmopolitan, yet pious Muslims in touch 
with modern cultural developments as well as Islamic practice. Thus, following 
Morley's (2007) thesis, I move away from research designs that attempt to formulate 
linear understandings of audiences outside the west, homogenizing their diverse 
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experiences through singular or restricted categories of analysis. As Saldanha argues, 
the only way we can understand how young people are constructing their sense of 
place is by interpreting their images of the west, and not by reducing it to how we 
have been 'naming and experiencing modernity as a purely Western condition' 
(2002:346). In this context, I explore how it is that young Egyptians themselves are 
producing their own complex cartographies of the world, and their own unique 
cosmopolitan imagination where local, religious and global realities intersect.  
 
1.2 A Third-Order Framework for Cosmopolitanism in Cairo 
 
This project proposes that a very particular type of cosmopolitanism takes place in 
Cairo specifically, although it is of relevance to other urban contexts outside the 
west. What this study shows is that a third-order cosmopolitanism operates in 
between two established structures of power, which highly regulate the everyday 
experiences and life chances of young Egyptians. The first structure of power 
operates from within the nation-state and centres around i) debilitating class divides 
that place firm limits on young Egyptians' access to systems of power, education, 
cultural capital and urban space, ii) unequal gender relations that particularly 
disadvantage women, highly regulating their urban physical mobilities, public dress 
choice and even marital opportunities, and iii) a repressive government that quashes 
civil liberties and provides no opportunities for political participation or avenues for 
social dissent. The second structure of power operates from outside the nation-state, 
and involves the way unequal relations of global financial power and political 
influence have accorded Egypt a particular place within a highly polarized world 
order. This is particularly related to i) the global spread of a western capitalist order 
and a hegemonic culture, manifested most evidently in the universal and unmatched 
spread of western media products (Schiller, 1991; Boyd-Barrett, 1977); ii) colonial 
relations of western dominance that continue to shape the consciousness of young 
Arabs and Egyptians (Sabry, 2005, 2007; Abaza, 2006); iii) lastly the support of 
western superpowers for Egypt's corrupt regime headed by Mubarak, contributing to 
a political stasis and the unchallenged continuation of everyday government 
repression (Abaza, 2003).   
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Such a framework for cosmopolitanism allows my analysis to be sensitive to the 
unequal relations of power that shape, regulate and constrain the daily lives of young 
Egyptians, thus avoiding any romanticized or 'easy celebration of hybridity' (Morley, 
2000:232) in my analysis. As Hall (2008) argues, we are never faced with a benign 
cosmopolitanism, but cosmopolitanism is deeply conditioned by transnational 
inequalities, conflicts and contradictory processes associated with globalisation's 
uneven development. Although cosmopolitanism in Cairo does not transcend the two 
rigid divides I have documented above, it becomes a third space of imagination that, 
drawing heavily on the media, provides opportunities for resistance, allowing 
structured limits imposed upon the self to be negotiated in relation to what is 
observed in distant ways of life. Indeed, whilst the daily urban lives of young 
Cairenes are located within embedded structures that place firm limits on their social 
and physical mobilities, these young men and women shift imaginatively between 
the alternative systems of representation available to them in the mediascapes they 
have access to. This allows their sense of identity to be challenged, re-imagined and 
negotiated in new ways. 
 
1.2.1 Cosmopolitanism in Cairo as a Complex Apparatus 
 
As young cosmopolitans, the participants in my study operate in a highly restrictive 
milieu, characterized by severe socio-cultural and economic limitations as I have 
documented above. Thus, articulated predominantly through an everyday mediated 
engagement with the world, cosmopolitanism in Cairo cannot be approached through 
categories of analysis often used in western liberal contexts. In a situation where 
their own realities are so dismal, characterized by poverty and state repression, 
young Egyptians' cosmopolitanism is not about an ethical concern for a distant other 
(Silverstone, 2007; Chouliaraki, 2008). In a context where the majority of 
participants I worked with did not have passports and have never travelled outside of 
Egypt, cosmopolitanism is not about physical mobility, patterns of global travel and 
first hand experience of the world (Hannerz, 1996). Furthermore, the centrality of the 
nation to their daily experiences means cosmopolitanism in Cairo is not about a 
rootless form of identification with a 'universal' common humanity, attributed mainly 
to Kant and his Enlightenment ideologies (Kant, 2010; Nussbaum, 1994). I subscribe 
to Beck's notion that cosmopolitanism cannot be approached through any singular 
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category, but must be recognized as a complex and multifarious 'multidimensional 
process' (2004:136), manifested in numerous modes and involving multiple loyalties.   
 
Cosmopolitanism as an everyday lived reality for young Egyptians involves various 
forms and multiple modes of cosmopolitan expression. It involves a comprehensive 
cultural, moral and economic apparatus; a multi-pronged process compromising both 
a subjective as well as physical and embodied dimension. Young Egyptians' unique 
articulations of cosmopolitanism involve an aspiration towards a more privileged life 
as they see represented on television; a desire for egalitarian values and political 
ideologies they associate with the west; a desire for novel forms of cultural 
expression embodied within consumer practices; and the forging of transnational 
urban networks – both global and Islamic – that surpass the boundaries of national 
space. Thus, at the heart of a cosmopolitan imagination in Cairo is a sense of global 
interdependence (Hall, 2008). In particular, this means the reality of a world where 
social actors have become increasingly interconnected and aware of the presence of 
the other, especially within media space, allowing even those with the least means to 
be included within this reality of (virtual) interconnection. As Beck (2004:153) 
observes, cosmopolitanism involves the imaginative crossing of boundaries; 
including both the 'location of one's own lifestyle within the horizon of other 
possibilities, and the ability to see oneself from the viewpoint of those who are 
culturally other'.  
 
Although the word ‘cosmopolitanism’ (or its Arabic equivalent kosmopolitaneya) 
was never directly used by my participants, other terms and expressions within their 
narratives strongly indicated a desire to feel part of a transcending social, cultural 
and political context that surpasses the limits of direct experience. Indeed, discussing 
their city, nation or own subjective identities, comparisons with and references to 
donia (world), el ‘alam (universe), barra (outside/foreign) or aganeb (foreigners) 
were used confidently and in abundance. Furthermore, a reflexive awareness by 
young Egyptians of the inequalities of global hierarchical divides, and their location 
in the underdeveloped global south, meant a cosmopolitan desire to be part of the 
world was as much a desire to ‘be modern’ and to reap the benefits of being affiliated 
with global cultural circuits of modernity. They may not be able to control that they 
live in the ‘third-world,’ but as active and media-savvy men and women, they are at 
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least able to ensure that they are not excluded from processes of modernness, 
manifested particularly in the dynamic cultural practices of modern youth cultures.     
Thus, by placing the self at the centre of a broader interconnected world, 
cosmopolitanism in Cairo has become a complex system by which young Egyptians 
organize and understand their position in their immediate locality, but also a less 
immediate world beyond their reach.   
 
 
1.2.2 Cosmopolitanism as Imagination: A Breathing Space in a Repressive 
Reality 
 
In the context of a world that has become increasingly characterized by 
interdependent cultural relations, particularly through the global circulation of 
popular media products, Hall argues that the question of identity has become a 
central one. As he ponders, 'how do you make sense of your self, and your life, if this 
movement between places, cultures, religions, languages, civilizations, histories, 
times, becomes your lived reality'? (2008:347) Hall has argued elsewhere how 
identities are socially constructed in nature. According to Hall, although identities 
may have origins in a historical past, they mainly involve the dynamic ways in which 
the resources of history, language and culture are dialectically involved in a process 
of 'becoming rather than being' (1996:4). In this context, identities are never eternally 
fixed, but are more adequately regarded by Hall as being in a constant state of 
development and flux. Tomlinson (2000:269) also argues that in the era of 
globalization and mediated communications, identities have become fluid entities in 
accordance with rapid-scale changes to our experiences of time, distance and 
geography. The impact of the changing nature of relations of distance and proximity 
on the construction of identities is captured in Bauman's theorisation of the fluid era 
of liquid modernity he proposes we now inhabit. Characterised by an overturning of 
tradition, fluid modernity involves rapid change and disposability where stability 
ceases to exist, and where familiar borders are becoming increasingly porous and 
fluid. In this context, Bauman argues, people are choosing to engage in ‘networks of 
identity’ over hard and fast bonds, as they make connecting and disconnecting easier 
(Bauman, 2004:69). Nevertheless, as incorporated within my framework for third-
order cosmopolitanism, identities are not solely about free choices, and an 
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association with a modern world of unregulated cultural flexibility and mobility, but 
remain constrained within dominant relations of power in society (Du Gay, Evans 
and Redman, 2000; Butler, 1990).  
 
In my ethnographic investigation of the construction of cosmopolitan identities in 
Cairo, the concept of imagination is particularly central. The use of imagination 
within my analysis must not be mistaken for the celebration of the end of identity, or 
a subscription to the post-modern assertion that individuals are free to reflexively 
imagine and construct their lives as they wish, unrestricted by the confines of 
traditional collectivities (Giddens, 1998; Beck, 1994). My research documents the 
continuing importance of class, gender and the nation as bounded identity positions 
informing the everyday lives of young Egyptians. Despite this, my ethnographic 
analysis also illustrates how mediated communications means the process of identity 
formation often surpasses the limits of bounded forms of belonging conditioned by 
an 'immediate physical presence established by the body' (Gilroy, 1997: 314). Thus, 
as the cultural repertoires informing the construction of modern identities have 
become increasingly mediated, imagination provides a lens for examining how the 
self is not only defined by the immediacy of first hand experience, but very often is 
understood in relation to the distant and the unfamiliar. In this context, as the media 
become important cultural resources allowing those embedded in specific restrictive 
localities to negotiate and often challenge imposed social structures, I argue that a 
cosmopolitan imagination and a sense of being connected to a broader world are 
particularly significant in less privileged locations outside the west.   
 
Hall (2008) observes that cosmopolitanism is not always about the promise of a 
luxurious global life as a reward for status, privilege or wealth. Focusing specifically 
on the forced uprooting of diasporic locations with no choice but to become mobile 
cosmopolitans, Hall (2008) argues that cosmopolitanism for these groups is a 
mandatory condition of survival. Furthermore, I argue that even for those rooted in 
geographical place with no opportunities for travel, cosmopolitan aspirations that 
recognize and make a distant other part of one's everyday experiences, is also a form 
of survival. For young Egyptians in my study, cosmopolitanism allows them to 
negotiate and re-imagine their own disadvantaged and highly embedded realities in 
relation to what takes place elsewhere in the world. Findings from the World Values 
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Survey (UNDP, 2010) conducted amongst 3050 young Egyptians reveal that 
although national allegiance was strongest amongst the young Egyptian respondents, 
in terms of identification with a world culture, Egypt ranked seventh out of 19 
countries, overtaking developed nations such as Sweden and the USA. Thus, in 
contexts such as Egypt, the imaginative capabilities and opportunities for (subjective) 
mobility enabled by the media have become important 'spaces of hope' (Harvey, 
2000b) against a repressive reality confined within the immediacy of everyday life. 
For the privileged westerner the sense of a cosmopolitan connection to distant life-
worlds may be taken for granted as just 'another' option or lifestyle choice provided 
by contemporary globalization. For those with limited opportunities for social and 
often physical mobility, however, embedded within constraining geographical 
locations from which they cannot escape, a cosmopolitan imagination enabled by the 
media takes on a renewed importance.  
 
1.3 The Contradictory Experiences of Being Young in Africa's Biggest City 
 
Although my research is based on young Egyptian men and women between the ages 
of 18 to 25, my understanding of, and approach to ‘youth’, is not as a biologically 
determined or fixed category. As previous research has shown, members of this age-
cohort tend to share specific cultural and social attributes that although vary across 
space and time, distinguish youth from other generations and age-groups. According 
to Georgiou (2006), for instance, modern technology-literate generations enjoy a 
social and cultural flexibility, which allows them to shift easily between different 
cultural repertoires and influences. Whereas older people may be more attached to 
tradition and prone to that which is more 'familiar,' research on young people appears 
to indicate that, particularly through their frequent use of different types of media, 
they eagerly seek to transport themselves between a diversity of social and cultural 
contexts. Georgiou confirms this point suggesting:  
younger generations enjoy most of the spatial, communicational 
and cultural mobility and flexibility. For the young technology-
literate generations a playful mobility in and out of their 
ethnicity and between diasporic and non-diasporic mediascapes 
and virtual scapes is a daily experience (2006: 77).    
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McRobbie’s (1996) examination of the culture of ragga girls in 1990s Britain is an 
important demonstration of the way in which these young black girls use music to 
negotiate their multi-racial identities. McRobbie analyses how ragga music imported 
from Jamaica consists in its original form of sexist lyrics and overt homophobia. This 
is challenged, however, by these young black girls 'in their highly enthusiastic 
embracing of ragga as well as their distinctive “calls and responses” to it through 
dance' (McRobbie, 1996: 35). Importantly, this embracing of ragga has taken place 
against a wider British culture of racial tension, and a media constructed moral panic 
regarding the perceived obscene and sexually explicit nature of black youth culture. 
Against this backdrop, McRobbie believes that by combining transnationally 
imported ragga music with their own forms of dancing, and by changing the lyrics, 
black teenage girls add their own unique dimension of meaning not visible in the 
music and the lyrics alone. This analysis of ragga girls demonstrates the complex 
cultural dynamism of youth cultures, where transnational musical forms have been 
imported, redefined and embedded within local ideological structures resulting in the 
creation of dynamic spaces of self-understanding.  Such findings, according to Wulff 
(1995), illustrate that when exploring the formation of transnational connections or 
as everyday consequences of cultural globalization, youth cultures should be at the 
forefront of theoretical interest. In particular, 'youth, their ideas and commodities 
move easily across national borders, shaping and being shaped by all kinds of 
structures and meanings' (Wulff, 1995: 10). Nilan and Feixa make a similar point 
when they contend that in the wake of globalization and spread of information 
technologies which have brought previously distinct cultures closer together, there is 
a renewed interest and indeed, importance, in analysing youth activities. As they 
note, ‘we do assume that as a generation, all youth are caught up to some extent in 
the ‘network society’ (Castells 1996, 1997). The young people studied here obtain 
their information, often their inspiration, from global sources’ (Nilan and Feixa, 
2006: 6).  
 
In particular, the economic impact of globalization and the widespread 
implementation of neo-liberal policies in different national contexts have had a major 
impact on the lifestyle choices and opportunities of global youth. They have become 
dedicated consumers of global cultural industry products and services. Miles (2000) 
notes how global changes in economy and culture greatly impact upon the 
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construction of young people’s identities, and particularly important is their 
relationship to consumerism. As Miles argues, ‘in effect then, consumerism provides 
a flexible enough arena for the construction of what are inevitably flexible post-
modern identities….Young people’s lifestyles provide the arena within which 
consumer identities are apparently forged’ (2000: 52). Nilan demonstrates the 
importance of consumer activities with her in-depth research on Indonesian youth, 
whose culture involves an intimate negotiation between both religious law and global 
popular consumer trends. Young Indonesians in the study are able to religiously 
tailor their consumer activities, and select products to consume that conform to, and 
respect the most important aspects of their Islamic faith. For instance, they purchase 
halal cosmetic products, Islamic clothing that conforms to the latest western fashion 
trends, and mobile phones and iPods containing Islamic iconography and Koranic 
verses. In this context, Islamic youth culture in Indonesia constitutes a distinct ‘third 
space’ not shared by other groups such as non-Muslim Indonesian youth, westerners 
or adults.  As Nilan notes:  
they establish themselves as a morally superior category of modern 
young Indonesians, in solidarity with the globally-distributed 
discourse of progressive Islam. This hybridity challenges the 
assumption that cultural meeting points must always signify relations 
of domination (2006, 94).  
In light of the above, Nayak (2003) argues that new spaces have emerged within the 
local-global nexus, allowing young people to take up different subject positions in 
response to global change. Thus, young people, according to Nayak (2003:167), are 
not ‘passive recipients of social transformations’ but are responding to global 
change in a multitude of ways that ‘draw upon the signs, symbols and motifs made 
available at local, national and international scales’.  Nayak (ibid.:19) uses the term 
‘youthscapes’, therefore, to indicate the diversity and dynamism of youth cultures 
that ‘orbit around a moving constellation of signs, symbols, practices and motifs.’  
Furthermore, an important point Nilan and Feixa (2006) make is that whereas from 
an outsider perspective it may appear that youth are caught between two or more 
contradicting cultural repertoires, the youth concerned do not necessarily regard it 
as such. They see themselves as inhabiting only one highly complex world, 
although drawing on a range of diverse sources in their local creative practices. 
Thus, according to Miles (2000), in order to gain a clearer understanding of youth 
cultures, we must examine how young people in different spaces and micro cultures 
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differentially interact with, and negotiate the multiple social worlds in which they 
locate themselves and their everyday lives.  
Following on from the above, Nayak (2003:28) argues how much literature on youth 
cultures has suffered from an aspatial approach that underplays or dismisses the 
significance of ‘place and spatial variation at different scales and in multiple sites’. In 
this context, we should never approach ‘being young’ as a unanimous and 
homogenous experience, as this fails to examine the context-bound and thoroughly 
situated ways that youth in different places inhabit and experience their age-group.  
Thus, despite the young sharing age-specific characteristics centred around cultural 
flexibility and a desire for change and experimentation, McRobbie (1996:31) uses the 
term 'different, youthful, subjectivities' as a reminder that there is no one single or 
unanimous experience of being young. According to McRobbie, there are multiple 
youth encounters that take on varying forms depending upon the specific socio-
economic, cultural and ideological contexts in which different young people are 
embedded. In this sense, we cannot fully comprehend the dynamic impact of global 
changes on youth cultures, without engrossing ourselves in an analysis of local 
micro-cultures and practices.  Another problem with the literature on youth cultures, 
according to Wulff (1995), is that it takes an ethno-centric approach, focusing 
specifically on young, urban, white males. Thus, many of the assumptions made on 
youth cultures, are based on research conducted on the limited experiences of white, 
western youth. As Wulff (1995:15-16) argues:  
‘youth culture does not only consist of resistance and delinquency on 
the part of white teenage boys in Western cities. Youth culture is what 
young people are concerned with…It is time for anthropologists to 
make a more substantial contribution to the study of youth culture, to 
view young people as cultural agents and to illuminate their 
perspectives towards a wide range of general themes in social life: 
gender, class, ethnicity, race, globalization. 
By moving outside the west, it may be possible to uncover the inequalities and 
uneven relations of power that shape the construction of global youth cultures. 
Youth cultures are not only about sustaining  new transnational connections through 
the globally-shared consumption of the same music, food and fashion trends, but 
also about patterns of exclusion and marginalization for those not always able to 
partake in such activities. Focusing on the experiences of Nepali youth, Liechty 
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(1995) recognizes the inequalities of power and control that dominate the landscape 
of global-local youth culture. Liechty focuses particularly on the story of the young 
Nepali boy Ramesh, and argues that the way he negotiates and subjectively 
perceives his identity is greatly influenced by the American films he regularly 
enjoys consuming. The mediated images of success, freedom and liberty imbued in 
the movie narratives he engages with on a daily basis, are constant reminders of a 
world he so desperately wishes to inhabit; yet an even greater reminder of a world 
faraway he will probably never experience. These lost, unattainable dreams, 
translated into feelings of bitterness, mean that Ramesh denotes his immediate 
locale in very distancing terms; Nepal is constantly referred to as ‘out here.’ This 
‘self-peripheralizing’ mentality, characteristic of youth growing up in developing 
nations, according to Liechty (1995:186), is in large part due to the mass media 
which 'are like windows on to modern places that are distant in both time and space. 
But if the video screen is like a window, it is one with bars that keep viewers like 
Ramesh outside, ‘out here’ looking in’. Hence, young people in Ramesh's situation 
often consider themselves to be no more than 'distant voyeurs' on an exciting youth 
scene happening elsewhere in the world, yet excluding them (Osgerby, 2004: 162). 
Following on from the above, and as Massey reminds us, youth culture is not a 
closed system of social relations, but a 'particular articulation of contacts and 
influences drawn from a variety of places scattered according to power relations, 
fashion and habit, across many different parts of the globe' (Massey; 1998, 124). 
Thus, these youthful cultural formations are not neutral connections, but are highly 
charged entities, which, structured along class, gender and ethnic lines, result in 
multiple narratives of inclusion and exclusion. What is needed are spatially sensitive 
analyses that take into consideration the economic, social and political specificities 
which shape youth cultures in different places. 
The latest Egypt Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010) indicates that Egypt's 
demography is now shaped by a massive bulge in its youth population, who comprise 
a quarter of the total national population. As Abaza (2006) observes, the public 
visibility of youth and youth cultures in Egypt has become an increasingly evident 
phenomenon which is in need of in-depth research. Karam captures the paradoxes 
and inequalities associated with being young in the Arab world when he argues that 
although demographically they represent the largest and most important cohort, the 
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experiences of the young are at the forefront of a disadvantaged social reality 
'because of their position in a strongly traditional and patriarchal system' (2010:302). 
According to the Egypt Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010), the life-chances 
of young Egyptians are severely constricted through a lack of democracy and respect 
for human rights, political corruption, lack of civic engagement, decreasing income 
levels, unequal job opportunities and poor educational standards. Nevertheless, 
despite the weak social status of young people in the Arab world as a result of the 
social, political and economic challenges they face (Karam, 2010), findings from my 
research confirm that in occupying a lively media world, young Egyptians are 
exposed to new potentials for expanding the limits of their imagination and hybridity 
associated with global youth cultures. 
 
In an interesting study, Al-Tawila, Ibrahim and Wassef (2003) document how both 
advances in education and an increased exposure to the media by young people in 
Egypt have encouraged them to develop aspirations and desires that starkly 
distinguish them from their parents’ generation. The authors begin by confirming 
that the family is a central unit of society in Egypt and across the Arab world. 
Within the family setting,  young people are required to balance and conform to two 
roles simultaneously, ‘that of conveying valued societal norms into the future, but 
also of opening the family to social change and new ideas from the outside’ (Al-
Tawila, Ibrahim and Wassef, 2003: 215). In this context, young people in Egypt are 
rarely able to function independently of their parents: they depend on them for 
social, economic and emotional support. Nevertheless, with access to higher levels 
of education becoming common place and more widespread, and with a variety of 
media outlets functioning as important cultural platforms in the daily lives of these 
young men and women, they have come to formulate their own unique dreams and 
imaginations and thus occupy and experience a youth that is quite different from 
that of their parents. Although it ran across the whole sample, women, in particular, 
within Al-Tawila, Ibrahim and Wassef’s study, held attitudes that showed a 
significant level of divergence from their parents’ generation. These young women 
particularly aspired to:  
marriage arrangements not typically present in their parents’ 
generation…emphasize equal education attainment among spouses, 
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undermine female circumcision and consanguineous marriages, stress 
sharing, and express a higher degree of rejection of violence towards 
wives (2003: 232). 
Importantly, the above study paves the way for understanding how the media 
function as significant platforms through which young Egyptians dynamically 
negotiate their subjectivities. Nevertheless, the multifarious ways in which young 
people interact with, and negotiate the highly complex social and cultural worlds 
they appropriate through the media, remains to be significantly documented within 
Arab cultural studies. According to Sabry (2007), there is a poverty of research 
documenting, through empirical methods, the ways in which Arab audiences interact 
with the media and incorporate them into their everyday experiences. Dismissed by 
many Arab intellectuals as being 'profane, unconscious, irrelevant and consequently 
unworthy of study,' (Sabry, 2007: 159) the everyday relevance of Arabic popular 
culture, particularly the media, remains underdeveloped. The notable studies that 
have been conducted on Arab youths' appropriations of the media, which I will refer 
to throughout this thesis (for example: Sabry, 2005, 2010; Kraidy, 1999, 2007, 
2009), demonstrate that although the daily lives of young Arabs are captured within 
contexts replete with government repression and severe social and economic 
inequalities, they are not excluded from the dynamic hybrid cultural exchanges 
associated with global youth cultures. Using ethnographic methods that have allowed 
me to engage with young Egyptians in the urban spaces of their everyday life, I 
believe my research provides an important and timely contribution to the gap within 
Arab cultural studies, which have done little to address the everyday relevance of 
media practice within Arab societies (Sabry, 2007).  
Recently, media studies research has become orientated towards the increased use 
and popularity of new media, particularly the Internet. According to Livingstone 
(2008), the online realm is adopted enthusiastically by teenagers as it represents 
‘their’ own private space, ‘visible to the peer group more than to adult surveillance, 
an exciting yet relatively safe opportunity to conduct the social psychological task of 
adolescence’ (Livingstone, 2008: 396). Thus, by forging out exclusive online spaces 
not accessed by their parents, these young people are able to connect with their 
friends, maintain social relations, share their private experiences, ‘to create spaces of 
intimacy, to be themselves in and through their connection with their friends’ 
(Livingstone, 2008: 406). Although much of this recent research has focused 
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particularly on western youths’ experiences of the Internet, the 2011 Arab Spring has 
significantly reawakened interest in how the online world, and particularly social 
media websites, have allowed revolutionaries in non-western dictatorships to gather 
support in order to challenge and overthrow their repressive regimes. In an 
interesting personal editorial, Shahine (2011) compares his own generation brought 
up in 1980s Egypt, with today’s generation of engaged ‘Internet youth’ who were at 
the forefront of the recent revolution. According to Shahine, when he was in his 20s 
in the 1980s, Egypt was going through a period of relative stability, and the 
opportunities facing the young (middle class) seemed abundant and limitless: they 
were guaranteed a decent education and a job in one of the many multinational 
corporations that were springing up across Egypt. For today’s youth, however, high 
rates of unemployment, growing religious fundamentalism, state brutality and 
debilitating social class divides mean they have no real prospects for a dignified 
future. These socio-economic and political constraints placed upon young Egyptians, 
coupled with their technological skills and knowledge, eventually erupted in an 
angry revolution that managed to bring down the government; an achievement that 
previous generations could only dream of. As Shahine (2011:2) notes, ‘online they 
took part in a world that was very different from the one they (previous generation) 
were living in’ and thus by connecting with other global activists through Facebook 
and Twitter, ‘Egyptian youth came to understand what it might mean to be a citizen 
in a proper sense’.         
 In light of the above arguments, the recent uprising across the Middle East and the 
well documented role that the Internet and social media websites played (Khamis and 
Vaughn: 2011; Karolak, 2011), may lead some to question why a study on television 
should be of interest at present. Is television not outdated in the face of new media 
technologies that provide more decentred, less government controlled means of 
communication? Statistics continue to show the overwhelming penetration and 
popularity of television in Egypt. According to The Egypt Report (Oxford Business 
Group, 2010) television is by far the most popular medium for news and 
entertainment in the country. The report illustrates that with 200 sets for every 1000 
people, Egypt boasts one of the highest numbers of television per capita in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Furthermore, the latest Egypt Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 2010) confirms this point, indicating that there is a 
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94.7% penetration rate of television in Cairo. Karam's (2010) recent comparative 
research between four Arab countries including Egypt, records how television is not 
only a source of entertainment, but a significant and comprehensive tool for 
education and personal development. In this context, television goes beyond mere 
pleasure and forms of escapism 'and into the realm of self-learning and the 
acquisition of values, behaviour and lifestyles' (Karam, 2010: 313).  
 
Statistics on Internet usage demonstrate that although there is a considerable annual 
growth rate in Internet penetration, it still continues to be far lower in comparison to 
television. When I began my fieldwork in 2008, there was only a 12.9% penetration 
rate of the Internet in Egypt (Internet World Stats, 2010). Nevertheless, ICT 
indicators published recently by the Egyptian government (Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology, 2011), indicate there is a penetration 
rate of 30.05%, with an annual growth rate of 8.14%. Although this points to more 
than a two-fold increase in Internet usage in Egypt over the past three years, statistics 
on television penetration continue to illustrate that this in no way challenges nor 
parallels the universal spread, popularity or relevance of television to Egyptians. 
Indeed, as it requires financial capital in order to afford the technological 
infrastructure needed for an Internet connection, and the cultural capital to use a 
computer, the Internet is not a viable option readily available to all Egyptians. The 
Egypt Report (Oxford Business Group, 2010: 184) confirms that Internet use in 
Egypt continues to be associated with the 'upper and upper middle class, which is 
young, educated and well traveled'. In this context, as my study involves an 
exploration of three different classes with a variation in access to systems of cultural, 
educational and financial capital, it was necessary to base my analysis on a medium 
readily available across class.              
     
1.4 The City: Cultural Fluidity and Class Polarization   
 
In order to understand and examine cosmopolitanism as a daily pervasive reality, it is 
important to approach it in the actual spaces it is articulated and expressed, namely 
the city (Latham, 2006; Beck, 2002; Stevenson, 2003). Ghannam (2002:17) argues 
that an examination of everyday life in Cairo reveals how its inhabitants articulate 
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'local values, national policies, and global forces in their daily struggles'. This 
cultural fluidity and plurality associated with modern cities is captured in Sassen's 
(2000) conceptualization of urban place, which she considers to be one of the most 
strategic spaces for the formation of transnational identities and communities. 
According to Sassen (2000), the city is localised, embedded in particular and 
strategic sites, yet is also transterritorial, connecting other sites which are not 
geographically proximate, yet intensely connected to each other. Importantly, 
although my research highlights the primacy of television as a daily cultural 
framework through which cosmopolitan imagination is predominantly articulated, an 
analysis of everyday life through the city allows me to locate my work against any 
form of media-determinism. I subscribe to Georgiou's (2006:22) thesis that media 
users are shaped by complex forms of 'multilayered belonging' where the relevance 
of the media only makes sense as they are juxtaposed alongside the immediate and 
non-mediated discourses. The importance of ethnography as my chosen 
methodological framework in this context is indisputable, as by positioning my 
analysis in the everyday spaces of the city, I have been able to situate my 
understanding of young Egyptians within a broader socio-cultural and economic 
context that transcends the immediate moment of media consumption alone. I have 
been able to approach young Egyptians in all their social complexity, and as their 
daily urban lives are shaped through media practice, class inequalities, state 
repression, family relations and religion. 
 
As well as being a space that has provided young Egyptians with opportunities for 
new cultural possibilities, I also approach Cairo as a highly unequal terrain that 
starkly brings to the fore the inequalities and paradoxes associated with globalization 
in developing-world contexts. Indeed, almost 94% of Cairo's land is uninhabitable, 
meaning that an urban population of approximately 17 million (Demographia, 2011) 
is forced to live on 6.2% of the capital's available land (IDSC, 2009). Thus, in a 
situation where there is an over concentration of bodies in a limited geographical 
space, forced proximity requires Egyptians to negotiate the intense juxtapositions of 
difference as part of their everyday urban experiences. In particular, I focus on the 
ways social class disparity, which results in highly visible contradictions in lifestyle, 
has become central to everyday experiences of the city. Thus, the intense coming 
together of class difference leads to a performance of 'boundary maintenance' 
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(Morley, 2000: 214) where young Egyptians, particularly from the upper middle 
class, close themselves off in homogenous urban enclaves that exclude the lower 
classes who display alternative levels of cultural and financial capital (Kuppinger, 
2004; Denis, 2006; De Koning, 2009).  
 
An analysis of everyday life in Cairo confirms the continuing importance of class, 
which profoundly shapes Egyptian citizens' access to power, cultural practices, 
lifestyles, and even relations of reproduction (Moghadam cf. Inhorn, 1996: 34). 
Nevertheless, according to Inhorn (1996), despite the recent profusion of studies in 
the Middle East and Egypt, clear, representative, class-based analyses are yet to be 
achieved, as certain segments of the population – namely the upper-classes – are 
usually over-represented in research. By focusing on three different classes that 
display varying degrees of access to cultural and financial capital, my research 
records and documents the multiple different experiences and life stories of young 
Egyptians. Giddens (1998) and Beck (1994) argue that we inhabit an age of reflexive 
modernity where the individual emerges as the most important social unit of 
everyday life. Through this 'individualization' thesis, the authors propose that, freed 
from the confines of traditional collectivities and social structures such as class and 
religion, the individual becomes a reflexive and consciously alert being, able to think 
and make their own decisions. Nevertheless, according to Skeggs, Thumim and 
Wood (2008), Beck and Giddens' claims are backed up by little empirical research to 
illustrate how processes of individualization actually take shape in the real world, 
and thus, how they may negate the importance of class. In fact, recent research 
documents the continuing importance of class in shaping identities. Studies have 
revealed that although individuals may not explicitly recognize, or verbally 
acknowledge themselves as belonging to traditional class collectivities, class remains 
a major feature of their subjectivities, shaping and informing daily struggles over 
resources and ways of being (Skeggs, 1997; Savage, 2000b). With these concepts in 
mind, my research is sensitive to the ways in which class disparities in Egypt 
regulate everyday lives in Cairo, leading to vast inequalities in accesses to resources 
and systems of power.  
 
Sreberny argues how 'inequality of resources and access, especially in the digital 
arena, do remain vitally important issues, but more is happening that is creative and 
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empowering and worthy of attention' (2005:14). Indeed, my research findings reveal 
how universal access to cultural representations on television, represents a common 
space of enjoyment through which the everyday classed and disconnected 
experiences of young Egyptians often come together. This indicates that the 
experiences of disadvantaged groups do not always proceed according to predictable 
narratives of exclusion or marginalization, as the media can often bridge class gaps, 
functioning as a common association to entertainment and culture more broadly. 
Nevertheless, my ethnographic findings also reveal that although the widespread 
availability of translated media products has contributed to a democratization of 
access across different classed groups, the constraints of socio-economic status are 
never completely overcome. As Martin-Barbero (1993b) importantly reminds us, 
cultural competencies shaping different classes impact upon television use, 
informing the different understandings groups make of the media. For instance, in his 
cross-national comparative analysis, Harindranath (2009) explores the importance of 
higher education in influencing how audiences in the UK and India interpret 
documentaries. The author discovers that Indian audiences with a background of 
higher education use the same interpretive frames as British audiences with similar 
educational credentials, than other audiences in the same Indian national context 
without a higher education. My research, however, is not preoccupied with the 
question of how young Egyptians decode or interpret specific media texts in relation 
to their class or gender identities. In contrast to this 'cognitive' and 'rational' (Morley, 
2006: 109) approach to audience-text relations usually associated with reception 
theories, my ethnographic study explores how the media have become important 
cultural resources, used within the broader context of everyday life, allowing young 
Egyptians to construct and negotiate these very identities. Thus, although television 
provides young Egyptians with spaces to come together in their access of the same 
media, and thus enjoyment of the same culture, an ethnographic examination of these 
young men and women in all their classed, gendered and urban nuances, unearths the 
diverging ways the media are used and made sense of by different audiences as 
resources for everyday living.   
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1.5 Thesis Outline 
 
Before I proceed to the next chapter, I would now like to briefly describe the shape 
that this thesis will take through mapping the chapter outlines. Chapter Two performs 
a contextualizing function by introducing some of the most prominent social, cultural 
and political factors that have moulded Egypt's contemporary history. I discuss how 
a specific discourse of 'modernity' heavily drawing on a European model has taken 
shape in Egypt, linked particularly to a long colonial history. I also chart the 
development of electronic media in Egypt, examining how mediated platforms have 
become catalysts used both by the government and citizens to negotiate different 
understandings and interpretations of a 'modern' national identity. In Chapters Three 
and Four I outline my theoretical discussion. Chapter Three develops my specific 
conceptual framework for understanding cosmopolitanism in Egypt, which I propose 
can only be approached through concepts other than the ones used by research 
focusing on western liberal democracies. I discuss my rationale for using the term 
imagination as a lens for understanding the construction of identities in the 
contemporary mediated world. Although I approach imagination as being articulated 
through relations of distance and proximity as negotiated by the media, I also argue 
in this chapter that imagination is not an ahistorical product of the moment, but is 
partly formulated through a changing historical and political context, particularly 
colonialism.  
 
In Chapter Four I focus more specifically on the city whose urban terrain has become 
an important space for observing and examining cosmopolitanism as an everyday 
lived reality. I argue how cities outside the west cannot be approached through an 
analysis of economic and financial industries alone, as the polarized city 
underwritten by severe class divides has become a factor of central importance in the 
study of urban contexts in the developing south. Nevertheless, I argue that the city is 
not only a static backdrop for the articulation of cosmopolitan identities, but using 
Lefebvre's (1991) theory of the Production of Space, I propose that the city is a 
creative urban terrain, itself being negotiated, constructed and imagined by citizens 
through everyday media practice. In the methodology discussion in Chapter Five, I 
outline my choice for using ethnography as a main methodological framework, 
where triangulation was employed and data was collected through the combined use 
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of a television consumption survey, participant/non-participant observation and focus 
groups. I argue how my long term and intense examination of young Egyptians and 
their everyday media culture gathered through first hand observation of 'natural' 
behaviour, self-reported data and verbal reports has allowed me to develop an in-
depth understanding of my key concepts of analysis.  
 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight present my empirical discussion where I argue that as 
an overarching cosmopolitan imagination in Cairo intersects with the specificities of 
everyday experience, especially in relation to class inequalities and unequal gender 
relations, it takes on three different forms. In this context, I argue how a closed, 
implicit and critical cosmopolitan imagination, articulated predominantly through 
television, is expressed in relation to three factors: attitudes towards the nation, 
consumer practices and urban mobilities. Chapter Nine, the conclusions, will then 
bring the different theoretical, empirical and methodological strands of this thesis 
together, critically assessing what this project has contributed in relation to our 
understandings of cosmopolitanism, media consumption, class and identity 
construction. I will also discuss what I believe to be some of the limitations inherent 
in this study, and give recommendations for future research.    
 
This thesis explores how cosmopolitanism is not an association limited to the west 
and the upper classes only, but a sense of global interdependence and a desire to 
reach out across cultural differences remains a pervasive reality both outside the 
west, and for those with limited economic means. Articulated predominantly through 
the media, cosmopolitanism as I have observed it in Egypt, remains in dialogue with 
local loyalties; it is an overarching system of organizing everyday lives where 
national sentiments, religious identities and global realities intersect.  Nevertheless, 
an ethnographic examination of cosmopolitan imagination in all its classed, gendered 
and urban nuances, reveals how cosmopolitanism does not exist in any unitary 
structure, but is an evolving form, highly imbued within unequal relations of power 
and influence both at the national and transnational levels.   
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2 Egypt at a Crossroads: Postcolonial History, Global Modernness and Media 
Development 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
I clearly remember a summer's day in July 2009 when I was sitting with a group of 
lower middle class men and women in Beanos Café as we were drinking our mango 
juices and sipping our mint teas. While talking animatedly amongst ourselves, 
Mariam, a 20-year-old student of Education, suddenly turned with a hushed whisper 
and told us to 'look quickly' as she gestured with her eyes towards a young veiled 
woman who had just entered the café. Our five pairs of eyes keenly followed the 
woman who seemed to be familiar with the waiters and waitresses, greeting them and 
distributing kisses as she proceeded towards the staff changing room. 'Just wait and 
keep looking' Mariam told us with a defiant smirk on her face. Indeed, around six 
minutes later, the woman walked out, although I was certain she had spent the last 
few minutes in some sort of magician's room. The veiled woman in a conservative 
dress who entered the room, exited as a transformed lady: she became a long blond-
haired (obviously dyed: the signature 'western' look in Egypt) waitress clad in a 
knee-length skirt and Beanos' customary orange T-shirt. As I stared at her in disbelief 
while she happily and obliviously went about taking orders from customers, Mariam 
giggled at my reaction. Mariam told me: 'the management here doesn't allow girls to 
work in their veil. The waitress once told me that the veil ruins the "modern" image 
that the café is trying to maintain, so she has been asked to remove it before 
beginning her daily shift.  
 
The above encounter took my memory back to how Egyptian state elites have 
embarked upon massive urban renewal projects, physically demolishing and 
relocating whole communities within Cairo, replacing their humble neighbourhoods 
with 'modern' cosmopolitan living spaces (Ghannam, 2002). The forced removal of 
this 'underclass' and their popular rundown quarters from their location in central 
Cairo, was typical of the state's attempts to impose their own officially conceived 
image of a global capital city and a modern national identity. What these two 
incidents demonstrate is how a 'modern' identity in Egypt has often become a 
contested discourse, both commercialized (in the case of the café incident) and 
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constructed according to state policy (in relation to the example of urban planning) 
imposed upon the nation, rather than being constructed from within it. Thus, official 
discourses of 'being modern' in Egypt position it as a secular project associated with 
the aristocracy of culture and drawing heavily upon western ideals of sophistication 
(Armbrust, 1996). Nevertheless, as I embark upon an ethnographic project exploring 
the lives of young Egyptians, I ask to what extent can there be spaces of dialogue or 
even resistance between the official and the everyday where a bottom up version of 
'being modern' can be envisioned? Cairo's recent revolution provides a timely 
example of how identity is primarily a transitional project; a contingent structure that 
never reaches any final destination, but is a unique product of a particular moment. 
Identities provide an important mediating space that balance imposed discourse 
alongside lived practice. Moments of rupture, as the revolution illustrated, can tilt 
this delicate balance, allowing people to become constructors of their own destiny 
rather than being resigned to a prescribed life. The 25
th
 of January 2011 involved a 
re-writing of what it means to be Egyptian; the nation was no longer subject to a 
prearranged vision of identity as imposed by the state, but the nation found its voice 
and turned against the state (Sreberny, 2011). 
 
This thesis examines how young Egyptians are constructing different classed 
versions of a cosmopolitan imagination at the intersection of a highly fragmented, 
highly mediated everyday urban life. Central to the vision of cosmopolitanism is an 
openness and orientation towards the wider world and a sense of connection to a 
distant 'other' that transcends the specificities of immediate locality and social 
experience. Where inter-cultural dialogue has become a permanent feature of our 
increasingly interconnected world, the question of what it means 'to be modern' has 
taken a central position, specifically in contexts outside of the west (Sabry, 2010; 
Deeb, 2006; Ghannam, 2002). Thus, this chapter addresses how understandings of a 
'modern' Egyptian nation have been shaped, both historically and in contemporary 
times, both by ordinary Egyptians and often through official state discourse. The first 
section of this chapter explores how understandings of 'being modern' in Egypt have 
been strongly linked to the development of the nation-state, specifically in relation to 
its colonial past. I then move onto a discussion of how the desire to be modern is 
essentially a performance and is thus embodied, lived and physically asserted. I look 
specifically at class and gender as two important categories around which 
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contemporary Egyptian culture and performances of modernness are located and 
articulated on a daily basis. The final section examines the dual role the media have 
played in shaping how questions of being modern and being Egyptian have 
developed. They have been used both as official state tools of control disseminating a 
very specific version of modernity and national development, and also from below, 
as tools of everyday resistance in the hands of citizens.  
 
Before proceeding with the first section of this chapter, I would like to briefly outline 
some important demographic characteristics in relation to Egypt's urban-rural 
development and distribution of resources. Egypt is divided into 29 governates, only 
six of which are considered to be totally urban (Zohry, 2009). Five of the 29 
governates comprise the Greater Cairo Region (Cairo, Giza, Qalyoubia, Helwan, 6
th
 
October) (El Kouedi and Madbouly, 2007). According to the latest 2006 census 
(CAPMAS, 2006), the population of the Greater Cairo Region is approximately 18.4 
million, representing approximately 22% of the total population of Egypt (El Kouedi 
and Madbouly, 2007). Nevertheless, despite accommodating just over a quarter of 
Egypt's total population, Cairo accounts for over 50% of the national GDP and 40% 
of manufacturing outputs. Additionally, Cairo is home to 55% of Egypt's higher 
education institutions, 46% of the total number of hospital beds, 40% of pharmacies, 
43% of the total job employment opportunities in the public sector, and 40% in the 
private sector (El Koueidi and Madbouly, 2007).  
 
Regarding telecommunications infrastructure, 20.7% (just over two million) of the 
total number of fixed phone lines in Egypt are located in Cairo, compared to 9.5% in 
Alexandria, the second biggest city (CAPMAS, 2009). Furthermore, 35.6% of 
Cairo's inhabitants have access to a phone line, compared to 18.4% of Egypt's total 
population, again illustrating the concentration of social resources and technological 
infrastructure within the capital in relation to whole country (IDSC, 2009). 
Regarding this over-concentration of social, economic and technological resources in 
Cairo, Zohry (2009) comments on how this has contributed to a very stark and 
visible disparity between the development of rural and urban areas in Egypt. As a 
result, Zohry argues, there has been a growing wave of internal migration within 
Egypt, heading particularly towards Cairo and Alexandria. According to the 
CAPMAS census of 2006, about 7% of the population of Cairo were internal 
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migrants, who left the Upper Egypt and the Delta regions in search of better work 
opportunities in the two main cities of Cairo and Alexandria. Zohry (2009) refers to 
this as survival migration where the overwhelming reasons for internal migration are 
economic. A new life in the major cities represents the only chance for survival and 
the dream of a better life for rural youth.           
 
2.2 Are we Egyptians, Muslims or are we Modern? The Shifting 
Understandings of Modernness in Egypt 
 
'Being' modern, aspiring to 'become' modern or 'resisting' the forces of modernization 
are all claims that we have become accustomed to hearing as part of the commentary 
on globalization. Nevertheless, such claims may often raise more questions about the 
realities of our cultural relations than they can possibly answer. Indeed, what is 
modernization? Who is considered to be modern and who is not? Furthermore, who 
decides what and who conforms (or not) to a specific discourse of 'being modern'? In 
relation to Egypt, these critical questions seem particularly pressing in the context of 
a nation that has a long colonial history, and which is economically, culturally and 
politically open to contemporary globalization flows (De Koning, 2009; Amin, 
2004). Simultaneously Egypt has been defined by a transnational Islamic resurgence 
in recent years (MacLeod, 1992, Abaza, 2001), often expressed as resistance to 
globalization and its very constricted, western-driven project of modernity (for an 
example see Abdelrahman, 2006 who explores the increasing popularity of Islamic 
consumer items as an alternative to western consumer products). In the context of 
these multifarious and often contradictory cultural and religious orientations, how are 
discourses of modernity – that appear to naturally accompany the globalization 
phenomenon – received and understood by ordinary Egyptians? King (2003) rightly 
questions conventional theories of social development by asking: whose explanation 
is being foisted upon the world and whose understanding of modernity is being 
privileged? 'If modern means "now," "of the present," we need to know whose "now" 
and whose "where" is being privileged' (King, 2003:266). Exploring the dynamic 
historical development of the Arab region that has witnessed multiple diverse 
cultural encounters, Sabry (2010) concludes that there cannot be one homogenous 
understanding of what being modern entails. Sabry, therefore, uses the term 
modernness as opposed to modernization or modernity as a more grounded, 
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contextualised approach to how 'being' modern can evolve in multiple ways and in 
diverse forms. Thus, with a bottom-up focus on the specificities of everydayness and 
structures of thought, Sabry develops a purely ontological interest in how 
modernness is articulated and communicated in various different forms in relation to 
the daily context of Arab lived experience. Following Sabry, I will also use the term 
modernness throughout this chapter when referring to the experiences of Egyptians. 
However, when referring to governments or officially disseminated versions of 
'being modern,' I may still use the term modernity or modernization.  
 
A point of importance raised by Deeb (2006) is that the ways in which individuals 
and groups articulate specific understandings of modernness in the world is a highly 
relational process: a person, object or place can only be perceived as modern in 
relation to something else that may have existed elsewhere or at a different point in 
history. For instance, Deeb discusses how the Lebanese women on which her study is 
based, consider themselves to be modern Muslims as they experience an 
'authenticated Islam' (2006:21) based on piety and understanding, as well as an 
appreciation and enjoyment of global culture. These women were comparing 
themselves with older generations of Muslims whose actions were largely about an 
unreflexive and almost blind conformity to religious tradition and heritage. Using 
this same relational stance, I argue that the way young Egyptians formulate particular 
understandings of modernness is not a static or ahistorical product of the present 
moment, but involves complex processes which have developed, and continue to 
develop within the dynamic intersections of history, politics and culture. According 
to Denis' (2006) analysis of contemporary Egyptian culture, for instance, everyday 
perceptions of sophistication, beauty and modernness continue to be influenced by 
Egypt's historical period of colonial British rule, which is routinely compared with 
other stages in Egypt's national development. As Denis (2006) notes, anything 
associated with the west is an example of the elegance, grace and sophistication of 
the colonial era, compared to the period of Arab reform and socialism from the 
1950s. This period of pan-Arab influence is perceived by many Egyptians as a 
stagnant era of social decay and corrosion (Denis, 2006). According to this example, 
the different ways Egyptians position themselves regarding how progressive or 
modern they perceive themselves (or the nation) to be, is articulated in relation to the 
multiple narratives of development that have shaped their nation at different points in 
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history. In order to elaborate on this point, the next section will undertake a brief 
analysis of some of the most important political and economic moments that have 
shaped Egypt's cultural and national development in its recent history.  
 
2.2.1 Egypt's National History: Between the 'Pre-Modern' and the 'Modern'  
 
Mitchell (2002:13) explores the way discourses of modernness taking shape in the 
Egyptian context have been closely linked to the development of the nation. As he 
writes: 'the nation is an identity that must be continually remade' and this 
construction of the nation requires a performance of the past which involves 
'questions of the relationship of Cairo's political elites to the West, and at the same 
time their relationship to their own wider society'. A brief examination of Egypt's 
recent national development uncovers the extent to which it involves a very diverse, 
constantly shifting multilayered history. As this chapter is exploring the way 
Egyptians, as national subjects, are formulating particular understandings of 
modernness, the last two centuries in Egypt's history are particularly important.  
 
It was the penultimate year of the eighteenth century which signalled the fall of the 
Ottoman empire, witnessed Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt, and thus moulded Egypt's 
modern culture towards its present form (Piterberg, 1997). Both institutionally, at the 
level of state politics, and subjectively, at the level of the ordinary citizen, Egypt was 
transformed from a 'pre-modern' to a 'modern' nation that re-directed its interests 
away from its long established Turkish influences, looking to Europe as a 'model for 
modernization' (Schaub, 2000: 226). Indeed, Piterberg (1997) writes how the year 
1798 became a turning point in the development of Egyptian history as it erected a 
symbolic barrier between what was often perceived to be the period of the primordial 
and backward Ottoman rule, and nineteenth century western-led state modernism. 
Modernism, therefore, according to Piterberg (1997), came to be synonymous with 
the west and the superiority of western culture. This became a notable reality 
particularly during the period of British colonialism (1882-1952) when the signs of 
British cultural influence were making inroads all over Egypt.  
 
Schaub (2000) explores how the state of foreign languages in Egypt dramatically 
changed after the British occupation, as the teaching of English made significant 
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gains in public schools. Simultaneously, there were attempts by the colonial powers 
to relegate native Arabic to a secondary position due to its perceived 'inferior' status. 
Abaza (2006:8) has similarly commented on how colonialism created new 
cosmopolitan lifestyles that produced 'different notions of leisure time such as horse 
riding, racing, polo and cricket'. Cairo's infrastructure was also physically altered as 
new schools such as Victoria College and the American College were established, 
alongside bars, hotels such as The Mena House and department stores like Gattengo 
grand magasin (Abaza, 2006).  In relation to these new colonial influences that 
became strongly desired and incorporated into the cultural practices of Egyptians, 
Mitchell's (1991) exploration of how British imperialist rule was able to extend its 
power and authority over Egyptians (until this day) provides a very important 
contribution. According to Mitchell, the colonizers maintained command over 
Egyptians by controlling both body and mind. While the former more obviously 
refers to physical forms of supervision and control, the latter is a more discrete form 
of indirect power related to an ability to manipulate subjectivities. Colonial 
ideological discourses, rules and moral codes were made to appear as impressive and 
desirable as the contemporary European-style infrastructure that began dominating 
Cairo's streets. The enforcement of colonial power, therefore, became a naturalized 
process, not forcibly imposed, but effortlessly and often desirably spread throughout 
national institutions and social and cultural processes (Mitchell, 1991).    
 
From the 1930s to the 1970s, however, there was a strong shift away from cultures of 
the west (Gershoni and Jankowski, 1995). In particular, the 1952 military coup ended 
British occupation and overthrew the Egyptian monarchy. A new republican order 
was established under the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who sustained strong 
links with the Soviet Union and promoted a regionally popular pan-Arab national 
allegiance. Furthermore, the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel was the start of a steady 
decline of pan-Arabism, and the beginning of an Islamic resurgence (Nafi, 2008). 
Thus far in Egypt's history, the nation had acquired multiple and diverse meanings at 
different points of its development. As Gershoni and Jankowski argue, all the diverse 
‘traditions’ of Egyptian nationalism were 'subjective mental constructs created at a 
specific point in time through a selective reading of the multi-layered Egyptian 
heritage' (1995:14). This resembles the position of the theorists of the modernization 
school (Smith, 1999; Gellner, 2006) who have observed how nations are not natural 
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timeless phenomena, but are socially constructed artifacts, products of particular 
events and developments at a specific time in history. Furthermore, national 
development is not a process based exclusively on internal politics and the singular 
impulsive decisions of power holders. As Winter has suggested, how a national 
culture is shaped should be 'associated less with culture, ideology and moral 
superiority than with power, historical sequence and the international hierarchy of 
nations' (Winter, 2007: 498).  
 
According to Winter's theory, external relations of power and dominance, and issues 
of global hierarchy have a prime role to play in influencing how nations internally 
develop, and how nations are constructed and take shape vis-à-vis the other. Indeed, 
this is clear in the analysis of Egypt's contemporary history above in the way the 
nation tried to assimilate itself with western inspired forms of state modernization, 
and even when it tried to engage with pan-Arab or transnational forms of religious 
identity, this was primarily a reaction against western influences. As a further 
illustration of Winter's relational argument of national development, it was probably 
the post 1970s era that contributed towards some of the most important economic 
and political changes that have shaped Egyptian culture to this day. In an attempt to 
solve Egypt's economic and financial problems, President Anwar El Sadat , who 
came to office in 1970, suspended relations with the Soviet Union initially 
formulated by Abdel Nasser, and directed his efforts towards the USA.  
 
In 1974, Sadat declared the infitah or economic 'open-door policy,' reversing 
president Abdel Nasser's Egyptianization and nationalization of all large industrial 
firms, banks and companies. With the spread of economic liberalization, therefore, 
Egypt opened up to foreign investment with new relaxed laws granting access to 
foreign investors (Amin, 2004: 129), while the increased presence of multinational 
companies brought about a rapid growth in the world of consumption. This greatly 
extended the impact of globalization into the everyday lives of ordinary people in 
Egypt (Ghannam, 1997). Importantly, this (re)newed orientation to the west was not 
approached as a completely new chapter in Egypt's cultural and economic history, 
but as a continuation and (re)awakening of a fascination with the west developed 
during colonial times (Amin, 2005). Patterns of economic liberalization initiated 
under Sadat's rule, continued into, and were further capitalized upon during the reign 
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of now ousted Prime Minister Hosny Mubarak (1981-2011).  Indeed, Mubarak 
enthusiastically embarked upon an intense program of liberal economic reform. 
Although it may have cosmetically raised Egypt's profile on global economic reports, 
Mubarak's economic vision failed to address the underlying problems confronting 
ordinary Egyptians such as poverty and lack of access to basic resources. This has 
created tension between a state national project that combines a sanitized version of 
modernity that is well ordered and up to global standards on the surface, with an 
everyday social infrastructure of political corruptness, debilitating class polarization 
and the absence of individual liberties. According to Mitchell (2002), for instance, 
despite frenzied claims that the economic open door policies of the 1970s brought 
about widespread changes and social benefits to all Egyptians, in reality, it bettered 
the lives of about 5% of the population. These fundamental class inequalities that 
have remained unaddressed by successive Egyptian leaders have continued to divide 
and polarize the everyday cultural realities of an entire nation. I turn to this in the 
next section when I explore the importance of both class and gender as discourses 
around which everyday experiences of the city and nation are forged.       
 
2.3 One City, Different Stories: Class, Gender and a Divided Everyday Life  
 
2.3.1 Class 
At the initial stages of my research, I decided that I would conduct an ethnographic 
study on the middle-class and the working-class in Egypt. However, after consulting 
relevant literature and conversing with several Egyptian anthropologists and 
sociologists, I realized there was no homogenous or singular middle-class. Recent 
changes that have befallen Egypt's social, cultural and economic fabric, have meant 
that the idea of a single identifiable middle-class has become increasingly invalid 
(Abdel Mo'ti, 2006; De Koning, 2009; Amin, 2000). Indeed, De Koning (2009) has 
commented on how the middle-class in Egypt has been increasingly destabilized as a 
result of the country's most important economic developments. As De Koning notes, 
in the years following the 1952 revolution against the monarchy, the Egyptian state 
led by President Abdel Nasser's communist government came to play a central role 
in the formation of the national economy. Through the democratization of public 
education and the provision of government jobs to all graduates, a large urban middle 
class rapidly came into existence (Abaza, 2006; Ibrahim, 1982).  Nevertheless, 
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political change came about as Anwar El Sadat took over power in 1971 and 
introduced new liberal economic reforms. From 1974, there was a withdrawal of the 
state as a primary agent of national development, and the integration of Egypt within 
global economic networks that had a great impact upon the cultural ambitions and 
thus structure of the middle class.      
 
A large section of the middle class was no longer complacent with a public education 
or a secure government job characteristic of Abdel Nasser's previous communist 
political orientation, but developed an ambition of keeping up with new 'global' 
standards of modernity established by Sadat's policies. This involved gaining a 
private language based education and working in the increasingly burgeoning private 
sector (De Koning, 2009; Amin, 2000). Abdel Mo'ti (2006) notes how the 
government's financial investment into the private sector increased by 30% in 1986, 
even though the total workforce in this sector represented only 9% of the whole 
Egyptian workforce. Thus, those who were able to participate in these new 
cosmopolitan lifestyles made possible by the government's new economic changes, 
enjoyed a relatively easy ride up the social ladder, while a large chunk were forced 
down. The middle class therefore became progressively de-stabilized and 
increasingly divided 'between professionals whose more localized qualifications have 
lost much of their previous value and others whose formal and informal 
cosmopolitan qualifications allow them to compete for relatively lucrative jobs in 
Egypt's upscale workspaces' (De Koning, 2009: 6). I decided, therefore, that my 
research would need to involve a comparison between three different classes in order 
to account for the social, cultural and economic changes that have befallen and thus 
altered the structure of the middle class in Egypt   (for a more detailed discussion on 
the changes that have shaped the middle class in Egypt see Abdel Mo'ti, 2006; Amin, 
2000). Firstly, the upper-middle class who represent the faction of the middle-class 
able to sustain new standards of cultural and economic capital associated with global 
modernity as initiated by President Sadat's 'open door' policies; the lower-middle 
class who are unable to keep up with these cultural and economic standards and thus 
remain affiliated with more localized forms of belonging; and lastly the working 
class. In contrast to the two middle class groups who are more likely to acquire a 
higher education degree and take up skilled, professional occupations, I define the 
working class as a group who usually leave mainstream education at the age of 15 to 
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undertake secondary vocational education, receiving a specialized industrial, 
agricultural or business diploma. Following two years of vocational education, 
students then either search directly for a job opportunity (usually unskilled labour) or 
complete three further years in an intermediate vocational institute.  
 
In light of the above discussion that has documented some of the factors that have 
shaped class identities in Egypt, I approach class as a category defined through both 
cultural, as well as economic capital. This focus on cultural capital is especially 
relevant in relation to the upper and lower middle class, whose standards of living 
and cultural aspirations are starkly divergent, despite both belonging to the middle 
class strata. I particularly follow Ibrahim's (1982) model of classification based on 
Cairo, as according to Inhorn (1996), although there have been several attempts, 
Ibrahim provides the most useful description of class divisions in urban Egypt. 
Realizing the difficulty involved in defining what constitutes 'class,' and even more 
so, establishing the number of classes in a complex society such as Egypt, Ibrahim 
(1982) draws on several indicators of socio-economic status. Particularly relevant to 
my research are income, education, occupation (occupation of parents in the case of 
my study) and lifestyle. Together, these indicators form a person's cultural and 
economic capital, thus contributing to the construction of a particular class habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1984).  
 
As Ibrahim's system of classification was formulated almost 30 years ago, however, I 
believe the way he defines some of his class indicators, particularly education and 
lifestyle, need to be accorded a more contemporary approach that is up-to-date with 
recent cultural and economic changes. For instance, lifestyle for Ibrahim connotes the 
acquisition of durable goods and the size of residence. Nevertheless, in contemporary 
Cairo, 'lifestyle' cannot be approached as a static type that revolves around what you 
own or where you are physically located. I believe that such an understanding of 
'lifestyle' that defines it as a materialistic category articulated purely through the 
acquisition of certain essential objects such as a fridge or car, needs to be supplanted 
by an understanding of  'lifestyle' as an everyday cultural performance, centred 
around particular lifestyles and consumer practices (Abaza, 2006; De Koning, 2009). 
Again, I discuss this in more detail in Chapter Four in relation to how consumer 
products are no longer defined solely through their use/functional value, but 
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increasingly through a more elusive symbolic value where they communicate 
specific cultural meanings.  
 
Furthermore, Ibrahim uses 'education' as an indicator of socio-economic status, and 
this is particularly relevant to my research as my participants are at an age (18-25) 
where they are either still in further/higher education, or have recently completed 
their studies. Nevertheless, I wish to deconstruct Ibrahim's understanding of 
education, where he primarily defines it as being involved in a relationship of 
positive correlation to income. Thus, once again, similar to his conceptualization of 
'lifestyle,' Ibrahim approaches education through a narrow economic lens, which in 
the context of contemporary Egypt, fails to reflect the full reality of education as 
sustaining a socio-cultural, as well as economic function. Today, the abundance of 
higher education outlets in Egypt, both private foreign language and public Arabic 
institutions (Schaub, 2000), means that type of education, as well as level, are 
important indicators and preservers of cultural capital and class habitus. Private 
language universities have rapidly increased in Egypt over the last two decades, with 
five times as many institutions available today compared to 1990 (Arvizu, 2009). 
Whereas in western societies entry into particular institutions is predominantly 
associated with performance and merit, in Egypt, entry is often based upon socio-
linguistic and economic capital, which makes educational spaces exclusively 
available for some, and denied to others. Furthermore, the type of educational 
institution entered in Egypt ultimately determines an individual's position in society, 
their access to resources and systems of power. Private language universities that 
conduct most of their teaching in English and often give their students an opportunity 
to spend a year in Germany, the USA or the UK, produce a particular caliber of 
students highly sought after by top paying multinational firms. Along with the 
prestigious faculty of Economic and Political Sciences at Cairo University, Gamal El 
Din (1995) refers to these private language institutions as 'first tier'. This is in 
contrast to graduates of particular faculties within public universities, such as History 
and Education, which Gamal El Din (1995) refers to as 'second tier'.  
 
Graduates of 'second tier' faculties who lack the internationally orientated cultural 
and language skills in comparison to graduates of private institutions, often end up 
working for less financially rewarding government institutions and local firms 
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(Gamal El Din, 1995). In this respect, education is another cog that feeds into, and 
sustains the highly fragmented and hierarchical class system in Egypt. Thus, the 
different educational institutions I engaged with during the course of my research 
provided an important point of entry into the culturally polarized classed worlds of 
young Egyptians (Gamal El Din, 1995; Arvizu, 2009). In light of these complex 
realities, I selected three educational institutions to represent the very different 
socially and economically fragmented lives of young Egyptians: The American 
University in Cairo (first tier institution- upper middle class), and The Faculty of 
Education: Ain Shams University (second tier institution-lower middle class) and 
Madina Institute (working class) that awards intermediate diplomas in computing. 
Although level and type of education provided an initial point of access to the three 
classes, I did not rely upon education as my only form of class categorization. 
Through the survey I distributed in the three institutions, I was able to build a more 
comprehensive understanding of the diverse lives of the three groups by asking them 
a range of cultural and financial related questions, including: family income, 
occupation of parents, area of residence, destination of travels and number of cars 
owned (see appendix, fig.1).      
 
2.3.2 Gender 
According to Abu Lughod (1998:3), it is particularly in the postcolonial world that 
women become 'potent symbols of identity' who function as important indicators of 
how 'modern' a particular national context is considered to be. Nevertheless, feminist 
discussions regarding the position of women have, according to Abu Lughod, been 
framed in terms of cultures that are posited in stark opposition to each other: the 
'proper' role of women is seen in light either of a western (liberal) or eastern Islamic  
(traditional) model. By avoiding being dragged into an east versus west binary 
opposition, however, we can be more sensitive to and 'particularize, and to ground in 
place, class, and time the experiences of women and the dynamics of gender' (Abu 
Lughod, 1998: 22). For instance, Mernissi (1982) discusses how Mediterranean 
societies are very much patriarchal cultures where women are expected to be 
subordinate and under the control of men. In this light, women, whose destiny it is to 
await marriage and the responsibilities it entails, are required to protect their family 
honour by sustaining a virginal modesty: they are expected to constantly portray a 
righteousness and virtuous innocence (Mernissi, 1982). Mensch, Ibrahim, Lee, et al. 
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(2000) examine how this is often achieved in Egyptian society through controlling 
women's physical mobility. By the onset of puberty it is expected, according to the 
authors, that women withdraw from public space and display increasing forms of 
modesty. Following on from these theories, although concerns over women's 'honour' 
and 'respectability' remain central values that dominate the rules of Arabic and 
Islamic cultural practices, to what extent does such a simplified and stereotyped 
narrative of complete female subordination continue to ring true in these societies? 
As Abu Lughod (1998) notes above, feminist discussions should not fall prey to 
simplified binary oppositions that fail to reflect the complex and multifarious 
realities of women operating in particular contexts and at a particular time.    
 
Contrary to the above assertions of female immobility, it has been noted by various 
scholars that the selective visibility of women in public spaces is in fact a 
requirement of globalising cities claiming their place within discourses of urban 
modernity (Phadke, 2007; De Koning, 2009). Nevertheless, even though the 
complete exclusion of women from public space falls short of everyday realities in 
the Arab world and conservative societies in general, their visibility remains a highly 
conditional one. Examining the Indian city of Mumbai, Phadke (2007:1512) for 
instance, discusses how women's public presence is shaped by a need to maintain 
'sexual safety' where the female body is required to police its own virtue and honour. 
Thus, in order for this aura of sexual safety not to be penetrated, these women are 
obliged to conform to a 'manufacture of respectability' (ibid.) where they carry the 
burden of guarding the reputation of themselves and, more indirectly, their family 
and neighbourhood community. Nevertheless, as well as ensuring that their own 
sexual safety is protected, these women, according to Phadke (2007), are also 
expected to conform to established ideals of femininity where they publicly market 
themselves as attractive and desirable 'marriage material'. Similarly, discussing 
experiences specific to Morocco, Newcomb explores how women are forced to 
balance 'rules' that avoid them being perceived as 'sexually promiscuous' (2006:297) 
while out in the city, alongside a need to 'dress stylishly, wear make-up, and be 
visible to attract potential husbands' (ibid.:298). Thus, a need to maintain an 
untainted sexual reputation is underpinned by an ideological gendered morality 
which dictates that women ultimately need to 'save' themselves for a marital 
relationship which they are constantly on the lookout to secure. This delicate balance 
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between policing reputation, while asserting feminine potentials can only take place 
in certain 'privatized' public spaces where exclusive entry policies control who is and 
who is not granted access (Phadke, 2007). Focusing particularly on the importance of 
cafés for Egyptian women, De Koning refers to them as 'own spaces' (2009:552) that 
allow women to engage in a 'safe' physical presence in public, while conforming to a 
socially agreed sexual correctness. 
 
As well as policing their physical behaviour while out in the public sphere, another 
strategy by which the 'virtuous' conduct of women is maintained is through their 
embodied appearance. The veil has become an important device in this context. It has 
allowed women to shift between different public spaces while maintaining the 
socially and religiously constructed norms of modesty and honour (Hoodfar, 1991). 
Macleod (1992), for instance, discusses how the widespread appearance of the veil in 
Islamic societies has often been perceived as the ultimate symbol of female 
oppression and subordination. Nevertheless, through her close examination of lower 
middle class women in Egypt, she explores how these women confidently assert their 
own multiple and complex reasonings for why they choose to adopt the veil as an 
everyday embodied expression. According to Macleod, this revolves around 
'accommodating protest' (1992:534) as women often choose to wear the veil as a 
statement of modesty and a 'protest' against public perceptions that the working 
woman who is out on the streets is loose or morally corrupt. At the same time, 
however, Macleod believes that women simultaneously 'accommodate' by altering 
their dress to fit in with dominant ideological norms that women represent sexual 
temptations without questioning or seeking to challenge these values.  
 
Writing from a feminist point of view, Kandiyoti (1988:283) explores how, in 
response to patriarchal dominance, women have discovered strategies and coping 
mechanisms, which have allowed them to put up a kind of 'passive resistance' to 
male forms of domination and control. She uses the term patriarchal bargain in 
relation to the way women are not completely disempowered, but are constantly on 
the lookout for ways in which they can take part in this exchange of benefits. As we 
have seen in the above studies, by guarding their 'honour' through controlling their 
conduct and physical appearance, women are securing a kind of indirect bargain 
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where they guarantee for themselves at least a selective and conditioned presence in 
the public sphere. 
 
2.4 Television, State Control and National Development in Egypt 
 
In the first section of this chapter I discussed how discourses of modernness within 
Egypt have been closely linked to the nation's development throughout its history. 
More importantly, however, how have particular ideologies of the nation formulated 
by elites and those in power been disseminated to citizens? How have ordinary 
people been included in the project of national development? In contemporary 
history, the media have been one of the most important tools of development used by 
states as joint platforms that help to maintain national solidity amongst citizens. This 
is particularly true in the Egyptian context where high rates of illiteracy along with 
the declining prices of television sets make television an important everyday 
transporter of information, entertainment and cultural messages, to which the 
majority of Egyptians today have access (Guaaybess, 2001). Since its introduction in 
1960 under the Presidency of Abdel Nasser, Egyptian television, modelled on a 
public service ideology, has been a highly centralized absolute monopoly, and thus, 
has always been a strong vehicle for mobilizing citizens and maintaining nationalism 
and unity (Amin and Napoli, 2000). Radio and television in Egypt are run by the 
government through the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) formed in 
1971, which operates according to an established Code of Ethics (Napoli, et al., 2005 
cf. Hassan, 1996). This code of ethics includes the prohibition of broadcasting 
negative statements about religious beliefs and religious groups. It also prohibits 
criticizing the regime or state officials in radio or television programmes (Hassan, 
1996).  
 
According to Abu Lughod (2005), television is a 'key institution' used by Egyptian 
state elites 'for the production of national culture' where the receiver has been 
addressed predominantly as a citizen, rather than as a consumer. Indeed, as 
confirmed by Aly (2011), the Egyptian elite have been carefully involved in 
constructing a very narrow notion of al-shakhsiyya al-masriyya, or the 
(quintessential) Egyptian character. This represents a 'kind of biologically 
deterministic approach to Egyptian society, whereby certain types of women and 
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men are produced through fixed notions of citizenship, belonging, gender, class, 
religion and social stratification' (Aly, 2011: 3). This is an important illustration of 
how governments invest socially and economically to transform the nation into a 
political project that is moulded and truncated to fit their constricted vision of what 
the nation ought to be. Anderson (1983) has explored how the nation is imagined as 
all its members can never know each other or see each other face-to-face, yet through 
the joint consumption of print media, these citizens are able to imagine themselves as 
being part of this collectively shared national community. Nevertheless, Anderson's 
phenomenological approach to the nation neglects the ontological question of how an 
imagined community envisioned by state elites and disseminated through the media 
is actually received and decoded by ordinary citizens. Valentine (1996:158), for 
instance, argues that there can never be one unitary or joint conception of national 
culture. Valentine explores how the different experiences of Tamils from different 
backgrounds mean the nation becomes 'available' or 'unavailable' to these groups in 
multiple ways. For instance, for Tamils of a lower socio-economic status, Valentine 
explores how their disadvantaged condition means they develop feelings that the 
nation is 'unavailable' to them, deferred instead to a ruling elite who benefit from all 
the potential comforts and privileges that the nation can offer. 
 
According to the above, therefore, how viable are government attempts to use media 
outlets as platforms disseminating a single joint imagination of the nation, if this very 
idea of the nation is interpreted by citizens in different ways according to their 
everyday socio-cultural life experiences? Abu-Lughod (2005) explored this question 
through a focus on the reception of what she names domestic-dramas amongst 
different groups of urban and rural marginalized women. The author argues that 
through the technique of 'heightened emotionalism' (Abu-Lughod, 2005, 113), these 
melodramas have become effective instruments of social development and platforms 
disseminating a particular state narrative of modernization. Nevertheless, Abu-
Lughod recognizes that these television productions, although constructed to fit a 
particular dominant elite vision of development, are received in particular local 
contexts in complex ways by a variety of different television audiences. Thus, using 
the single life-stories of underprivileged Egyptian women, Abu Lughod explores 
how they can form their own subjective counter-hegemonic interpretations that were 
not necessarily intended at the production stage. With reference to the case of the 
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poor domestic servant Amira, for instance, Abu Lughod demonstrates how the 
importance of religious Islamic practices to her everyday life mediates how she 
interacts with these television serials. Amira integrates herself within a religious 
community, and not only a national community 'to which individual citizens are, 
according to television writers, supposed to relate themselves' (2005:130). Thus, we 
are warned by Abu-Lughod against telling any linear stories of 'personhood and the 
coming to modernity' (ibid.:113) that do not take into consideration the complex, 
multiplying axes of everyday life important to the personal lives of television 
viewers.  Following on from the above, it may be easy to understand how 
governments can benefit from citizens conforming to an officially disseminated 
version of national belonging. At the bottom-up level of citizens, however, as Abu-
Lughod (2005) and Valentine (1996) illustrate, does not an imposed national vision 
simplistically gloss over socially and culturally complex and divided societies? 
 
2.4.1 Satellite Television, Media Convergence and Citizen Power in the Arab 
World 
 
Anderson's Imagined Communities (1983) may be a viable explanation of what takes 
place in an era where a limited number of (terrestrial) televisual outlets are in the 
direct hands of governments. Nevertheless, can state attempts to foster a joint 
national understanding still be sustained where state-led media platforms have given 
way to multiple decentralized outlets? Indeed, a two-step process of television 
liberalisation began in Egypt from 1974 under President Sadat's rule and continued 
into Hosny Mubarak's reign from 1981. Initially, taking place on a domestic scale, 
the first step involved the liberalization of national markets where the content of 
Egyptian television began an orientation towards the USA. As Sadat reinitiated 
Egypt's relations with the west after the 1973 war with Israel, television was forced 
to adapt itself to this new global economic milieu based on western models, and thus 
a big proportion of content was imported from the USA (Amin and Napoli, 2000). 
As a consequence of this new unprecedented change in Egyptian media where 
television screens transported the average Egyptian living room to foreign lands and 
alternative lifestyles, content became subjected to tough government censorship. The 
first law of censorship was introduced in 1975 where censors were given the freedom 
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to remove scenes conflicting with religion and national security, social ethics and 
traditional norms (Amin and Fikri, 2002).  
 
The second stage of television liberalization in Egypt went beyond the immediate 
domestic level and involved the liberalization of regional and international economic 
markets. Coupled with developments in media technology – namely the satellite dish 
– this process of liberalisation began a rapid decentralisation of media ownership and 
control in Egypt. The first Egyptian Satellite Channel (ESC) was aired in 1990, 
although the major landmark in Egypt's satellite history came as Egypt launched its 
first satellite, Nilesat 101, in 1998. This allowed the broadcasting of several 
specialized television channels, such as Nile Sport, Nile Drama and Nile News – all 
still owned by the Egyptian government. Nilesat 102 shortly followed in 2000 and 
witnessed the launching of the first private Egyptian satellite channels in 2002 
including Dream 1, Dream 2 and Al-Mihwar TV (Hassan, 1996). Providing a 
platform for the transmission of nearly 230 digital channels, both Nilesat 101 and 
102 combined 'allowed private broadcasters, both Egyptian and foreign, to operate 
exclusively by satellite from a designated free zone' (Sakr, 2007: 7).   
 
Following on from the above, the introduction of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) in 
Egypt's highly controlled and censored communications environment of the 1990s 
was a landmark development in its television and communications history. This 
added to previous fears of the cultural threat represented by an increasingly open 
television landscape initiated during the first stage of media liberalization. Following 
the development of DBS, it seemed that another type of political 'threat' was also 
imminent. The rapid rise of a regional Arab geo-cultural satellite market meant 
television content was able to bypass government broadcast institutions and reach 
Arab homes directly. The Arab Media Outlook report (Dubai Press Club, 2009:73) 
has documented how satellite television 'accounts for the large majority of pan-Arab 
regional advertising spend, accounting for 88% of total media spend'. This points to 
the increasing importance and popularity of regional Arabic television broadcasting 
across the Arab world. More specifically, according to Sakr (2001), the development 
of an Arab geocultural market for satellite television in a region where state 
censorship strongly prevails, proved a threat to the status quo which became highly 
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advantageous to viewers. Thus, were Arab governments facing a new political 'threat' 
that challenged their ability to gain absolute control?  
 
In contrast to the highly controlled and censored nature of national terrestrial outlets, 
Lynch (2005) examines how pan-Arab satellite channels have shifted the balance of 
power on the ground contributing enormously 'to building the underpinnings of a 
more pluralist political culture, one which welcomes and thrives on open and 
contentious political debate' (p.150). Nevertheless, Lynch brings these optimistic 
visions back to reality by reminding us that Arab viewers have no institutional 
avenues for translating these new found political engagements into practical reality. 
'The new Arab media could build enthusiasm, but could not translate its excitement 
into political outcomes' (Lynch, 2005: 152). Sakr (2005) similarly counters the 
general optimism that some commentators attach to the potential of Arabic satellite 
broadcasting by describing how these outlets are either state institutions themselves, 
or are closely affiliated with state actors. For instance, Sakr (2005) illustrates how 
Egypt's Dream TV was directly linked to the government through a government 
shareholding in the company, which often resulted in certain outspoken presenters 
who dared to engage in anti-government protest being taken off air. Campagna 
(2005) also comments on the extent to which local Arab governments are still 
capable of exerting influence on the news coverage of satellite channels by 
disrupting the normal activity of local news bureaus through restrictive press laws 
and arrests. Furthermore, through an empirical analysis of a range of programming 
offered by Arabic satellite broadcasting, Karam (2007) similarly refutes the idea that 
Arab satellite broadcasting represents a catalyst for facilitating greater democratic 
potential in the region. Instead, he argues satellite's real importance falls in its acting 
as an essential 'breathing space ' (Karam, 2007: 81) for young people whereby they 
can virtually escape their everyday burdens and realities through the plethora of 
engaging cultural entertainment programmes on offer. 
 
If the democratizing potential of satellite television remained questionable, then the 
development of the Internet and new media across the Arab world since the 1990s 
certainly pushed the debate towards acknowledging a freer media space. New media 
have altered control over media telecommunications and have become increasingly 
more decentralized, moving away from the complete control of autocratic 
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governments. Nevertheless, it is not the Internet or new media alone which single-
handedly paved the way for a democratic media space, but as new media converged 
with television, established structures of power within the Arab media landscape 
were significantly reconfigured (Ward, 2009). Kraidy (2007:139) documents the rise 
of what he names a 'pan Arab hypermedia space' combining the impact of 
entertainment satellite television and small media such as mobile phones. The initial 
impact of this media convergence was demonstrated in the 'democracy like' 
(ibid.:143) activities it permitted viewers of the reality television show Star 
Academy, who were able to vote for and campaign for their favourite candidates by 
sending text messages to be aired on music television channels. Importantly, Kraidy 
argues that these democratic acts of campaigning and voting were not only visible 
within the realms of televised forms of light entertainment, but significantly 
contributed to changes in Arab governance. 'Arab activists have drawn lessons from 
the reality television phenomenon' (Kraidy, 2007: 154) transforming themselves into 
'citizen-correspondents' (ibid.:151) within political demonstrations, using mobile 
phones, digital cameras and the Internet to get their voice out to the world.  
 
The recent Arab spring initially sparked in Tunisia in late 2010, is a testament to the 
true democratic promise of the Internet and media convergence in general. The 
Egyptian government itself underestimated the potential of alternative media. It dug 
its own grave through its quite laughable false television reporting where state-
supported counter-narratives chose to ignore the uprising at first, focusing their 
cameras on the calm areas of Cairo as evidence that it was another normal day in 
Egypt (Peterson, 2011). While the Ministry of Information in control of the media 
was in panic-mode, selecting which movie to broadcast on its state-run channels in 
the hope viewers would forget about mass protests taking place only metres away, 
media-savvy and well informed citizens were selecting and constructing their own 
platforms of information. Social media became a very important agent of change and 
a platform for social and political protest.  
 
According to Khamis and Vaughn (2011:1) social media websites during the 
Egyptian revolution allowed for an effective form of 'citizen-journalism' where 
ordinary citizens were allocated digital forums through which they were able to 
'document the protests; to spread the word about ongoing activities; to provide 
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evidence of governmental brutality…'. As I discussed in relation to satellite 
television, one criticism levelled against these regional television channels is the gap 
that exists between their role as spaces for dissent and opposition, and the existence 
of democratic avenues through which these rebellious voices could translate this into 
real political action. A very important point raised by Khamis and Vaughn (2011), 
however, is the way social media during Egypt's revolution helped to bridge this gap 
as mediated platforms of resistance supported and worked hand-in-hand with 
grassroots political activism on the ground.  
 
It would be a naïve overstatement to suggest that the Internet caused the revolution in 
Egypt. What is certain, however, is that social media contributed to the formation of 
a very specific kind of revolution where the world was witness to what was 
happening minute by minute; where on-ground action was effectively rallied; and 
where global support was rapidly gathered. In the wake of such a complex media 
scene, who controls the media? Is it governments? The media blackout imposed by 
the Egyptian government on the 28
th
 January reminds us that states still maintain 
control over media infrastructure and thus still have the power to shutdown a nation's 
connection to the world. It could be, however, that at long last, Arab governments 
have come to realize that the media are not only effective platforms of control from 
above, but also powerful tools of resistance towards these very forms of control from 
below. What the Arab Spring and the uses of media and communications by its 
activists demonstrates, is that the media reinforce spaces of dissent and action. 
Furthermore, it appears that the Egyptian government has jumped on the bandwagon 
of social media power themselves. In an ironic twist of fate, the Internet that was shut 
down by authorities to prevent young Egyptians from getting their version of reality 
out to the world during the revolution, has now become the official platform of 
connection between the ruling Military Council and these young men and women. 
Indeed, the Facebook page of the Egyptian Military Council, their favoured location 
for releasing their latest statements, has now become one of the most popular 
Facebook pages in Egypt.  
 
After watching what can happen when power is transformed into the hands of media-
savvy citizens, could it be that ordinary individuals now control the media? As the 
controversial 'Gay Girl in Damascus' scandal demonstrated, as the media are 
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becoming increasingly decentralized, new concerns over content validity and 
authenticity can often arise. A Syrian lesbian blogger named Amina who, much to 
the amazement and interest of Internet users across the globe, began documenting her 
lesbian sexual adventures and brutal encounters with Syrian police, turned out to be a 
hoaxer. Amina was in fact a middle aged male American PhD student living in 
Scotland, who was able to con the world into believing and following his story for a 
number of years (Addley, 2011). What we can certainly glean from the events of the 
past few months is that media power has moved away from a hierarchical top-down 
structure, located solely in the hands of an elite few, and has become much more 
horizontal in its distribution and influence.          
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
I began this chapter with the argument that identity is constructed at the intersection 
between lived practice and structured relations of power. Indeed, throughout this 
chapter it has emerged that the everyday in Egypt is a space of tension, positioned 
between top-down assertions of government control and moments of active bottom-
up negotiation and often resistance. As the discussion gradually unfolds throughout 
the coming chapters, this everyday space will be located specifically within the city 
and studied in its classed, gendered, religious and urban nuances. What happens to 
the individual in the midst of these complex and contradicting cultural and religious 
flows and shifting lines of power? What becomes of agency and the ability of 
Egyptians to form their own reflexive understandings and interpretations of the world 
and their position within it? As Singerman and Amar (2006:10) write in relation to 
Cairo: 'operations of the authoritarian state, city administration, social control 
agencies and national identities are contingent, internally contested, often 
fragmented, and pregnant with multiple possibilities'.  If state domination and 
repressive control have continued to physically constrain everyday lives in Egypt, 
this has not managed to curb completely moments of creative agency, especially at 
the level of imagination. Societies such as Egypt are rigidly structured around classed 
and gendered identities that afford little room for manoeuvre within or beyond them. 
However, cosmopolitan imagination, I propose, offers increased opportunities for 
symbolic, and sometimes physical mobility, cultural openness and reflexivity. I turn 
to this in the next chapter as I argue my case for a very specific type of 
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cosmopolitanism that takes place in Egypt, specifically, and in contexts outside the 
western-liberal world, more generally.  
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3 Cosmopolitan Imagination: Between Postcolonial History and a Mediated 
Globality 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Khaled Said was a 28 year old Egyptian man whose images of his bruised, battered 
and badly beaten corpse made his story one of the most talked about in Egypt and 
across the world. Said was dragged from an Internet café by two policemen and 
openly beaten to death in the streets of Alexandria on 6
th
 June 2010. According to 
initial police reports, he died choking on a packet of drugs that he hastily swallowed 
in a bid to remove any evidence that he was dealing in drugs. However, as harrowing 
images of his dead body went viral on the Internet, an entirely different story soon 
began to emerge. As the investigation into Said's death proceeded, it became clear 
that earlier on in the year he had posted a video on his online blog showing two 
policemen 'sharing the spoils of a drug bust' (BBC News Middle East, 2010). This 
sparked speculations, which indeed were eventually confirmed, that his murder was a 
cruel act of revenge and a way for Egyptian authorities to flex their muscles and 
demonstrate what could happen if you dared defy them. In such a context where 
basic human rights are disrespected and where democratic values are non-existent, is 
there a space where a cosmopolitan vision can ever become a reality? I argue in this 
chapter that it can.  
 
If a Kantian tradition of cosmopolitanism is followed, where the world is purported 
to be one large transcending common humanity threaded together by basic 
humanitarian ideals (Kant, 2010), then where does this vision leave a large swathe of 
countries outside the west where such ideals can only be dreamed about? I propose 
that such countries do not stand outside the experience of cosmopolitanism, but that a 
very specific type of cosmopolitanism comes into existence operating from within 
the closed socio-political cultures and tyrannical regimes of such places. Khaled 
Said's case was a cruel and visible demonstration of the extent to which the 
humanitarian values we have long associated with cosmopolitanism are often far 
removed from the constricted political visions of dictators and repressive 
governments. Ironically, however, it was the legacy of Said and the worldwide 
support gathered for his cause that also proved the extent to which these ideals 
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remain central to the everyday imaginations of Egyptians, no matter how much 
governments try to suppress them. Indeed, the 'We Are All Khaled Said' campaign 
was one of the main factors that triggered the 2011 revolution in Egypt.  
 
A series of revolutions was sparked from Cairo, to Ben Ghazi to Damascus to 
Bahrain, which represented a true implementation of cosmopolitan ideals. A sense of 
connection to the wider world was no longer formulated through the latest burger 
released by McDonalds or what dress was worn by whom at the Oscars, but through 
the recognition that we are all humans connected by a natural desire for the values of 
freedom, dignity and justice. Divisions between east and west were (temporarily?) 
relegated to the background: it was no longer a 'third-world' searching for cheap 
counterfeits of western consumer items as points of entry into a desired 'first-world' 
imagination, but it was the west that became inspired by the braveness of the Arab 
people to shape their own destiny. Workers in Wisconsin held up banners reading 
'fight like an Egyptian' while in Barcelona, protestors promised to stage another 
'Tahrir Square'. This proves that when an adequate set of circumstances permits, 
especially in the most repressive of contexts, values we associate with 
cosmopolitanism such as freedom and democracy are not just abstract ideals, but 
really are the essence of a dignified existence that many will risk their lives to 
achieve. Nevertheless, I ask, what happens when, in a pre-revolutionary context, 
these adequate circumstances are not permitted and when all avenues for the 
implementation of such humanitarian ideals are blocked? Are such societies 
excluded from ever experiencing cosmopolitanism?   
 
I locate my investigation of cosmopolitanism in Cairo within wider debates of class 
identity, television consumption and everyday life in the city. It is at their 
intersection that these factors frame and give meaning to daily experiences in the 
largest city in Africa and the Middle East. Thus, with pre-revolutionary Cairo as my 
main focus, this chapter introduces my argument for a very specific type of 
cosmopolitanism that could be applied to other national contexts outside the west 
with similar socio-cultural and political circumstances to Egypt. I propose a 
framework for understanding cosmopolitanism that transcends the vantage point of 
western liberal democracies from which many studies and conceptualisations of 
cosmopolitanism have begun (Silverstone, 2007; Chouliaraki, 2008; Kant, 2010). I 
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approach cosmopolitanism as largely a subjective prospect; an imagination through 
which young Egyptians are able to emigrate mentally (Sabry, 2005:195) beyond 
national borders, particularly towards the west as their chosen destination. 
Importantly, the west as a symbolic geography imagined by young Egyptians not 
only represents a pleasurable repertoire of lifestyle choices and consumption, but 
also the dream of an alternative, more hopeful life: an emancipatory symbol of 
freedom, liberty and justice. Thus, a cosmopolitan imagination in Cairo is 
predominantly associated with a mediated openness to the world, and the way a 
connection with the distant other becomes an important means through which the self 
is negotiated and understood. 
 
I start this chapter with a discussion of how cosmopolitanism can be understood as 
an everyday lived reality, particularly in contexts outside of the west. The next 
section then explores how I propose to use the term cosmopolitan imagination as a 
lens through which the construction and negotiation of identities can be understood 
in the context of a highly mediated, pluralized everyday life. Section 3.3 argues that 
cosmopolitan imagination is not an ahistorical or static product of the present 
moment, but is negotiated within the changing repertoires of socio-cultural reality as 
it has emerged through history, especially colonialism. The final section then 
questions the extent to which the media have been a continuation of western imperial 
projects, leading to a homogenization of cultures outside the west, or whether they 
have provided more dynamic hybrid spaces of global interaction and participation.    
 
3.2 Cosmopolitanism and Everyday Life: What Does it Actually Mean to be a 
Cosmopolitan? 
 
The merits of cosmopolitanism as a conceptual framework have been established in 
the Introduction. Yet, cosmopolitanism remains sociologically meaningless unless it 
is examined as an everyday reality and tangible practice. If we were to deconstruct 
this conceptual term into its basic raw components, what would it consist of? 
According to Skrbis, Kendall and Woodward (2004), cosmopolitanism faces a crisis 
of meaning and definition: what cosmopolitanism actually consists of, and who can 
be considered cosmopolitan are all questions that have not been clearly 
operationalized. My interest in cosmopolitanism is inspired by Ong (2009) who 
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approaches it not as an idealistic vision we should strive to reach, but as an identity 
that is lived, performed and embodied in everyday life from within multiple localized 
spaces. Thus, Ong (2009) believes that research should not be making assumptions 
about what cosmopolitanism ideally should be, but through bottom-up empirical 
work, we need to explore lived experience, and hence what cosmopolitanism actually 
is for different people. As Ong argues, in the search for cosmopolitanism within the 
fabric of everyday life, 'it is crucial to think of the expressions of cosmopolitanism as 
always-already plural'. In this context, it is important to be sensitive to the 
'extravagant array of possibilities' that shape the articulation of different 
cosmopolitan identities (Ong, 2009:453).  
 
If we were to strip cosmopolitanism down to its barest form, its core would comprise 
the reality of an increasingly interconnected common humanity shaped by 'an 
attendant concern to our relationship with the Other' (Ong, 2009:463). Exactly how 
this relationship takes place and the reasons that may drive people to form 
connections with the 'other' and, indeed, who this distant 'other' represents to 
different groups, are all subject to the core of cosmopolitanism as an experience and 
set of values. Thus, cosmopolitanism needs to be approached ontologically as a 
'contextual, fragile identity' (Ong, 2009:463) which is articulated in a range of 
different expressional forms. As Beck (2004:134) writes, cosmopolitanism existing 
in the real world is not an idealistic vision associated with a 'glittering moral 
authority' (ibid.:135) as often argued by theorists of the enlightenment period. It is a 
deformed identity that organically takes shape in different forms in a world that 
'includes both the location of one's own lifestyle within the horizon of other 
possibilities, and the ability to see oneself from the viewpoint of those who are 
culturally other' (Beck, 2004:153).    
 
To appreciate the specific attributes that cosmopolitanism as an analytical concept 
brings to the social sciences, it is important to reflect on its Kantian origins. Kant, 
discussing his cosmopolitan vision in the early 18
th
 century, proposed the need for a 
'civil society which can administer justice universally' (Kant, 2010:20). According to 
Kant, cosmopolitanism represented a transcending and universal humanitarian 
community with an important ethical and moral dimension that world citizens were 
to relate to as equal individuals. These individuals were to be guaranteed basic rights 
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established through common cosmopolitan laws (Kant, 2010). Kant's theorisation 
provides an attractive proposition for an egalitarian interconnected world 
underpinned by universal moral values. Nevertheless, how is this to be translated into 
an everyday social reality for individuals and groups embedded within multiply 
dispersed and distinct localities? Significantly, Kant's analysis is based on a western 
and North European experience and political culture, and thus to what extent can his 
vision for cosmopolitanism be applied to other socio-cultural and political contexts 
outside the west? In particular, Kant downplays the importance of the nation in 
people's experience and ideologies. Although he recognizes the state as an important 
political container, albeit one that fails to preserve and guarantee the basic rights of 
its citizens, the role of the nation as an everyday cultural reference that provides a 
sense of stability, security and importantly, identity, is not sufficiently addressed. 
Appiah (1997:618), on the other hand, has argued for a 'rooted cosmopolitanism' or a 
'cosmopolitan patriotism' in which individuals can remain embedded in their own 
local particularities, while also developing cosmopolitan desires to be part of a wider 
world. Appiah maintains that the nation must occupy a central role in theorizations of 
cosmopolitanism, precisely because it continues to matter and be desired by people 
'whose autonomous desires we ought to acknowledge and take account of' 
(1997:624).                       
 
According to Fine (2003a;2003b), by downplaying the importance of the nation, 
Kant could be writing about an idealistic cosmopolitan vision as it ought to be, or as 
he envisaged it in his mind, rather than a complex, grounded reality as it actually 
exists. Thus, Fine (2003a) argues that in order to go beyond the abstraction of a 
Kantian approach to cosmopolitanism, which often remains imprisoned at the level 
of intellectual thought, there is a need to reconcile universal beliefs with particular 
identities and interests. Furthermore, Harvey (2000a) asserts that just as we are in 
need of a cosmopolitan mode of thinking that pays increased attention to specific 
places and localized ways of life, so we are in need of a new geographical knowledge 
that is inspired by a wider cosmopolitan vision. Harvey argues how cosmopolitanism 
and geographical particularities do not exist as mutually exclusive categories, but are 
involved in a dialectical relationship where one is central to, and constantly informs 
the other. Perhaps the value of Harvey's conceptualization of cosmopolitanism 
becomes more apparent if we contrast it with Nussbaum's (1994) more constricted 
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approach. Nussbaum (1994) develops a particular understanding of cosmopolitanism 
which she conceives to be incompatible with nationalism and local loyalties. 
Patriotic sentiments, according to Nussbaum, closed and parochial as they are, exist 
in opposition to a true cosmopolitan essence based on universal laws and moral 
values.  
 
Returning to Harvey, rather than using the term 'local' which may seem to point to an 
essentialist, closed form of particular belonging as theorized by Nussbaum, Harvey 
refers to geography. He defines geography as the way 'places and localized ways of 
life are relationally constructed by a variety of intersecting sociological processes 
occurring at quite different spatiotemporal scales' (Harvey, 2000a: 542). Thus, just as 
cosmopolitanism is informed and mediated by localized ways of life, so it is a two-
way process of influence where the local has become increasingly cosmopolitanised. 
The local is not a static product of the present moment, according to Harvey, but a 
dynamic social space constructed at the intersection of the immediate and the global. 
In this context, Harvey (2000b:16) calls for a 'relational dialectics' where the 
universal and the particular are not counterposed, but always 'internalized and 
implicated in the other'. This brings me back to the concept of internal heterogeneity 
I mentioned in the Introduction, and the way the global is not an entity that exists 
externally to us or outside of our localities and everyday experiences, but we are 
increasingly involved in the construction of more creative spaces where the local and 
the global are dialectically interlinked. In this context, cosmopolitanism is not about 
prioritizing the global over the local or vice versa, but is about a 'mutual affording of 
space' where 'regulation might occur of culturo-symbolical treatments of both 'own 
and 'other' ' (Rapport, 2007:231). As Massey (2005) argues, we should avoid making 
the distinction between place as a local entity that is concrete and bounded, and space 
as being global and abstract. Massey proposes that both space and place have 
become increasingly interrelated as space is increasingly a product of multiple 
interrelations between local, global and national processes.  
 
Following on from the above, what I am trying to do is slowly deconstruct the term 
'cosmopolitanism,' de-linking it from some of the conceptual baggage that has 
become common to the way we understand it. Thus far I have established that at the 
core of cosmopolitanism is an interconnection to a wider world that exists beyond 
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national borders. Nevertheless, what is the nature of this interconnection, and how is 
it sustained in modern times? The media have become our main platforms of 
connection to a larger world beyond immediate frontiers, meaning that we often 
connect symbolically rather than physically to what occurs across distance. 
Silverstone (2007) and Chouliaraki (2008) both provide key references for furthering 
our understanding of the importance of the media in sustaining and constructing (or 
not) cosmopolitan identities. Silverstone (2007) discusses the media's contemporary 
importance as primary frames for people’s understanding of the world. He coins the 
term mediapolis in reference to the media as a moral space that redefines distance 
and a public space where the 'other' is represented. Nevertheless, Silverstone is 
critically sensitive to the shortcomings of the media in living up to the responsibility 
of fair representation that sustains the truly moral dimension of the cosmopolitan 
logic. According to Silverstone, cosmopolitanism 
 
implies and requires, therefore, both reflexivity and toleration. In 
political terms it demands justice and liberty. In social terms, 
hospitality. And in media terms it requires…..an obligation to listen, 
an obligation which I will suggest is a version of hospitality (2007:14). 
 
The media achieve a sense of cosmopolitan connection to the wider world through 
their constant performance of 'boundary work' (ibid.:19), which importantly, involves 
immense power and an immense responsibility; a responsibility that the media fail to 
acknowledge through their selective and culturally biased modes of reporting that 
often demonize the 'other'.  
 
Chouliaraki's (2008) research into the role of news media in sustaining a 
cosmopolitan logic and sense of ethical connection to distant suffering has also 
provided useful insights. Specifically, Chouliaraki questions the extent to which the 
media not only expose people to distant suffering, but 'simultaneously expose them to 
specific dispositions to feel, think, and act toward each instance of suffering' 
(2008:372, emphasis in original). The author argues that a cosmopolitan logic is 
sustained only through one genre of news out of the three she studied: emergency 
news. This genre of news presents a dramatic story about the misfortunes of a distant 
other, and then engages the spectator by calling upon them to take part in emergency 
action to relieve this misfortune in some way. Significantly, what both of the above 
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studies so accurately demonstrate is the gap that distinguishes an ideal form of 
cosmopolitanism that we may perhaps strive to achieve (as one of hospitality and an 
ethical concern for the distant other), and a 'deformed' (Beck, 2004: 134) 
cosmopolitanism that actually exists in the context of a highly mediated everyday 
life. Both the above conceptualisations illustrate how cosmopolitanism should not be 
celebrated as a taken for granted 'given,' a natural side effect of a world that has 
become increasingly interconnected. As a fragile and highly contextualized identity, 
a range of circumstances need to be provided and sustained before people are 
propelled to begin thinking and feeling like cosmopolitans. For Silverstone (2007) 
this involves a responsible media space where cultural representations need to be 
fairly controlled through laws and media regulations. For Chouliaraki (2008), the 
way news stories are framed, and the methods of reporting such as the use of 
personalized stories, determines the extent to which news spectators begin to elicit a 
sense of ethical sympathy towards the distant other.       
 
A point of immense significance to my own research, is the fact that both of these 
authors are writing from a purely western perspective. They both examine 
cosmopolitanism as a set of sentiments that travels from the west to the rest. For 
instance, Chouliaraki (2008) explores the way emergency news reports on western 
European channels are able to sustain cosmopolitan sympathies amongst the western 
spectator toward African sufferers or a Nigerian woman convicted to death by 
stoning. Such discussions, limited within western discourse and western political 
culture, leave open the question of how those outside the west and outside its liberal 
political experiences, can ever become cosmopolitan. What happens, I ask, when 
those usually on the receiving end of western cosmopolitan sympathies, seek to 
become the main protagonists of cosmopolitanism themselves?  In a highly 
repressive context such as Egypt where individual liberties are quashed, and where 
there are no avenues through which ethical values central to cosmopolitanism such as 
freedom, democracy and justice can be expressed or exercised, where does this leave 
the type of cosmopolitanism theorized by Kant (2010), Chouliaraki (2008) and 
Silverstone (2007)? Would it be fair, realistic even, to suggest that individuals living 
in such dismal social conditions and autocratic political contexts, engage in 
cosmopolitan sentiments that display an ethical concern towards instances of distant 
suffering? Focusing on pre-revolutionary Cairo, I wish to move the debate away 
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from the vantage point of western liberal democracies that have provided the 
contextual backdrop for many theories of cosmopolitanism. Instead, I seek to 
question the extent to which those outside the west (outside it physically, yet also 
socio-politically in relation to being very distant from its practices and ideals of 
justice and human liberty) can engage in the construction of a cosmopolitan identity.  
I explore this in the next section when I analyse how the concept of cosmopolitanism 
has recently made an advance within Middle East studies.  
 
3.2.1 Cosmopolitanism within Middle East Studies: Moving Beyond the 
Nostalgic and the Elitist 
Although many of the notable theoretical contributions to cosmopolitanism within 
the social sciences have been approached through a western lens, there is an existing 
and growing body of cosmopolitan research within Middle Eastern academia. 
Although this research may have suffered extensive critique, it importantly 
demythologises the notion that cosmopolitanism is essentially a western cultural 
product.  Indeed, the Arab world has long been regarded as a centre and setting for 
cross-cultural and cosmopolitan interaction.  In particular, Calhoun (2002:872) writes 
that the Ottoman Empire (1301-1922) with its diplomatic relations, established trade 
routes and thus multinational, multilingual nature, was a ‘high point of 
cosmopolitanism’. Nevertheless, despite cosmopolitan cultural relations being 
intrinsic to the history of the Arab region, the concept of cosmopolitanism has been 
starkly impoverished and underdeveloped within Middle East scholarship. As Hanley 
(2008:1348) notes, within the historiography of the Middle East, cosmopolitanism is 
a ‘particular, European, literate, bourgeois perspective’. More specifically, Hanley 
argues, cosmopolitanism according to such a perspective is both exclusive, being 
reserved for European educated Arab elites, and adopts the tone of grieving nostalgia 
− a yearning for an historically imagined utopia of intense social mixing that once 
existed.  
Zubaida’s (2002) exploration of the historical experiences of cosmopolitanism in the 
Middle East provides an important illustration of such an elitist and nostalgic 
contribution. According to Zubaida’s (2002:33) analysis of the Ottoman Empire, any 
evidence of cosmopolitan milieux that existed until the nineteenth century, was 
confined to ‘the higher echelons of Istanbul society…of patrician merchants, 
72 
 
diplomats and courtiers’. Such culturally diverse milieux, Zubaida argues, sat 
uncomfortably with local religio-communal boundaries, and so were able to flourish 
only through the deracination from caste community and religion. Thus, drawing 
heavily on European models and influences, this type of cosmopolitanism advocated 
by Zubaida functioned through an exclusion of the poor and those with more nativist 
ambitions who had a strong sense of connection to religious and national culture.  In 
this sense, to be a cosmopolitan, one had to live a cosmopolitan ‘lifestyle,’ such as 
Jamaleddin al-Afghani, described by Zubaida (2002:35) as a ‘remarkable 
cosmopolitan’. Al-Afghani was a member of Masonic lodges, frequented cafes and 
clubs, regularly drank alcohol and was thought to have illicit sexual encounters.  
According to the above account, cosmopolitanism is conditioned by secularism and 
wealth, ‘both of which are signalled (in the context of Islam) by consumption of 
alcohol’ (Hanley, 2008: 1350). Nevertheless, detailed accounts and observations of 
some of the most important cosmopolitan centres in the Arab world, particularly 
Alexandria –Egypt’s second largest city – illustrate the active role played by the 
lower classes in sustaining cosmopolitan networks. Fahmy (2004:281), for instance, 
rightly argues how the celebrated cosmopolitanism of Alexandria is ‘essentially 
predicated on ignoring and silencing the city’s Arabic-speaking population’. 
According to the author, however, it is possible to develop a ‘quotidian, non-elitist 
dimension’(ibid.:282) to understanding the everyday relevance of cosmopolitanism, 
through an examination of the mundane micro-practices of everyday city life. Such 
an examination reveals that, in fact, lower class Egyptians played an important role 
in the development of ‘cosmopolitan’ Alexandria, and thus deserve to be recognized 
as ‘the true founders’ (ibid.:289) of the modern city. 
Fahmy (2004) gives a detailed and interesting account of how non-elite Egyptians 
interacted with the diverse foreign communities of Alexandria on a daily basis in a 
peaceful manner. These intense cross-cultural interactions saw people from different 
religious and national backgrounds trade with each other, exchange currencies, eat, 
drink and have sex with one another. In a similar vein, Aciman’s (2006) intriguing 
memoir of life as a Sephardic Jew in mid twentieth century Alexandria, finely 
captures the important presence of working class Egyptians in sustaining the 
cosmopolitan networks and activities that characterised the city at that time. His 
biographic account vividly documents how Egyptian servants, cooks, maids and even 
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butchers − accustomed to interacting with European residents of the city − learned 
new languages and diverse culinary skills through their daily domestic labour and 
work in organizing inter-cultural parties in foreign consulates.  
What the above studies illustrate is that there are different forms and varieties of 
cosmopolitanism that do not necessarily negate or exclude poverty, national 
allegiances and religion as argued by Zubaida (2002). As Hanley writes (2008), 
Middle East studies should move beyond the elitist and restricted approach that has 
long been followed, accepting that multiple cosmopolitanisms exist. Thus, through 
empirical work and ethnographic research, it is possible to shift the emphasis away 
from cosmopolitanism as a static or fixed criteria, and be willing to investigate it as a 
practiced and lived identity. Indeed, this approach has been adopted by the New 
Cairo School of Urban Studies, which has lately published a comprehensive volume, 
compiling a large number of research projects documenting the diverse cosmopolitan 
networks and identities expressed across Cairo (Singerman and Amar, 2006). Puig 
(2006), for instance, has explored the highly cosmopolitan nature of the famed 
Muhammad Ali Street located in one of Cairo’s most popular working class districts. 
Renowned for its famous street musicians, Puig notes how the musical activities of 
the street, up until the 1970s, were an important hub for bringing together a broad 
range of musical styles, instruments and influences that have culminated throughout 
Egypt’s long multi-layered, multicultural history. The cosmopolitan ambiance of the 
street, infusing Turkish, local Arab and European musical cultures, became a focal 
point for aspiring musicians from Egypt, but also more widely from across the Arab 
region. Puig even describes how the introduction of global forms of technology – 
particularly cassette tapes – to these more traditional forms of folklore music, 
allowed Muhammed Ali Street musicians to achieve huge financial success by 
breaking into the mass market. In the same volume, De Koning (2006:228) provides 
an interesting analysis of how up-market cafés in Cairo allow the young upper 
middle class to engage in imagined cosmopolitan spaces that are ‘local, Cairene, and 
Egyptian, yet part of wider First-World circuits and publics’. Such chic urban spots, 
that keep the poor out, allow upper class men and women to consolidate their elite 
status by displaying their global connections, sophisticated cross-cultural tastes and 
cosmopolitan elegance. Nevertheless, although functioning as spaces of first-world 
belonging and sophistication, these cafes are also protected urban niches where 
74 
 
appropriate forms of cross-gender mixing and low key flirting as acceptable in the 
Egyptian context can take place.     
Such important empirical explorations outlined above are a reminder of how 
cosmopolitanism in the Arab world is not a utopic fantasy of times past that we 
should mourn and continue to yearn. Cosmopolitanism is an intrinsic reality of the 
present that we need to discover and explore in its many different evolving forms. 
Furthermore, according to Zubaida (2002:39), contemporary media are incapable of 
sustaining the sophisticated cosmopolitan networks that once existed as they fail to 
‘breach communal and particularistic boundaries and spaces’.  Nevertheless, by 
sweepingly overlooking the centrality of the media, Zubaida marginalizes the 
cosmopolitan aspirations that could be open to a large group of people who remain 
socially and physically immobile. An important question for Middle East studies, 
Hanley (2008) argues, is whether cosmopolitanism is a material or mental condition. 
According to Zubaida’s analysis, old cosmopolitan milieux could be measured 
through exclusive lifestyle practices that placed people within particular elite circles 
and western cultural networks.  Nevertheless, by giving prominence to the role of the 
media, my research explores how modern cosmopolitan identities in Cairo are not 
necessarily dependent upon access to resources and wealth, but are sustained by the 
power of imagination. Cosmopolitanism is about a subjective desire and willingness 
to be included; to partake in and contribute to a global cultural youth scene, even 
when financial resources and cultural capital are extremely limited. Thus, I explore 
the importance of television in broadening young Egyptians’ interpretive horizons 
and cultural knowledge beyond their immediate, familiar framework. Nevertheless, 
as local affiliations and the particularities of geographical space remain central to 
their identities, I demonstrate how religious beliefs and national sentiment are not 
antithetic to cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the media allow these young men and women 
to form multiple allegiances to God, the nation and global culture simultaneously.   
3.2.2 Cosmopolitanism in Cairo as a Third-Order Framework 
Based on the above discussion, I propose that a very particular type of 
cosmopolitanism is taking place in Egypt. Specifically, I argue how there are 
alternative ways to feel part of a common humanity that do not conform completely 
to a Kantian understanding of cosmopolitanism, nor are always able to draw directly 
from values of western liberalism. As Ong (2009) notes, media studies have for too 
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long approached cosmopolitanism as the relationship between media consumption 
and the formulation of a moral consciousness. Although this rests 'atop of the moral 
hierarchy, it is also an expression that leaves out many other ways by which 
individuals in a globalizing world relate with difference' (Ong, 2009:463). 
Specifically, I argue that what we observe among young people in Cairo is a third-
order cosmopolitanism. The everyday lives of young Egyptians are positioned 
between two established structures of power, one of which operates from within the 
nation, and another on a broader transnational scale. I draw here on Martin-Barbero's 
(1993a) framework for understanding change and hegemony. In his analysis of how 
native Indian identities have taken shape in contemporary Latin America, Martin-
Barbero (1993a) argues that native cultures cannot be conceived of as pure, 
autonomous and authentic, but must be regarded as integrated within, and thus partly 
transformed by wider transnational structures, particularly capitalism. By drawing on 
Garcia Canclini's work and focusing on how the production of Indian crafts has 
developed and changed in the context of globalization, Martin-Barbero charts change 
and hegemony as operating both through outside pressures and internal mediations. 
Whereas the former refers to the external influence of capitalism and a changing 
tourist industry, the latter pertains to changes that have taken place internally, 
particularly how relations of production have altered within the local Indian craft 
community.      
 
Drawing on Martin-Barbero's framework, which proposes that hegemony operates 
both internally and externally, I argue through my third-order framework for 
cosmopolitanism that hegemony in Egypt operates on two levels: both from within 
the nation-state, but also from the outside, taking place on a broader transnational 
scale. I have discussed the following factors in more detail in Chapter Two, although 
I will review them here briefly. At a sub-national scale, the daily lives of young 
Egyptians are rigidly structured around the categories of class and gender. Socio-
economic background in Egypt determines relations of power and access to resources 
(Moghadam cf. Inhorn, 1996), public space (De Koning, 2009; Abaza, 2006) and 
education (Gamal El Din, 1995). Gender is also an important determinant of one's 
everyday experiences in the Egyptian context, particularly shaping women's visibility 
in public spaces (De Koning, 2009; Mensch, Ibrahim, Lee, et al., 2000) and 
embodied appearance (Macleod, 1992; Hoodfar, 1991). Furthermore, at the level of 
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government policy, the autocratic Egyptian regime headed by Hosny Mubarak 
(1981-2011) has quashed civil liberties and citizen rights, providing no opportunities 
for democratic rights, political participation, or avenues through which to voice 
dissent. In this context, Egypt has experienced a social and political stalemate over 
the past 30 years.  
 
Regarding outside pressures, global hierarchical divides that shape relations between 
nations have accorded Egypt a very specific place on a global ranking of power. 
Firstly, a long history of British colonial rule has been instrumental in influencing the 
imaginations of Egyptians in relation to the west as a 'superior' imperial centre 
(Abaza, 2006; Amin, 2005). Secondly, there is the universal spread of a global 
capitalist order and the hegemonic consumer culture it has brought in its wake, often 
raising concerns in Egypt regarding western forms of cultural imperialism (Amin & 
Napoli, 2000). Thirdly, is the strong support that western superpowers have 
exercised towards the corrupt political regime in Egypt, allowing Mubarak to 
maintain an unchallenged position of power for over 30 years. As the revolution in 
Egypt broke out on 25
th
 of January 2011, US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, 
completely disregarded the opportunity of hope the revolution represented for 
Egyptians. She urged them to back down, claiming Mubarak's regime was 'stable' 
and 'looking for ways to meet the Egyptian people's aspirations' (Reuters Africa, 
2011). This 'political stability' celebrated by Clinton may have been pivotal to 
American political interests in the region, but seemed to willingly overlook appalling 
human rights abuses, a lack of democratic rights of expression, and the political 
corruption that shaped Mubarak's regime for over three decades.  
Where does cosmopolitanism, as experienced in Cairo, fit in within these two 
established structures of power? I argue that cosmopolitanism, involving a complex 
interplay between national identities, consumer practices and urban mobilities, 
becomes a third space of imagination that provides opportunities for resistance, 
allowing structured limits imposed upon the self to be negotiated. As Stevenson 
(2003:36) argues, cosmopolitanism should be 'concerned with questions of 
imagination, identity, recognition and belonging as it has more traditionally been 
with entitlements and obligations'. The media, particularly television, represents a 
space for potential reflection and interpretation where young Egyptians are exposed 
to alternative forms of governance and different cultural influences, meaning the self 
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and nation are constantly compared to, and perceived in the light of distant others. In 
this context, as the possibilities of other worlds and the existence of distant ways of 
life become central to young Egyptians' subjective experiences, the limitations and 
constraints placed upon the self become increasingly exposed. Thus, as a complex 
'multidimensional process' (Beck, 2004:136) sustaining a range of national, religious 
and global affiliations, cosmopolitanism in Egypt translates into a sense of 
imagination that aspires to be part of the world, seeking to engage with a 'wider array 
of paths, possibilities, styles and aims "out there"' (Schielke, 2007:3). In its most 
basic form, therefore, a cosmopolitan imagination in Cairo is about the dream of a 
better life at home, yet one that draws heavily on the possibilities and promises 
enabled through a vision that locates one's experiences at the centre of a wider world. 
In the next section I explore how I conceptualise 'imagination' within the context of 
my third-order cosmopolitan framework.  
 
 
3.3 Cosmopolitanism as Imagination: A Different Lens in Examining Identity 
Construction 
 
Although the daily lives of young Cairenes are located within embedded structures 
that place firm limits on their social and physical mobilities, television provides a 
space from within which highly structured limits on the self are negotiated. Thus, as 
these men and women's imagination shifts between different systems of 
representation available to them in the rich mediascapes they have access to, 
horizons of their identity also expand. In this context, I argue how cosmopolitanism 
takes the form of a dynamic subjective space and becomes a horizon for imagining 
the self and others in a broader cultural and political context that surpasses direct 
experience. Imagination, therefore, is not intended as a replacement of the concept of 
identity, but becomes a way to understand how identity is shaped and how media 
representation can challenge boundaries of rigid social structures. My choice to use 
imagination draws from, and is based on wider established debates that approach 
contemporary identities as socially constructed. My research proposes that within the 
process of identity construction, however, the imagination of the limits of self and 
others, particularly in relation to televised representation, is crucial. In this context, 
imagination becomes a lens allowing me to examine how young Egyptians are 
shaping their identities at the juxtaposition of a social reality, which is rigidly 
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structured around classed and gendered divides and unequal relations of global 
power and influence, on the one hand, yet a diverse and fluid system of media 
representations of self and others, on the other hand. 
 
According to Stevenson (2003:42), cosmopolitanism needs to be 'discursively and 
emotionally imagined' in order for people to begin thinking and feeling like 
cosmopolitans. Additionally, by establishing imagination as crucial to the articulation 
of cosmopolitan affiliations, Delanty argues how cosmopolitanism offers 
'opportunities for new kinds of connectivity through which the social is constituted 
beyond the limits of national societies' (2005:416). In the context of a transnational 
European affiliation, Delanty contends that this cosmopolitan Europeanization does 
not unfold in opposition to global and national forces. Through processes of 
imagination, however, both old and new identities come together in transformative 
ways resulting in multiple cosmopolitan possibilities. Hence, for cosmopolitanism to 
have any meaning, Delanty (2005; 2006) theorizes it as an 'imagining' which is 
cognitively experienced, resulting in the dynamic and reflexive (re)construction and 
(re)interpretation of bounded identities.  
 
Following on from the above discussion, crucial to imagination is the way subjective 
forms of mobility enabled by the media have provided space for the revaluation and 
reflexive interpretation of concrete identities and particular experience. Focusing 
exclusively on this cognitive and reflexive aspect as the main determinant of the 
construction of subjectivities in the modern world, several theorists have made a bold 
argument against identity altogether. Cohen (1994) observes that in order to 
understand the self, we must attempt to grasp processes of self consciousness – to 
elicit and describe the thoughts of individuals that are often glossed over when we 
talk about 'identities' and generalised collective social categories. Thus, Cohen argues 
that we cannot talk of a collectivity sharing a single national or religious identity as 
there can never be one agreed unanimous definition across a diverse group of what 
this identity involves or represents. With a specific focus on the media as vehicles for 
the construction of modern subjectivities, Aksoy and Robins (2003) also provide a 
key reference in the debate against identity. According to their study of Turkish 
speaking communities in London, mediated transnational experiences are associated 
with novel kinds of mental and imaginative processes that transcend the specificity 
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of cultural space. Using the concept of identity, Aksoy and Robins argue, makes no 
room for human consciousness, awareness and reflexivity. Whereas identity may 
connote something that is stable, continuous and unchanging, imagination, for Aksoy 
and Robins, better captures socially constructed experiences that are contextualised, 
discontinuous and constantly shifting.  
 
 Although I agree with Aksoy and Robins', and Cohen's focus on subjective 
consciousness as a useful indicator of the nature of contemporary identity 
formations, I do not subscribe to the idea that identity has academically expired or 
has become irrelevant in the context of social research. Evidence from my study 
illustrates that social categories and identity positions, particularly class, gender and 
the nation, continue to inform and shape the everyday experiences of young 
Egyptians, often limiting their mobilities and even determining their life chances. 
Nevertheless, as much as these bonds of identity can constrain and highly structure 
their daily lives, so imagination, drawing heavily on media representations, provides 
opportunities to challenge the limits of social order and hegemonic values associated 
with it. In this context, and as the media allow young Egyptians to expand the 
repertoires of their cultural references, they display greater forms of self-scrutiny and 
reflexivity towards established identity positions, rather than abandoning identity 
altogether or engaging in the construction of supra-national identity networks 
(Delanty 2005;2006). Indeed, in their discussion of 'reimagined solidarities', Morley 
and Robins (1995:41) argue how solidarities and collectivities have not disappeared 
in contemporary times, although they increasingly develop aspirations directed 
beyond immediate and local experience. The crucial question, according to the 
authors, should be about positions and positionings in local and global space: how 
bodies are located in a particular place, although a subjective existence is 
increasingly shaped by a less bounded mediated space. These new forms of mobility 
'make local attachment not a matter of ascribed and determined identity but 
increasingly a question of choice, decision and variability' (Morley and Robins, 
1995:41).  
 
In light of the above discussion, I follow Delanty's stance and mobilise the notion of 
cosmopolitan imagination as one that is not at tension with, or above national 
identity or any other type of identity, but represents an overarching imagination and 
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system of organisation through which established or traditional identity positions can 
be understood and negotiated in new ways. As Appiah argues in defence of national 
patriotic sentiments within cosmopolitanism: 'even when we are constructing new 
and counternormative identities, it is the old and the normative that provide the 
language and the background' (1997:625). Thus, by centring imagination as the 
primary lens through which I approach the (re)construction of identities in Cairo, I 
display a sensitivity to the ways in which agency is often accorded a space to operate 
from within – yet never overcoming – established systems of structure, providing 
opportunities for young Egyptians to interpret and negotiate their identities in new 
ways.  
 
It is, however, important not to over-romanticise the capacity for human agency 
within the process of imagination. Although imagination can provide young 
Egyptians with opportunities for reflexive kinds of interpretation, evidence from my 
research suggests that they still remain bound by the expectations of established 
structures of the class and gender they are affiliated with. In his analysis of Indian 
television, Kumar (2006) displays an important sensitivity to everyday structures of 
capitalist discourse that highly regulate everyday imaginations of the Indian nation. 
Contemporary forms of mediated imagination, Kumar argues, have increasingly 
become a collective property involving the 'collective agency of viewers who are free 
to be at home with their television sets, even as they are regulated by the ideological 
constraints of electronic capitalism' (Kumar, 2006:18 emphasis mine). Hence, 
according to Kumar's analysis, Indian television audiences are accorded a degree of 
freedom in their ability to access transnational channels and thus diverse mediated 
representations that expand their national imagination. Simultaneously, however, 
they are embedded within capitalist ideological networks and collective social 
positions that regulate – usually unconsciously – the boundaries within which their 
everyday imagination is articulated. Thus, it cannot be denied that we are conscious 
and creative beings with some ability to form our own reflexive understandings of 
the world. Inevitably, however, how we come to form these understandings is framed 
by dominant structures of power, such as those associated with class and gender. 
These systems, from which it is impossible to completely escape, continue to 
regulate lived traditions and practices (Hall, 1980).  
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Appadurai (1996) provides a key reference in the debate on imagination and power, 
as he theorizes imagination as a social practice undertaken by historically situated 
groups and people. Imagination, according to Appadurai, is not a mythical enclave 
through which individual fantasies can be played out, but is a lived practice that 
emerges from within the daily experiences of ordinary people and importantly, social 
groups:  
 
It is the imagination, in its collective forms, that creates ideas of 
neighbourhood and nationhood, of moral economies and unjust rule, 
of higher wages and foreign labor prospects. The imagination is today 
a staging ground for action, and not only for escape (Appadurai, 
1996:7). 
 
Imagination, according to Appadurai, is not driven by individual whims and 
aspirations, but is firmly located within grounded everyday practices, and takes its 
meanings through processes of joint collectivity. In light of this observation, 
although I approach cosmopolitan imagination as a mediated openness to the world 
that offers diverse cultural possibilities and opportunities, I also recognize it to be a 
highly unequal and stratified process. Hence, as cosmopolitan imagination in Cairo 
intersects with the specificities of everyday experience, especially in relation to class 
inequalities and unequal gender relations, it takes on three very different forms. 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight explore how three different classed versions of a 
cosmopolitan imagination emerge in Cairo at the juxtaposition of age, gender 
relations and everyday life in the city. 
 
Furthermore, I argue that cosmopolitan imagination in Egypt is not an ahistorical 
product of the present moment. Imagination is not only constructed within the 
intersection of proximity and difference, especially as this is negotiated in mediated 
communication, but also within the changing historical context, especially as 
associated with colonialism. As Ang and Morley have argued in relation to the 
potency of the west as a symbol of cultural superiority and power, '(the west) is not 
just a geographical site, it is also an idea: an idea inextricably linked with the myth of 
Western civilization, and its implications not only of culture but also of colonialism' 
(Ang & Morley, 1989:133). Furthermore, as Appadurai (1996:2) usefully reminds us: 
'all major social forces have precursors, precedents, analogs and sources in the past'. 
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Thus Appadurai warns us against 'the legacies of grand western social science' 
(Appadurai, 1996:2) that theorize the present as a single, steady moment articulated 
solely within the realms of the immediate and the familiar. Imagination, therefore, is 
constructed within socio-cultural and political contexts where colonial power 
continues to influence and inform the aspirations, memories and dreams of young 
Egyptians. As Mitchell (1991) argues, the British imperial rule in Egypt not only 
controlled the bodies of Egyptians, but more importantly, captured their minds, and 
continued to do so even decades after it ended.       
 
3.4 Postcolonialism and Egyptian Imagination Across Time 
 
Talking to any middle class Egyptian brought up in 1940s and 1950s Cairo, I have 
become accustomed to hearing reminiscent sighs of how 'Egypt used to be a piece of 
Europe'. Indeed, the era of British colonial rule in Egypt is often perceived to be the 
most elegant, modern and advanced period in its history (Abaza, 2006; Denis, 2006; 
Kuppinger, 2004). Walking round the streets of Cairo today, especially downtown 
and the elite districts of Maadi, Zamalek and Garden City (themselves products of 
British colonial rule), the physical reminders, or the 'shreds and patches' (Appadurai, 
1996:89) of the colonial heritage remain visibly present within Cairo's urbanscape. It 
is marked in the boulevards of the downtown area, and the wide open spaces and 
modern European architectural designs not characteristic of the rest of Cairo. It is 
also seen in the multi-storey shopping complexes of Cicurel, Sednaoui and Chemla 
grand magazins that displayed expensive European goods, catering to Cairo's rich 
and elite. Still very much functioning and highly popular in Cairo today are the social 
and sports clubs, especially El-Maadi and El-Gezeira, built originally for colonial 
administrators (Abaza, 2006) yet today catering to Cairo's middle class. It seems, 
therefore, that although colonialism may have ended politically as a form of imposed 
territorial rule, the lasting influences and physical symbols of the colonial heritage 
remain very much interwined in the culture of modern day Egypt and its capital city.  
 
As Richard Werbner (1996:4) argues, the post in postcolonial is a 'marker of 
dynamic complexity': does it refer to what takes place after colonialism, because of 
it, or in opposition to it? I propose that the subjective influences including memories 
and cultural desires associated with Egypt's colonial past have not completely 
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eroded, yet continue to shape the everyday imagination of young Egyptians. Said, 
(1995) in his seminal Orientalism, argues that the legacy of western colonialism 
continues to have a lasting ideological influence in our modern world. In the wake of 
colonialism, regulated systems of producing knowledge have created a naturalized 
vision of the world divided between a weak, irrational orient (east) and the powerful 
occident (west). Indeed, as Fanon observed in relation to this lasting form of 
ideological control, hegemonic cultures not only colonize lands, but, often to greater 
effect, 'colonize the mind' (cf. Harootunian, 2002:167) In relation to the experiences 
of the Arab world, Sabry  argues:  
 
Even though most Arab societies are postcolonial societies, the 
postcolonial question is seldom posed in the Arab world today in 
relation to the identity and structures of feelings of Arabs. It is as if the 
aftermath of colonialism had washed away completely (2007:165).  
 
If colonialism, as Sabry contends, has created a particular 'structure of feeling' that 
continues to shape identities in the modern Arab world, how exactly can we theorise 
and understand this very particular subjective interpretation of the world created as a 
result of colonial experience?  
 
Fanon's (1967) work has provided a key reference in developing modern day 
understandings of how colonialism has shaped the subjectivities of the colonial 
person. Focusing specifically on the experiences of Black West Indians living under 
the French colonial rule, Fanon (1967) describes how an awareness by blacks that 
they were being assessed through white eyes, created a feeling of inferiority that led 
them to symbolically distinguish themselves from the African-Negro race inhabiting 
Africa. Thus, although West Indians shared the same cultural heritage as Africans, 
the latter could not compete with Black West Indians, who, assimilated to the 
'modern' metropolis, spoke French, liked rum and danced the beguine (Fanon, 1967). 
Thus, by symbolically 'wearing' a white mask they associated with colonial 
superiority, the black West Indian, according to Fanon, was distinguished from the 
black African. DuBois (1998) also provides a seminal analysis of how colonialism 
shaped the subjective experiences of the black diaspora, although focusing his 
analysis specifically on early twentieth century America. According to DuBois, it 
was as a result of their race and African descent that Afro-Americans developed a 
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double-consciousness. The black self, constantly perceived through the eyes of white 
America, developed a self-perception as being an inferior second class citizen 
(DuBois, 1998). Fanon and DuBois' examinations of colonial subjectivities illustrate 
how colonial power was not only exercised in the form of seized lands and political 
control imposed from above. Rather, power occurred in a less forceful way as the 
colonized subjects themselves internalized racialised discourses of colonial 
superiority and inferiority. As I discussed in Chapter Two, a similar process took 
place in Egypt where not only the bodies, but the 'experiences and consciousness' 
(Gilroy, 2000:15) of Egyptians were captured by an imperial colonial power shaping 
their everyday cultural perceptions, desires and understandings of the world.   
 
Drawing heavily on the work of Fanon and DuBois, Gilroy (2000) explores the ways 
in which slavery and colonialism have employed 'race' as a rigid category of 
hierarchisation. Individuals enclosed within this system, Gilroy argues, were 
accorded a particular status within the colonial nation on the basis of cultural 
heritage. Gilroy finds Fanon's phenomenological analysis of racial identity 
particularly useful in disclosing how orders of power and differentiation were 
exercised in relation to skin colour or epidermalization. As Gilroy writes:  
 
It (epidermalization) refers to a historically specific system for making 
bodies meaningful by endowing them with qualities of "color." It 
suggests a perceptual regime in which the racialised body is bounded 
and protected by its enclosing skin (2000:46).  
 
Although Gilroy gives much precedence to Fanon and DuBois' conceptualisations of 
'race' as a category for maintaining political control within established relations of 
colonial power, he also argues that a closer micro-analysis of the everyday 
experiences of the colonized black diaspora, reveals spaces where structured 
categories of  race were often challenged and overcome.     
 
The notion of physical movement is central to Gilroy's analysis, which draws heavily 
on DuBois' concept of double consciousness. By coining the term Black Atlantic, 
Gilroy explores how the movement of black people across the Atlantic towards 
Europe, the Caribbean and America, resulted in new and dynamic forms of identity 
construction. He seeks to move away from dominant modes of thinking about race, 
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based on a 'bitter dualistic coding' (Gilroy, 1996: 21) where a singular, traditional 
and pure black identity is juxtaposed against modern, western ways of being. Gilroy 
argues that through their patterns of transatlantic mobility, black people have been 
actively involved in constructing a hybrid, dynamic form of black culture. Slavery 
and colonialism are not regarded by Gilroy to be solely about loss or a sense of 
mourning, but themselves to be pivotal moments in the way black people have been 
able to construct their own forms of modernity. Significantly, what Gilroy's analysis 
of the black enslaved diaspora illustrates, is that colonialism should not always be 
approached as a one-way process of complete domination. There have been spaces 
from within the dominant discourses of colonialism where new identities and forms 
of cultural connection have been envisioned by the colonized. Diouf (2000), for 
example, exploring the biography of a rural Senegalese Muslim brotherhood 
network, explores how their Islamic faith allowed the brotherhood to organize a 
unique cosmopolitanism that consisted of participation in, and not assimilation with 
the colonial administration. Thus, they engaged creatively with a governing colonial 
order in ways that corresponded to, and benefited their Islamic identity. 
 
According to Bhabha (1994), such moments of dynamic interaction between 
colonizer and colonized, would be theorized as 'in between space' (1994:2) resulting 
in the articulation of new cultural hybrid identities. Nevertheless, despite being a 
central figure of influence within postcolonial studies, Bhbabha's work has often 
been criticized for its abstraction and lack of empirical grounding. As Sabry writes:  
 
The concept of 'hybridity' as a 'third space' has no empirical 
foundation to support it, for how does one purport to understand a 
hybrid state of consciousness if the structure of the latter has not been 
put to the empirical test? (2007:167).  
 
Harootunian (2002) also criticizes Bhabha, particularly in relation to the way he 
bases his theoretical insights of the colonial experience solely on the single and 
limited colonial encounter between Britain and Bengal. Despite its contextual 
limitations, Bhabha's theory has, according to Harootunian, been made into a 
'muscular trope promising to stand in for the relationship between colonizer and 
colonized everywhere' (Harootunian, 2002:169). The main logic behind 
Harootunian's criticism is very important. According to the author, through the easy 
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circulation of reductionist binary terms that undermine the complexity of the colonial 
experience in different contexts, postcolonial theory has often fallen into the trap of 
being 'blind to the temporal and spatial differences lived and experienced by those 
voiceless, excluded, marginalized peoples it seeks to redeem' (Harootunian, 
2002:172). As Harootunian argues, it is important to acknowledge that the 
experiences of colonial domination differ vastly in different contexts. Thus, there is a 
pressing need for particularity within postcolonial research and to display more 
sensitivity to the specific political and economic histories of colonized countries. 
This way we can avoid the 'essentialisms' and 'exceptionalisms' often attributed to 
postcolonial theory (Harootunian, 2002:172).  
 
Furthermore, an essential point raised by Ahmad (1992) is that colonized citizens do 
not experience imperialism in the form of a foreign body of power imposed from the 
outside, but rather, imperialism exercises its power from within nation-states. In this 
context, according to Ahmad, the question of class within the context of colonialism 
becomes one of central importance. In relation to Egypt, for instance Abaza (2006) 
documents how the new forms of leisure, culture and education created by the British 
imperialist rule, were accessible to, and thus experienced almost exclusively by a 
small middle and upper class elite. Furthermore, in a critique of Fanon, Peterson 
(2007) argues that rather than speaking on behalf of the black colonized diaspora en 
masse, Fanon basis his analysis on an elite minority for whom an engagement with 
colonial powers was an everyday reality. The majority of colonized black people, 
according to Peterson, had no direct contact with the colonial rule and thus speaking 
French or drinking rum, as Fanon theorises to have been normal practice, was only 
experienced by a small privileged minority. In this context, Ahmad argues that the 
process of decolonization gave power to a national bourgeoisie that became the main 
recipient and benefactor of colonial culture.  For instance, using the example of the 
English language in postcolonial India, Ahmad explores the continued use of this 
'instrument' by the 'professional petty bourgeoisie' (1992:75) for 'dominant systems 
of administration, education and communication' (ibid.:74). He argues the dominant 
use of English amongst India's elite and professionals is a profound illustration of the 
organic cultural link maintained – on the basis of class – between an imperialist 
colonial power that continues to maintain its cultural presence and influence vis-à-vis 
the postcolonial bourgeois state.  
87 
 
 
In light of the above, a focus on Egypt as a postcolonial nation-state is not an attempt 
to sustain global hierarchical divides that may relegate it to the position of a third-
world colonized country. Rather, by exploring the historical relations of power 
specifically embodied in colonialism, I suggest it is possible to make greater sense of 
the present. As Shome and Hegde write, for cosmopolitan theories to provide 
academically and socially responsible research, they must be sensitive to, and 
question the histories and geographies of our modern day cultural relations (2002: 
265). Thus, history continues to matter, and precisely as Ahmad (1992) has shown, 
by being sensitive to transnational hierarchical divides that have historically taken 
place between nations, we can understand how these shape modern day divides – 
specifically in relation to class – within nations. Furthermore, Sabry (2007) and 
Harootunian's (2002) arguments are also an important reminder that when studying 
colonial histories, we cannot talk of 'A' or 'The' postcolonial experience. Research 
needs to document and be sensitive to the everyday material encounters and diverse 
socio-economic and political contexts that have shaped unique colonial experiences 
in different places. I believe that my study offers a much needed contribution in this 
respect, as through my empirical work with young Egyptians, I document how a 
colonial past, as it intersects with modern day urban experiences, socio-economic 
inequalities and television consumption practices, may continue to influence their 
identities and thus shape their cosmopolitan imagination. As Catherine Hall (1996) 
writes, memories from the past are interwined in our construction of modern 
identities. Thus, experiences of a colonial past do not necessarily remain buried in 
the past, but decolonization involves the complex ways certain aspects of a shared 
historical past continue to frame our modern understandings of the world.  
 
Ahmad argues we can better understand the way a colonial past continues to 
influence the present by focusing on how traditional forms of colonial imperialism 
have taken on a new guise in our contemporary world. In particular, this is related to 
a modern-day 'global triumph of imperialism' (Ahmad, 1992: 21) associated with a 
hegemonic capitalist order disseminated mainly from the United States. Harootunian 
(2002) makes a similar point when suggesting how an approach to postcoloniality as 
an act of memoration needs to be incorporated within the larger  
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framework of capitalist modernity and its transformations. Such a 
study might redirect our attention to the role played by capitalism 
throughout the globe and to the relationship between the experience of 
everydayness and the relentless regime of the commodity form 
(2002:173).  
 
Indeed, the emergence of this new form of imperialism, a globally circulating 
'cultural imperialism' (Tomlinson, 1991) has raised fears about the extent to which 
the universal spread of western – particularly American-style – liberal consumer 
culture has reaffirmed western power, leaving former colonies in a further state of 
dependency on the west. In a recorded interview with Sut Jhally, Said (Media 
Education Foundation, 1998) has distinguished between old colonial European, and 
more modern forms of (mediated) American orientalism. Whereas the former 
maintained control through direct territorial occupation, the latter is able to preserve 
a more politicized form of influence, boosted through the universal spread of western 
media systems. Following Said's (Media Education Foundation, 1998) thesis, to what 
extent have global media ensured the continuing and interrupted power of western 
nations since colonial times? Conversely, in what ways have the media provided 
important platforms reaffirming and strengthening local or more hybrid forms of 
identity? I address these questions in the next section. 
 
 
 
3.5 Transnational Media: Between Fears of Imperialism and Audiences' 
Hybridity 
 
Fears of media imperialism, or a one-way flow of media production from the west to 
the rest (Boyd-Barrett, 1977), has often raised concerns of western powers using 
these media outlets to transmit their cultural and economic values to the developing 
world, thus destroying indigenous cultures (Chadha & Kavoori, 2000). A proponent 
of dependency theory, Schiller (1991) argues that although the global political and 
economic stranglehold of the United States may be diminishing, US power is 
transferred to 'transnational corporate cultural domination' (Schiller, 1991: 15). In 
this context, media-cultural imperialism, according to Schiller, is not just embodied 
in television, but is a whole cultural apparatus that involves the universal spread of 
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the English language, shopping malls, international music and western news 
channels. Thus, the unprecedented increase of American dominated media-cultural 
systems, according to this approach, has left nations and peoples in the developing 
world, more vulnerable than ever to American forms of influence and domination 
(Schiller, 1991).      
 
Concerns over cultural imperialism have been especially rife in Egypt and across the 
Arab world. The popularity of both western media products and consumer culture 
has raised fears among writers and intellectuals over the dilution of local ways of life 
and the destruction of indigenous and religious values. Amin and Napoli (2000:183), 
for instance, argue that Egyptian society, and more widely, Islamic society, are 
'culturally defensive'. The Egyptian individual, according to the authors, 'identifies 
himself or herself first with the family and second with the religious community' 
(Amin and Napoli, 2000: 183) and thus increasing exposure to western media has 
intensified these cultural/religious defences. Abaza (2006) has also commented on 
how many Arab intellectuals have associated consumer practices with notions of 
'foreign intrusion, "cultural invasion" the destruction of indigenous values and modes 
of living, and of Americanisation' (Abaza, 2006:46).  
 
Sabry (2007) has criticized uniform approaches that make generalized claims without 
really testing empirically, how it is in reality, that assertions of cultural uniformity or 
homogenization take place in an everyday context. Indeed, Amin and Napoli's broad 
assertion that all Egyptians identify themselves first with the family and second with 
religion represents a naïve generalization reducing the vast complexities inherent in a 
nation comprised of multiple complex differences and internal heterogeneity. The 
universal spread and popularity of western media is undeniable. Yet, if we move 
beyond a political economy approach such as Schiller's (1991), and pay more 
attention to micro-practices at the receiving end of media consumption, then serious 
questions are raised. As Tomlinson (1991:42) writes: 'the key question is, does this 
presence represent cultural imperialism? Clearly the sheer presence alone does not'. 
Tomlinson (1991:61) argues how it is helpful to think of the media as 'the dominant 
representational aspects of modern culture', although the 'lived experience' of culture 
also means that other factors such as family relationships, work and education may 
shape and influence how the media are interpreted. Indeed, in Chapter Four I explore 
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the importance of class and gender to how audiences are able to construct diverse 
and multiple readings of media texts. Thus, the media should not be seen as 
determining, but rather mediating complex cultural experiences associated more 
broadly with other practices and socio-cultural and economic contexts that fall 
beyond the media (Tomlinson, 1991). Tomlinson's argument complements Martin-
Barbero's (1993b) influential approach to communications that does not begin from 
the assumption of absolute media power, but explores the creative and dynamic ways 
in which social movements in Latin America have used media products. Focusing 
particularly on telenovelas, music and the radio, Martin-Barbero explores how 
audiences interpret and appropriate them in ways not always intended by a dominant 
hegemonic ideology at the time of production.  
 
Martin-Barbero calls for a focus on mediation that places culture at the core of a 
complex process of communication, thus allowing us to acknowledge the resistances 
and the varied ways in which audiences use the media. Thus, discrediting the idea 
that the media are capable of forcing Latin American audiences to automatically 
conform to dominant ideologies, Martin-Barbero (1993b) has focused more on a 
complex process of cultural negotiation that takes place through the media. More 
specifically, the author has highlighted how subaltern classes have selectively 
adopted and critically adapted media messages contributing to the formation of new 
social identities. Martin-Barbero's approach that explores the creative appropriations 
and uses that audiences make of the media, is captured in Arvizu's (2009) research 
on linguistic capital and the creation of youth publics in Cairo that defy and subvert 
government censorship. Focusing on the distribution and consumption of youth 
magazines, Arvizu investigates how the use of 'Arabized English and the use of 
Arabic words in English type' (2009:395) has expanded the readership of these 
magazines beyond the middle classes, to include those with less financial and 
cultural capital not fluent in English. Thus, rather than homogenizing the cultural 
identities of young Egyptians, English language publications, through the use of 
creative socio-linguistic techniques, have allowed young Egyptians from different 
backgrounds to collectively maintain a critical civic public that operates despite 
government censorship.  
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By continuously adapting new communication techniques to avoid raising the 
suspicion of government officials who have a poor command of the English 
language, youth publics in Cairo 'seek to democratize the current media structure by 
creating their own forms of expression' (Arvizu, 2009:404). Findings from Arvizu's 
study correspond more generally to research conducted on Arab youth cultures, 
where the media have contributed not to a homogenization or unification of their 
practices, but have provided spaces for the negotiation of more dynamic hybrid youth 
identities. Kraidy's (1999) research on the media consumption practices of young 
Christian Maronites in Lebanon, provides a much needed illustration of how young 
Arabs construct their identities at the intersection of local particularities and global 
realities. Kraidy explores how these young men and women articulate their hybrid 
identities between two competing cultural discourses as framed predominantly 
through the media: modernity (west) and tradition (Arab). Media programs became 
important 'dialogical counterpoints' (Kraidy, 1999: 471) for these young Maronites, 
allowing them to set their own rules of inclusion and exclusion to both an 'Arab' and 
'western' culture, and thus to 'construct, preserve, and defend hybrid identities' 
(ibid.:471). 
 
The cultural/media imperialism thesis can only be sustained on the assumption that 
audiences outside the west are naturally choosing to consume western media over the 
diverse other media they may have access to. Nevertheless, through his theory of 
cultural proximity, Straubhaar (1991:39) argues otherwise. Confirming that relations 
within international media production continue to be highly unequal, Straubhaar 
(1991:43) uses the term 'asymmetrical interdependence' which recognizes the limits 
placed on many nations' media systems, yet also gives precedence to the unique 
dynamics of each nation's media industry development. Within such a framework 
that moves beyond a simple assumption of western media domination, Straubhaar 
argues that audiences display a preference for local, national or regional media 
content that is more proximate to their everyday concerns and cultural specificities. 
Furthermore, urging us not to view audiences, even within the same nation, as an 
undifferentiated mass, Straubhaar claims that desires for cultural proximity differ in 
relation to class and cultural capital, with the less educated preferring culturally 
proximate genres, in contrast to the better educated who display a preference for 
global and western programming.  
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Following a similar line of argument as Straubhaar, yet focusing particularly on the 
Asian case, Chadha and Kavoori (2000:428) maintain that there is little evidence to 
support 'the wholesale destruction of its (Asia's) indigenous cultural subjectivities' as 
a result of the circulation of western media. National television ratings in India point 
to the continuing popularity of local media productions, particularly Hindi films and 
the hugely popular religious and mythological serials that attract substantial audience 
ratings (Chadha and Kavoori, 2000). Mankekar (1999), for instance, focused on how 
religion, particularly through the televised broadcasting of the serialized Hindu epic 
The Ramayan, became integral to the construction of a unique 'modern' Indian 
national vision. This vision roused the consciousness of Indians towards their 
religion, and equated national Indian culture with Hindu culture. In light of this, 
Mankekar emphasises: '…everyday religiosity and faith are not "things" to be 
discarded as we march toward modernity, but rather are part of the multiple 
genealogies of modernity' (1999:220). Theories of media development, therefore, 
should avoid linear assumptions of homogenization or domination that subsume 
nations and groups on one linear timeline that begins with tradition and ends at a 
western inspired modernity.  
 
As Rajagopal (2000) argues, to understand the role of television within the 
developing world, it is important to take into consideration the specific national 
context of particular localities, thus avoiding any generalized or abstract 
theorizations that approach the 'non-western' experience as in anyway linear or 
unitary. In national contexts outside the west, characterized by highly unequal and 
contradictory rates of development, 'modernity', Rajagopal argues, should not be held 
in any constant or standardized notion as a fundamentally western value. Television 
for Indian citizens was not associated with the fear of cultural homogenization 
through the imposition of 'modern' western values. Modernity for Indians and the 
search for national development, Rajagopal argues, articulated partly through 
television, involved the search for a mythical past and the discovery of religious 
identities. 
 
The above studies provide an important contribution that counter theories of 
media/cultural imperialism and illustrate the dynamic preferences of media audiences 
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often driven by desires of proximity to local and national cultural values. 
Nevertheless, my ethnographic engagement with young Egyptians has revealed that 
they display a more intricate set of preferences towards the diverse media they have 
access to, which does not always fall neatly within a linear cultural proximity 
framework. Young Egyptians' media preferences centre around the content and 
values represented by particular genres and programmes, rather than being based 
solely on the cultural origins of the media. Indeed, in a more recent reworking of the 
cultural proximity theory, Straubhaar and La Pastina maintain that although audience 
desires predominantly conform to cultural proximity, media preferences must be 
recognized as more complex, taking place at multiple levels:   
 
People have multilayered, complex cultural identities. Aspects of 
them are geographic or spatial…Other aspects are purely cultural or 
linguistic…Other aspects might be religious, as when Catholic or 
Islamic messages or cultural products appeal across geographical and 
cultural boundaries (2005: 274).  
 
Indeed, through empirical research conducted on Brazilian television audiences, 
Straubhaar and La Pastina (2005) illustrate how Mexican telenovelas, although 
produced in an alien cultural context and media market, were more proximate to 
these Brazilian audiences. By not challenging traditional gender roles and 
relationships as some national productions may do, the ideological content of 
Mexican telenovelas provide a 'cathartic space' (Straubhaar and La Pastina, 2005: 
283) that does not question, but reaffirms their values and beliefs. This example 
points to the fact that audiences are not passive receivers of homogenous or 
standardized media messages, but are media savvy users able to select and interpret 
from the diverse repertoire of media outlets they have access to. Furthermore, rather 
than assessing programmes solely on the basis of their national origin, audiences 
interact more critically with the values represented in specific genres in relation to 
their multiple sets of cultural and religious proximities formulated along local, 
regional and sometimes global lines. Kraidy's (2009) analysis of the reality TV 
programme Star Academy and its reception in the ultraconservative environment of 
Saudi Arabia, captures the ways in which transnational media and particular genres 
are not only important in reaffirming pre-established values, but often in providing 
alternatives to local cultural beliefs deemed to be undesirable. According to Kraidy 
(2009:347), although an Arabic production aired on the regional LBC channel (partly 
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owned by Saudi businessmen), Star Academy's broadcast in Saudi triggered 'a 
controversy shriller than previous outcries about "foreign" programs'. Nevertheless, 
although stirring up a controversial storm amongst intellectual circles, royals, clerics 
and some journalists, the genre proved to be immensely popular with female viewers, 
promoting an alternative social reality characterized by more liberal forms of 
women's agency. 
 
The above discussion illustrates the centrality of transnational media in opening up 
spaces for a potentially cosmopolitan imagination. As the media broaden the cultural 
references of audiences and expand the repertoires of their imagination beyond their 
immediate world, 'transnational narratives have the potential to motivate strong 
processes of identification' (Straubhaar and La Pastina, 2005:285) thus allowing the 
self to be negotiated and interpreted in relation to distant others. As audiences 
approach the screen embedded in a complex set of proximities and preferences 
shaped by their plural cultural and religious affiliations, it is often mediated 
representations produced in alien cultural contexts and media markets that provide 
the important raw materials which reaffirm or challenge audience identities in 
desirable ways. As increased opportunities for mediated connection have promoted a 
diversity in the cultural tastes and preferences of audiences, Garcia Canclini's (2005) 
analysis of the complex and multifarious process of hybridization shaping Latin 
American countries is relevant here. Refusing to see the world in binary terms and 
simple oppositions that distinguish between tradition and a western inspired 
modernity, Garcia Canclini argues that an ongoing process of hybridization is the 
reality of a world shaped through a plurality of spatio-temporal scales. According to 
the author, the modern and the traditional have both become transformed in the Latin 
American context, in a complex process and interweaving of 'indigenous 
traditions….of Catholic hispanism, and of modern political, educational and 
communicational actions' (Garcia Canclini, 2005:46).  
 
However, Garcia Canclini (2005) warns us against adopting any romanticized or 
overly optimistic attitude to hybridity's reality or potential. Regarding the media as 
modern day protagonists of cultural exchange and interaction, Garcia Canclini (2005) 
makes the case for a heteronomous hybridization that 'concentrates combinatorial 
initiatives in a small number of transnational headquarters for the generation of 
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goods and messages, for the publication and administration of social meaning' 
(2005:x1). Thus, while always acknowledging unequal power relations, this intense 
mediated intermixing of different cultural origins and temporalities, makes one 
wonder how accurate is Beck's (2004) conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a 
'side effect' of our globalised world. According to this approach, cosmopolitanism is 
no longer something we have to search for or make an effort to realize. As our world 
has increasingly become interconnected in an intense process beyond the control of 
individuals, and in ways we are not always fully conscious of, 'my body, my 'own 
life' become part of another world, of foreign cultures, regions and histories and 
global interdependence risks' (Beck, 2004:134).   
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4 Communication in and Through the City: Grounded Cosmopolitanism and 
Mediated Everyday Life 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In 2008, for the first time in history, more than half of the world's population were 
estimated to be living in urban towns and cities (UNFPA, 2007). The biggest and 
fastest growing of these cities were located mainly in the global south (Massey, 
2007). By 2030, the number of urban inhabitants is expected to reach almost 5 billion 
people, with the biggest concentration being in Africa and Asia (UNFPA, 2007). 
These statistics, that point to an ever growing urbanization trend across the globe, 
illustrate the importance of the city as the privileged site of the everyday for a big 
proportion of the world's inhabitants. In this context, a point of criticism often 
levelled against theories of cosmopolitanism, is that they make claims and 
assumptions while failing to investigate the actual spaces in which cosmopolitanism 
is articulated and expressed as an everyday reality (Latham, 2006; Beck, 2002; 
Stevenson, 2003). If, for most people, the city is the specific arena of everyday life 
where cosmopolitan imagination is formulated, what exactly does the city represent? 
What are the most important characteristics of cities that make them such exciting, 
unpredictable and dynamic places to live, brimming with an over concentration of 
bodies drawn in from diverse locations both from within, but also beyond the nation? 
My focus in this chapter is on the city as a site of communication, or the 
'communicative city' as it has often been termed (Gumpert and Drucker, 2008; 
Georgiou, 2008). Here I refer to communication as a multidimensional process 
(technological and non-technological) existing in diverse forms, in its most 
glamorous institutional guises, but also at its most banal as articulated face-to-face by 
urban citizens in an everyday context. 
 
It is usually cities that host the impressive skyscrapers, grand satellite transmitters 
and media corporations where the main media related decisions are undertaken by 
rich businessmen and media moguls (Georgiou, 2008). Nevertheless, beyond the 
glamour of expensive technology and large scale corporations, the city is also home 
to a vast number of media users who appropriate media and communications 
technologies for diverse purposes, including entertainment, information or even 
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engaging in networks of belonging and participation beyond national boundaries. 
The stark and abundant visibility of satellite dishes and television antennae on the 
sides and rooftops of apartment blocks, five star hotels, but also more humble shacks 
and houses, is probably one of the few common physical symbols that unite the poor 
and privileged areas of the city. Carpentier (2008) explores the less glamorous, 
usually overlooked, yet much important 'belly of the city' that hosts alternative 
communicative cultures serving the needs of urban communities. Carpentier 
particularly focuses on the way Belgian WI-FI activists have used the cultures of 
radio amateur broadcasting to develop their own participatory networks that 
transcend the local, connecting them to other Belgian cities.  
 
Furthermore, the city is also host to forms of interpersonal face-to-face 
communication that are not always dependent upon technology, yet are of no less 
importance in functioning as symbolic carriers of meaning and interpretation. In 
particular, the city is an intense meeting space for 'unexpected juxtapositions' where, 
especially in Egypt, the rich and poor areas exist 'cheek by jowl' (Amin and Thrift, 
2002: 40). This forced geographical proximity often provokes the self to retreat into 
homogenous urban enclaves that exclude difference (Szerzynksi and Urry, 2002; 
Denis, 2006). In such a situation where distance and proximity between citizens are 
negotiated in the daily spaces of the city, difference and sameness, particularly in 
relation to social class, are used as public markers of distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) 
and belonging. Consumption, which I discuss in section 4.3.1, becomes an important 
strategy and a form of symbolic communication (Featherstone, 1991; Miller, 1998); a 
performance through which urban inhabitants manage the complexities and 
diversities of urban experience. 
 
The city, however, is more than just a medium for hosting communications 
infrastructure, media consumers and interpersonal forms of non-technological 
communication. According to Burd (2008:210), the city is a whole 'process of 
communications networks rather than a geographical place'. Thus, the city is not only 
a location where communication takes place, but itself a product of the diverse 
appropriations of media and communications technologies adopted by its citizens 
(Gumpert and Drucker, 2008). In this respect, as theorized by Lefebvre (1991), the 
city is not a passive backdrop or a space already existing, but is a creative urban 
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terrain that I suggest is shaped by, and emerges through everyday media practice. 
Using the term communication space, Lie (2003) argues that through everyday lived 
experience and mediated communication, places as bounded and static are negotiated 
and are transformed into communication spaces of intense interpretation and 
symbolic meaning. Bull (2004), for instance, has explored how new mobile and aural 
technologies have altered the relationship between the public and the private in the 
city, and thus the ways in which users of these technologies 'inhabit' urban public 
space (Bull, 2004:275). Specifically, Bull investigates how the privatized sound-
worlds created by mobile technologies allow users to reconfigure spaces of 
experience, and through the power of sound, to make the urban world around them 
more 'intimate, known and possessed' (Bull, 2004:283). Georgiou (2008) has 
similarly explored how the use of communications technologies by marginalized 
citizens in certain global cities allows them to transform the urban into a space of 
meaning and inclusivity. Whereas political and cultural life in the nation excludes the 
socially and economically underprivileged, media spaces provide opportunities for 
identification and representation (Georgiou, 2008).  
 
The city, with all of its diverse opportunities for mediated connection, has become a 
location where cosmopolitan imagination can find expression in its territory. The city 
is a space of difference, connecting people across boundaries as they seek to forge 
moments of belonging and identity through face-to-face and mediated systems of 
communication. Thus, as Stevenson (2003:59) argues, cities are able to retain their 
cultural prominence and importance precisely because in the context of intense 
diversity and difference, they provide spaces for citizens to 'experiment with their 
identities' in ways that imaginatively connect with a distant world. This chapter is 
primarily about the city: about the way the city facilitates and hosts diverse forms of 
communication, both directly dependent on, but also independent of technology, yet 
alternatively, how the city is itself a creative urban terrain shaped through 
communication practices. In order to tackle this objective, I have broken the 
discussion down into five sections. The first part of this chapter explores how cities 
have been theorized in research, usually approached through a dual framework that 
positions them as either a 'global city' or a 'third-world' city. Nevertheless, I argue 
that such reductionist terms do not do justice to the complex reality of cities outside 
the west, which cannot be understood through economic and financial development 
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(or lack of) alone. Section 4.3 explores the intense juxtaposition of difference and 
diversity that characterizes everyday urban experiences in the cities of the global 
south, particularly in relation to class, leading urban inhabitants to develop tactics of 
communicating their differences from each other. This leads onto section 4.3.1, 
which looks specifically at how consumption has become a daily practice, enabling 
urban citizens to communicate socio-economic differences.  
 
The remaining sections of the chapter then explore how the city is not only a medium 
or container for different forms of communication, but is itself shaped in multiple 
ways through communications practices, particularly televised representation. 
Section 4.4 examines the importance of television in shaping everyday life, 
specifically in its construction of class and gender identities. The final section of the 
chapter, 4.5, focusing particularly on Lefebvre's (1991) Production of Urban Space, 
explores the different ways in which Cairo is shaped from below through the 
television consumption practices of its inhabitants.   
 
4.2 Communicating an Urban Identity: Global City or Third World City? 
 
According to Burd (2008:211), a 'city's form, structure and skeleton distinctly 
'announces' its identity in space and place and introduces itself '. In this context, 
urban infrastructure, Burd argues, is not comprised of lifeless artifacts or inert 
buildings. Inscribed onto the physical and urban topography of cities are stories, 
histories and memories of colonial conquests, invasions and empires, but also more 
contemporary symbols of globalization and visual indicators of transnational 
cosmopolitan connections. In this context, buildings, streets and landscapes, but also 
traditions, customs and heritages continually communicate the particular story of a 
'global city', a 'multicultural cosmopolitan city', a 'megacity' or even a 'third world 
city'. According to Garcia Canclini (2005), one of the most important factors that 
shape the contemporary identities of cities, is the intense amalgamation of difference 
and diversity. How is it, Garcia Canclini wonders, that such diverse spatio-temporal 
influences get mixed together so seamlessly in our urban everyday worlds? 
Specifically, the city attempts to: 
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reconcile everything that arrives and proliferates, and tries to contain 
all the disorder- the peasant's exchange with the transnational 
corporation, the traffic jams in front of protest demonstrations, the 
expansion of consumption together with the demands of the 
unemployed (Garcia Canclini, 2005:4). 
 
As a meeting point juxtaposing the modern alongside the old, it is within cities that 
remnants of a colonial past remain inscribed onto the cultural products of cities, 
landscapes and buildings (King, 2003; Triulzi, 1996; Yeoh, 2001). Nevertheless, as 
well as being a locus where imagining a historical past may remain relevant, cities 
are also places of 'now' and of future projections. They are important nodes that 
occupy centre position in modern transnational flows of capital, people, information 
and media images. According to Yeoh (2001) strivings for new identities do not 
make a colonial past redundant, but the defining feature of cities is that they 
represent prime locations of a 'postcolonial present' (ibid.:459) where the old and the 
new remain dialectically interlinked. Beck (2002) argues that the city should be 
explored as a space for the production of the global, which often engages the global 
directly and bypasses the national. Massey (2007) reminds us, nevertheless, how the 
city is not only characterized by an external geography of global flows, but also an 
internal one. While the internal geography relates to the specificities of cities that 
remain rooted in geographical place, the external pertains to the multiple lines that 
run out from cities, particularly in relation to 'trade routes, investments, political and 
cultural influences the outward connections of the internal multiplicity itself' 
(Massey, 2007:7).  
 
According to Massey's urban theory, what we are in need of is a 'politics of place 
beyond place (2007:15 emphasis in original) that is sensitive to the dialectical 
relationship linking the global with the local. Robins (2001:87) argues that the 
openness and fluidity associated with urban space means we should think through 
the city, rather than through the nation, as this provides the opportunities for 'some 
alternative cultural and political possibilities' other than a national one. Although I 
acknowledge the diverse cultural possibilities enabled by an urban perspective, I do 
not subscribe to Robins' (2001) argument that a focus on the city means we 
automatically need to think against the nation. In fact, I suggest that it is from within 
the city that the nation is lived and experienced as a daily reality. In particular, 
political authority and global commodity networks are realized and rooted in urban 
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space, thus transforming the city into an important sub-national node for 'plugging 
the nation' (Bunnell, 2002: 290) into wider globalization networks.  As Sandercock 
(2003) argues, it is actually through the city that we can begin to understand the 
nation, as the imagination of national space is in fact embodied in the local spaces of 
streets, neighbourhoods and the city in general. This can be linked to Morley's 
(2000) thesis that it is through micro-processes embodied in smaller units (heim) that 
larger communities and collectivities (heimat) are themselves embedded and 
constituted.   
 
The vast human concentration, cultural diversity and rapid economic and financial 
development characterizing big cities, particularly in the west, has led to a body of 
research investigating 'global cities'.  According to Sassen (2000), we are presently 
occupying a new geography of centrality, one which has given rise to new urban 
spaces and the formation of new claims by transnational actors. Within this new 
geography, we are witnessing an interconnection of global cities where control and 
management of global financial networks and industries has become concentrated in 
a few leading financial centres, particularly New York, London and Tokyo (Sassen, 
2000). Furthermore, using the term 'informational city,' Castells (2000:409) argues 
that we are currently in the midst of an informational and global economy organized 
around urban 'command and control centers'. These advanced urban nodes are 
'information-based, value-production complexes', where global corporations and 
financial firms find both the 'suppliers and the highly skilled, specialized labor they 
require' (Castells, 2000: 415). This leads to a rigid hierarchical structure shaping 
different urban centres, where the biggest concentration of financial power and skill 
is located in a limited number of major cities, usually outside the west.  
 
A point of criticism targeted at literature focusing exclusively on the financial 
industries of major global cities, is that it narrates a 'very western story' (Massey, 
1999: 171), failing to recognize that cities within developing countries of the global 
south may in fact have very different stories to tell. According to King (2003), recent 
urban research, predominantly stemming from western academia, has undertaken its 
analysis through concepts such as 'world city' and 'global city,' meaning that the 
attention of urban scholars has focused on a limited number of cities that fall solely 
within these economic categories and western histories of urban development. Cities 
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that do not conform to these constricted categories, have usually escaped the urban 
studies' spotlight. Castells' urban theory, for instance, uses terms such as 'black holes 
of marginality,' 'back offices' and 'less developed regions' (2000: 410-416) to 
describe the less financially developed urban areas outside the west. Hence, although 
Castells does recognize the existence of these less powerful 'megacities' (2000: 436), 
they are still perceived in relation to a dominant western prototype of economic 
superiority, thus reducing them to inferior shadows of powerful financial urban 
centres. Commenting on the economic determinism of the 'global cities' paradigm, 
King (2003:267) argues that to imagine such limited economically driven concepts as 
being in any way universally applicable to cities in general, 'is an illusion'. Such 
concepts do not give enough insight into the 'many different meanings of particular 
places, or can, without reference to the particular histories, politics, memories or 
subjectivities, capture the highly diverse identities which exist in particular cities' 
(ibid.). 
 
Conceptualisations of the (western) city, such as those formulated by Sassen (2000) 
and Castells (2000), recognize urban inequalities only in relation to global financial 
power, and only as they occur between cities in different national contexts. What 
kind of urban picture develops, however, if we transfer our focus to the disparities, 
inequalities and unequal patterns of development that fall within particular named 
cities? By turning to an analysis of non-western cities, particularly Egypt in this 
study, I  focus on the way socio-economic deprivation and class segregation, 
resulting in highly fragmented lifestyles and the ability to access (or not) urban 
space, have become central to everyday urban experiences. As Gugler argues, the 
increased integration of 'third-world' cities in the global economy has exposed 
populations of these cities to 'sudden reversals of fortune that are not cushioned by 
public systems of support such as may be found in rich countries' (2004: 3). 
Following a similar line of argument, Chakravorty (2000:57) also contends that a 
global cities paradigm cannot be directly applied to cities in the global south, which 
encompass 'a great diversity of development levels, political-economic structures and 
histories, and levels of integration into the global economy'.     
 
As a response to the above mentioned drawbacks associated predominantly with a 
western-centric focus on the city, another body of literature has attempted to 
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document the progression and expansion of developing cities in what they have 
termed the 'third world' (Drakakis-Smith, 2000; Potter and Salau, 1990). Robinson 
(2002), however, heavily criticizes this geographical division that has long 
dominated urban studies. On the one hand, are theories placing cities on a 
hierarchical rank according to economic power (Sassen, 2001, 1994; Castells, 2000), 
while on the other hand, is a school stemming from development studies reducing 
'other' cities to third world status. There is a danger that by looking upon non-
western cities as stuck on a linear path of development, located within a deprived 
third world, yet naturally striving to become labelled as global, we are obscuring 
significant aspects of city life such as popular culture and the 'creative construction 
of diverse forms of urbanism' (Robinson, 2002: 544).  
 
Parker (2004) calls for a replacement of the term 'third-world' city with 'majority 
urban world'. The latter term, according to the author, is more sensitive to the hugely 
complex and diverse nature of cities outside the west, which need to be understood in 
terms other than geographic (non-western) or economic (poor). Instead, according to 
Robinson (2002), cities need to be researched in their own right as ordinary cities 
that are diverse, creative and distinctive. It is important to note, however, that 
although the specific particularities that characterize different cities must be taken 
into consideration, they can never be fully divorced from the context of global 
cultural and economic flows in which they are inevitably embedded. As Robertson 
(1992) has argued, the central dynamic of globalization involves a twofold process: 
the particularization of the universal, and the universalization of the particular. Thus, 
the universal and the particular have become increasingly interpenetrated and united 
in terms of both the universality of experience and the expectation of particularity. 
 
4.3 Class and Urban Experiences Outside the West 
 
Everyday life in the city involves coming into close contact with a vast range of 
diverse others. In such a situation, urban inhabitants develop tactics through which to 
manage and deal with diversity and difference as an everyday proximate reality 
(Georgiou, 2008). Communicative strategies particularly non-technological, 
symbolic and interpersonal ones are used amongst city dwellers to negotiate 
difference and assert similarity as a means of consolidating belonging and identity. 
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The next section will explore the importance of consumer objects as symbolic 
carriers of meaning through which individuals are able to communicate and articulate 
networks of belonging in the city. Before this, however, I wish to briefly explore the 
complex nuances and juxtapositions of difference that are unique to everyday urban 
experiences, most particularly in the context of the developing south.  
 
Benjamin's urban theory provides a key reference in capturing the contradictory 
character and distinctive nature of the contemporary city. Similar to modern 
ethnographic projects, Benjamin was interested in a micro-analysis of the banal and 
mundane structures of everyday city life: the unique character of urban experience 
articulated in the architecture, public spaces, streets, the circulation of inhabitants 
and daily routines (Gilloch, 1996). Benjamin developed a dialectical perspective on 
the city where he perceived it to be a seat of the modern – particularly the 
development of the money economy, technology and new impersonal social 
relationships – but also a location for the antique. Cultural treasures and historical 
artifacts, listed buildings and ancient heritage exist in stark proximity to modern 
skyscrapers, contemporary architecture and busy urban life (Savage, 2000a). 
Therefore, urban experience, according to Benjamin, is articulated at the intersection 
of memory (personal and collective), history and the built environment. Thus it is not 
just a matter of analyzing the city as an amalgamation of buildings and physical 
infrastructure, but the key question remains of how the city is perceived, understood 
and deciphered by its inhabitants (Savage, 2000a). In this context, there is no single 
grand narrative that characterizes urban experience, but the city is encountered in 
multiple discontinuous and fragmented ways by its subjects.    
 
Central to Benjamin's understanding of the modern city, and particularly relevant to 
my own research, is the 'shock experience' (Gilloch, 1996) he associated with 
modern encounters of the urban environment. The intense juxtaposition of 
difference, the stark positioning of the old alongside the new, the fast paced tempo of 
the streets and the noisy urban crowd have all contributed to an experience of shock, 
excitement and distraction, commonplace to life in big cities. Indeed, in a city like 
Cairo, inhabited by almost 18 million people (Demographia, 2011) in quite a limited 
geographical space who are forced to negotiate horrendous traffic, extensive 
pollution, unavoidable crowds and ongoing noise, Benjamin's notion of the shock 
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experience most definitely captures the realities of everyday life for the average 
Cairene. Savage (2000a:49) has directly linked Benjamin's thesis of the 'shock' 
experience to the contemporary and widespread trend of 'manicured postmodern 
urban spaces (that) cocoon visitors in safe spaces' thus reducing the impact of shock 
experience associated with the modern city. Such urban cocoons, particularly gated 
communities, have become a notable trend in Cairo, functioning particularly as 
exclusive spaces allowing the elite to distance themselves from the lower classes and 
thus to maintain social class hierarchies.  
 
Denis (2006:50) argues how exclusive gated communities in Cairo offer their elite 
inhabitants protection against the 'ill effects' of the wider city including pollution, 
crime and poverty, associated primarily with the vulgar lifestyles of uneducated, 
working class city dwellers. Kuppinger (2004) similarly explores how these very 
exclusive housing arrangements located on the fringes of the capital city, offer 
material comforts as well as a much desired distance from the crowd and uncivilized 
behaviour of the lower classes. 'Most obviously, however, they address the fine 
distinctions of class and wealth, and a certain positioning on a global map' 
(Kuppinger, 2004: 46). Interestingly, Kuppinger focuses on the names of these 
private housing complexes in Cairo, and with choices like Belle Ville, Queen 
Elizabeth and  Queen Victoria, the author questions whether they are 'consciously 
situated on a historical continuum from the colonial era, harboring the unspoken 
dream, that Egypt's colonial/royal era was a time of superior comforts and lifestyles?' 
(Kuppinger, 2004:48). These examples demonstrate the extent to which the intensity 
and proximity of different others in the city forces inhabitants to deal with this 
situation. They often resort to closing themselves off in manageable enclaves with 
clear boundaries asserting who is excluded as much as who is included.    
 
The containment of urban inhabitants within familiar walled off enclaves, may be 
analysed in the light of Simmel's (2004) notion of reserve that emerges as a result of 
the hectic and rapid pace of life in the city. Similar to Benjamin's notion of the 
'shock' experience, Simmel writes about an 'intensification of nervous simulation' 
(2004:13 emphasis in original) resulting from the intense, rapidly changing sensory 
perceptions associated with city life. In particular, theorising the city as the prime 
seat of the money economy, Simmel (2004) argues that a concern with financial 
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matters has objectified and thus eclipsed the importance of personal and emotional 
relationships. In this context, city inhabitants have developed a 'blasé attitude' 
(Simmel, 2004:15) towards fellow urban dwellers, leading to a form of self-
preservation and reserve against the presence of (different) others. As a result, urban 
inhabitants often come to form very limited personal relationships based on a 
restricted social circle requiring the establishment of rigid boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion. Thus, although the intense concentration of inhabitants in the city 
seems to indicate 'bodily proximity', Simmel (2004:17) describes how reserve and 
self-preservation point to a reality of social and 'mental distance'. In this context, 
Allen (2000) explores how Simmel's figure of the stranger captures 'the 
contradictory experience of what it means to interact socially with someone who is 
both near in a spatial sense, yet remote in a social sense' (Allen, 2000:57). Hence, 
although city dwellers may be forced into close proximity dictated by the boundaries 
of the limited geographical space they jointly inhabit, few points of social or cultural 
commonality, mean urban inhabitants may often find it necessary to communicate 
their differences from each other. Thus, deterred by those existing nearby, city 
dwellers may search for new forms of stimulation, and for spaces of belonging, 
identity and inclusivity in distant places that transcend immediate frontiers. This 
makes the city one of the most fruitful locations for the construction of transnational 
identities and formations (Sassen, 2000; Eade, 1994). Specifically, a cosmopolitan 
imagination becomes relevant in this respect, allowing for a discovery of cultural 
plurality and a negotiation of the self in relation to distant others.  
 
4.3.1 The City as a Locus for Consumer Distinction 
 
Consumer objects are not always 'odourless products' stripped of meaning or context 
as Iwabuchi (2002) once argued, but are very often statements in themselves; 
vehicles rife with symbolic and cultural interpretation. Featherstone (1995) explores 
how consumer products represent important cultural messages. Using the example of 
the burger, Featherstone argues that it is not only a material substance physically 
consumed to satisfy one's hunger pangs, but is consumed culturally as a form of 
symbolic affiliation to a particular way of life. By eating a burger from McDonald's, 
one is aware, according to Featherstone, that this provides an important point of entry 
to the 'transposable themes which are central to consumer culture, such as youth, 
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fitness, beauty, luxury, romance, freedom' (Featherstone, 1995). In this context, in 
emphasizing the symbolic aspect of consumer products, Featherstone (1991) 
highlights how consumption should not be understood as a material utility or the 
consumption of use-values, but argues the original or functional 'use' value of 
products often become eclipsed as we deal with commodity signs.  
 
According to the above, commodity products or signs can be attributed with 
particular cultural and symbolic meanings. Indeed, through the multiple 
anthropological portraits he conducted of household consumption patterns in a single 
London street, Miller (2008) shows how, very often, the ability of 'things' or objects 
to communicate particular meanings is more powerful than discourse. Consumer 
objects, according to Miller, represent a prevailing form of outward expression that, 
if examined closely, may reveal fascinating insights or a new sense of depth to a 
person or household. Nevertheless, an engagement in consumption is not simply a 
matter of individual expression, but the relevance of consumption as a form of social 
communication often emerges in its collectivity, and as members of a particular 
group jointly partake in the experience of consumption. Urry emphasizes the 
communal and communitarian value of consumption when arguing:  
 
satisfaction is derived not from the individual act of consumption but 
from the fact that all sorts of other people are also consumers of the 
service and these people are deemed appropriate to the particular 
consumption in question (1995: 131).  
 
When engaging in consumer practices, therefore, individuals are often driven by a 
desire to share in, and be a part of the same experiences of a specific wider 
collectivity, that may then distinguish them from other social groups.  According to 
Bourdieu (1984), social distinction is a central dimension of social life. Furthermore, 
'defined by the distribution of economic and cultural capital among its members,' 
(Bourdieu, 1984:260) Bourdieu argues how a person's social taste, or specifically 
habitus, is defined. Thus, habitus is a social presupposition that becomes our 
common sense interpretation of the world; the end product of practices and 
performances that we consciously and subconsciously develop to fulfil our desire to 
be accepted in society. Bourdieu's concept of distinction becomes relevant to our 
understanding of the social function of consumption, as habitus (the end product of 
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distinction), is not only a subjective mode of thinking, but is expressed in a physical 
and embodied form, often through the acquisition of specific consumer items. Thus, 
our habitus becomes a performance inscribed onto our bodies and informs how we 
present our homes, while also influencing conscious bodily actions related to dress, 
speech, posture and ways of eating (Featherstone, 1991). As Featherstone argues in 
relation to habitus, 'the body is a materialization of class taste: class taste is 
embodied. Each group, class and class fraction has a different habitus, hence the set 
of differences' (1991:90). Importantly, therefore, habitus for Bourdieu is not a 
product of individual freedom of thought, but is regulated by, and takes its meaning 
from within the dominant class structures we belong to. 
 
In Chapter Two I discuss in detail my own approach and conceptualization of class, 
and thus the process by which I was able to split members of my sample into three 
class groups. Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of habitus, which claims that access to 
differential amounts of both cultural and economic capital form two important 
elements of class formation, was particularly relevant. This approach has helped 
illuminate how access and resources help create class hierarchies, leading to the 
consolidation of particular ‘social positions and positions in knowledge’ (Skeggs, 
1997:9). As Savage (2000b:107) argues, Bourdieu’s seminal thesis allows us to 
understand class as ‘implicit, as encoded in people’s sense of self-worth and in their 
attitudes to and awareness of others’. Thus, Bourdieu’s analysis allowed me to 
manage and engage with some of the complexities of class, by functioning as a 
useful framework that provided a basis through which I divided members of my 
sample into the upper middle, lower middle and working class. Nevertheless, 
although access to ‘capital’ has widely been acknowledged as a powerful contributor 
to social classification, Bourdieu’s model has not come without critique.  
 
Although Savage (2000b) and Skeggs (1997) draw heavily on Bourdieu, they both 
claim his work can be highly problematic if applied mechanistically. According to 
the authors, it is important to avoid the assumption that class factions are rigid social 
groupings, underpinned by a linear relationship between habitus, access to capital, 
and thus behavior or social practice. As Savage (2000b:110) argues, ‘there is 
movement between cultural practices, with the result that social and cultural 
boundaries are porous’. Additionally, Skeggs (1997:10) makes the claim that if 
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applied religiously, Bourdieu can be accused of coding behavior ‘in a cold and 
mechanical classificatory manner’. Instead, through detailed ethnographic 
approaches that engage directly with the subjective experiences and micro-practices 
of ‘classed’ individuals, we need to explore and record the dynamic ‘pleasures and 
pain associated with gender, class and sexuality’ (ibid.). Thus, in a context replete 
with vast social divides, and where people’s ordinary life chances are dictated almost 
solely by their socio-economic status, I continue to proclaim for the importance of 
class as a framing category for everyday experiences in Egypt. Nevertheless, my 
empirical narrative illustrates that although differences between classes are profound, 
the fluidity, disagreements and contradictions in participants’ responses within 
particular class categories, are testament that classes are not homogenous social 
categories. For this reason, it is important to engage with people not as classed dupes, 
but as ‘rationally acting individuals’ (Bottero, 2004: 988) who are unescapably part 
of the inequalities of the class system. I discuss these points in more detail in the 
conclusion. 
 
 Returning to the discussion on consumption, consumer activities can often help to 
consolidate forms of classed belonging or exclusion 'through symbolic means, 
cultural differentiations and the management of codes and information' (Clammer, 
2003: 407). Furthermore, inequality of access through socio-economic disparities 
means that the ambitious promise of consumerism so flagrantly displayed in cities, 
whether on television screens, billboards or urban spaces of leisure, leaves a vast 
swathe of urban populations unable to fulfill consumer desires. Miles (1998) argues 
how consumption plays a paradoxical role, as although it is enabling in that it gives 
individuals a perceived sense that they can willingly express themselves through 
their chosen objects, it simultaneously plays a more discrete role in actually imposing 
forms of control upon those unable to acquire the symbols of consumerism. Thus, as 
Miles (1998:1007) writes, the personal meanings attached to consumer products 
cannot be divorced from the 'power relations within which they are constructed'. 
Thus, consumer activities, underpinned by unequal relations of access leading to the 
distinction between 'haves' and 'have nots,' inclusion and exclusion, feed into the 
divisions of socially fragmented cities. Oncu (2002:187) similarly argues how 
consumerism has contributed to the creation of 'multiple divisions of city life which 
are constructed in and through consumption processes'. For urban groups with the 
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least cultural or economic capital, consumer products often remain desirable and 
highly visible, yet unattainable and unfulfilled promises of a better life, largely 
affiliated with urban spaces to which they have no access.  
 
That an engagement in consumer practices requires economic capital, is an 
undisputable fact. Nevertheless, empirical research has continued to document how 
consumption should not be regarded as an occupation limited solely to those with 
abundant levels of financial and cultural capital. Often, groups from a disadvantaged 
socio-economic position are able to negotiate their own points of entry into a 
consumer world. Werbner's (1999) research on 'working class cosmopolitans' 
provides some very interesting insights into how consumer goods have allowed 
Pakistani labour migrants living in the UK to form their own unique cosmopolitan 
networks. Werbner particularly focuses on the global pathways established by these 
labour migrants, which carry flows of goods and patterns of gifting and consumption, 
and thus have become an important way of making places travel, and bringing distant 
places closer to home. This traffic of ‘objects-places-sentiment’ (Werbner, 1999: 26), 
according to Werbner, points to the fact that labour migrants cannot be labelled as an 
isolated group, encapsulated and doomed by their economic limitations, but must be 
recognised as inhabiting their own cosmopolitan worlds and capable of constructing 
their own global pathways that carry goods, ideas and people.  
 
Similar to Werbner (1999), Ghannam's (2006) investigation of Egyptian working 
class labour migrants who travel to Arab Gulf countries to make a living, provides 
interesting insights. Through her ethnographic analysis of the experiences of one 
young man Magdi, Ghannam explores how he used his newly made money to buy 
appliances from Kuwait to furnish an apartment he bought back in his home town in 
Egypt. Significantly, the style in which Magdi chose to furnish his apartment was a 
reflection of his time spent outside of Egypt: the water filters, kitchen fan and 
vacuum cleaner he purchased in Kuwait were not common in the area of Cairo he 
was from. As Ghannam notes, therefore, 'for many people, his unit became a 
signifier of the modern, the new, the beautiful, and the desired' (2006: 263). As the 
above two examples demonstrate, consumer objects represent loaded symbols that 
can be used in diverse ways by different groups to communicate particular lifestyle 
choices, and often to enable a desire for social mobility. 
111 
 
 
Bringing in the importance of the media to processes of consumption, Schein (1999) 
charts how electronic media are allowing China's most socially and physically 
immobile to engage in a globally imagined cosmopolitanism that transcends national 
boundaries. Unable to acquire the abundant store of consumer goods so flagrantly 
displayed on screen, Schein argues that for China's most poor and disadvantaged, it is 
mediated representations of a consumer world that become consumed, rather than the 
actual goods themselves, which are far beyond their limited socio-economic means. 
Thus, through television, these Chinese media consumers are able to imagine 
themselves to be 'cosmopolitan participants in global commodity culture' (Schein, 
1999:345), which they would be unable to access otherwise. This offers an important 
counter-argument to Binnie, Holloway and Millington's (2006) assertion that the 
construction of cosmopolitan identities is necessitated by direct experience of the 
world, by cultural capital and a particular level of education. According to the 
authors, 'being worldly, being able to navigate between and within different cultures, 
requires confidence, skill and money' (2006:8). On the contrary, the past studies are 
an important illustration of how, in the absence of an abundance of cultural or 
financial capital, individuals and groups are still capable of constructing their own 
cosmopolitan formations that are often heavily dependent upon the media as cultural 
transporters.  
 
By providing spaces of global inclusion even for the most physically immobile, 
therefore, a focus on communication practices that take place in 'banal manners and 
in humble locations' (Georgiou, 2008:234) may allow us to transcend the 
conventional focus on the more glamorous and predictable outcomes of 
globalization, often associated with elite 'global hoppers'. Thus, by making the link 
between cosmopolitanism and imagination, and examining its intersection with the 
everyday stratified but highly mediated life in the city, a classed based analysis 
becomes relevant to our understandings of the diversity of urban cosmopolitan 
identities. Such a framework that is sensitive to the disparate socio-economic 
realities that characterize different groups in the city, may ensure that research avoids 
homogenising all the different possible constructions of cosmopolitanism within one 
elite framework. Such an elitist approach would risk discounting the associations 
between working classes and an imagination of the self within humanity enabled by 
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the media in ways that fall beyond the specificity of their locale and first hand 
experience alone.  
 
The chapter thus far has approached the city as a strategic location for 
communication. I have focused particularly on the city as a site for the intense 
juxtaposition of difference and diversity, looking specifically at the importance of 
consumption as a symbolic form of communication. I have explored how 
consumption allows urban inhabitants to manage and control difference, particularly 
in relation to class. Nevertheless, I propose that the city is not only a medium or 
container for communication, but is itself a creative urban terrain that is shaped 
through communications practices and the diverse appropriation of media 
technologies by urban inhabitants. To understand this point more clearly, I would 
like to return to Benjamin and specifically, his key figure of the flaneur: the urban 
wanderer who took pleasure in aimlessly strolling through the glass arcades of 
modern Paris, encountering the crowd and experiencing the city at a relaxed pace. In 
a more recent reworking of Benjamin's classic concept, Featherstone (1998) suggests 
that inhabitants of cities today are not only lonely strollers as defined by Benjamin's 
'flaneur', but urban dwellers have become skilled readers of the city. Furthermore, 
Featherstone argues that whereas the flaneur was conceptualized by Benjamin to be 
an individual who experienced the city in a slow and linear manner, a modern 
process of 'flaneurie,' according to Featherstone (1998), involves inhabitants 
engaging in mediated urban encounters.  
 
Electronic flows of a networked world, according to Featherstone, provide 
instantaneous connections and perceptions of the city that render physical and spatial 
distances irrelevant. Thus, the city is no longer approached or understood in a linear 
manner argues Featherstone, restricted by what is geographically proximate or what 
is available 'now,' but is increasingly determined by that to which we have electronic 
access (Featherstone, 1998), lying outside the immediate boundaries of space and 
time. Donald (2003:47) confirms this point with his assertion that there is one 'real 
city', as there are multiple urban experiences articulated through 'the immaterial city 
of word, image and myth'. It is through the media, according to Donald (2003), that 
we learn not only to see cities, but also how to live in them'. My research focuses 
specifically on television, and the ways in which televised representations young 
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Egyptians are exposed to, play an important role in shaping the different experiences 
of everyday life in Cairo. As Georgiou (2008: 226) argues in relation to daily uses of 
media technology in the city, not enough attention is paid to urban denizens tactics of 
'surviving the city, of making the city one's own and of finding spaces of 
representation outside the exclusive or excluding politics of national and commercial 
interests'. Before I embark upon the discussion of how the city itself has become a 
creative urban terrain shaped in multiple ways through everyday media practice in 
the final section, I precede this with a contextualizing discussion of television's 
significance within everyday life. 
 
 
4.4 Television and the Everyday: Mediated  Consumption and the Construction 
of Class and Gender Identities 
 
Television occupies such an omnipresent existence in our lives that it has become 
deeply entrenched in our subjective perceptions and interpretations of the everyday. 
Williams and Williams (1990) contend that television has become an important 
shaper of our 'structure of feeling', regulating the ways in which we articulate 
particular understandings and feelings about the world around us. Departing from a 
similar understanding of television's everyday relevance, Silverstone asks: 'how is it 
that such a technology and medium has found its way so profoundly and intimately 
into the fabric of our daily lives? How is it that it stays there'? (1994:2). According to 
Silverstone, television is particularly important in sustaining our sense of ontological 
security as it is deeply involved in extending our sense of confidence and sanctuary 
in an increasingly unsure world replete with risks and dangers. In this sense, 
Silverstone understands ontological security as a cognitive state; a way of being in 
the world where individuals seek a stable and ongoing continuity of everyday life 
while avoiding chaos and anxiety.  
 
As our everyday lives are intensely saturated with televised images, we are being 
constantly bombarded with information about potential global health, social and 
ecological risks that may often increase our sense of confusion and chaos about the 
world (Silverstone, 1994). Paradoxically, despite being the medium through which 
these tensions are initially communicated to audiences, Silverstone (1994) argues 
how television performs a parallel function of controlling these anxieties. Television 
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has become the main frame through which order is maintained, while distance and 
risk are managed and brought under control. Silverstone comments on this dual role 
of television, writing:  
 
Its (television) emotional significance, both as disturber and 
comforter; its cognitive significance, both as an informer and a 
misinformer; its spatial and temporal significance, ingrained as it is 
into the routines of daily life…is both complete and fundamental 
(1994: 3).  
 
Although Silverstone's thesis offers an important insight into the relevance of 
television in sustaining a sense of security and order within our contemporary 
mediated times, his analysis is attached to a period where audiences were 
predominantly faced with a limited number of television channels that framed their 
mediated experiences and knowledge of the world. Nevertheless, how does this 
change when in the age of advanced satellite technology, with its propensity for 
narrowcasting and disseminating niche specialized channels, audiences can no longer 
be addressed under a unified media environment? Can television continue to fill this 
anxiety-reducing role as Silverstone predicted? Gillespie's (2007) more recent 
empirical analysis of young British Muslim audiences' consumption of transnational 
television news provides an important challenge. Gillespie explores how threats 
regarding securitization are shaped through everyday transnational media cultures, 
leading especially to the marginalization of British Muslims. Using techniques such 
as breaking news stories, rolling 24 hour news broadcasts, split screens and rapid 
cuts, a 24/7 televised media industry, according to Gillespie, is able to intensify a 
sense of immediate threat and risk, thus always keeping public fears alive and 
vigilant. This has particular repercussions on how British Muslims have become 
implicated within this process, as 'the media are seen as systematically demonizing 
Muslims, associating Islam with violence and terrorism, and representing Muslims as 
the 'enemy within' ' (2007:283). Consequently, for these racialised Muslim 
minorities, negative self-perceptions constructed through demonizing media 
representations have provoked them to question whether the prospect for peaceful 
multicultural coexistence is realizable.  
 
Gillespie's study provides an insightful illustration of the complexities involved when 
audiences are accorded access to both national and transnational media outlets. This 
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no doubt has its advantages in terms of providing an instantly accessible source of 
diverse information and knowledge of distant ways of life. Nevertheless, as 
Gillespie's research with young Muslim audiences demonstrates, the exposure to 
negative self-representations in the diverse media they have access to, can compound 
feelings of anxiety and a sense that the world has become a less secure place. 
Gillespie, nevertheless, locates her work against a deterministic approach which 
dictates that media consumers interpret the media in any unified way. Although her 
research findings predominantly suggest that television can conjure up negative 
feelings of demonization and disappointment, Gillespie recognizes that the multiple 
transnational news outlets available to British Muslims help these minority audiences 
'seek out and use alternative sources of news and information, displaying highly 
flexible modes of reasoning…' (Gillespie, 2007:281). Thus the unique uses and 
interpretations that media consumers display towards the diverse media they are 
exposed to cannot be generalized or narrated in any predictable fashion as they are 
multifarious, critical and often unpredictable.  
 
The desire for audiences to access diverse transnational media outlets is especially 
prevalent in the Arab world in the context of a highly popular regional geo-cultural 
television market. Matar (2007) has argued how, against the highly censored and 
controlled media environments of terrestrial national outlets, transnational satellite 
broadcasting has provided important alternatives; proving to be a much needed 
'breathing space' (Karam, 2007:81). In particular, Matar focuses on the rise of niche 
channels such as Heya TV that have contributed to the 'empowerment of women' 
(2007:513) across the Arab world. By nurturing a feminist agenda and thus openly 
discussing topics rarely approached publicly in Arab and Islamic public spheres such 
as cohabitation and homosexuality, Matar argues that Heya TV displays strong 
potential towards becoming a feminist counterpublic and a communicative space 'for 
women to articulate their own voices, their concerns about their position in society' 
(2007:522). Furthermore, Kraidy (2009) documents the interesting and 
overwhelmingly positive reception that the reality TV programme Star Academy 
received in Saudi Arabia following its airing on the Lebanese Broadcasting 
Corporation (LBC) channel. Kraidy argues how, making an appearance in the ultra 
conservative, highly patriarchal cultural environment of Saudi Arabia, the reality 
programme offered an 'alternative social reality imbued with women's agency' 
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(2009:358). The public visibility of female contestants dancing on screen, touching 
men physically and sharing the same living spaces was strongly condemned by 
religious clerics and the conservative Saudi government. Nevertheless, it offered 
more liberal viewers, particularly women, a fleeting vision of 'a more participatory 
and inclusive society, one with less clerical influence and a wider margin of 
individual autonomy' (Kraidy, 2009:362).  
 
Kraidy's (2009) study demonstrates the ability of female Saudi audiences, operating 
from within a complex social reality underpinned by rigid hegemonic gender 
relations, to interact with Star Academy in a way that countered and challenged 
everyday experiences of dominant religious doctrine within the nation.  Thus, the 
complex ways in which audiences interpret the media is dependent upon and filtered 
through 'their multiple everyday experiences within other social contexts and 
different social structures' (Parameswaran, 1999:101) beyond the media text. This is 
an important indicator of the complex process of intercontextuality that characterizes 
the dialectical multilayered relationship shaping the media and audiences 
(Parameswaran, 1999; Bird, 1992). For example, in Gillespie's (2007) study, young 
Muslims' experiences of transnational media is dictated by their ethnic identity and 
their encounters with racial tensions in Britain. In relation to Kraidy (2009) and 
Matar's (2007) empirical findings, transnational Arab television is often negotiated in 
relation to everyday experiences of conservative gender norms prevalent in the Arab 
world.  
     
Intercontextuality is an important reminder of how television audiences, embedded in 
complex everyday lives that fall beyond the immediate moment of consumption, 
approach the screen already positioned within structures of power along class, ethnic 
and gender lines. Morley's (1980) pathbreaking study of class and textual 
interpretation provided one of the earliest critical reception studies of how media 
messages make sense primarily from within cultural formations and practices. 
Exploring specifically the reception of The Nationwide programme amongst four 
groups from different occupational backgrounds, Morley studied how multiple 
classed readings of the text were made across the different groups. He concluded that 
although different subcultural formations existed within each class, these differences 
remained guided and framed by social class position, which often permitted access to 
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a broad repertoire of available cultural codes, while at other times, allowing only 
restricted access to a narrower range of codes (Morley, 1980). Despite the 
importance of socio-economic status in shaping everyday interactions with the media 
as indicated early on by Morley's study, Skeggs, Thumim and Wood (2008) argue 
that media and communications research has largely abandoned class since the 1980s 
and the 1990s. Although there have been notable exceptions to this trend as I discuss 
below, these have remained only a few. This is especially so in relation to Arab 
audiences, where Arab cultural studies in general suffer from a poverty of in-depth 
empirical research documenting the multiple ways in which audiences interact with 
the media on an everyday basis (Sabry, 2007).  
 
Perhaps one of the main reasons why class has been downplayed so much within 
media and communications research is due to the increased interest in gender, 
particularly in women. Nevertheless, even though the spotlight of media research has 
concentrated on gender, I believe understandings of gender will remain partial as 
long as it is explored as unconnected to class. As Ang (1996:115) argues in relation 
to research on female audiences, 'class makes a difference'. Avoiding such an 
artificial divide within my own research that disconnects the different socio-cultural 
positions that shape media audiences, I explore how class, age and gender, within an 
urban everyday context, are very often in dialogue with each other, revealing their 
relevance often at their points of intersection.  Press' (1991) comparative study of the 
diverse interpretations working and middle class American women made of the soap 
opera Dynasty, is a key point of reference in making the link between class and 
gender. Press discovered that middle class women adopted a highly critical attitude 
towards the soap opera, particularly criticizing narratives that portrayed weak women 
with a lack of power in the family and in society. In contrast, working class women, 
articulating their interpretations of the serial in relation to their own experiences of 
being imprisoned within a patriarchal society and rigid gender-based divisions, 
focused more on the portrayal of day-to-day survival issues.  
 
In a more recent analysis, Skeggs, Thumim and Wood (2008) have explored the 
ways in which working class and middle class British women differentially receive, 
and form multiple interpretations of reality television. Working class women, the 
authors discovered, were more likely to perceive reality television in ways that 
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corresponded to their own everyday struggles and constricted economic experiences. 
In this context, the working class often sympathized and related with reality 
television participants, regarding these types of programmes as a legitimate way for 
ordinary disadvantaged people to experience rapid social and financial mobility. 
Middle class women, on the other hand, were more interested in demonstrating to the 
researchers their cultural capital and ability to semiotically read and decode such 
'exploitative genres' for what they really are. Thus, they displayed less empathy and 
identification with the protagonists on screen, condemning them for their greedy 
desire to 'get something for nothing' (Skeggs, Thumim and Wood, 2008: 18-19).   
 
A long-standing concern of feminist research has not only been the way gender 
influences the interpretation and negotiation of media texts, but how gender itself, 
particularly the subjective conceptions of 'femininity', is negotiated within the 
process of media consumption. This has often been examined through drama genres, 
particularly soap operas. Although such research has offered important insights into 
the way gendered identities are partly shaped in media consumption, it has departed 
from a feminist framework of analysis, thus focusing on women and their feminine 
desires for the possibilities of imagination and fantasy enabled through melodrama. 
Men have usually been excluded from these worlds (La Pastina, 2004), which means 
the question of how men position themselves in relation to mediated drama, and use 
them to construct their identities, remains yet to be addressed.  
 
Ang (1996) uses the term melodramatic imagination in relation to the pleasures 
female viewers derive from imaginary identifications with soap operas. 'Being' a 
woman is never definitive, Ang argues, but involves an ongoing process of identity 
construction, and thus the fantasy and fiction aspect of soap operas becomes a 
reassuring private space in which these women can be excessively melodramatic, 
exploring other, more desirable situations and identities not available to them in their 
everyday lives. Abu-Lughod's (1995) ethnographic analysis of working class 
Egyptian women's consumption of the drama serial Hilmiyya Nights, captures how 
female viewers actively negotiate drama texts in ways that correspond to their 
everyday particularities.  Although produced originally to fit an elite vision of 
national unity and patriotism, Abu-Lughod explores how media-savvy female 
viewers of the serial interpret it in ways that challenge the message intended by 
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producers. Working as domestic servants in Cairo, Abu-Lughod's poor female 
participants find pleasure in the character of Nazik Hanem; 'the aristocratic, 
conniving, magnificently dressed femme fatale who plays the leading female role' 
(Abu-Lughod, 1995: 200). They admire Nazik Hanem's strong character and her 
remorseless defiance of a moral system that usually keeps women such as themselves 
silenced.  
 
The above discussion illustrates how television viewing is a highly selective activity 
where viewers accept and enjoy storylines that correspond to their own life-worlds, 
personal ambitions or interests. As Van Zoonen (1994) reminds us, we should never 
assume gender to precede cultural practices, but gender requires continuous work as 
it is part of an ongoing process within which subjects are dialectically constituted. 
Thus, gender is constructed in the context of everyday life where media consumption 
is one of the most important daily practices (Van Zoonen, 1994). The same applies to 
class where class identities are not pre-established or static conceptions, but people 
are involved in an ongoing process of developing new ways of thinking about and 
expressing their class status, often through the media. In their content analysis of 
reality television programmes, Wood and Skeggs (2008) explore how such genres 
provide highly classed representations of everyday life, underpinned by a drive to 
universalize middle class lifestyles and rules of etiquette in terms of taste, behaviour 
and embodied appearance. Thus, through a promotion of strategies for 'behaviour 
modification' (Wood & Skeggs, 2008:189), working class contestants (and viewers) 
are 'taught' how to develop what the programme makers define as taste, style and a 
beautiful life drawn from a middle class model.  
 
What can be gleaned from the above studies is that the importance of television to its 
viewers is not necessarily in providing an escapist depiction of an idealistic life as 
they wish it to be, but as a cultural space in which mediated representations allow 
them to reflect back upon and renegotiate the self in new ways. This links to Hall's 
(1994) theory of the media as representational systems that do not simply function as 
mirrors reflecting ready-made identities that exist independently of mediated 
representation. According to Hall (1994), it was specifically through cinematic 
representation consumed in the 1970s that peoples of the Caribbean were collectively 
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able to discover the African component to their identities, which were previously 
based on a heavy European and American influence. 
 
In light of the above studies and concepts, it appears that television may enable the 
articulation of a cosmopolitan imagination. The more people are exposed to different 
media, the more the limits of their identities are expanded and the rigidness of 
everyday social experiences may be challenged as they come to see different 
representations of gender roles, of diverse cultural realities and alternative 
understandings of class. Thus, the diverse media representations that people consume 
have resulted in the articulation of imagination, which becomes a window leading 
out of the rigidness of immediate social experience, allowing for a reflection upon 
the self in relation to distant others. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
Egypt, where identities could not be more unequal in relation to deep-seated social 
divides. As television expands the repertoires of people's cultural references, 
therefore, the self and the everyday increasingly only make sense in relation to 
events and others who exist in places beyond their reach. In a similar vein, I return to 
my discussion of the city and propose that as the privileged site of the everyday 
where class identities, gender roles and cultural realities are realized and rooted, we 
experience and negotiate the city through a mediated exposure to what takes place 
beyond its borders in places never physically experienced (Featherstone, 1998). In 
this context, television is not only a receiving frame whose images and 
representations allow us to make sense of an external world existing beyond us, but it 
is often from within television that the everyday is actually constructed. As 
Silverstone argues, 'the media are both contained by, and are the container of, the 
everyday' (2007:20). Thus, as the media come to alter our everyday socio-spatial 
perceptions of urban space, the city becomes transformed into a creative urban 
terrain rife with possibilities for imagination, allowing inhabitants to 'experiment 
with their identities and participate in a more disorderly existence' (Stevenson, 
2003:59).  I turn to this in the next and final section of the chapter where I argue that 
there is no one shared perception of a single 'real' city. Using Lefebvre's (1991) 
theory of the Production of Space, I propose that multiple urban narratives as 
informed by the media are emerging.   
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4.5 Romance on Cairo's Bridge: Lefebvre's Theory of Space and Imagining the    
City 
 
That Cairo is a space of inequalities, of debilitating social divides and unequal access 
to systems of power, is undeniable. Yet, at the same time, does this necessarily mean 
that everyday experiences of the city for young Cairenes are pre-determined, 
unfolding in predictable ways on the basis of static and homogenous social 
experiences within set social formations? More specifically, are Cairo's inhabitants –
particularly the economically and socially marginalized – afforded no room for 
manoeuvre and no space from within which to shape their own urban experiences? 
According to Beazley's (2000) research on the spatially marginalized street 
subcultures of Indonesia, street children are not entirely passive victims, but have 
managed to develop particular urban survival strategies. Such tactics allow them to 
appropriate selected spaces within the city for their own use where they can 'form a 
collective identity in opposition to oppression' (Beazley, 2000:481). This 
complements Moyer's (2004) ethnographic findings which reveal that young 
Tanzanian street workers do not surrender completely to classed mechanisms of 
urban exclusion. Instead, these young people have developed an intelligent sense of 
space that allows them to control such moments of demarcation to meet their own 
ends. For instance, Moyer examines how the prestigious area surrounding the 
Sheraton hotel, frequented mainly by Tanzania's rich and elite, is of benefit to street 
workers who establish their own informal businesses there.  
 
With the media as a framing category, I build upon Moyer's (2004) and Beazley's 
(2000) approach that the city is a creative terrain which urban occupants of different 
backgrounds make their own, constantly searching within to locate spaces of 
representation and inclusivity (Georgiou, 2008). Lefebvre's (1991) influential theory 
of the Production of Space that conceives the city not as an 'epistemological starting 
position' (Schmid, 2008:28) simply existing, but as a dynamic social space constantly 
in a state of production, provides my main conceptual framework.  Specifically, 
Lefebvre's triadic model for the production of urban space that draws on material, 
symbolic and imaginary dimensions, allows us to bring together the media and the 
city as two important cultural systems, and to understand how, at their intersection, 
they provide an important space for the production of everyday life. Furthermore, 
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Lefebvre's sensitivity to how everyday spatial practices are strongly underpinned by 
relations of power and hegemony (Savage, 2000a) is a point of significance in 
relation to my research. It is important not to over-romanticise the opportunities for 
spatial and cultural openness provided by the city, and the imaginative capabilities of 
its inhabitants. The city remains a place of restriction, of control, of authority and 
government repression. With Cairo as their focus, Singerman and Amar (2006) 
capture the contradictory nature of the city, both as a space of creativity and 
opportunity, but also as a continuing terrain of repression and regulation. The authors 
argue how Cairenes have become skilled at resisting dominant state institutions and 
articulating forms of subjectivity and agency, yet always 'under conditions not of 
their own choosing, and within relations of power that can radically dehumanize and 
militarize daily existence' (2006:10).   
 
Lefebvre approaches the city not as a passive or dead surface where activity is 
carried out, but as a space that is 'organic and fluid and alive; it has a pulse, it 
palpitates, it flows and collides with other spaces' (Merrifield, 2000: 171). Lefebvre 
proceeds from a relational concept of space and time where they are perceived not to 
exist universally, but 'can only be understood in the context of a specific society. In 
this sense, space and time are not only relational but fundamentally historical' 
(Schmid, 2008:29). Thus, as a social space, the city is a contextualized entity that is 
actively produced within the specific repertoires of history, time and culture. More 
specifically, Lefebvre highlights three interlinked dialectical dimensions that 
underpin the production of urban space. Firstly there is perceived space: this involves 
the obvious perceivable elements that can be grasped by the senses and thus directly 
relates to the material and physical dimensions that constitute urban space. Secondly, 
conceived space: this refers to the dimension of space produced and planned to fit the 
vision of the dominant elites. Space here is constructed by professionals and 
technocrats, and thus is intimately tied to ideology, power and knowledge. Lastly 
there is lived space: this is the space of everyday experience as it is lived and directly 
perceived by urban inhabitants (Schmid, 2008).  According to Harvey (2004), this 
final aspect of Lefebvre's analysis is essential in its recognition that people are not 
material atoms inhabiting a material world, but that we 'also have imaginations, 
fears, emotions, psychologies and dreams. These spaces of representation are part 
and parcel of the way we live in the world' (Harvey, 2004:8). Thus, Lefebvre's triadic 
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model illustrates how everyday experiences of the city are not simply based on 
bodies physically circulating within an urban material infrastructure. Our perception 
and understanding of urban space is a multidimensional process shaped by relations 
of hegemonic power and emerging at the intersection of the physical, imaginary and 
the symbolic. 
 
Focusing specifically on women's urban experiences in Cairo, Ghannam (2002) 
discusses how many studies have approached the city as a 'mere container for the 
practices of its residents', yet we 'rarely read about how these practices shape the city 
and the specificity of urban life in producing and shaping the activities and 
relationships forged by women' (Ghannam, 2002: 16-17). Thus, in Lefebvre's terms, 
Ghannam argues that studies have overly focused on the perceived and conceived 
aspects of urban space where the city is reduced to a grounded material 
infrastructure, constructed to fit the hegemonic vision of intellectuals and political 
figures. Nevertheless, what is missing is a more in-depth examination of the lived 
dimension of Cairo's urban spaces: how social agents themselves play an active role 
in producing and reproducing their everyday urban lives by articulating 'local values, 
national policies, and global forces in their daily struggles' (Ghannam, 2002: 17). 
Although Ghannam gives precedence to the everyday spatial practices of ordinary 
inhabitants, she continues to protest for the significance of the conceived aspect of 
space linked to the production of hegemonic knowledge. Indeed, it is often the 
policies and laws established by the state that set the agenda and establish a dominant 
framework from within which social actors develop strategies to deal with, resist and 
incorporate these discourses into their daily lives. Hence, as an everyday system of 
cultural organization, our experiences of the city operate at multiple levels. Both 
bottom-up strategies of resistance and struggle continue to be juxtaposed alongside 
top-down dimensions of power including state control, financial, social and cultural 
capital, which together, lead to the construction of multiple urban experiences.  
 
De Certeau's (1984) thesis is central in this analysis as he emphasizes the need to 
focus on the 'everyday practices' of ordinary people who experience the city from 
below (1984: xii). Distinguishing between the concepts strategies and tactics, De 
Certeau maintains that ordinary practitioners of the city do not have the ability to 
reject or alter structures of power associated with dominant institutions and the 
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powerful elite (strategies). Although the everyday lives of urban inhabitants must 
operate from within, and thus remain framed by these discourses, they are often able 
to manipulate, resist or transform these structures of power to meet their own ends 
(tactics). Hence, everyday life in the city is mainly produced through the strategic 
practices of the powerful, yet is simultaneously re-produced from below through the 
daily practices of ordinary consumers (De Certeau, 1984). Thus, the city as bounded 
place includes a concrete (controlled and governed) materiality, but this materiality is 
sociologically meaningless unless we focus on the subjective thoughts and the lived 
experiences that imbue them with particular symbolic meanings and imaginations.  
 
As important cultural windows and everyday resources for connecting to a wider 
world, the media are considered to be 'representational registers' (Jansson, 2009: 309) 
through which our imaginations are formed and filtered, thus allowing 'built 
environments and infrastructures (to) become communicative, that is, socially and 
culturally meaningful' (ibid.:309). Concentrating particularly on the importance of 
mediated communication in contemporary experiences of modern urban space, 
Jansson (2009) praises Lefebvre for focusing on everyday experiences of the city 
from below, overcoming the usual division between material, symbolic, and 
imaginary spaces. Thus, as the media broaden our repertoire of cultural references 
and expand our knowledge of the world beyond the immediate, the familiar and the 
present, they increasingly shape how we interpret and negotiate our urban 
experiences (Georgiou, 2008; Featherstone, 1998; Jansson, 2009).  
 
The city in its multiple guises, contradictory facets and paradoxes that allow 
moments of tyranny and repression to be juxtaposed alongside spaces of agency and 
resistance, cannot be manifested more clearly than in Cairo. As Al-Sayyad 
(2006:539) asks: 'which Cairo do we talk about and in whose name?' Indeed, findings 
from my ethnographic research demonstrate how multiple Cairos constructed and 
imagined by young Egyptians exist in close proximity, yet rarely maintain contact. A 
global Cairo, Islamic Cairo, Cairo as London of the Middle East, Cairo as a third 
world city and Cairo as oppression and lack of opportunity, are just some of the 
descriptions my young sample have used in reference to life in their capital city. 
Indeed, as everyday life in Cairo intersects with gendered and classed realities on the 
one hand, and mediated representations of a broader world on the other, Cairo has 
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become a cultural vessel permeated with different meanings and different 
interpretations. Sabry's (2010) ethnographic analysis of the Qassr Nile bridge in 
central Cairo illustrates how young Egyptians imbue their own mediated 
understandings and imaginative interpretations onto this urban space. Built by the 
British colonizers in the 1930s, this is described by Sabry (2010) as an attempt to 
'modernize' Cairo's image and to promote a sophisticated physical infrastructure 
befitting Egypt's capital city. Nevertheless, with its location at the heart of modern 
Cairo, connecting the bustling Tahrir Square with the elite Zamalek district, the 
creative uses that Cairo's  inhabitants today make of the bridge have somewhat 
defied the original intentions of the British colonizers.  
 
Interestingly, Sabry examines how the bridge has become a refuge where young 
Egyptian couples of less privileged backgrounds meet for secret romantic encounters. 
Standing in close romantic proximity beyond the disapproving gazes of their family 
and neighbourhood community, backs are turned towards passing cars as couples 
find it acceptable to undertake acts of physical affection while positioned on this very 
public space. What Sabry (2010) finds most interesting is the way such bold shows 
of intimacy outside marriage, considered completely immoral and inappropriate in 
the Egyptian cultural context if performed anywhere else, are normalized and in no 
way rebuked when performed on this bridge. Furthermore, Sabry argues how these 
public acts of romance are both ontological and natural expressions of love, but also 
performances of modernness that draw heavily on institutionalized media images. It 
would be inaccurate to say that before the exposure of these young people to the 
media they did not engage in secret acts of love defying discourses of religious 
morality as imposed by families and wider community expectations. Nevertheless, it 
could be that as the prime modern transporters of cultural meaning and influence, 
televised representations frame these actions and accord them particular connotations 
associated with the 'normal' everyday practices of global youth cultures.  
 
As televised representations of a distant world increasingly converge with cultural 
norms and religious rules in Cairo, 'they create a third space, which, perhaps only the 
lovers can articulate' (Sabry, 2010: 74). Sabry poses the important question of how 
an urban space such as Qassr Nile bridge should be perceived: 'could it be a different 
kind of public space, a private-public space, an in-between space or even a hyper-real 
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space?' (2010: 69). Baudrillard (1994) argues how the implosion of media images 
into our everyday lives means we are increasingly facing a hyperreality or a 
simulation of reality. Mediated representations and messages have come to precede 
our actual lives and lose their connection to reality. The extent to which the media 
create simulations that evade any sense of reality is a long debate I will not undertake 
here. Nevertheless, what is certain is that the media expose these young Egyptians to 
a broad range of cultural influences that allow them to broaden their 'interpretive 
horizons' (Jansson, 2009: 310), thus reformulating how they come to perceive and 
experience the urban world around them. In this context, as the urban becomes a 
space where the televised and the physical come into dialogue, new opportunities for 
the formation of cosmopolitan imagination come into being, transforming the city, to 
borrow Lefebvre's term, into a creative and dynamic lived space uniting the physical 
the imaginary and the symbolic.  
 
The case of Qassr Nile bridge in Cairo links back to the discussion of modernity that 
was the main theme discussed in Chapter Two. I explored how 'being' modern is a 
subjective category that takes shape in multiple ways as it is located within the 
specific and evolving repertoires of class, place and history. State conceived top-
down versions of modernity are constantly in conflict with more creative, bottom-up 
articulations of how citizens themselves perceive and understand the need (or not) to 
be modern. As argued in this chapter, it is the city, as the main locus of everyday life 
that represents this mediatory space of creativity between lived practice and official 
discourse. In relation to the bridge in Cairo, while state elites intended this 
architectural artifact to stand for Egypt's new physical resemblance to the 'modern' 
west, young Cairenes also use it to avow their modernness, albeit through forbidden 
acts of love that defy religious rules and societal norms. Do these stolen romantic 
encounters, drawing predominantly on transnational media images, position these 
young men and women on a cosmopolitan map? Perhaps not within a Kantian 
analytical framework. What is certain, however, is that these young Egyptians, 
operating from within very specific spatio-temporal contexts, are articulating a 
definite cosmopolitan moment from which they assert their presence and belonging 
to a world where national, regional and global realities intersect.  
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5 Methodology 
5.1 Introduction: Triangulation and Cairo's Worlds within Worlds 
I always knew what to expect when I walked into the gates of the American 
University in Cairo. I was never surprised to see large groups of women walking 
around with their Gucci handbags and Ray Ban sunglasses, men clad in Vans trainers 
and Levi jeans eating Big Macs from the McDonalds canteen, or 'hippies' sipping 
their lattes and strumming their guitars. All this seemed quite normal to me. I once 
stopped in surprise, however, upon seeing a couple openly kiss in the middle of the 
campus, only to be pushed away by my giggling friend and told: 'You're in the 
American University- everything happens here!' For me, however, the real surprise 
came the first time I entered the predominantly working class Madina Institute. In a 
space almost twenty times smaller than the American University, I was always 
greeted by a sea of veiled heads and enthusiastically gelled hair. Standing at the main 
gates, I remember being overwhelmed by swarms of students flocking into the 
institute in overcrowded microbuses or walking from the nearby metro station.  With 
popular Egyptian music blasting out of a wooden shack just next to the entrance – 
which I later came to realise was the canteen – I also saw Vans trainers (written 
Vanz), Levi jeans and even Dolce and Gabbana T-shirts (written Gapana) all obvious 
counterfeits, made locally in Egypt. Walking around the highly neglected, almost 
derelict buildings of the campus, I could not help but wonder how this could be a 
productive and fruitful environment for anyone to learn in.  
Later, watching a documentary on the state of poverty and education in Egypt, I 
reflected on the two very diverse milieux I witnessed earlier that week and realised 
my naivety. Seeing beyond the preconceptions and assumptions which had 
previously clouded my vision of Egyptian society, only then did I begin to 
comprehend the huge methodological challenges facing me. I was wrong to have 
been complacent by what I saw at the American University, or indeed, surprised by 
what I saw at the institute. How could I have been surprised by such differences that 
characterise groups whose socio-economic and cultural position is worlds apart in 
Egyptian society? As I began to subjectively transcend the 'cultural cocoon' from 
within which I had narrowly experienced Egyptian society previously, I gradually 
began to acknowledge that in a country where poverty and deprivation prevail, 
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students of the American university are a true minority. What this early encounter 
taught me was the need to approach the research scene with the ability to reflect upon 
all my taken for granted inhibitions, thoughts and preconceptions. It may be assumed 
that a familiarity with the research scene is naturally an advantage as one is 
acquainted with the main cultural codes, while access to participants becomes less of 
a hindrance. On the contrary, this prior familiarity with the context under study often 
brings in its wake problems of a unique kind.  
Being accustomed to the research scene and positioned within particular socio-
cultural networks that dictated for me a specific experience of Egyptian society, 
meant I often took it as a given that young Egyptians act in a particular way or 
naturally dress in a specific fashion, without ever questioning the reasons behind it. 
Wearing the 'cap' of the researcher, however, I realised the importance of adopting a 
critical approach whereby I could probe the deeper motives and intentions behind 
everyday acts.  My main concern, therefore, was that I needed a combination of 
methods that would allow me to go beyond assumptions associated with first-level 
appearances and trends. My research was an urban study based in Cairo, and 
involved a daily ethnographic engagement with young Egyptian men and women 
between the ages of 18-25 years as they negotiated daily spaces of leisure and 
education in the city. Three educational institutions, in particular, provided an initial 
point of entry into the different classed worlds of my young Egyptian sample: The 
American University in Cairo (upper middle class), The Faculty of Education, Ain 
Shams University (lower middle class) and Madina Institute (working class).  The 
aim of my ethnographic research was to undertake an in-depth micro analysis of the 
construction of three different classed versions of a cosmopolitan imagination that 
intersects with a highly fragmented, yet mediated everyday urban life. In order to 
approach and dissect the phenomenological articulations of cosmopolitan 
imagination, I needed to delve deep into the daily urban lives of young Egyptians, 
engaging with them as they went about their everyday cultural practices in order to 
unearth their thoughts, contradictions and everyday meaning-making processes.   
In light of the above initial concerns, I adopted an ethnographic approach to my 
study spending nine months in Cairo conducting intensive research, which allowed 
me to participate and observe, talk and listen to young Egyptians from within an 
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everyday urban context. I predominantly required a combination of methods that 
would enable me to take a holistic approach, drawing connections between the media 
and the larger cultural framework in order to contextualise processes of media 
negotiation and interpretation as they take place in everyday life. Observation 
(participant and non-participant) and focus groups were the main qualitative methods 
I adopted, although in conjunction with these, I used a survey as a supporting method 
that allowed me to record media consumption trends. The statistics informed my 
ethnographic narrative, providing useful information about patterns and choices 
associated with daily television consumption amongst young Egyptians. 
As Flick (2006: 37) argues, processes of triangulation can prove very fruitful as 
'different methodological perspectives complement each other in the study of an 
issue, and this is conceived as the complementary compensation of the weaknesses 
and blind spots of each single method'.  Belton (2000: 642) confirms this when she 
discusses how, in relation to television research, a multi-pronged approach is needed 
that will take on board the 'individual, everyday, embedded reality of the viewing 
experience'. A multi-method approach is necessary in that each method contributes 
something new and unique to the researcher's understanding of the concepts under 
study. Similarly, Bird (2003) makes an interesting contribution when she notes how 
all methodological approaches, no matter how academically sound they may claim to 
be, will always be characterized by constraints. The key to overcoming this is to be 
flexible; to tailor one's ethnographic encounter to a particular context, and be aware 
of the impact of such methodological choices. Thus, the researcher must be 'creative' 
and 'reflective' (Bird, 2003: 16), realising that it is not about selecting the methods 
which are hailed in text books as being the best ethnographically. It is about the 
ability of the researcher to display sensitivity to the particularities of the culture 
under study, and consequently, choose a combination of methods that both address 
the main research questions, and importantly, suit the cultural experiences of those 
being researched.  
The survey represented the first step in the research process which was followed by 
focus groups. The participant/non-participant observation sessions took place 
simultaneously alongside the other methods. The first part of this chapter is dedicated 
to a discussion of the reasons why I have selected ethnography as my main 
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methodological framework, as well as reviewing my sample recruitment process. In 
the following section I then explore issues of researcher identity and reflexivity by 
investigating how my own position as a young middle class woman and academic 
may have influenced the research process. Finally, I proceed on to a more specific 
discussion of my three chosen methods: survey, focus group interviews and 
participant/non-participant observation.      
5.2 Why Ethnography?  
Ethnography allowed me to immerse myself into Egyptian culture, and to develop an 
in-depth and first-hand understanding of the experiences, sensations and events that 
young Egyptians commonly experience on a daily basis.  As Gillespie (1995) argues, 
traditional models of research have unsuccessfully examined the lived experiences of 
media consumers, and have failed to capture the insights surrounding the 
complexities of television and its audiences who are enveloped in wider social, 
political and economic formations. As Ang (1996) also writes, there is a need for 
radical contextualism in research, where the media should not be studied in isolation, 
but as embedded within an everyday technical and consumer culture which is 
simultaneously domestic, national and global. Ethnography permits this 
'methodological situationalism' by uncovering the thoroughly situated, context-bound 
ways in which 'people encounter, use, interpret, enjoy, think and talk about 
television' in everyday life' (Ang, 1996: 70).  Thus ethnography, which seeks to 
understand audiences in their full sociological complexity, offers significant insights 
into the broader complex social and cultural worlds of media audiences.  
As Machin (2002) has discussed, the way the social world is constructed and the way 
people relate to the media is a very arbitrary and highly subjective process that 
depends upon each group's cultural tool kit, or cultural framework for understanding 
the wider world. The importance of ethnographic research comes in disassembling 
social interaction and social behaviour from the flow of everyday life in order to 
come closer to understanding the unique cultural tool kits associated with different 
groups. This disassembling process uncovers behaviours and thoughts that occur at 
the immediate moment of research, although to give these actions a broader 
contextualisation, the ethnographer then needs to reintegrate these practices back into 
the broader flow and context of everyday life (Machin, 2002).  Moreover, according 
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to Radway (1988), in order to truly understand the way the media are integrated and 
implicated within everyday life, research needs to cover a multitude of sites such as 
the world of daily work, education and multiple leisure worlds. In the light of 
Radway's arguments, it is clear that human behaviour cannot be understood through 
a narrow observation of any one single moment, but must be examined in different 
times and under different contexts. I embraced this idea within my own research, 
realising that young Egyptians can never be fully constrained by one place, but are 
located within, and influenced by multiple discourses of leisure, education and 
domestic/community spaces. For this reason, I adopted a multi-sited approach to my 
research (Bird, 2003), engaging with young Egyptians in their prime sites of 
everyday leisure and education.        
As ethnography is a dynamic method, very much shaped in the process of interaction 
with the informants themselves, I was faced with a continual refinement of the 
research design based upon the continually incoming data. Willis (1980) notes that 
the very nature of ethnographic research involves being 'surprised at certain 
moments' (cf. Gillespie, 1995: 61). Indeed, on numerous occasions I encountered 
unexpected events and attitudes which forced me to alter my research plans. For 
instance, I faced a difficulty with working class men at first in relation to participant 
observation, as they informed me it would be highly unsuitable for a woman like 
myself to socialise with them alone. Thus, in the first few months, I was forced to 
substitute this with increased sessions of non-participant observation. However, after 
much persuasion and as my relationship with them grew stronger, they eventually 
suggested that I could arrange for a male companion to accompany me on the 
participant observation sessions, which would be far more 'respectable' than me 
simply meeting them alone. As they constantly made clear to me, a woman should 
never socialise with a group of unfamiliar men without a chaperone. Furthermore, as 
the male chaperone I brought along was my relative, I was faced with the problem of 
power imbalance. The participants quickly came to realise that he was university 
educated and working in a multinational company. Although I did instruct him to 
keep as low a profile as possible during the discussions, they intriguingly asked him 
several questions about himself and thus there was no escaping the fact that feelings 
of inadequacy and incompetence may have arisen as a result of his presence. Phrases 
such as, 'well, we probably don’t know as much as your friend here,' or 'we may not 
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be as highly educated as your relative but we do know what is going on in the world,' 
were sometimes voiced. Instances such as these were unfortunate problems that I 
could not plan for or avoid. Nevertheless, I was aware from the start, that with a 
laborious methodological process such as ethnography that requires much human 
contact and unique personal encounters, I would frequently be faced with such issues 
that would need to be swiftly dealt with and resolved as they arose.      
I recorded my data as field notes, complemented by a fieldwork diary, and I used a 
recording device that enabled me to tape what my participants were saying, while 
giving me the opportunity to concentrate on the discussion taking place. I always 
informed the groups I would be recording the sessions, and thus gained their consent. 
My field notes consisted of a notebook that I kept with me during the non-participant 
observation sessions and focus group discussions. I made notes of events and 
practices I was seeing, hearing and taking part in as they were happening.  I 
attempted to relay as much intense detail as I could, including accurate quotations, as 
I needed to capture the most precise snapshot of the way young Egyptians were 
acting, performing, dressing and talking. Regarding the participant observation 
sessions, in order to avoid making my presence as a researcher too obvious and to 
fully blend in with the group, (while always being cautious of not 'going native') I 
relied upon my memory to complete my notes. I usually kept the notebook in my bag 
and at the first opportunity that I was alone, I would record the latest encounters. I 
also kept a daily fieldwork diary that was a very important tool for personal 
reflection, as I recorded my feelings and worries, the attitudes of my participants, 
problems I encountered in gaining access to particular areas, and how I dealt with 
these issues. It is important to note that all the focus group and observation sessions 
were conducted in Arabic, which I then translated myself into English as I was 
transcribing them. 
5.2.1 Participant Recruitment  
My sample consisted of young Egyptians between the ages of 18-25, divided equally 
between women and men and students from the three different educational 
institutions. This section will predominantly explore the more technical side involved 
in my participant recruitment process, although section 5.4 onwards reflects upon the 
numerical details of sample size at each stage of the research. My research largely 
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adopted a snowballing technique where I relied on my own personal networks to 
instigate and maintain research momentum. The reasons for this were two-fold, the 
first of which related to the broader aims and objectives of my research. I was 
undergoing a qualitative, ethnographic project where there was no intention of 
unearthing results that would be statistically representative of my wider target 
population. As Davidson and Layder (2001:173) write: 'qualitative research is 
concerned with smaller number of cases but with more intensive analyses' and thus 
the logic behind selecting informants for this kind of qualitative endeavour is 'to 
concentrate on an intensive analysis of a limited number of cases which represent, or 
are in some way tailored to, the central objectives of the research'. In this context, 
snowballing represented a quick, cheap and convenient form of strategic sampling 
(Davies, 2007) through which I gathered a limited number of people who were 
primarily important in allowing me to explore my research questions. As a result of 
my sampling method, therefore, my sample remained both non-random and 
unrepresentative.  
The second reason I relied on snowballing related to the unique nature of the 
research setting. Egypt is a country that is socially and politically closed, and where 
there is usually little opportunity for people to speak openly, or honestly express their 
views. In this context, and as I learned from the pilot study, randomly approaching 
people I did not know, and asking them to take part in a study they knew nothing 
about, where they would be expected to open up about their everyday lives, would 
not have yielded many positive responses. Indeed, I was often asked by wary or 
suspicious participants if I was a government agent or foreign journalist trying to 
expose them to the world. Conducting my research in a culture saturated with such 
levels of fear and paranoia, therefore, meant I was forced to approach informants 
through a network of established social contacts. This meant potential participants 
could easily enquire about my research, and thus be assured of my identity and 
purposes for talking to them (Denscombe, 2003). Furthermore, I was granted entry 
into the three institutions on the basis that I would be cooperating with a limited 
number of named lecturers/professors, and so it was only through them, as initial 
contacts, that I was able to further access participants.       
Through snowballing I began with a small number of participants at each of the three 
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educational institutions, which gradually expanded through successive waves, where 
I encouraged students to recruit their peers. This continued until the desired number 
of participants for each stage of the research was reached in relation to size and an 
equal distribution of men, women and students from the three different institutions. I 
maintained the momentum of these waves through a dual-incentive system (an 
approach used mainly by respondent-driven sampling techniques. See Heckathorn, 
1997). Lecturers at the American University and Faculty of Education agreed to 
award separate educational incentives including coursework points and extra marks 
in exams for students who took part in the questionnaire themselves and recruited a 
friend. Obviously, as it was only a limited number of professors and lecturers that 
agreed to implement this system of incentives, I had to ask participants to only 
recruit their friends that attended these specific classes. As the later phases of the 
research (focus groups and participant observation) were conducted in locations 
away from the educational institutions, educational incentives could not be applied 
here. The only exception was with the lower middle class, as I conducted almost all 
the focus groups within the university campus and thus lecturers agreed to offer 
another coursework/exam point for those who took part in the focus group sessions. 
Nevertheless, with the upper middle class, I had to rely on the fact that beyond the 
survey, people who took part in the research did so out of a general willingness and 
personal interest to do so.  
Matters were quite different in the institute where lecturers were not willing to 
support this system of incentives. I overcame this by replacing it with financial 
incentives. I offered them a financial reward for their time (survey) and for travel 
expenses (to take part in the focus group sessions), and in the instances where the 
focus groups and observation sessions were conducted in a café, I paid for their food 
and drink. Conscious of always approaching the research scene with ethical 
considerations towards all my participants, I made an effort not to implement these 
incentives in any way that could harm, insult or disadvantage them. For instance, I 
was assured that this culture of receiving 'extra marks' in exams and coursework was 
normal in Egyptian institutions. Students could often guarantee extra points to boost 
their final mark by undergoing specific research tasks for their lecturers. Thus, 
receiving an incentive for completing my questionnaire did not benefit some students 
at the expense of others, but provided one of many established means of gaining 
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extra class marks. Furthermore, when I rewarded the working class participants 
financially, I was conscious not to personally distribute the money to each participant 
myself, and especially whilst in public. I felt this could harm their feelings and sense 
of dignity. This was especially so for men where the idea of a woman openly 
displaying financial control is highly disregarded in the patriarchal culture of 
working class Egyptians. I handed the money over to the person I had the closest 
relationship to in the group and made it their responsibility to distribute it at a time 
they considered most suitable.   
5.3 Identity and Reflexivity: Between Insider and Outsider Status 
The extent to which my own personal identity was central to the research process 
became clear to me almost as soon as I started. The multiple identities within me, 
conjured up important issues relating to power and positionality. The fact I am of 
Egyptian origin and so visit Egypt several times a year and have a large circle of 
friends and family there, meant I was able to depend on this social circle to introduce 
me to, and bring to my attention the required number of participants I needed for the 
research. Thus, from a practical point of view, access to participants posed no 
notable problem and it became much easier to enter the world of Egyptian youth 
culture and establish a positive relationship with them. Before conducting the study, I 
was initially worried that my position as an educated upper-middle class woman 
might intimidate, and thus deter the working class and lower middle class groups 
from opening up to the research questions. Indeed, the group that did prove to be 
most challenging during the initial stages of the research was the working class men. 
They found it difficult at first to acknowledge the power imbalance that existed 
between myself as an academic, thus naturally in a position of authority, and between 
themselves as informants. The fact I was a woman, made it all the more awkward for 
them to uncover their thoughts and feelings to me at first. However, as the research 
progressed, and they began to realise that I was not there to judge them, and that in 
fact, I was very much aware of, and sympathetic to their hardship, they began to 
relax and to speak freely with less inhibition. 
According to Parameswaran (2001: 93), rather than experiencing neatly categorized 
states of insiders and outsiders, the researcher will be involved in constant 
negotiations between insider/outsider and self/other positions 'depending on the 
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dialogical and interactive process of identity construction in the field'. Indeed, I was 
never confined to one single subject positioning but moments of interaction with 
different participants, particularly in relation to my class status and gender identity, 
meant I was constantly alternating between a position as an insider and outsider. I 
developed very unique relationships with the different class participants, which 
shaped the path and direction each research encounter took. With the upper middle 
class, my education in a 'foreign' university and upbringing in the west positioned me 
as an 'equal' in relation to class identity, and thus meant I was instantly accepted into 
their social groups, quickly becoming an insider. This in itself presented a challenge 
as they often considered me to be a friend more than a researcher, and in many 
instances, I found myself having to steer conversations away from personal stories 
and questions about my life, and more towards the set research objectives. It was a 
hard balance to maintain a friendly and open manner alongside the more formal 
conduct of a professional researcher who had a list of prompts and questions they 
needed to get through in a limited time frame. I was conscious to avoid inducing the 
sense that I was too conceited or overly proud of my academic status (despite our 
very similar ages) not to engage with them in friendly dialogue.    
As Seiter, Borchers, Kreutzner, et al. (1989) found in their research on women and 
soap opera viewing, the interviewers' identification as academics meant that a social 
hierarchy was instantly imposed between them and their participants. Nevertheless, 
despite their status as academics which placed them in the category of 'other,' the 
researchers' identity as women allowed them to develop relationships of closeness 
with their female informants. They were able to draw on common 'female issues' 
such as fashion, housework and heterosexual relationships. Thus, gender provided an 
important position of 'sameness' in relation to the informants (Seiter, Borchers, 
Kreutzner, et al. 1989). I adopted this idea of 'sameness' in my own research in order 
to try and develop a relationship of trust, and to establish a rapport between myself 
and my participants. For the working and lower middle classes, our joint identities as 
Muslims established a link of similarity from the outset. Being veiled (a phenomenon 
associated more with the lower classes in Egypt) and not conforming to what they 
perceived to be the typical image of an academic in Egypt (usually middle-aged and 
authoritative) made them feel at ease, and thus my position as an upper middle class 
academic was temporarily relegated to the background. Nevertheless, as I noted 
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previously, this acceptance took more time with the working class men. As the 
research came to an end, some of the informants revealed that when they were first 
informed of the research, and that a British educated 'Doctor' – as they referred to me 
– would be conducting the sessions, they were rather wary. They presumed I would 
be dressed inappropriately as a 'foreigner', and attempt to act as westernized as 
possible, not knowing anything about the experiences of the lower classes, thus 
treating them as laboratory mice. As 21-year-old Amany told me:  
(Laughing) I thought you would walk in wearing a short sleeved top 
and jeans, and have your hair dyed blonde, and of course pretend to 
know nothing of what's happening in Egypt. I was quite surprised 
when you walked in and you were veiled, had good knowledge of 
Islam, and even spoke Arabic properly – even though you have lived 
in a western country for a big part of your life. I really respected that 
and respected that you are interested in doing your studies on Egyptian 
culture and Egyptian people – it would have been much easier for you 
to just do it in London. I almost instantly felt like you were one of us. 
Thus some of my informants like Amany were 'proud' that I lived in the west, yet 
was able to maintain my religious identity. From their perspective I had achieved the 
success of going to the UK, while overcoming what they regarded as the corrupting 
influences of western culture. This instant identification with me as a fellow Muslim 
was a factor of importance for the two lower classes that made them feel at ease 
opening up to me. For the upper middle class, I was able to easily slot into their 
group gatherings, which usually took part in western inspired cafes, and to 
effortlessly engage in their conversations, usually conducted in a dynamic mix of 
Arabic and English. Similar to the two other groups, my Islamic head cover was very 
often a point of intrigue for the upper middle class. They seemed particularly 
interested in, and regularly commented on how I was able to combine my higab 
(headscarf) with a very modern appearance and the latest western fashion trends.  
As the above demonstrates, the headscarf became an important religious symbol that 
allowed me to navigate and form different relationships with the three groups. I will 
discuss this in more detail in the next section.  
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5.3.1 The Islamic Headscarf as a Mediator 
As Coffey (1999:59) argues, ‘fieldwork is necessarily an embodied activity’ as the 
bodies of the researcher and researched become central to the accomplishment of 
fieldwork. Ethnographers, according to the author, are constantly engaged in ‘body 
work’ (ibid.:62) as they actively produce a physical body image that is suitable to the 
particularities of the research setting. Thus, in responding to the norms and rules of 
this setting, ethnographers are often forced to engage in bodily performance where 
physical appearance and body image are necessarily crafted for successful 
completion of the fieldwork. As Coffey (1999:68) further notes, ‘what our body 
looks like, how it is perceived and used can impact upon access, field roles and field 
relationships’. Indeed, my own bodily image and appearance as a researcher, 
especially in relation to the Islamic headscarf, became central to the fieldwork 
process and the relationships I formulated with my different groups.  
Modesty and covering of the body is an obligation for Muslim women, where only 
their hands and face can be revealed. Although attire is required to be loose-fitting 
and non-transparent, there is no particular requirement within Islamic texts that 
dictates exactly what women should wear or how they should cover their bodies. For 
this reason there are a plethora of styles and modes of dress – across class and culture 
− that allow Muslim women to practice their religious commitment.  For instance, 
walking down a typical street in Cairo, one can see women wearing the isdal: a large 
headscarf that extends down to cover the arms and chest area; the niqab: a full face 
veil and large black cloak that covers the entire body; and most commonly, the 
higab: a small headscarf that covers the hair and neck, usually fused with modern 
forms of dress. I conform to the third style of covering, where my headscarf is 
combined with typical western fashion trends such as jeans, tunics, trainers and 
cardigans. Nevertheless, I was aware from the beginning that my chosen method of 
wearing the higab was only one out of many different versions that are common in 
Cairo. Thus, for my three groups, both men and women, the higab conjured multiple 
meanings and thus shaped my relationship with them and their perception of me in 
different ways.  
I had contact with several hundred participants who had their own unique 
philosophies and understandings regarding why and how the higab should be worn, 
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that often conflicted with my own. Interestingly, Mulderig (2011) found similar 
results with her research amongst Moroccan women. As a western convert to Islam, 
Mulderig felt that amongst her Moroccan female informants, she was elevated to the 
status of an ‘ideal’ Muslim woman. Thus, her embodied appearance in the field as a 
‘new’ Muslim, and particularly the way she wore her headscarf, was – for her 
informants − the biggest indicator of this foreign woman’s piousness and seriousness 
in joining the Islamic Umma. For this reason, her Moroccan participants often 
grabbed at her face and head, wrapping and rewrapping her higab to demonstrate 
how she ‘should’ wear it properly. Thus, Mulderig notes how she often felt 
vulnerable as the women were almost trying to prove that they were good Muslims 
themselves by trying to constantly ‘make’ her look a ‘better’ Muslim. 
While conducting my fieldwork, I had a similar experience as Mulderig regarding 
my Islamic attire and appearance. Wearing the higab was not a random or haphazard 
choice made whimsically, but the outcome of a conscious decision which became an 
element of reference and self-reference in each research encounter. For the two lower 
classes, my headscarf became an important symbol that confirmed my identity as a 
devout Muslim, which, for them, overshadowed my status as an upper middle class 
woman. For lower middle class men in particular, although it took time initially, the 
headscarf came to represent a symbol of trust that facilitated the gradual building of 
rapport. They often told me that the fact I was a ‘respectable’ veiled Muslim woman 
slowly encouraged them to confide in me and reveal aspects of their private selves 
without fear. My embodied religiosity seemed to reassure them that I could never 
betray them by spreading rumours in relation to what they told me in confidence. 
Furthermore, as a Muslim, yet a Muslim living in the west, they felt that more than 
anyone, I would understand the difficulties involved in trying to be a pious and 
practicing Muslim in the modern world. I would sympathise with and understand the 
difficulty of their situation and how the temptations their regularly face − particularly 
through the unregulated media they have access to − means they find it difficult to 
always adhere to the strict practices of their religion.   
Regarding the female participants, it was not just the fact that I wore the veil, but the 
method in which I wore it that became central to my interaction with women from 
these the lower middle and working class. When I began my fieldwork in 2008, a 
new trend of wearing the higab by tying it loosely at the back of the neck instead of 
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wrapping it around the front of the neck became fashionable. I experimented with 
this style myself during the first few months of fieldwork, although it appeared to be 
very unpopular with members of the two lower classes. For them, this way of 
wearing the headscarf was an embodiment of how the upper classes in Egypt have 
‘westernized’ Islamic symbols, transforming them into fashionable items, and thus 
emptying them of their religious value. During focus group and participant 
observation sessions, women from the lower middle and working class would take 
the opportunity to ‘teach’ me how the higab ‘should’ be worn in ways that were more 
conforming to the Islamic requirements of modesty. Indeed, they would often warn 
me that a stray hair is showing or that part of my shoulder is bare. Furthermore, on 
several occasions, they even bought me gifts in the shape of coloured headscarves 
and fancy pins and would show me how to wrap them around my hair and neck 
properly so as to be appropriately covered, while conforming to the latest colours and 
styles in the world of higab fashion.  
I was often lectured on how my top was too short and that although it covered my 
derriere, ideally, it should be knee-length. Additionally, my skinny jeans were 
regularly a topic of conversation as I was told how baggy trousers should be worn, or 
preferably a long skirt. My embodied appearance and preferred method of wearing 
the headscarf was perceived by them to be an influence of the infiltration of western 
culture through the media, adopted and imitated mainly by the upper classes. Despite 
this, I was spared their wrath as they almost gave me an ‘excuse’ for the way I 
dressed; I lived in a non-Muslim country. Thus, from their point of view, the fact I 
was born and bred in the west, yet chose to wear the headscarf, meant I should be 
praised and congratulated. Nevertheless, almost considering me to be a ‘novice’ 
Muslim due to my distance from the Islamic world, they felt obliged to advice and 
guide me as to the correct practices of our religion. I felt this gave them almost a 
sense of superiority over me. Although academically and in terms of class status I 
was in an elevated position, when it came to religious knowledge – particularly in 
relation to proper modes of Islamic dress – they were the ones endowing me with 
their expertise and wisdom. As a result of the above, I attempted to tweak and adapt 
my appearance in a way that allowed me to still maintain my own identity and feel 
comfortable, yet while blending in with the group as much as possible in order to 
facilitate rapport. As not to portray the image of an elite woman whose religion is 
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being employed almost as a fashion statement – thus reaffirming social class 
differences – I tried to conform to more simpler and traditional methods of wearing 
the headscarf. I also avoided wearing excessive jewellery (especially gold) and 
branded clothes or handbags that could once again reaffirm class status.          
In Egypt, the higher up the class system one goes, the less likely it is that women 
(and men) conform to traditional forms of Islamic dress. In this context, I was a 
minority in the upper middle class sessions, in the sense that women who did not 
wear the headscarf, far outnumbered those who did. Nevertheless, my identity as a 
veiled woman was still an important part of the fieldwork process and of researcher-
participant interaction. In relation to upper middle class men, it appeared that the 
headscarf created the automatic assumption that I was religious and thus must always 
conform to the rules of Islamic practice. On several occasions, for instance, I sensed 
that they attempted to avoid or would reluctantly reveal more liberal aspects of their 
behaviour such as drinking alcohol or having open relationships outside wedlock. It 
was almost as if they believed that a veiled Muslim woman would surely not 
comprehend or approve of such behaviour. Nevertheless, as the research progressed 
over time and as they learned more about the details of my life in the UK and my 
wide circle of non-Muslim friends, they seemed much more willing to speak about 
particular aspects of their behaviour. Again, our similar class status was an advantage 
here as they realised that even if these types of behaviour did not necessarily 
conform to my own preferred lifestyle choices, I was both accustomed to and 
accepting of them as a result of my life in the UK. 
With the upper middle class women, a rapport was established almost 
instantaneously as a result of our gender, which became an important thread of 
similarity, particularly in relation to fashion interests. Although wearing the 
headscarf meant I was a minority in these sessions, my embodied appearance was 
more a point of intrigue, rather than unease as it was with male members of this 
class. I regularly received compliments from upper middle class women regarding 
how I was able to give my higab a 'modern' and fashionable twist. They liked how I 
combined the headscarf with garments conforming to Islamic requirements, yet 
purchased from what they perceived to be highly fashionable western outlets they 
enjoyed shopping in themselves – whilst abroad – such as Gap, Zara and French 
Connection (at the time of research they were all unavailable in Egypt, although the 
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latter two now have several branches across Cairo). According to these women, the 
higab is associated with negative connotations amongst the higher classes, as it is 
generally perceived to be bee’a (tacky, common). One woman, for instance, told me 
how she wanted to wear the headscarf after going through a religious phase. She was 
deterred from doing so by her parents, however, who told her that veiling is a 
practice associated primarily with the lower classes, and thus could ruin her chances 
of finding a ‘suitable’ suitor from a good, wealthy family. Thus, it seemed as if these 
women almost had a sense of respect for me as I was able to wear the higab 
(especially while living in a western country), yet keep it highly fashionable and 
funky, thus making it more of a desirable possibility for upper class females. Indeed, 
I often felt like I was a mannequin that displayed to them the latest designs hot from 
the London high street, which had not yet reached Cairo; they would regularly ask 
me about the details and product numbers of items of clothing I was wearing.  As I 
discussed above, with the lower class women, my identity as a veiled woman 
overshadowed my class status, as they felt that they were the ones with the religious 
knowledge able to educate me on how the headscarf should be properly worn. With 
upper middle class women, quite the opposite was true. My fashion choices and 
embodied appearance in fact confirmed our similar class status, yet created a sense of 
intrigue and interest in a phenomenon (veiling) usually associated with the lower 
classes.   
The above discussion illustrates how my identity as a veiled woman conjured up 
multiple meanings and thus shaped my relationship with the groups in different 
ways. As Chacko (2004:53) argues regarding ethnographic research, ‘even for those 
studying their own community, assuming a researcher’s position and gaze can throw 
into stark relief positions that were dormant for both scholar and subject until 
fieldwork began’. Indeed, when I first instigated the fieldwork, I was not fully 
conscious of how I wore the headscarf, although as the research progressed, my 
identity as a veiled woman, and more importantly, how I wore the higab, became 
central to the research process. Thus, Chacko (2004:55) writes how there is a need 
for ‘self-reflexive contemplation’ in the field. As particular differences become 
blurred while others achieve prominence, the researcher needs to build upon 
common ground and shared experiences, thus ‘fostering mutually rewarding 
relationships’ (ibid.:61). It appears that the headscarf, therefore, interpreted both as a 
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physical embodiment of religious piety, yet also a mediator between conservative 
Islamic practice and western fashion trends, became a visible socio-religious symbol 
that allowed me to foster links of commonality and thus to navigate across the three 
classes.  
Following on from the above, subjects do not always approach the research scene 
with ready-made views and opinions, but these opinions are often formulated in 
instances of openness between researcher and participants.  In this context, it is 
necessary for researchers to be sensitive to the dynamics of power between 
themselves and their participants, and thus to carve out shared spaces that will allow 
them to build relationships of trust and rapport. In this way, researchers can ensure 
that 'moments of openness' during fieldwork encounters are as fruitful and as 
worthwhile as possible. Importantly, my sensitivity to the power dynamics that 
existed between my own position as a researcher and between my participants, also 
strongly informed the analytical process of the write-up phase. Whereas during 
interactions with participants I ensured as much as possible that my identity as an 
upper-middle class woman and doctoral student in no way imposed any feelings of 
disempowerment upon them, I tried to maintain a power balance during the write-up 
process. Thinking constantly of my participants as the ones leading the research, 
rather than 'subjects' upon which the research is based, I always tried to ensure that I 
gave them a fair presence and a voice, particularly through the use of direct and 
extensive quotes that allowed them, to some extent, 'to speak for themselves'.  
5.3.2 Researcher-Participant Interaction: Fears of ‘Going Native’ 
Although being of the same ethnic and religious background as participants brings its 
advantages in terms of access, and an awareness of important cultural codes and 
conventions, it can also prove debilitating to the research process. Fears of 'going 
native' means a researcher may entirely submerge themselves in the culture under 
study to the extent that they identify with it completely, and thus are unable to 
maintain the essential objective eye of the researcher. Gillespie discusses how prior 
familiarity with a research site can often mean that habitual modes of perception, 
presuppositions and assumptions can build up into forms of 'common-sense' and 
'taken-for-granted' categories and understandings that may cloud a researcher's 
analysis of data (1995: 67). In response to such concerns, Abu Lughod (1991: 137) 
144 
 
coins the term halfies in reference to people whose 'national or cultural identity is 
mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education, or parentage'. By simultaneously 
being a part of both global and local repertoires, halfies are the most suitably 
situated, according to Abu Lughod, to comprehend the hybridity inherent at their 
intersection. As a person of Egyptian origin with relevant lived knowledge of the 
scene under study, but also, with familiarity of global discourses through my 
residence in the UK and training in a foreign university, I myself probably qualify as 
a 'halfie' and thus native ethnographer (Kraidy, 1999).   
Kraidy advocates native ethnography (not to be confused with the concept 'going 
native' I discussed above) as an important methodological technique for 
understanding hybridity. As Kraidy suggests: 'rather than resorting to dubious claims 
of authenticity, the 'native' ethnographic project must then be an appropriation of 
voice by a subject whose speaking position is located on the borderline between two 
worldviews ' (Kraidy, 1999: 461). In my case, the fact I was very much acquainted 
with, and a part of both British and Egyptian cultural repertoires, meant I was able to 
position myself, in Kraidy's terms, as a native ethnographer and translator between 
two different world views. Indeed, being raised and brought up in a different cultural 
context to the participants meant I was able to maintain a critical distance and a 
position of external reflection, thus approaching my research with a much needed 
reflexive attitude. Furthermore, the fact I conducted my fieldwork in two phases, the 
first from December 2008-July 2009 and the second from October 2009-December 
2009 was also a great advantage. I travelled back to the UK in the three month period 
in between, which proved to be a very important transition that, away from the 
research scene, allowed me to maintain detachment and to critically reflect on the 
everyday occurrences I had become a part of in Cairo.    
Nevertheless, it is essential not to over-romanticise the ability of research to erase 
subjective influences altogether. Although a reflexive assessment by the researcher 
of their own influence over the research process and subsequent findings can help 
them take these limitations into account, it will not necessarily allow the researcher 
to escape them. Any research account will inevitably be partial because the observer 
or commentator is a social subject located within pre-existing networks and value 
systems (Salzman, 2002). For this reason, Mauthner and Doucet (2003) warn against 
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believing that we, as researchers, have the ability to capture the 'true' voices of our 
subjects or that what a person has said in an interview has given us direct access to 
their subjectivity and lived experiences. Thus, ethnographic research 'permits the 
telling of a particular story, or a discursive version of the interviewee's experience' 
(Cloke, Cooke and Cursons, 2000: 137). We must realise that in another time, 
geographical place or with a different subject, the same story will not necessarily be 
replicated, which is evidence of the unique nature of each ethnographic encounter. 
For this reason, Mauthner and Doucet believe it is useful to talk about 'degrees of 
reflexivity' (2003: 425) where some influences are easier to identify and deal with at 
the time of the research, while others often 'take time, distance and detachment from 
the research' (ibid.). Furthermore, Salzman (2002) believes that rather than 
researchers making themselves subjects of their accounts, ethnographic research can 
be improved through the solitary researcher being replaced with a collaborative 
research team where the perspectives and insights of each researcher can be 
challenged and tested by the other.       
5.4 Research Conduct and Ethical Considerations 
A pilot study conducted in January 2008, provided a valuable opportunity to test my 
chosen methods without the pressure of time which I would be constrained by during 
the actual implementation process. Generally, I spent this period in casual 
conversations with young Egyptians who would later become my target population. I 
was seeking to gain a general feel for the sorts of issues of importance to their 
everyday experiences that I would later need to focus on. By informally spending 
time with members of my target group, I was then able to approach the actual 
research with a clearer vision of some of the most important issues and matters that 
would need to be discussed. Significantly, the language in which the questionnaire 
was to be distributed became an issue central to the piloting process. It was 
recommended by lecturers in the American University that I distribute questionnaires 
to students there in English, which is the language they are most articulate in as a 
result of their long-term education in private language institutions. Indeed, when I 
talked to the students themselves during the pilot study, they told me, much to my 
surprise, that they would find it easier to understand a questionnaire if it was written 
in English. Thus, although the format of the questionnaire remained the same across 
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class, I decided, on the basis of this information, to distribute an Arabic version to 
the lower middle and working class and an English version to the upper middle class. 
The other main advantage of the pilot study related again to the survey. Using the 
feedback I received, I was able to modify, revise and re-word the questions to make 
them more understandable.  I often found that questions were worded awkwardly, the 
structure confusing, or that the questionnaire was simply too long. I modified the 
questionnaire several times, according to this feedback, until I reached a format 
which both the participants and I found satisfying.  
As the majority of my methods involved sustained contact with human beings, I 
needed to ensure that I was approaching my participants with a number of ethical 
considerations in mind. Primarily, I did my utmost to 'avoid harming (participants) in 
the process by respecting and taking into account their needs and interests' (Flick, 
2006:45). Specifically, Christians (2005) notes how, since the 1980s, a code of ethics 
has been laid down by major scholarly associations, with a number of aims. I 
attempted to implement the main aspects of this code within my own research 
practice. Firstly, informed consent: I initially approached participants through their 
universities. I asked lecturers and seminar leaders to allow me to introduce the study 
myself to students, where I informed them of my name, institutional affiliation and 
position as a PhD student conducting research on media consumption amongst young 
Egyptians. I felt that by introducing the research myself independent of the lecturers, 
I was in no way coercing students into taking part or making them feel as if it was 
obligatory to their performance in their course. I made it clear that they would have 
the full right to withdraw from taking part in any stage of the research at any time. 
Secondly, privacy and confidentiality: I ensured participants that their responses 
would be guaranteed full anonymity. I did inform them, however, that later stages of 
the research would involve direct contact with me through focus group and 
observation sessions, where their identity would obviously be central to the process. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to publishing the results in my thesis or academic 
papers, I guaranteed them full confidentiality as I would use pseudonyms and no 
specific identifying details such as addresses, minute details of appearance, or dates 
would be used where identities could be disclosed. Finally, accuracy: I made sure to 
report my findings as accurately as possible as directly observed or narrated to me by 
the participants, while avoiding using the data that could in any way potentially harm 
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them, physically or psychologically.  
In terms of non-participant observation, I was formally granted entry into the three 
institutions, and as they were public spaces where an 'expectation of privacy' 
(Wimmer and Dominick, 2006:75) could never really be guaranteed, I felt that I was 
in no way infringing upon the rights of the students by observing their general 
behaviour. Furthermore, as Guillemin and Gillam (2004) note, it is not just about 
dealing with independent instances during the research whenever ethical concerns 
may arise, but it is about adopting a specific attitude towards the whole research 
process from the start that constantly centres around an ethical reflexivity and 
sensitivity towards research participants. As Morley (2007) comments on both the 
pragmatic and obvious dimensions to ethical responsibilities within ethnographic 
research, the central issue is how the researcher chooses to behave towards 
participants at the mundane human level. 'You could have the best theoretical 
methodology in the world, but if you walk into someone's house and behave like a 
prat, you're going to get nowhere' (Morley, 2007:72).           
5.4.1 Survey 
The administration of the television consumption survey represented the first step in 
the practical stages of my research. One important finding that emerged following 
the pilot study was that the observation and focus group methods did not yield a 
substantial amount of demographic information in relation to the specificities of 
everyday television use. Rich data was indeed acquired through the qualitative 
methods regarding subjective attitudes towards the content of national/global 
television and the effects of television on society, while in-depth discussions were 
enthusiastically undertaken regarding certain programmes that were broadly popular 
at the time of the research. Nevertheless, as an investigation of television's influence 
on the construction of cosmopolitan imagination was one of the objectives of this 
project, it was essential to understand what young Egyptians of the three different 
class backgrounds were choosing to watch exactly. As Harmon (2008) confirms, 
getting precise figures on media audiences in the Arab world is difficult, and thus, in 
this context, I had no prior indication of the television consumption preferences of 
young Egyptians. The survey, therefore, provided a quick and convenient method of 
documenting more widespread and general patterns of television consumption 
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amongst young Egyptians from the three classes, which transcended the limited 
sample on which my qualitative methods were based. According to Berger (2000) a 
survey allows the researcher to collect a vast amount of current information on a 
given topic, in relatively little time. This was very important in my case as I was a 
sole researcher working alone and restrained by a limited time frame, and thus I 
required a relatively cheap and convenient method that would allow me to collect 
demographic information in relation to everyday television use. Indeed, the survey 
proved very successful in allowing me to collect descriptive statistics and in 
recording frequencies in relation to the everyday consumption patterns of young 
Egyptians. These statistics were then integrated within the empirical narrative and 
helped to support my ethnographic data of the daily relevance and consequences of 
television in the daily lives of the three classes.  
Schensul and LeCompte (1999) call for the collection of both quantitative and 
qualitative data in ethnography, as both are vital parts of the ethnographic research 
encounter. As they explain, ethnographic research involves understanding a local 
population in a broader socioeconomic and political context, and some aspects of this 
macroeconomic context often need to be conveyed quantitatively. In this light, 
numerical data alone is of little value within the framework of an ethnographic study 
unless it is supported by qualitative findings that locate it within the wider socio-
cultural framework of everyday life.  Indeed, I do not conceive of my qualitative and 
quantitative methods as two separate aspects to my research, but I believe that it is at 
their intersection, and as both approaches operate together as two prongs to one 
single ethnographic fork, that they truly add a combined value to my ethnographic 
aims. Pearce (2002) confirms this point when she writes how methods which vary in 
form and focus act as checks on one another, adding important advantages and 
compensatory strengths to the mix. As Pearce argues, survey data provides 'a sense 
of valuable information about informants. This can help in preparing for interviews 
by suggesting important topics to discuss, making it easier to physically locate 
informants, and providing a pre-established rapport with the informants' (Pearce, 
2002: 112). One method, therefore, informs the other, strengthening the whole 
research process yielding richer, more accurate data. Indeed, as a first stage in the 
research, the survey represented an essential tool of preparation that allowed me to 
collect important biographical information about my participants as well as particular 
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media-related attitudes prior to focus groups and observation sessions. Thus, it 
performed an important preparatory function where I was able to come to subsequent 
stages of the research with suggested topics for conversation, probes and a wealth of 
background and contextual issues which I felt needed to be explored further.  
The questionnaire included 18 questions, 14 of which were closed and gathered 
quantitative elements of media consumption such as: channels consumed, 
language(s) of consumption, availability of satellite channels in the home, and 
amount of time spent watching television daily. The remaining four questions were 
open, and invited participants to express brief opinions about the state of public 
service television in Egypt, the development of new commercial Egyptian channels 
and the rapid infiltration of western channels via satellite. It took approximately 15-
20 minutes for the questionnaire to be filled out. My initial target was to distribute 
the questionnaire amongst 450 young Egyptians; 150 in each of the three institutions, 
split into an equal number of 75 men and 75 women. Three hundred and ninety out 
of my target 450 questionnaires were eventually completed, although 20 of them had 
to be discarded as they were not filled in correctly or accurately. This left me with a 
high response rate of 370 questionnaires. More specifically, 110, 122 and 138 
questionnaires were completed in the working class, lower middle and upper middle 
class institutions respectively. Nevertheless, to allow for an accurate comparison of 
television's relevance and importance across class, it was essential that I had an equal 
number of questionnaires in the three classes.  
Based on the actual number of usable questionnaires I had, I based my analysis on 
300 questionnaires: 100 in each of the three different institutions, split equally 
between 50 men and 50 women. I do not in any way feel that this discrepancy 
between desired number of questionnaires and actual number received disadvantaged 
my research. I never intended the questionnaire, or indeed my research in general, to 
be representative of Cairo, or speak on the behalf of all young Egyptians. On this 
basis, I felt that 300 questionnaires still fulfilled my aim of providing a general 
picture of the main media consumption practices of a particular group of young 
Egyptians at a particular time. I was able to secure a high response rate (370 out of 
450) primarily through my method of distribution as in the majority of instances, and 
where possible, I made sure I remained present while participants completed the 
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questionnaire. This gave them an opportunity to ask about and clarify any ambiguous 
issues or unclear questions. The questionnaire was distributed mainly in two ways: 
 I relied on a snowball sampling technique in order to distribute my 
questionnaires. Participants who took part were encouraged to recruit 
other friends and so on as the recruiting process slowly but surely 
gained momentum. Nevertheless, a single chain of snowballing in 
each institution did not always yield the required number of 
participants, or they would often take too much time in recruiting their 
friends. As I was greatly restricted by time, I often had to begin a new 
chain. 
 Last minute drop-outs or simply not yielding enough respondents 
through the snowballing chain, meant I had to often search myself for 
participants who would be willing to take part and fill in the survey. I 
would approach students during their lunch hour or in the break 
between lectures and ask them to fill in the survey (obviously, done in 
this way, I could not offer any educational incentives). 
I chose to administer the questionnaire personally by hand, and although an 
electronic distribution would have been much easier and may have facilitated 
targeting a larger sample (although limited only to the upper and lower middle 
classes for obvious economic reasons of Internet access), it could have influenced the 
eventual response rate. I was conscious that people could just choose to ignore my 
email or might genuinely forget about it, which would have forced me to spend time 
chasing people up. Thus, constrained by a limited time period, I felt it was much 
more efficient to undertake a traditional 'pen and paper' questionnaire where I 
personally administered and collected them myself. As part of maintaining an ethical 
approach to my research, I secured anonymity for my respondents where no 
identifying details were requested in the questionnaire. Nevertheless, I also needed to 
request the names and contact details of those willing to take part in further stages of 
the research process. Thus, following the survey, I briefed participants on what later 
stages of the research involved, and for those willing to take part, I asked that they 
leave their contact details with the lecturers and seminar leaders with whom I 
cooperated. In this way, I was able to assure them that no link could be made 
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between their identifying details and their survey responses. 
Data from the questionnaires was input into, analysed and converted into percentages 
through the SPSS software. This resulted in endless pages of statistics that I then 
converted into frequency tables – constructed according to class – which allowed for 
a more manageable, visual understanding of the frequencies.   
5.4.2 Focus Groups 
I conducted 12 focus groups altogether, each one composed of six to eight 
participants. The groups were devised to ensure that there was some degree of 
familiarity between the informants; for example, they took classes together but were 
not necessarily close friends. I was worried that having complete strangers might 
make them feel uncomfortable and thus shy away from talking freely and openly. At 
the same time, by avoiding very close acquaintances, I was attempting to dissolve the 
temptation to give socially desirable answers. I felt that in a situation where the 
informants were not bound by intimate relationships and friendships, it might be 
easier to talk openly with less inhibition as they might not want to reveal particular 
sensitive details and opinions in front of people they know too well. This need for 
segmentation (Morgan, 1997), or controlling of group composition, is essential in 
facilitating more free-flowing conversations and in setting up a suitable environment 
that allows participants to feel comfortable enough to generate meaningful 
discussions. 
As I discussed in section 5.4.1, through the survey, I encouraged participants to take 
part in the next stage of the research: focus groups. Once I had briefed them on what 
the focus group was to involve, and encouraged them to bring a friend along, I made 
it clear that I would prefer them to bring class colleagues who they knew were 
opinionated and articulate, and would thus contribute to the discussion, rather than 
simply selecting close friends. Indeed, whenever a group of survey respondents 
approached me about taking part in the focus group, I would become very observant 
and sensitive to the group dynamics. If I felt they were a group of very close friends, 
I would try splitting them up into different sessions. As Lunt and Livingstone (1996) 
suggest, in order for focus groups to simulate a genuine public discussion where 
strong disagreements and contradictions are bound to happen, then representatives of 
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multiple positions within the group are much called for. Sometimes, however, I 
would not get enough participants through the survey alone who would be willing to 
take part in further stages of the research, or often those who had previously 
displayed willingness to participate, later dropped out. In this case I reverted back to 
my own personal social networks to fill in the gaps by introducing me to other 
potential participants.  
 
My research involved three class categories- the working class, lower middle class 
and upper middle class- and for each class I conducted: 
 Two x six-eight women 
 Two x six-eight men 
Initially, my desire was to conduct each group session with eight participants, which 
with 12 focus groups, would total 96 participants. However, I also set myself a 
minimum of 6 people to each session that I was not to go under to ensure that a 
meaningful and dynamic discussion could ensue. Eventually, the sessions were 
conducted with a total of 87 participants, which broke down to six groups of eight 
participants, three groups of seven and three groups of six. I believe this small 
discrepancy between desired number of participants (96) and those actually used (87) 
did not in any way influence the validity of my results, as I was still able to ensure 
that each group was composed of no less than six people which maintained a vibrant 
and dynamic, yet controllable discussion. Each session lasted around one hour, and I 
arranged two different focus group sessions with each subset of my target population 
in order to cross-examine validity over the nine month period. This was important to 
ensure that the data produced by the focus groups was an accurate reflection of the 
general patterns of thought and behaviour amongst this group of young Egyptians, 
not just simply an expression of  that unique set of participants or 'the idiosyncrasies 
of a particular group' (Hughes and DuMont, 1993: 778).   
In terms of group composition, although it may be normal for men and women to 
socialise in the same spaces, to have them sat together in a single discussion group 
and to expect them to talk openly and honestly about sensitive topics, may be quite 
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unusual in the Egyptian cultural context. Thus, for my research to yield the most 
reliable results, I believe it was necessary to follow the usual gendered social patterns 
by having men and women in separate groups. Pettigrew (1981) experienced a 
similar obstacle while studying Sikhs in the Punjab. She found that in a context 
where the idea of 'reputation' was central, and thus movement of women outside the 
home greatly restricted and always supervised, she was forced to adhere to the 
traditional pattern of gender separation. Throughout her research, therefore, 
Pettigrew conformed to this code of gender segregation herself, whilst importantly, 
also being careful to apply it to her research subjects. This point is confirmed by 
Hughes and DuMont (1993) who suggest that too much heterogeneity within a focus 
group can often lead to stark social status differences as lower status participants can 
often defer their perspectives in the face of those they perceive as higher status. In 
this context, it is often better to compose groups with participants who have similar 
characteristics, and find it easier to identify with each other's experiences. Hence, 
comparisons need to be made across homogenous groups rather than within 
heterogeneous groups (Hughes & DuMont, 1993). Indeed, in relation to my own 
research and especially regarding the two lower class groups where patriarchal 
attitudes were strongly observed, I felt that women could feel constrained and may 
be too intimidated to speak openly in the presence of men. 
Although focus groups are usually conducted within an artificial setting and 
gathering that may not have taken place independent of the research, one of their 
most important advantages is that the dynamics between individuals in the group 
very much resembles the mechanism of a spontaneous conversation that occurs in an 
everyday context (Bloor, Frankland and Thomas, 2001). Thus the conversational 
style of the group sessions allowed for intense and dynamic discussions to take place. 
Very frequently, serendipitous points occurred, which stimulated others to pursue 
lines of thinking that may not have been raised in a situation involving one person 
(Wimmer & Dominick, 2006: 130). The strength of focus groups, therefore, comes in 
their ability to emphasize the social nature of communication and to forge strong 
links between identity, discourse and society. Meanings and identities are created not 
in isolation, but individuals are naturally social beings and thus are continually 
repositioning themselves in relation to the circulation of discourse (Lunt and 
Livingstone, 1996). 
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The focus group discussions were an important stage in my research as they allowed 
me to give the immediate cultural scenes I encountered during the non participant 
observation sessions more of a 'holistic' perspective (Fetterman, 1998: 19). Through 
the open-ended group discussions, I was able to question participants about the local 
historical, religious, political and economic situation of their country, and how they 
perceived its impact upon their cultural desires and ambitions. I also asked them 
about the effects of global trends and dynamics which are no doubt having important 
influences on their local cultural experiences. Attitudes towards, and preferences for, 
local terrestrial, regional and global television, were also popular points of 
conversation. Focus groups, therefore, represented an important opportunity to shed 
more of a focused light on the primary research questions, and probe deeper into 
particular issues that arose from the survey or came to my attention during the 
observation sessions (see appendix, fig.2 for the list of prompts). 
In relation to the analysis of focus group data, I transcribed the recorded 
conversations and input them electronically after each session. I then printed all the 
transcripts and tried to develop a very visual, manual system of coding from within 
which I could extract a coherent ethnographic narrative. I began my research 
knowing that I was exploring cosmopolitanism, or more specifically, the way young 
Egyptians draw on mediated representations to position themselves as part of a wider 
world that exists beyond immediate borders. Nevertheless, I had no pre-formulated 
conception of how such cosmopolitan 'modes of belonging' would actually be 
expressed across class – this was something I would discover and extract from the 
research process. Thus, initially, my coding process began with an 'open' stage 
(Davidson and Layder, 2001) where I transcribed and analysed everything I heard as 
I could not judge in advance what was and what was not relevant. I read and re-read 
over the transcripts (a process which took several months) using written symbols, 
coloured pens and post-it notes to try and develop some form of categorisation and 
thematic analysis.  
Using the unused walls of a spare room (rooms in Egypt are significantly larger than 
the UK), I attempted to work from within categories of class and gender to extract 
common themes and threads. For example, I would hang up the transcripts for the 
three female groups and try to make links, visually acknowledging how often a 
155 
 
particular theme occurred. I did the same for the male groups, then worked across 
categories of class. I often found it helpful to work with opposites: to position 
different classes or genders alongside each other and visually examine them. 
Differences between particular groups often helped me to more easily acknowledge 
instances of commonality between others. I was able to formulate a provisional set of 
categories at first, such as 'the importance of religion,' which was continually refined 
until core categories were established such as 'religion as moral conduct' or 'religion 
as public conformity'. Thus, as the data was transposed from pages of written text 
into broken-down segments of specific identifiable themes, it became a lot easier to 
merge this rich qualitative dialogue within the linear frame of an ethnographic 
narrative.  
5.4.3 Observation 
According to Murphy and Kraidy (2003:305), much recent research can be criticized 
for its ‘quasi ethnographic’ approach, as they have relied on in-depth interviews and 
discussion groups at the expense of immersion and long-term observation in the 
field. In order to avoid the thinness of previous field experience, I chose to conduct 
both participant and non-participant observation, which gave me the opportunity to 
spend an extended period of time in the field in contact with the persons and contexts 
to be studied. I observed young Egyptians from the three different classes over a 
period of nine months, with several weekday educational, and weekend leisurely 
activities observed every week:  
i)Weekdays: non-participant observation conducted in three different educational 
institutions: The American University in Cairo; Ain Shams University- Faculty of 
Education; and Madina Institute. Where possible, I conducted at least one session per 
week in each institution.  
ii)Weekend: participant observation sessions undertaken in the chosen weekend 
leisure spaces of the three different group categories. The number of sessions I was 
able to conduct was unpredictable at the initial stages of my research as it was out of 
my control. It depended primarily on how these young men and women organized 
and directed their social lives, which I attempted not to intervene in as much as 
possible. I did try to ensure, however, that I undertook at least one session with each 
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class group every 10 days. 
Observational methods gave me the opportunity to immerse myself in the lives of 
young Egyptians and to become a part of their everyday micro-practices and socio-
cultural experiences. Through non-participant observation I became a witness to the 
everyday behaviours, public performances and embodied fashion choices undertaken 
by young Egyptians, and thus how they asserted specific cultural allegiances and 
modes of belonging on a daily basis. Cross-gender contact was also a factor of 
interest as I wanted to observe the extent to which the formation of social groups was 
based on gender interaction or segregation. Observational methods also allowed me 
to determine how such patterns of cultural behaviour differed according to class 
category. Importantly, non-participant observation provided me with a valuable 
opportunity of maintaining some verbal and personal distance from the participants, 
observing from afar and uncovering patterns of cultural behaviour over time, as it 
occurred in its daily context. Whereas the focus group and participant observation 
sessions may have been influenced by the visible presence of the researcher, non-
participant observation allowed me to study and record behaviour as it took place in 
its natural and everyday setting, free of researcher influence.  
As Belton (2000) notes in her research on young children and the effects of 
television, media-influence is largely a cognitive and non-rational process, where 
individuals are not always fully conscious or reflective of their feelings, motivations 
and assumptions. In this context, methodologies that require direct questioning and 
thus rely on verbal reports are not always effective as it depends on those aspects of a 
person's identity which are conscious and easily articulated. For these reasons, 
Morgan (1997) suggests that methodologies such as focus groups, which rely on 
verbal behaviour and self-reported data alone, are not always adequate for the study 
of particular social roles and practices, and thus the increased naturalism of 
observational methods becomes necessary in this respect (Morgan, 1997: 8). Once 
again, therefore, it is clear how the strengths of my different methodologies only 
emerge at their intersection, and as each one acts as a check on the other, 
counterbalancing its weaknesses. As Patton (1990) confirms, qualitative research is 
continuously emergent and flexible. It is a recursive process made up of several 
component parts, where each one informs the next. For example, participant 
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observation sessions that represented the normal, everyday social gatherings of 
young Egyptians, contrasted with the more artificially arranged environment of the 
focus groups. Nevertheless, I was only expected to 'tag along' during the participant 
observation sessions, maintaining a low profile as a researcher and observer. In this 
context, it was the artificial environment of the focus groups that allowed me to 
retain control and to direct the sessions, probing participants about pre-determined 
questions. In terms of analysis, qualitative data from the observation sessions was 
transcribed in the same way as the focus groups (please see section 5.4.2 above). 
During the participant observation sessions I engaged with the young people during 
their leisure outings and attempted to immerse myself within their social groups. I 
aimed to uncover how they choose to spend their free time, which spaces of the city 
are selected for everyday leisure practices, and how such patterns differ according to 
class. Additionally, I became aware of the topics that these young men and women 
choose to discuss in their peer groups and the extent to which the media are central to 
their social dialogues. Focus group discussions were an important precursor to these 
participant observation sessions, as the open and dynamic discussions allowed me to 
become vigilant about particular attitudes and opinions of significance to the young 
informants. Through the participant observation sessions I then attempted to casually 
bring up these attitudes and opinions of concern.  
Many of the classic studies of television (e.g. Livingstone, 1990; Lull, 1990; Ang, 
1996; Silverstone & Hirsch, 1992) have been conducted in the private sphere of the 
home, where it was assumed that television was mainly a domestic, family-centred 
technology. However, as my research uncovers, although the immediate act of 
watching television takes place mainly in the home, media consumption is very much 
influenced by, and indeed influences, social processes that take place outside the 
domestic sphere. Georgiou (2001) for instance argues how there is a need to surpass 
the domination of the domestic as the singular point of reference and research in 
media studies, by looking at how media consumption is implicated in wider 
processes of identity and community construction. Similarly, Gillespie (1995) refers 
to television's embeddedness in the 'here and now' due to its ability to converge the 
private and the public. Although viewing television is mainly conducted in the 
private realm, TV talk is more widely integrated into our social and leisure spaces as 
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we very often interweave our talk about television into our everyday social and 
personal discussions. Indeed, Egypt is an extensive outdoors culture with the young, 
in particular, spending large amounts of time outside their homes in cafés, malls and 
other leisurely venues, which are open until the early hours of the morning. Such 
locations have become noticeably populated with television screens, and although 
they are usually relegated to background noise, particular programmes can often act 
as an important impetus for media related discussions. Thus, although the television 
viewing patterns of young Egyptians remain predominantly positioned in the private 
sphere of the home, the cultural effects of mediated representation far surpass the 
walled boundaries of the domestic space as they influence leisure practices, fashion 
choices and public performances. As Morley (2007: 216) confirms, there is now a 
'de-domestication of the media and the radical distribution of domesticity itself'. An 
investigation of public practices through observational methods, therefore, is 
essential in informing and furthering our understanding of how both the public and 
the private spheres are continually shaped and informed by the media.  
5.5 Conclusion  
In conclusion to this chapter, triangulation has been particularly useful in addressing 
my main research objectives. It has allowed me to immerse myself in Egyptian 
culture and to develop a close understanding of the thoughts, attitudes and sensations 
that young Egyptians experience on a daily basis. As I established earlier, successful 
ethnographic research is not about selecting techniques hailed as the most 
methodologically sound in ethnographic text books. It is about the ability of the 
researcher to display a critical sensitivity towards the research context under study, 
and to be familiar with their subjects in order to select the methods most socially and 
culturally appropriate. I was advantaged enough to have a sound knowledge of 
Egyptian culture, which led me to the conclusion that triangulation – combining 
observation, focus groups and a survey – would be the most fruitful unison for the 
study of my complex areas of media consumption, identity, class and everyday life 
within the city and nation. As Morley (2007:69) rightly comments regarding the 
'pragmatic' nature of methodological choices, 'research is always a question of what 
you can do, in the circumstances you face, with the resources available, which is 
most likely to get you something like the kind of data you want.' Indeed, my nine 
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month research period involved several instances of deliberation where I paused, 
reflected upon previous judgements and assessments I had made, sometimes 
modifying my research plan or implementation process. Some of these changes were 
minor such as taking a decision not to arrive at the working class sessions in my 
private car or not to take my iPhone out of my handbag so not to reaffirm unequal 
statuses in relation to class difference. Sometimes these modifications to my 
methodological plans were more major, such as being forced to halt participant 
observation with working class men at the initial stages of my research, supplanting 
them with non-participant observation sessions. Thus, a successful methodology 
involves making informed choices in relation to desired research objectives, yet also 
as a researcher operating from within a specific constraining environment.   
Ethnography has given me the opportunity to undertake a grounded, local analysis of 
everyday life as it is sensed and experienced by young Egyptians. It is important to 
realise, however, that this analysis represents a snapshot − albeit a very detailed and 
accurate one, as far as I can say – of life at a particular time in a particular place, with 
particular people (Bryman, 2001). Additionally, as a solitary researcher undergoing 
this media ethnography alone, I spent a considerable amount of time in the field in 
close contact with participants, which meant that my own experiences and personal 
identity had a very important bearing on how the research developed, particularly in 
relation to the male groups. Obviously, being forced to deal with these unpredictable 
situations in the best possible way, and with the limited resources available to me at 
the time, meant my research was inevitably affected and often disadvantaged. Thus, I 
once again subscribe to Salzman's (2002) suggestion, which is that ethnographic 
research can be improved through the solitary researcher being replaced with a 
collaborative research team where the unique biographical details of each individual 
researcher can contribute its own advantages (and obviously disadvantages) to the 
research process as a whole. Nevertheless, I end this chapter by reconfirming the 
strengths of ethnographic approaches that lie in their ability to record the complex, 
multilayered processes of identity construction, and more particularly, in the case of 
my research, imagining the self and the world in the context of mediation and urban 
life.     
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6 Ethnographic Findings from Cairo: A Third-Order Cosmopolitanism and 
Imagination in the City, Nation and World 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction to Empirical Discussion: 
Cosmopolitanism through a Triadic Matrix: National Attitudes, Consumption 
Practices and Urban Mobilities 
 
 
I thought that black and white television was extinct, or that was until I once stopped 
by one of the many wooden shacks populating Cairo's streets, selling cigarettes, 
sweets and soft drinks. 'One can of Pepsi please' I announced to four young men who 
were huddled inside the shack, some on the floor and others standing as, oblivious to 
my presence, they had their eyes glued to the small, ancient portable black and white 
television set with its sprouting antenna. They were watching the much publicized 
football match between famous arch rivals Ahly and Zamalek intensely, and I 
wondered how, on such a minute screen with its terrible resolution, they could even 
follow where the ball was. 'We're losing the picture' one of the young men said, 'give 
it a good whacking so it returns. We can't miss this'.  
 
I was often warned that if I went out onto Cairo's streets during an Ahly-Zamalek 
football match, I would be met with a silent abyss – quite a contrast to the usual 
hustle, bustle and crowded atmosphere of everyday life in Cairo. Indeed, as I walked 
down Street Nine in the Maadi district, there were hardly any cars in motion as most 
people seemed to be huddled around the television set in their homes or in public 
cafés, following the match. I could see groups of men gathered in a traditional café 
smoking shisha, the tension visible in the air as all eyes were on the old-fashioned, 
dusty television set propped high on an elevated shelf for all to see. Further down the 
street, men and women sitting in Beanos Café were hooting and cheering happily as 
they followed the match on the flatscreen plasma set hung on the wall while they 
sipped their cappuccinos and lattés. Families could also be seen on their balconies 
gathered around the television set, waiting for a result in this historic game. The 
intensity and variety of television sets to suit different environments and economic 
contexts was overwhelming: flat screen, plasma, black and white and portable sets 
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drew together Egyptians of all ages and backgrounds. Some preferred to watch the 
match on Egypt's terrestrial channels. Nevertheless, the abundant visibility of 
satellite dishes in all their diverse shapes and forms told a different story. Satellite 
dishes propped on top of buildings, sometimes beside them, while often resting on 
balcony floors, with exposed wires illegally linking televisions to transnational 
satellite transmissions, illustrate how Egyptians are constantly and actively seeking 
out alternatives and diverse outlets to fulfil their media consumption desires.  As this 
lively scene demonstrates, the centrality of television to the everyday lives of 
Egyptians represents a fertile area for research.   
 
By positioning television at the heart of young Egyptians' everyday practices, this 
thesis, as previously explained, examines how these young men and women are 
constructing a cosmopolitan imagination as they occupy a highly stratified, highly 
mediated everyday urban life. I explore how this cosmopolitan imagination is 
articulated primarily in relation to cultural and financial capital associated with class 
status, yet its meaning also emerges at the intersection with age, gender relations and 
urban experience. Specifically, through a triadic matrix of intersecting factors, I 
investigate how young Egyptians, physically positioned in the same city, yet socially 
and imaginatively occupying very different classed worlds, shape three versions of a 
cosmopolitan imagination. With television occupying centre position in these young 
people's subjective understandings of the world, both immediate and far away, 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight each explores a specific dynamic through which I 
have witnessed young Cairenes' particular classed version of a cosmopolitan 
imagination.  
 
Chapter Six examines the importance that the nation continues to represent as a 
stable cultural reference in the everyday lives of young Egyptians. The majority of 
participants in the study do not own passports and have never travelled outside of 
Egypt, and thus the media represent primary, and often, their only cultural windows 
exposing them to distant worlds beyond their own. Nevertheless, I propose that this 
mediated engagement with a wider world is not a way of transcending the nation or 
engaging in supranational identities that may undermine the significance of the 
nation. As the media expand the 'interpretive horizons' (Jansson, 2009: 310) of young 
Egyptians to incorporate trans-local forms of cultural influence, these young men and 
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women develop new ways of reflexively (re)imagining and (re)negotiating the nation 
in the context of globalization. Thus, the majority of participants across class 
assertively maintain that they are 'proud Egyptians'. Nevertheless, I argue that whilst 
subjectively shifting between different local repertoires, religious attitudes and a 
global articulation of culture accessed primarily through the media, each class 
develops a very different interpretive frame regarding what they perceive the nation 
to represent.  
 
Chapter Seven explores the articulation of cosmopolitan imagination in relation to 
everyday patterns of consumption. As I discuss in Chapter Three, I am particularly 
inspired by Ong's (2009) conceptualization of cosmopolitanism, as he approaches it 
not as a model identity we should strive to achieve, but as a lived identity that is 
embodied and performed on a daily basis. In this context, I explore how three 
different versions of a cosmopolitan imagination in Cairo are daily expressed and 
physically asserted through selected embodied forms of representation and leisure 
practices. Finally, Chapter Eight investigates the importance of the city not only as a 
backdrop against which young Egyptians live their everyday lives, but in itself as 
central to the everyday construction of cosmopolitan performances. Cairo is a 
physical terrain rigidly structured around classed and gendered divides, yet it is also 
a symbolic space of imagination through which the circulation of media products is 
facilitating a reflexive negotiation of the self and everyday in relation to distant ways 
of life.  
 
This proposed triadic framework for understanding cosmopolitanism with its 
different component parts (national attitudes, consumption practices and urban 
mobilities) has become an important illustration of how cosmopolitanism is a 
complex multidimensional process expressed in diverse forms through its bodily, 
discursive and urban lived articulations.  I argue that the interplay between the 
nation, consumption and city are best understood in their relevance and 
consequences through a matrix of concentric circles: 
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Figure 6.1- Cosmopolitan matrix: consumption practices, urban mobilites and 
national attitudes 
 
As the diagram illustrates, the media are central to the formation of the three 
expressions of cosmopolitan imagination I have observed in Cairo. Furthermore, 
although representing three different cultural indicators of identity – national 
attitudes, consumption practices and urban mobilities – they capture in their 
intersection the way cosmopolitanism has come to be articulated as a form of 
imagination that frames understandings of the self and others. Thus, with the media 
at the centre of this analysis, I explore how televised representations can offer young 
Egyptians joint windows onto an interconnected world and a route to articulating a 
cosmopolitan imagination of self and others, the world close by and far away.  
Although the everyday realities of young Egyptians are characterised by a series of 
bounded classed and gendered worlds, a diverse range of transnational media offer 
spaces where these very exclusive realities meet in the consumption of the same 
representations and sets of information and cultural products available on screen. 
Hence, I suggest that the enjoyment and consumption of common media products 
across class, create frequent points of convergence or shared spaces of cosmopolitan 
connection, where young Egyptians of different backgrounds are united in their 
negotiation of moral aspirations, consumption desires and national imaginations. 
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Nevertheless, these subjective understandings and desires, formulated primarily from 
within the media, intersect with everyday structures of power related specifically to 
class inequalities and unequal gender relations. Hence, they result in numerous points 
of divergence in the daily experiences of young Egyptians that lead to the 
formulation of three different versions of a cosmopolitan imagination. In this context, 
I analyse how an overarching cosmopolitan imagination breaks down into: closed 
cosmopolitanism as imagined by the upper middle class, critical cosmopolitanism 
relating to the experiences of the lower middle class, and for the working class, an 
implicit cosmopolitan imagination. To illustrate the numerous points of contact that 
unite these young Egyptians, but also points of divergence which distinguish the 
highly polarized realities of the three classes, I construct a table that I build upon 
throughout each chapter to allow for a visual cross-class understanding of these 
points of convergence and divergence.  By structuring the following chapters and the 
experiences of young Egyptians around these three versions of cosmopolitanism, it 
becomes a useful framework that illustrates how cosmopolitan identities develop 
from within socio-economic status. Nevertheless, I do not claim that these classed 
cosmopolitan identities are completely coherent or in any way dependent upon 
absolute unity between those who occupy them. As the empirical discussion will 
illustrate, the disagreements and contradictions often recorded between those in the 
same class, highlight the fluidity of class boundaries that cannot be regarded as 
homogenous social categories. As differences occur within and not only across class 
groupings, I approach young Egyptians as rational and reflexive individuals, 
although ones who are inevitably part of the inequalities and hierarchies of an 
established class system. 
 
Before I embark upon the first empirical discussion in section 6.2, I contextualize the 
ethnographic analysis through reference to the most important findings from the 
television consumption survey conducted among 300 young men and women of the 
three classes I studied. 
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6.1.1- Television Consumption in Cairo: Findings from the Survey 
 
The everyday centrality of television to the lives of young Egyptians is reflected in 
the results of the television consumption survey. All 100% of the sample responded 
that they own a television set in their household. Additionally, all of the upper 
middle class claimed to have access to satellite television, compared to 80% of the 
lower middle class and 94% of the working class. For purely economic reasons, I 
was initially surprised that a larger number in the working class group would have 
access to satellite in relation to the lower middle class. Inquiring about this issue 
during the focus group sessions, I found that the majority in the working class group 
tend to access satellite channels through an illegal system of communal sharing, 
where a single satellite dish is shared across a number of flats or even apartment 
blocks. Each household is then connected to the dish manually through cables in 
exchange for a nominal monthly fee. This makes satellite a cheap and easily 
accessible option, which is a contrast to the lower middle class who tend to go down 
the more expensive legal route of direct purchase. Furthermore, the majority of 
respondents in the upper middle class sample own three or more sets in their 
household, with one usually located in their bedroom. Indeed, 75% of respondents in 
the upper middle class sample claimed to watch television mainly in the private 
space of their bedroom. They often discussed the importance of this in facilitating 
solitary consumption practices, which allows them freedom to consume channels and 
programmes of their choice, at the times of their choice, irrelevant to its 
(in)convenience to other family members.  
 
The biggest proportion in the lower middle and working class groups, 81% and 89% 
respectively, responded that they own only one television set, usually positioned in 
the family living room. This dictates that television consumption has become a more 
communal activity that often forces them to take into consideration the whims and 
desires of accompanying family members. Indeed, many participants in the two 
lower class groups, particularly the women, spoke of how their parents enforce 
forms of censorship on their consumption practices. Specifically, the free European 
channels they had access to, are usually encrypted, as families often fear the negative 
moral consequences they could have on their children, particularly the females. I was 
informed on numerous occasions how parents considered the presence of these 
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European channels to represent a 'devil' being in the home. Sixty percent of the 
lower middle class reported that they watch three hours or more of television per 
day, compared to 52% of the upper middle and 58% of the working class, the 
majority of whom watch one and two hours respectively daily.  During the focus 
group discussions, the upper middle class informed me how they often choose to 
spend their leisure time engaged in activities beyond the domestic space such as 
cafés, sporting clubs and bars/restaurants, while many in the working class sample 
conveyed how they work alongside their education and so are accorded a limited 
amount of time in the day to watch television. For the lower middle class, the 
majority of whom do not work, yet also do not occupy the comfortable financial 
positions of the upper middle class, television provides a relatively cheap and 
accessible medium of everyday entertainment and information.  
 
Although there are particular class specific reasons regarding the importance and 
relevance of television to each group that I will discuss in the following chapters, 
common trends across the sample did emerge. For the whole sample, 'entertainment' 
was selected as the most popular reason across class for why young Egyptians watch 
television. Seventy percent, 86% and 78% of the upper middle class, lower middle 
class and working class respectively, chose entertainment as a 'very important' reason 
for watching television. Furthermore, the survey revealed that these young men and 
women are predominantly turning away from local terrestrial media outlets. Less 
than 20% of respondents in each class selected them as channels they chose to view 
regularly. Through the focus groups it became clear that there was a general 
perception, across class, that these terrestrial channels are repetitive, unexciting and 
technically very poor compared to the engaging, sophisticatedly produced American 
productions they prefer to consume on satellite television. Indeed, the genre that by 
far featured as jointly popular across the three class categories was movies, with 
77.3% of the whole sample selecting it as a 'very important' genre. Specifically, 
movies were selected by 80% of the upper middle class, 79% of the lower middle 
class and 73% of the working class. The popularity of movies was followed by 
serials, selected by 67% of the whole sample as also being a 'very important genre.' 
Again, this broke down to 71%, 68% and 62% of the upper middle, lower middle and 
working class respectively selecting serials.  
 
167 
 
It was American movies, in particular, more than local or regional productions, that 
were jointly popular across class, selected by 76% of the upper middle class, 72% of 
the lower middle class, and 68% of the working class. This preference for American 
movies spanned across both men and women in the three groups, although for the 
two lower groups, Arabic movies and serials were noticeably popular. Fifty-eight 
percent of the lower middle class and 62% of the working class also selected Arabic 
movies as an important genre for 'entertainment'. Arabic serials were particularly 
popular with women, while men did not display much interest in local drama 
productions. Sixty-eight percent of women in the two lower class groups 
(representing 34% of the whole lower middle and working class group together) 
chose Egyptian serials for reasons of 'entertainment'. Furthermore, Turkish serials 
dubbed into Arabic were of particular importance to the daily consumption schedules 
of lower middle class women, which I will discuss in Chapter Seven.  
 
Interestingly, across the three classes, movies were preferred viewing on regional 
satellite Arabic channels with 86% and 79% of the upper middle class choosing 
MBC4 and MBC2 respectively as the channels they view the most, confirmed by 
81% and 76% of the lower middle class again for MBC2 and MBC4 respectively. 
The situation was less clear-cut with the working class, where Arabic music channels 
proved the most popular with 64% selecting it as first choice. MBC2 and MBC4 
were close behind, however, selected by 58% and 51% of the working class 
respectively. While MBC2 is a 24-hour movie channel broadcasting mainly 
Hollywood movies, MBC4 is dedicated almost entirely to American serials and light 
entertainment programmes. I found these statistics, especially those in relation to the 
upper middle class, quite surprising. I expected these elite classes, supported by their 
financial and cultural capital, to display a strong preference towards western 
channels. Nevertheless, despite having access to channels such as MTV and 
Showtime Movies, and having the cultural skills to interpret them as part of their 
familiar cultural repertoires, there was still a strong desire for regional Arabic 
television.   
 
The popularity of American movies across class demonstrates how the media are 
often important platforms and cultural spaces which unite different groups who may 
usually live very classed and disconnected lives that rarely come into contact 
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(Arvizu, 2009). The disadvantaged socio-economic status of participants in the two 
lower classes meant they were often excluded from the use of some of the more 
expensive satellite packages accessed by the upper middle class including Showtime 
and Orbit, which requires an expensive monthly fee. Nevertheless, the widespread 
availability and popularity of western entertainment products, including translated 
versions on open-access regional Arabic channels, free of monthly charges, meant 
that young Egyptians from different class backgrounds had a common reference that 
became a joint daily association with entertainment and culture more broadly. The 
English-Arabic translations provided by the MBC channels allowed men and women 
from the two lower class groups, many of whom have very basic English language 
skills, to be able to watch American movies.  
 
According to the survey, 76% of respondents in the upper middle class category 
carry out the majority of their consumption practices in English, while only 15% of 
the lower middle class and 25% of the working class claim to consume programmes 
in English. Again, I was initially puzzled as to why the working class, who have 
received no formal education in English, would watch more television in English 
compared to the lower middle class. Through the focus groups, members of this class 
informed me that American movies and sitcoms that they predominantly watch on 
the MBC channels are translated through text rather than dubbing, and they find the 
classical written Arabic text very difficult to follow. Nevertheless, the formulaic 
nature of Hollywood movies means that most of the time, they are able to rely on the 
standardized format of the movie itself and unfolding events on screen to interpret 
the storyline, independent of the translation. Indeed, statistics from the survey reveal 
that 60% of the working class sample watch television mainly in Arabic, with only 
15% relying on written Arabic translation.  
 
In relation to the lower middle class, 50% responded that the majority of their 
consumption time is dedicated to Arabic productions, in contrast to 35% who mainly 
prefer foreign programmes, mainly American movies and sitcoms, translated (with 
written text) into Arabic. In a question related specifically to the types of genre 
watched through translation or in English, the overwhelming response across the 
whole sample, 80%, pointed to movies and serials. On the other hand, there was a 
preference for political programmes, cultural programmes and news broadcasts to be 
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consumed almost exclusively as local Egyptian or regional Arabic productions. I was 
informed in the focus groups that although they consider the themes and storylines in 
American movies and serials to be universal and thus enjoyable across cultural and 
national boundaries, there is a desire for genres exploring political, economic and 
cultural realities to be reflective of the everyday concerns, aspirations and desires 
that the young in Egypt and the Arab region commonly face.  
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6.2 One Nation, Three Different Stories: Cosmopolitanism and the National 
Imagination 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
'Masr dee om el donia' (Egypt is mother of the world: a phrase frequently circulated 
amongst Egyptians and Arabs pertaining to the symbolic position of importance and 
influence that Egypt holds in the region) 24-year-old Ahmed enthusiastically told me 
as we sat in a small traditional working class café, sipping sweet teas and drinking 
cups of Turkish coffee. Swatting the army of flies tickling my nose while discreetly 
pushing away with my feet the stray disease-ridden cat nibbling at a fish bone under 
the table, I listened to Ahmed's narration of why Egypt should be accounted such a 
special position not only in the Arab world, but the whole world. Ahmed told me: 'If 
you travel the world, you will not find a nation as kind-hearted and as funny as we 
are. I can guarantee it. As they say, anyone who drinks water from the Nile will 
always come back'. Ahmed's friend, 23-year-old Wael added:  
 
Look at the extent of poverty in Egypt and look at how we are treated 
inhumanely by our government. But we get on with it, always with a 
smile on our faces – we are thick skinned. Put a westerner in our place 
and see how they will cope. They are spoilt and used to the good life. 
They have never been forced to adapt to the hardships that we endure.  
 
I was suddenly startled as Ahmed casually (but very loudly) shouted out to the small 
humble restaurant across the narrow road to bring us four ta'meyya (falafel) 
sandwiches and a plate of pickles. 'Let us show you Egyptian generosity' he proudly 
told me, then adding 'I bet you miss that when you're in England, because the Brits 
are quite tight with money, right'? Finding this to be a hilarious revelation, the rest of 
the men laughed in acknowledgment, with 24-year-old Ayman saying: 'Are they 
really like we see them on television? Do the "foreigners" all pay for themselves 
when they go out, even the women'? Thinking of how best to answer this question, I 
was relieved that a sudden debacle broke out, with the café owner running 
hysterically to remove his tables and chairs that were spilling out of the narrow 
pavement and onto the street, obstructing oncoming cars.   
 
In the distance a green Volkswagen Golf approached slowly while honking 
aggressively as it attempted to negotiate the very narrow road blocked with chairs, 
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rubbish deposited from the nearby houses and children playing obliviously. 'Aghbeya 
we hawash' (stupid, vulgar people) the young male driver shouted out, angrily adding 
'what kind of people live like this?' Feeling embarrassed for my working class 
friends, I was not quite sure how to react, although feeling my discomfort, Ahmed 
reassured me that they are quite used to this treatment; in fact, it happens several 
times a day I am informed. The narrow back-road on which the café is located, leads 
out on to one of the main streets of the Heliopolis district of Cairo, so many cars use 
it as a shortcut. 'Don’t worry about us, we are used to being second class citizens in 
Egypt' Ayman told me. 'You are lucky you live in a country where everyone is 
respected regardless of their background. Never take that for granted'.  
 
What this incident, and similar ones that will be narrated in this chapter so vividly 
illustrate, is that the relationship of young Egyptians with the idea of the nation is at 
once complex and ambivalent, shifting effortlessly between moments of pride and 
dissatisfaction. These young men proudly see themselves as affiliated to a nation 
where its citizens are known for their kind-heartedness, generosity, 'funny' genes and 
thus ability to draw people back through one sip of its Nile water. Yet, as the car 
incident demonstrated, there is a stark realization that the nation is a force for cruelty 
as much as it is a source of pride. This is underpinned by a reality of debilitating 
class polarizations and inequalities where those at the lower end of the socio-
economic spectrum are treated as 'second class citizens'. Furthermore, the constant 
reference to aganeb (foreigners), barra (outside), donia (world), very common in my 
conversations with young Egyptians across class, demonstrates how the nation is not 
a self-enclosed entity, but through a mediated exposure to the outside world, it is 
constantly perceived in relation to what takes place elsewhere, specifically the west. 
It is through his encounters with on-screen representations on television that Ahmed 
reaches the conclusion that British people are economically cautious (to be polite). 
Furthermore, Ayman wonders how it could be that 'foreigners,' lacking the 
generosity of Egyptians, pay individually when socialising in groups, rather than 
arguing over who should foot the bill as is common practice in Egypt. Nevertheless, 
it is also television that brings these young men together in a realization that the west 
applies values of justice and respect universally across all citizens regardless of 
socio-economic status. A realization, of course, that causes them to critically reflect 
back upon their own repressive everyday realities in Egypt.  
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This chapter examines how a mediated connection to the world, through television, 
that expands the cultural horizons of young Egyptians, is allowing them to adopt a 
more reflexive understanding and re-imagination of the nation. Thus, as televised 
representations provide increased opportunities for reflection and interpretation of 
self and others, young Egyptians are being exposed to alternative forms of 
governance and cultural influence that are allowing them to expand upon the 
meanings of what it can or should mean to be Egyptian. An Egypt that treats its 
citizens justly, an Egypt that is democratic, an Egypt that has a well-planned and 
'modern' urban infrastructure and an Egypt that respects its core Islamic identity, are 
just some of the demands that these young people are making in relation to what they 
see occurring in different national contexts. In a situation where the majority of these 
young men and women have never travelled outside Egypt, the nation as a specific 
geographical location and thus sense of home in the world, continues to provide an 
important feeling of stability and identity in their daily lives. Therefore, the 
cosmopolitan aspirations of these young Egyptians that symbolically position them 
as inhabitants of a broader interconnected world, remain in constant dialogue rather 
than conflict with the nation.  
 
As Beck (2004:153) has argued, a cosmopolitan perspective opens up the possibility 
of a 'dialogic imagination' which involves the location of 'one's own lifestyle within 
the horizon of other possibilities'. With her research on India, Fernandes (2000) also 
argues that the focus should not be on how the nation is eradicated under the forces 
of globalization, but how the 'production of 'the global' occurs through the nationalist 
imagination' (Fernandes, 2000:611). Following on from this thesis, this chapter 
examines how a cosmopolitan imagination, providing a sense of worldliness and 
feeling of connection to a community broader than the nation, allows young 
Egyptians to retain local and national affiliations, whilst providing a dynamic space 
within which these local particularities can be 're-imagined in the context of 
globalization' (Fernandes, 2000: 614).  Specifically, I explore how, with the media at 
the centre of their everyday social practices, each class develops a different 
interpretive frame for understanding what the nation represents. 
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6.3 Contradictory Understandings of the Nation across Class 
 
Criticisms of Egypt were routinely voiced across class, harshly and often to extremes 
that shocked me. Yet almost paradoxically, there was always the underlying assertion 
that most of these young Egyptians loved their country and that any criticism they 
levelled against it was intended to be 'constructive'; embracing the idea that you can 
never improve unless you recognize your faults. As 21-year-old Mustafa, an upper 
middle class man told me: 
 
In a world where cultures are being exchanged daily, what does Egypt 
have to offer? Unfortunately, we are passive and we are powerless. I 
mean watch American media, for example, and you can learn something 
useful and new everyday – whether it's political or cultural or even 
related to sports. In contrast watch our media and what do you see? We 
don’t even have anything of quality to offer on our screens.    
 
Later on in the focus group, however, Mustafa asserts: 
 
Hearing all these criticisms you may think that we absolutely hate our 
country or that we are just waiting for a visa to flee somewhere else.  
That isn’t true. There is so much that is positive and unique about Egypt 
– I could spend the whole day listing them. I would never allow anyone 
foreign to say anything negative about Egypt. But I am saying this with 
good intentions: how will we ever improve or change if we don’t 
recognize our limitations? I come from a wealthy family you know, and it 
is no problem for me to pack my bags and go to Europe or the US. I don’t 
want to vote in democratic elections in the US, however, I want to vote in 
Egypt. I don’t want to open an American newspaper and read criticism 
about the government, I want to do it here, in my own country.      
 
What Mustafa's words illustrate, is a contradictory position towards the nation where at 
once it is undermined as being passive and unproductive, contributing nothing on a 
global scale of influence, yet simultaneously, is strongly defended as a source of many 
positive attributes. This defensive attitude is particularly prevalent when there is a 
feeling that the nation is under attack from someone 'foreign', almost suggesting that as 
an Egyptian, Mustafa has the right to be critical of Egypt, while others are not accorded 
this privilege. In the same focus group, 25-year-old Ahmed agreed with Mustafa and 
said: 
 
Mustafa is right, and do you know what our problem is? An 
authoritarian and repressive government that doesn’t allow people to 
oppose or speak out. A government that has stolen the wealth of this 
country and thrown us into the dark ages. What do you expect people to 
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feel towards their country but contempt?! Life in Egypt frustrates me 
much of the time as I don’t see the country ever progressing, unlike the 
west. I was just watching the news the other day and I heard about the 
MP expenses scandal in the UK – MPs being publicly shamed for 
claiming money for dog food?! I laughed so hard, but this was a sad 
laughter. I couldn’t help but compare this pathetic "crime" to the 
atrocities committed by government officials in Egypt, who remain 
unpunished. 
 
What these quotations demonstrate is a yearning by Mustafa, Ahmed and young people 
like them in Egypt, to be able to exercise freedom and democracy, values fundamentally 
cosmopolitan in nature, drawn predominantly from a mediated exposure to western 
culture, while positioned within their own nation. Thus, the media come to play a central 
framing role in how these young people are forming critical understandings and 
perceptions of others (west) and how this then reflects back upon the way the self 
(Egypt) is reflexively interpreted and negotiated. Furthermore, unable to divorce their 
understanding of the nation from its relationship to the repressive state, a sense of 
distrust and contempt towards the tyrannical Egyptian regime makes these young people 
quite skeptical that any change will ever really come about. This sentiment was 
particularly true for the working class, who seemed to be constantly on the receiving end 
of state repression and police brutality. Twenty-three-year old Kamal, for instance, a 
supermarket checkout operator, narrated a harrowing story of how he was once forcibly 
removed from the streets by Egyptian police for no apparent reason while socializing 
with his friends. He was thrown into jail for 13 months without any justification. Kamal 
told me: 
 
I had no idea why I was jailed, and I still don’t. I've learnt not to ask too 
many questions. It’s a viscous circle you know – the policeman who 
decided to aggressively drag me into the police car is probably treated 
inhumanely by his bosses and is badly paid. But still, I would never 
leave Egypt, you know. You may think I'm crazy, but I don’t expect you 
to understand. I would put up with this type of treatment in my own 
country, but nowhere else. I do have faith though that one day Egypt will 
change and be like other countries we see, learning to love and respect 
her children more. Why can't we be like them? Homa El-gharb kano 
ahsan menena? (A rhetorical question: are westerners fundamentally 
superior to us?).  
 
 
Such desire for change, however, towards the creation of an open and liberal society as 
they perceive to be characteristic of the west, is articulated in parallel with a strong self 
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realisation regarding established global hierarchies, and their position within them. 
These men and women are aware that these global hierarchies usually relegate those 
located outside the west to the fringes of such advanced cultural-political worlds. As the 
quotations above reveal, young Egyptians realise that their identity as Egyptians and 
Arabs, means they are consigned to the role of passive and marginalized receivers, and 
not instigators of cultural messages and transnational influences. The above quotations 
also illustrate how it is predominantly through the media that these young Egyptians 
articulate a specific perception of western modernity as representing the symbolic 
location of freedom and progress. This allows them to develop a dynamic sense of 
reflexivity where they constantly compare what occurs in the west with their own 
repressive realities in Egypt.   
 
This sense of admiration towards the west expressed above is an attitude that I 
encountered across all three classes and became particularly apparent during a 
participant observation session with a group of lower middle class women. Sitting with 
them in Chess Café one summer's evening, Amany (22) reminded me, as she always did, 
that there was an hour and a half to go before the 8pm curfew that she and her neighbour 
24-year-old Lina had to observe. Safaa, also 24 and the only married woman in the 
group, declared that she would have to leave even earlier as her husband was not free to 
come and collect her (as he usually did), and so she would have to go home alone using 
the microbus. He was not pleased about this she told me, but he would make an 
exception this time only. We quickly ordered our coffees and mango juices as we 
continued the conversation that had been in progress for over half an hour. We were 
engaged in an intense discussion about the way rape is dealt with in Egypt. There was a 
common sentiment uniting most of these women: the unfortunate treatment a raped 
woman receives in Egypt as she is transformed from a victim into a perpetrator. 
According to most of the women in the group, the raped victim is usually perceived to 
be a source of shame and humiliation to her family. Twenty-three-year old Malak 
discussed how the problem in Egypt is much wider than rape and is deeply rooted in the 
patriarchal culture where women are treated as scapegoats, automatically blamed for any 
moral mishaps in society. Malak found it 'deeply shameful' that until recently, there was 
a law in Egypt that gave the rapist an opportunity to escape a jail sentence if he asked his 
victim to marry him in order to 'compensate' for the fact that sex was performed outside 
of marriage. Disgusted, yet hardly surprised, Malak believes this can only be expected 
from a government that does not regard Egyptian life as worthy or dignified. 
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It seemed that these women felt empowered by being given an opportunity to speak 
openly and critically about rape, considered to be such a taboo subject, and rarely 
discussed openly in Egypt. When I tried to probe them further in order to discover what 
had provoked such intense and critical opinions about a matter they may not have 
directly experienced, I discovered, to my surprise, that it was an episode of the 
American teen drama 90210 that most of these young women followed. Interestingly, 
Amany told me that although they initially began watching the serial on the regional 
MBC channels, she later discovered from a friend that the US broadcasts episodes which 
are much more recent, available over the Internet. Thus, as not all of them have an 
Internet connection in their home, they meet up at a friend's house once a week to catch 
up with the episodes online. This is an important reminder that although television may 
be the dominant medium in the daily lives of young Egyptians, new media are also 
making an important presence, often empowering these media users by expanding their 
range of choices and consumption opportunities. In relation to the discussion of rape, the 
storyline where one of the lead female characters, Naomi, was allegedly raped by a 
school teacher, created much interest amongst the young women. As 22-year-old Amany 
commented: 
 
Look at how American society dealt with the alleged rape. As soon as the 
girl said she was sexually attacked, people started to comfort her and tell 
her not to worry, while the accused teacher was immediately suspended. 
Now imagine if the same incident had occurred in Egypt – what do you 
think would have happened? Nothing at all! The girl would have been 
told to stay quiet as not to lose the reputation of herself and her family. 
What a shame! 
 
Safaa, 24, had quite a different view and interjected saying: 
 
Well Naomi isn’t exactly the best character to defend – I mean her dress, 
attitude and general character would be considered provocative by any 
man. I like to think that the media producers are sending out a message 
that such immoral conduct can lead to negative consequences such as rape. 
Also, maybe it is not always wise to make a big fuss and let the whole 
world know a girl has been raped – some families keep it quiet because 
they fear their daughter will be tainted forever. Even Islam tells us: "etha 
boleetom fastatero" (rough translation: if you have committed a sin, at 
least do it covertly). In any case, I agree that such issues need to be 
discussed more in the media, at least to raise awareness amongst young 
women of how they can avoid rape by guarding their own conduct. 
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This dialogue points to the importance of television as a daily media window that 
transports and subjectively shifts young Egyptians between and within different cultural 
worlds. Additionally, it illustrates how these young media users are forming a wide 
range of interpretations of the same texts in ways that conform to their own social 
position and agency. For Safaa, this particular episode of 90210 is a confirmation of 
traditional gender roles and values as dictated to her by Islamic practice. Amany, on the 
other hand, interprets this episode as a way that the often oppressive treatment of women 
in Egypt can be challenged. Furthermore, the discussion of rape demonstrates how some 
of the attitudes of these young women develop through a constant reference and 
comparison to what is occurring beyond their national borders in cultures they have 
never physically experienced. Although the upper middle class often travel to Europe 
and America as part of their annual holidays, the majority of my lower middle and 
working class participants have never travelled outside of Egypt. However, they still feel 
that western culture is a very familiar part of their daily cultural repertoires as a result of 
their regular television viewing.  
 
Although television only provides these women with a selective representation of 
western culture – usually fictional – it still is a powerful tool allowing them to 
confidently engage in cross-national comparisons. Differences are often pointed out 
between their own tangible and everyday experiences of corruption and dishonesty in 
Egypt, and between scenes in a film or serial, which they perceive to point to the 
transparency and integrity of western culture. Indeed, for this group of lower middle 
class women, this particular storyline of 90210 functioned as an important impetus 
that brought to the fore their diverging viewpoints regarding the treatment of raped 
women in Egypt, as compared to the west. Some agreed, like Amany, that the 
victims of rape must be encouraged to speak out about their attack without feeling 
any sense of shame or guilt. Others followed Safaa’s opinion that in order to preserve 
their own honour and dignity, and indeed that of their family’s, women who have 
been raped should avoid publicising their experiences. This stimulating exchange, 
that was a source of fascination (although often frustration) for myself, was an 
important reminder of how class should never be perceived as a homogenous and 
uncomplicated social order. Often, those in the same class − and even same group of 
close-knit friends – are divided by their own personal views and experiences. 
Importantly, therefore, the discussion about rape demonstrates that the media can 
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function as central frames through which young Egyptians often develop a reflexive 
awareness of different sets of moralities informing social roles. Thus, in their casual 
consumption of television, their sense of morality and self-righteousness of dominant 
codes of practice in the nation come to be discussed and sometimes challenged in 
multiple ways. 
 
While there is enough evidence to demonstrate that the idea of 'western' culture provides 
a key ideological reference point to which these young people aspire, we cannot talk of a 
single homogenized western culture. Western societies are fragmented and characterized 
by their own internal heterogeneities. Thus, can these differences be sweepingly glossed 
over with the single brush of 'westernization'? According to my young participants, they 
can. Whenever the opportunity arose, I felt compelled to ask them what they meant 
exactly by their constant reference to the west, or specifically, where they considered the 
west to be positioned on the map. Interestingly, a map did not seem to offer much to my 
understanding of this very elusive term as the 'west' appeared to refer to everywhere, yet 
nowhere in particular. It was the US, Britain, Australia – even Malaysia sometimes. 
Thus, the west seemed to represent an ideology and the idea of a particular lifestyle, 
more than a specific geographical setting. In popular culture and everyday talk in Egypt, 
the 'west' has become an imagined category; a general allusion to a very broad and 
symbolic cultural imagining that embodies the humanitarian, scientific and technological 
progress characteristic of prosperous 'first world nations'. In its most basic form, 
therefore, the idea of the 'west' as imagined by these young Egyptians is everything that 
Egypt is not, and thus represents an important symbolic point of reference through 
which they are able to reflect upon and reflexively negotiate their own national culture. 
Thus, although I am aware that there is no singular 'west,' I will use this term sparingly 
in reference to the representation of the west in young participants' narratives.  
 
For my young Egyptian participants, the west was an important idea and prospect that 
represented the promise of a more dignified, egalitarian and modernly progressive life. 
This point lies at the core of the cosmopolitan vision of these men and women, 
representing an important point of contact bridging the diverse everyday experiences of 
my three classed groups. These young people are embedded within everyday identity 
positions that, static in nature, afford them little room for manoeuvre or mobility beyond 
them. I recorded this in the case of the working class man, Kamal, who was resigned to 
the fact that as a poor Egyptian he is not to 'ask too many questions' and to accept that it 
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is his fate to be unfairly thrown into jail. The discussion on rape also revealed how it is 
the destiny of women imprisoned in such a patriarchal society to receive marriage offers 
from their rapists. Nevertheless, selected media products come to represent a more 
flexible imagined space from within which they accumulate new cultural resources for 
self-understanding and reflexive interpretation. This is captured in the way Amany 
compares the handling of rape in America and Egypt, asking when it is that the raped 
woman in Egypt will cease to be treated as a perpetrator. It is also reflected in the way 
Ahmed, following the televised coverage of the MPs expenses scandal in the UK, 
wonders when government officials in Egypt will be similarly named and punished for 
their much more serious crimes. This makes one wonder how much the exposure to such 
stories on transparency and anti-corruption initiatives have influenced the demands for 
democracy in the recent Egyptian uprising. Thus, in a mediated world, where equal 
access to on-screen representations often means that class and gender divisions are 
relegated to the background, these young people are united in their reflexive re-
interpretations of what it means to be Egyptian, or at least what they want it to mean. 
Thus, I here build the first layer of my table that illustrates a common meeting point 
uniting the divergent experiences of young Egyptians: 
Attitudes towards the 
nation 
 
 
 Distrust of the state  
 Highly reflexive 
relationship to national 
community 
 Understood through a 
dialectic relation with 
global culture/ideals 
 
                             
  Figure 6.2 – National attitudes: points of convergence across class 
 
The discussion so far has explored how the nation is not a fixed category imbued with 
static meanings, but that everyday interpretations of the nation from below reveal it to be 
a vessel which takes on multiple, often contrasting and conflicting meanings. I have 
examined how harsh criticisms and strong attitudes of nihilism are routinely voiced, yet 
often interlaced with this are assertions of love and devotion towards the nation. The 
contradictory perceptions among young Egyptians towards their nation, became 
especially apparent in the most unexpected of ways: during play-offs for the 2010 world 
cup qualifying matches. Egypt's loss against Algeria twice fuelled an Egyptian-led media 
campaign of hatred against the Algerians, which almost led to a full blown political crisis 
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between the two countries. Accusations that Algerians attacked Egyptian fans and 
players after the matches led to an overly-exaggerated media battle on Egyptian state 
television that rather conceitedly claimed the 'leader' of the Arab world (Egypt), has been 
humiliated by the 'barbaric' Algerians.   
 
The effects of this mediated campaign were strongly and immediately reflected in the 
streets of Cairo, where Egyptian flags were flown from balconies and car windows, 
while individuals wearing T-shirts bearing the words 'Proud to be Egyptian' were 
commonly seen. The enthusiastic national assertions that this incident provoked, which 
is in direct contrast to previous experiences of pessimistic and often negative national 
sentiment during my research, points to the power of a largely media-staged event. It has 
the ability to transform aggressive discourse against a nation into one of defence, and 
nihilism and detachment, into extreme patriotism. Additionally, this sporting incident 
reflects the internal tensions and struggles that are an important part of the way young 
Egyptians, locked within everyday constraining identity positions, yet shifting more 
dynamically within mediated space, are negotiating their relationship to the nation. The 
media often become carriers of an 'indisputable truth' and are able, at certain moments, to 
unite Egyptians through a generation of different frames for understanding the nation. 
Significantly, the way such a relatively insignificant event bought Egyptians of different 
backgrounds together, both symbolically in a joint assertion of pride and patriotism, and 
physically onto the streets in protest against Algerians, raised the debate within the 
media and more intimate social circles of the extent to which Egyptians are lacking a 
common national project that can function as a healthy outlet for positive national 
sentiment. In an increasingly interconnected world where a global battle to lead cultural 
influence has left Egyptians feeling sidelined, they may be searching for something 
through which to assert their presence and re-awaken national sentiment. Perhaps they 
found that in a football match.  
 
What can be gleaned from the above discussion is that the conjuring up of paradoxical 
and inconsistent positions including pride, aggression and distrust, points towards the 
importance of emotion as a category through which everyday understandings of the 
nation are articulated. Such a focus on emotion allows us to formulate a more grounded 
consideration of how the nation can often become a highly reflexive or irrational 
category, taking on different meanings in relation to specific spatio-temporal contexts. 
What is the role of the media in this context? Anderson's Imagined Communities (1983) 
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offers a powerful framework for understanding the importance of the media in sustaining 
the sense of a joint national community. Such a thesis conceives of the nation not as a 
fixed entity with rigid parameters, but as a social construct with an important 
phenomenological dimension. Nevertheless, at the receiving end, to what extent does 
Anderson's claim for a joint national community sustained by the media, actually 
translate into reality? My research findings indicate that in an era of niche broadcasting 
and multiple transnational channels, audiences are no longer united by a single 
nationalized media outlet around which members of the nation can be jointly addressed. 
Thus, in the absence of a singular mediated public sphere, Scannell's (1992) conception 
of television as a public good, allowing the state to maintain a sense of order, stability 
and unity across the nation, seems increasingly inconceivable.  
 
Furthermore, as well as the absence of a joint mediated outlet, as the next sections of this 
chapter will illustrate, national audiences cannot be approached as a homogenized mass, 
united by a singular or uniform imagination of the nation. Rajagopal (2000) argues how, 
particularly in the developing south characterized by highly polarized and uneven rates 
of development, there can never be any coherent or unitary conception of national 
culture that unites people. Members of a national community are diverse, characterized 
by different levels of religious identification, socio-economic status and cultural capital, 
which leads to the nation becoming 'available' or 'unavailable' (Valentine, 1996) to 
different groups in multiple ways. Transnational television has come to play an 
important role in this respect, as illustrated by my findings, allowing the limitations 
placed upon the self and nation to be exposed. Thus, although particular groups may 
often feel excluded from daily life in the nation, transnational media offer a repertoire of 
cultural resources from which they can at least partake in the construction and 
negotiation of a desired national imagination. Nevertheless, despite the growing 
relevance of transnational media as illustrated in the above discussion, the Egypt-Algeria 
football match also demonstrates that national media have not become completely 
irrelevant. At times of crisis or when sensing that the nation is under attack from an 
outside force, terrestrial channels become a joint platform around which members of the 
national community come together in defence or celebration of their nation.    
 
I will now proceed to an examination of how, as everyday experiences of the nation 
intersect with classed realities and media consumption, three different class-based frames 
for understanding the nation have emerged amongst young people in Cairo.  
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6.4 Cairo as the London of the Middle East: The Upper Middle Class and a 'First 
World' Cosmopolitanism 
 
I vividly remember a phone conversation I once had with 23-year-old Noora when she 
informed me that she had arranged a dinner party in a restaurant located in Cairo's elite 
district of Zamalek to celebrate her best friend's birthday. 'Come along but bring enough 
money' she laughed, 'there's quite a high minimum charge, especially as it's Friday'. As 
we entered the Five Bells restaurant, I instantly understood why such a hefty price tag 
was attached. The restaurant was actually an old villa, built by British colonizers, whose 
interior had been converted into a bar, and the garden area, where we sat, was adorned 
with several chic, traditionally laid out tables. Sheltered by trees and lighted only by a 
single candle on each table, the garden area was all low lights and romantic ambiance. 
The immaculately dressed waiters went about their work with a silent yet almost 
automated precision, asking us how we preferred our steak and constantly refilling our 
glasses of water. I could see champagne bottles in iced buckets on most of the tables 
around us – but not ours, however, as none of us drank alcohol. After engaging in 
numerous group and individual discussions, I came to realize that all of these women are 
the daughters of doctors, engineers and wealthy businessmen. Thus it was not much of a 
surprise that they could easily afford the minimum charge of 100LE on a single meal and 
outing. 'Why did you decide to come here?' I asked them, genuinely intrigued as to why 
they selected Five Bells for such a special occasion. 'We always come here on birthdays, 
plus we wanted to show you a different side to Egypt – this is the Egypt we know and 
love. But this sophisticated and elegant side to Egypt is never shown in the media', 24- 
year-old Aida told me. Aida, whose father is a cardiologist and whose mother works for 
a multinational computer firm, could not have been more insightful in her answer. Their 
Egypt was most definitely a very different one to the everyday reality that existed 
beyond the sheltered trees and candle lights of Five Bells.        
 
The upper middle class participants imagined the nation through a very exclusive 
western frame. They perceived national progress and development to be encapsulated 
solely within a western model of development. This is reflected in the way these young 
men and women often choose to overcome their sense of disenchantment and 
dissatisfaction with the nation by disconnecting from local forms of cultural 
identification. They choose instead to engross themselves in cultural practices and 
symbols they associate exclusively with global cultural modernity.  This was evident in 
most of my discussions with them, where this young elite referred to how Egypt, if it 
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wishes to develop and progress, needs to keep up with global, and particularly western 
standards of scientific, technological and economic progress as much as it can. As 22-
year-old Karim commented: 
 
Egypt has done reasonably well over the past few years. There has been 
an increase in big multinational companies, well known international 
restaurants, and clean, well-built shopping malls that house some of the 
biggest global brands such as Burberry, Valentino and Mont Blanc. Thus 
I think Cairo, even though it has a long way to go, is on the right path 
towards becoming a globally recognized city. I hope that in a few years 
time, we can call Cairo the 'London of the Middle East.' 
 
In the same group, 20-year-old Christine enthusiastically added: 
 
Egypt has always been the most developed country in the Arab world: we 
had the first railway, first airline, first television station. Even though we 
have fallen behind a bit today, we aren’t doing too badly. More and more 
people are living in big houses, have expensive cars and are being 
educated abroad. The signs of wealth are everywhere. It's like we are 
living the American Dream. 
 
Interestingly, this quotation by Christine, by no means an exception across the upper 
middle class, locates the idea of the American Dream purely in the acquisition of 
material consumer products associated with western culture. Ironically, Christine 
believes the visible presence of these objects is an indicator that people in Egypt are 
experiencing an American Dream of their own. However, she seems to have completely 
missed the point, as the main ethos behind the American Dream was the belief that 
everyone should have the opportunity to better themselves and experience some form of 
social mobility regardless of class background. What Christine seems to completely 
ignore is that while a small minority of Egyptians like herself are living luxurious 
lifestyles drawn from the west, the larger majority, who she seems completely oblivious 
to, are increasingly sinking into poverty and despair. Nevertheless, Christine's words are 
an important reminder of the extent to which an imagined 'western' culture is their main 
symbol of freedom and a primary route towards experiencing the American Dream's 
promise of a better life in Egypt; even if this 'better' life is understood within the 
framework of a parochial class-based materialism.    
 
I discussed in Chapter Two how following Egypt's invasion by British imperialist forces 
during the twentieth century, Egyptians became greatly impressed with westerners and 
their progressive, technologically advanced way of life. A powerful belief followed that 
Egypt needed to emulate the west in order to become recognised as a ‘modern’ society 
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(Piterberg, 1997; Schaub, 2000). Everyday understandings of modernness, therefore, 
were associated with the lifestyle and cultural practices of a perceived superior imperial 
centre. Thus, Egypt's history as a colonized country has played a very important role in 
the way modern Egyptian popular imagination has developed with a strong belief that 
national and cultural progress is encapsulated predominantly within a 'western' way of 
life (Amin, 2005; Abaza, 2006).  For the higher class strata of the Egyptian population, 
the strong association of nations such as the US or Europe with discourses of modernity 
is not limited only to a subjective admiration of western culture. It is strongly reflected in 
the privileged economic position of these Egyptian elites which ensures that they have 
become a daily embodiment of this exclusive, foreign inspired lifestyle. For the upper 
middle class, therefore, western or global culture cannot be solely defined as a 
pleasurable cultural reference to which they have mediated access. Frequent travels 
abroad, private foreign education and employment in multinational companies, means 
western culture has become part of their privileged upbringing, and thus is deeply 
entrenched in the cultural and educational systems with which they are affiliated.  
 
Importantly for the upper middle class, a cosmopolitan openness towards the world, and 
the values associated with a cosmopolitan ethos, are located almost exclusively within a 
constricted framework of 'first world' belonging. Interestingly, despite living in Egypt, 
which they often acknowledged to be a 'third world' country, the upper middle class did 
not consider themselves to be located outside of, or on the fringes of the 'first world'. 
Rather, unlike other Egyptians, their privileged class status actually places them right at 
the centre of it (Schielke, 2007). Thus, this young elite did not find it necessary to be 
geographically located in Britain or the US to be part of the first world, as their access to 
wealth, the necessary social connections and cultural knowledge automatically places 
them on a par with other young people of a similar age and elite social status located in 
advanced nations of the 'west'. This complements Hannerz's (1996) assertion that 
transnational connections are becoming an increasingly evident phenomenon in our 
world. These transnational networks of belonging are making a claim on our senses in 
the way our imagination and sense of being can no longer be contained within a specific 
culture or locality, but is increasingly informed, often more strongly, by what occurs 
beyond national borders (Hannerz, 1996).  In light of the above, I use the term closed 
cosmopolitanism (Ong, 2009) to describe the orientation of the upper middle class, 
whose cosmopolitan imagination and sense of being part of the world is associated 
almost entirely with securing an elite class status in society. Evidence of the extent to 
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which the nation is imagined exclusively through a narrow lens of western liberal 
discourse, articulated in relation to a parochial attitude of class elitism, is demonstrated 
in the words of 22-year-old Karim. He told me: 
 
If you're asking me what I want Egypt to be like, then of course I want to 
see Egypt progress and develop in line with any other western country. In 
particular, I want to be able to say that I have voted in democratic 
elections once in my lifetime. But sometimes you can't help but wonder if 
an autocratic system is what suits Egyptians the most. I mean, there is no 
problem with us because we are educated and we can make informed 
decisions and vote fairly based on the merit of individual politicians. 
Unfortunately though, the majority of Egyptians are illiterate and don't 
have any political ambitions – they prefer to be led like sheep rather than 
think for themselves. If we had a democratic Egypt, then it would 
probably fall to pieces because all the poor would sell their vote for five 
pounds or a loaf of bread.  
 
Zein, 21, capitalized upon this point and agreed with Karim saying: 
 
Yeah you're right, but then it's easy for us to say because our class 
background means we've had the privilege to be well educated and to 
visit western countries and directly experience what freedom and 
democracy translate to in real life. The poor in Egypt don’t know any 
better….they've lived in one system all their lives and I don’t think they 
actually care to try and change. Like you said, it’s easier for them to be 
led than to think. I believe it would be best for us all if certain laws were 
laid down for who can and cannot vote – it's safer for Egypt and its future 
at the end of the day. 
 
Interestingly, what the above exchange demonstrates is the extent to which cosmopolitan 
ideals of democracy and political participation are heavily desired by these young elites. 
Nevertheless, these ideals are strongly associated with a very restricted class 
understanding that locates them exclusively within the rights of those of an elite class 
status and educational background. Thus, it seems that for the upper middle class, they 
are overcoming the sense of nihilism and dissatisfaction they feel towards the nation by 
imagining it exclusively through a western model of development. This attitude of 
almost complete immersion in western culture will become even more apparent as the 
coming chapters unfold. It is not only limited to a subjective attitude or way of thinking 
about the world, but their cosmopolitan imagination is physically asserted on a daily 
context, reflected in the ways in which they move in the city and acquire particular 
selected objects of consumption. 
 
 Although for the majority of the upper middle class I spoke to western culture was 
an influential source of admiration, some individuals within the group voiced their 
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concern that this ‘excessive’ westernization trend has cost Egypt its identity and 
traditional Arab heritage. Peter, 25, told me: 
 
I agree that across the Arab world we are all fascinated by the west 
and in many aspects we all want to be sophisticated and advanced like 
them. But I think it is important to always remember that we have our 
own unique cultural heritage that we must be proud of too. The 
Ottoman Empire, for instance, is an important historical legacy as it 
once ruled a large part of the world − although most young Arabs do 
not know a thing about it. I have many American friends who love 
Arabic culture – the food, the music, the dancing – and they really 
don’t understand why we try to distance ourselves from it. Honestly, 
how can we ever ask anyone else to respect us if we have no sense of 
self-worth? 
Even though a number of Peter’s friends during this participant observation session 
told me in a state of disinterest that there is not much really that they can feel ‘proud’ 
about in Egypt, 23-year-old Lina confirmed Peter’s words, saying sadly: 
I guess being a watered down version of western culture is never a 
good way to be. You’re worthless as long as you don’t have a strong 
sense of self identity. Look at the Gulf countries – ever wondered why 
they are so influential? It is because they are the most advanced and 
westernized, yet also maintain their cultural and religious identity with 
pride. I mean, I consider myself to be very westernized in many 
aspects, yet I’m also a very proud and loyal Egyptian, Arab and 
Muslim. I never forget that this is who I really am. 
 
Despite Peter and Lina’s viewpoints not attracting much consensus from the majority 
of group members, this exchange is an important indication of the confusion and 
contradictions that characterise young Egyptians’ perceptions of their nation, which 
was soon to find an outlet in the Egypt-Algeria football match. This dialogue in 
general, with its disagreements and discord, captures the way young Egyptians, even 
those with similar socio-economic experiences, are torn in their loyalties and 
identities between a state of pride, disillusionment and dissatisfaction towards the 
nation. 
 
Daily media consumption played a very important role in formulating and sustaining the 
very exclusive worldviews and cultural practices often associated with the upper middle 
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class. Significantly, this young elite seemed to perceive themselves to naturally be 
world-citizens through their education in foreign universities and their frequent patterns 
of travel outside of Egypt. Indeed, engaging with these young men and women through 
my long term ethnographic practices, I often felt that they were no different from my 
colleagues and friends in London, both in terms of physical appearance and daily 
cultural orientations. I was frequently informed (very proudly) by my young participants 
how a particular item of clothing was bought from Zara in London or Gap in the US. 
Even more so, when they did not have the opportunity to travel abroad themselves, I was 
told how they set up informal purchasing networks where a group of friends agree to 
inform each other if someone they know is due to travel abroad, especially to Europe or 
the US. Twenty-three-year old Yasmine, for instance, told me how she handed her friend 
travelling to the UK a list of Christian Dior cosmetic products to purchase for her, 
totalling £200. The Internet became very important in this respect as friends could 
circulate webpages and electronic attachments containing images of clothing, make-up 
and trainers that they required from abroad, together with size, colour and product 
number. Even more so, numerous Facebook pages have been set up by individuals in 
Egypt who regularly travel abroad and bring back 'foreign stock' to sell. These products 
are photographed and displayed on Facebook giving others an opportunity to browse and 
select the specific items they want. It was very common during participant observation 
sessions to see some of my participants connect to Facebook through their mobile 
phones, often chatting to friends and often browsing through the latest range of designer 
goods posted on dedicated Facebook pages. These examples illustrate how the 
convergence of new media, particularly the Internet and mobile phones, are allowing the 
upper middle class to sustain their exclusive lifestyles and elite cultural networks.   
    
Unsurprisingly, 58% of the upper middle class selected 'connecting with other 
people/cultures' as being 'not important' in the television consumption survey. Thus 
television, as a cultural resource able to link them with other cultural worlds, appeared to 
be taken for granted alongside other cultural systems that are a normal part of their daily 
lives such as education and travel. Nonetheless, following entertainment, what a 
considerable proportion of the upper middle class (64%) did enthusiastically view as an 
'important' reason for watching television, was 'being aware of what is occurring in the 
world.' This could correspond with the fact that 'political programmes' were also selected 
as an 'important' genre by 67% of upper middle class respondents. Again, the Internet 
played an important role in this respect, as although the upper middle class discussed 
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television as an essential resource for information about what is going on in the 
world, they did not completely depend on it. The Internet appeared to be accessed 
almost daily, whether in their workplace, university or at home, and thus was very 
often used as a means to discover what was happening in the world, particularly 
through global news sites such as CNN and the BBC. Despite the popularity of 
regional Arabic television amongst my young participants, particularly in relation to 
entertainment genres, they sometimes felt that news commentaries were censored, 
not reporting with the same standards of integrity and accuracy observed by western 
news agencies.    
 
Whereas the lower middle class see television as an important cultural resource which 
allows them to become aware of, and so feel a part of faraway cultures, for the upper 
middle class, television seems to play a more important role in personal development 
that is closely linked to their class consciousness. As they constantly mention throughout 
the discussions, feeling that they are the leading generation of Egypt, and that they carry 
the burden of guiding their country towards its global (which they use synonymously 
with western) potential, these elite Egyptians find it necessary, and almost obligatory, to 
educate themselves about major events occurring elsewhere in the world. Indeed, they 
feel they cannot be global without having a global orientation, which on a daily basis, 
can be reaffirmed through their engagement with repertoires of 'globality' on television.  
 
According to the above analysis, therefore, there is almost an unreflexive identification 
with the west as young upper middle class Egyptians attempt to reproduce western 
cultural values in their daily lives. Nevertheless, by subjectively interpreting the nation 
in such narrow terms that relate to a classed conception of western modernity and 
development, it seems to be unclear where they envision the rest (the actual majority) of 
Egyptians for whom these exclusive cultural values are not a daily lived reality. I cannot 
help but wonder how true one working class man's assertion is, that 'to the upper classes 
we are just "thin air" '- socially irrelevant and almost physically absent. Furthermore, 
despite confident claims often made by the upper middle class that their class status and 
the privileged cultural worlds they access posit them unquestionably within a 'first world' 
system, in some instances, they did not always reflect this assured confidence. Although 
on a national level the upper class may perceive themselves to be the elite of their 
country – far ahead of other Egyptians in terms of cultural or economic capital – they are 
often still compelled by, and display a very sensitive attitude of reflexivity towards 
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established global hierarchies and their position within them. Their historical memory as 
colonial subjects, their present reality as part of what they consider to be a developing 
nation, and negative global media stories of Arabs and Muslims, mean they are aware of 
their own representations in the global scene being torn apart by suspicion, contempt and 
sometimes sympathy towards their deprived 'third-world' status. For this reason, some 
members of the upper middle class often felt they were involved in a constant struggle to 
prove that they are able to detach themselves from their disadvantaged local realities, 
and instead, position themselves as part of a more advanced, more progressive global 
cultural modernity. As 21-year-old Rawan interestingly told me: 
 
Sometimes when I'm abroad and I tell people I'm Egyptian, I can just see 
something in their eyes. It's like they think "she's Arab" or "she's 
Muslim" so what does she know. People assume that when you come 
from this part of the world you're uneducated and ignorant, and I always 
want to prove them wrong. I just feel like saying "yes I'm Egyptian, but 
I'm just like you. I'm well educated and I know the world and I'm up-to-
date with whatever is happening". It should not really be a matter of 
where you're from or where you're positioned. It should be about your 
attitude and how you think about the world. 
 
Rawan’s friend, 23-year-old Sarah, agreed saying that no matter how much 
Egyptians like her perceive themselves to be civilised and part of ‘first-
world’ cultural circuits, they are still seen by westerners to fit the stereotype 
of ‘Arabs’ being unworthy, uneducated outsiders.What these words 
demonstrate is a reality torn between both a desire to internalize western 
cultural values, and alongside an awareness of negative mediated 
representations of the Arab world in the west. This is captured in the internal 
contradictions observed in the ways Egyptians like Rawan and Sarah position 
themselves both from within a nation they are aware is accorded a very specific 
place within global hierarchies, and simultaneously, outside a nation they wish 
to overcome in its limitations and marginality on this global (media) stage. 
 
6.5 'I'm Egyptian, I'm Muslim, but I'm also Cosmopolitan': The Unlikely Young 
Cosmopolitans of Cairo 
 
One of my most memorable experiences during the research period was being invited to 
the wedding of Randa, one of the female students at the Faculty of Education. I had not 
been to an Egyptian wedding in a long time, so I was very excited by the prospect. It 
took place in a very modest venue in one of Cairo's social clubs. What was immediately 
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noticeable, was that the wedding was a very Egyptianised, Islamised version of any 
typical wedding event in the west. Randa looked beautiful in a conventional white 
wedding dress that was designed with long sleeves and a veil to conform to Islamic 
requirements. She informed me before the wedding that the dress was rented as she 
could not afford to buy one. As Randa was walked down the aisle by her father, a 
popular Islamic song reciting the 99 names of God was playing loudly in the 
background, while instead of confetti, small coins with the traditional symbol of the blue 
eye were thrown on the bride to 'protect' her from the 'evil' eye (an old Egyptian 
tradition). Guests were served a drink of traditional sweet syrup made from rose petals, 
and family and friends clapped along with the catchy Islamic and traditional Egyptian 
wedding songs played by the DJ (literally called this in Egypt). Although Randa strongly 
objected to any adults dancing, young girls with scarves tied around their tiny waists 
were permitted to belly dance in the centre stage. As an open buffet was beyond the 
economic means of the bride and groom's families, small pre-packed boxes of cakes and 
savoury items were distributed. At 12pm the bride and groom happily left their guests 
behind to catch some sleep ready for their early morning two hour train ride that would 
begin their short modest honeymoon in Alexandria. Visiting Randa after her honeymoon 
to congratulate her properly (an established tradition in Egypt), I asked her if she had 
enjoyed her wedding party. She enthusiastically replied: 'I loved it. I always wanted a 
chic, modern wedding. I was able to wear the white dress which is the ultimate dream of 
any bride in the world. The most important thing, however, is that I did not displease 
Allah in any way – there was no dancing and I wore my veil. May Allah grant me and 
my husband peace and love in our new lives'.  
 
What this event confirmed was the centrality of both religious discourses and cultural 
hybridity informing the everyday practices of lower middle class participants. Randa's 
Islamized version of the 'big white wedding' was deeply saturated with the symbols of 
global cultural modernity including confetti, her father walking her down the aisle and a 
DJ to keep guests entertained. Indeed, in my conversations with lower middle class men 
and women, their religious identity was accorded a position of central importance and 
became almost synonymous with, or interchangeable with their sense of national 
identity. I was often told that patriotic sentiments cannot be divorced from religious acts 
of piety and devotion. As 23-year-old Hadeel informed me: 
 
To truly be a patriotic Egyptian, you firstly have to be a good Muslim 
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who is well aware of their religion and its main ethos. Islam teaches 
people to live together despite their socio-economic or even religious 
differences, to respect their leader, to protect their nation against an 
enemy or intruder. Islam discusses every aspect of our lives in detail and 
so it's almost like a guide book that, if followed, will lead to the 
construction of a stable and successful community, which translates into 
the wider nation.  
 
Fatima, also 23, agreed to this point saying: 
 
I see myself primarily as a Muslim, and it is from within my religious 
identification that I have learned to love my country. As Muslims we 
should constantly be looking for ways to improve our religion and be 
closer to Allah. Well, Allah and his Prophet have taught us to love our 
country and to defend it – and not just to love it figuratively, but to show 
that we love it by keeping it clean, by working hard to be better citizens, 
by raising our children to feel pride towards their country. We all know 
Egypt is full of problems, but it is our duty as Muslims to do whatever we 
can to relieve these problems. 
 
Despite these strong religious assertions, however, that spanned the lower middle class, 
and as the wedding scene illustrated, these religious and local particularities are in 
constant dialogue with a global articulation of culture. The west was perceived as a rich 
cultural fountain, and thus represented an important reference, and point of comparison 
through which they developed a more reflexive sense of understanding towards the 
nation. For the lower middle class, the majority of whom have never travelled outside 
Egypt, they displayed almost a complete dependence on television to connect them to the 
outside world. It is through the daily exposure of these young lower middle class 
Cairenes to transnational television that they have been able to discover new ways and 
new resources of reflexively negotiating the self positioned within nation. I discussed in 
the first section of this chapter how 'entertainment' is the most popular reason across 
class for watching television. Equally, a ' very important' reason for watching television 
in relation to the lower middle class, is 'connecting with other people/cultures,' with 74% 
selecting it. Interestingly, this is in direct contrast to the upper middle class, where 58% 
reported this very same reason to be 'not important'. Nevertheless, in relation to the lower 
middle class, they often told me during the focus group sessions how television is an 
important means by which they can be connected to the world beyond their immediate 
locale, and to learn more about the lives and ways of faraway cultures. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire also reveals that under 'educational reasons' for watching television, 62% 
selected 'documentaries' to be an 'important' reason why they watch television. As 20-
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year-old Heba, a woman studying at the Faculty of Education declared: 
 
We don’t live in the world alone, but we are part of a wider global 
culture, and I think it is an obligation for each one of us to try and learn 
about other peoples and cultures. You might hear a lot of Egyptians 
talking about the west as being evil and corrupt, but the truth is, we have 
so much to learn from them, especially in relation to human rights. We no 
longer need to travel or spend money to learn about other cultures, but 
this can be done from the comfort of our own living rooms through our 
remote control. There really are no excuses. As Prophet Muhammed 
(PBUH) said: "We have made you into nations and tribes that you may 
know one another". 
 
Thus, for the lower middle class, television is an important window on the world, which 
allows them to feel a part of other cultures. As they frequently discuss, Egyptians can 
improve themselves, striving to become more rounded and well informed citizens by 
learning from the successes of other cultures who are more advanced than them in the 
political, social or economic domains. In this light, it appears that by drawing upon their 
daily mediated mobilities, young lower middle class Egyptians are actively positioning 
themselves at the centre of a larger interconnected world from which they desire to learn, 
yet they also wish to transform this world in ways that conform to their own religious 
and spiritual vision.  As captured in Heba's words above, the young lower middle class 
often informed me how Islam is not against its followers engaging with other cultures 
and influences, but actually encourages Muslims to integrate with other people. As one 
woman asserted, Islam is a cosmopolitan religion at heart, as it does not address a 
particular tribe or nation. The Quraan, this woman told me, actually addresses mankind 
and humanity, without distinguishing between race, colour or gender.  
 
Primarily, these young men and women were undergoing a dynamic and imaginative 
engagement with western culture as an attempt to negotiate for themselves a position as 
worldly, culturally sophisticated Egyptian Muslims. Thus, articulating their 
understandings of the world through the lens of religion means that although the lower 
middle class accepted the west as an important fountain of cultural advancement, they 
also perceived it as a potential source of immorality and religious laxness. The 'spiritual 
ignorance' of the west they often referred to, which has resulted in their excessive 
materialism, objectification of women and sexual promiscuity, are just some of the 
negative values the lower middle class often associated with western and global culture. 
I propose, therefore, that these young Egyptians articulate a critical cosmopolitan 
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imagination. Although wanting to absorb certain values that they perceive to be 
associated with global and western culture such as personal freedom, human rights and 
respect for individuality, their cosmopolitan imagination, in contrast to the upper middle 
class, avoids a ready acceptance of western culture. Thus, they are experiencing a 
complex, hybrid form of cosmopolitanism that blends acceptance of the west with a 
critical attitude. They recognize that their relationship to western culture has to be 
carefully negotiated, as it is a potentially damaging, as well as enlightening force. This 
reflexive, constantly shifting relationship is best described in the words of Islam, 22, 
who undertakes a critical assessment of western nations regarding their lack of concern 
for religious values: 
 
The west may be at the peak of cultural progress at the moment and we 
all admire them, but they won't last long. These types of hedonistic 
societies where people just follow their own desires and pleasures 
without any regard for religion as an everyday moral framework, are 
contributing to their own demise. In a way, I'm glad I don’t have much 
money and thus I'm not tempted to engage in this type of world. I want to 
walk in the streets of Egypt and feel I'm in an Islamic nation – this is our 
true identity. I want to look out of my window and see minarets covering 
the skyline and I want to wake up to the sound of the azaan (call to 
prayer emanating from the mosque). 
  
It often becomes apparent that the lower middle class are attempting to displace these 
critical attitudes regarding immorality and a lack of concern for religion on to their 
fellow upper middle class Egyptians, who they perceive to be blind imitators of a 
spiritless western culture. They strive to constantly distinguish between themselves as 
pious, morally conscious Egyptians, and cosmopolitans who are open-minded, believe in 
democracy and justice, and the upper classes who seem to lack any form of respect for 
the sacred word of God. Discussing the attitude of the upper classes in Egypt towards 
those of less privileged means like herself, 24-year-old Yasmine tells me:  
 
It's like my class has come to define me. People see me not as a woman 
or a university graduate or an Egyptian, but simply as a lower class being. 
The way I talk, look and act doesn’t fit in with this sophisticated image 
that elite Egyptians are trying to build for themselves. However, I feel 
that being modern isn’t about being as westernized as possible. Power 
comes from the belief in God, not from money or status. There is much to 
learn from the west, although at the same time, we have an obligation to 
preserve the most sacred aspects of our identities – not follow them 
blindly like sheep. 
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It seems, therefore, that by including the west, and indeed the upper middle class (as 
imitators of western culture), in a backwardness which involves a lack of attachment to 
religious values and a disregard for religiosity, lower middle class participants are able to 
reverse the elite perception of them as being ignorant, stagnant and unprogressive. I 
believe this raises an important point of comparison between the outlooks and cultural 
orientations of the upper and lower middle class. Whereas the cosmopolitan imagination 
of the former appears to be a way of elevating their elite class status and maintaining a 
distinctive identity as 'first world' Egyptians, for the lower middle class, an identification 
with cosmopolitan ideals is more about searching for ways of becoming pious Egyptians, 
albeit ones who are worldly and globally conscious as their religious doctrines dictate 
they must be. In this respect, the nation and religion are not perceived to be mutually 
exclusive, but the way these young people understand their position as Egyptians, is 
largely negotiated through their identity as Muslims. Thus, although the attitudes of the 
lower middle class are characterized by cultural openness and a desire for humanitarian 
values associated with a cosmopolitan ethos, this does not stop them from developing a 
highly reflexive and often critical stance towards western culture on the basis of what 
does and does not conform to Islamic practice. As Ong (2009) argues, cosmopolitanism 
is a contextual identity where we constantly weave in and out of being open or closed to 
difference at various times. Indeed, this is very reflective of the lower middle class as 
their relationship to global culture is a very dynamic and critical one, where they make a 
clear distinction between an ideological, cultural and moral positioning towards western 
and global cultural repertoires. On an ideological and cultural level there is an 
engagement with humanitarian ideals and selected cultural symbols associated with the 
west that they enjoy and perceive to be compatible with their religious beliefs. On a 
moral level, feeling that the Muslim world is far ahead of the west in the way they 
maintain spiritual guidance and a religious framework as part of their everyday lives, 
there is a need to disengage with what they regard to be the immorality of the west. Thus 
it seems that cosmopolitanism is not an identity that is fixed or complete, but as 
Chouliaraki (2008:383) writes, it is very often a 'paradoxical and fragile condition'. In 
order to grasp more clearly the importance of cosmopolitan imagination within everyday 
life, I believe it is essential to identify and understand the different contexts which define 
everyday moments of engagement and disengagement in relation to different groups.  
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6.6 'I'm Egyptian, I'm Muslim, but Can I be Cosmopolitan'? The Internal 
Contradictions of the Working Class.   
 
 
Am I global? (hesitant pause). I don’t know….actually I don’t think I am. 
I'm a Muslim. I mean, is it possible to be both at the same time? No, 
you're either one or the other, and if I had to choose, I am definitely a 
Muslim (21-year-old Hany).  
 
As this quotation demonstrates, similar to the lower middle class group, the working 
class placed great emphasis on the centrality of religion to their everyday lives; 
sometimes with even greater force. Both groups were also united in how their discourse 
reflected a desire to place the nation within a religious frame, with members of the 
working class often blaming the state for what they perceived to be the lack of religious 
attachment experienced by most Egyptians. As 19-year-old Yasmine said: 
 
We are an Islamic nation. I mean, Egypt is the only country in the Quraan 
to be mentioned by name. We should see this as an honour and thus 
respect our religion even more. I blame the state for people’s lack of 
concern towards Islam. They seem to be scared of Islam and of people 
becoming religious, so they try to put an emphasis more on being 
westernized. What about us, what about our religion? We are Muslim 
Egyptians and we must never forget that! 
 
My initial encounters with this group led me towards a specific understanding regarding 
the role of religion in their daily lives, which, as the research progressed and moments of 
mutual rapport allowed my relationship with them to grow stronger, I began to question. 
Based purely on embodied appearances, where all the women without exception were 
veiled or wearing the isdal (a long black cloak only revealing the face), as well as the 
selected snippets of information they chose to tell me about themselves at first, it was 
very easy to make the assumption that an unquestionable commitment to religious 
practices was the main essence of their daily realities. The west was also seemed to be 
constantly distanced as representing an immoral cultural symbol. But ethnographers 
should not assume. Indeed, my ethnographic and long term examination of the everyday 
lives of young people from the working class allowed me to come to some very 
surprising and unexpected conclusions. By observing daily practices and listening to 
their everyday discourse, I have been able to go beyond self-constructed images 
associated with public appearances. I have been able to peel back the layers which these 
young people, and indeed people in general, tend to envelop themselves within in order 
to conform to family expectations and societal pressures. The three empirical chapters 
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need to be read consecutively for the reader to build an accurate understanding of the 
true complexities displayed by the working class. Indeed, in many instances during my 
research, it became apparent that the publicly performed identities of some members of 
the working class sample were characterized by inconsistencies, and rife with internal 
contradictions.  
 
I found this group the most challenging to work with initially, as they seemed intent on 
telling me very little about themselves. I could almost sense that what they chose to tell 
me at first was not fully representing their everyday practices and that there were private, 
unrevealed worlds hidden beneath the publicly constructed images they conformed to. I 
could not shake off the feeling that the lower middle class seemed to be a lot more 
comfortable with, and knowledgeable of their religious identity. Religion appeared to be 
the topic that interested them the most, and whenever it did arise, their enthusiasm for it 
and knowledge about it was visibly demonstrated. With working class participants, on 
the other hand, there was an instant desire to always state that they are first and foremost 
Muslims, and importantly, devout Muslims. Beyond this verbal assertion of religious 
identity, however, I felt they were not comfortable with me probing too much into the 
details of Islamic discourse or teachings; most of the time they seemed rather 
unknowledgeable and did not have answers to my questions. I will return to this point 
below in relation to the importance of educational capital in fostering religious 
understanding. Furthermore, I also witnessed another contradiction with this group. 
Although they often discussed the positive aspects of global culture, and the fact that 
they greatly envied the west for its respect of basic humanitarian ideals, wishing Egypt to 
learn from their model, whenever the conversation turned more personal, about their 
own sense of identity or how they chose to personally integrate western forms of 
belonging into their everyday lives, they seemed to display a defensive reaction. They 
made it very clear that it was religion which is of primary importance to them and 
nothing else. I did not know what to make of this at first, but as my ethnographic 
endeavour to understand them progressed, I realized that the everyday realities of this 
group are sometimes characterized by a very visible gap between what they said and 
actual lived practice. The question now became: why is this so?        
 
I discussed in the section on the upper middle class how they are characterized by a 
strong self-awareness that on a global scale of power and influence, they may be located 
towards the bottom end of this scale. For the working class, as well as a reflexive 
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awareness of these global hierarchical divides, they are also bound by more grounded, 
local forms of repressive power structures that involve familial and neighbourhood 
expectations. In light of these constricting expectations, which command that dress, 
behaviour and talk must correspond to the norms of Islamic acceptability, I argue that 
cosmopolitanism is not always about leisurely cultural choices. My analysis of the 
working class reveals that often, a cosmopolitan imagination provides a necessary 
breathing space, an essential moment of survival (although temporary) for those 
confined within particular repressive circumstances. My young working class 
participants are embedded within bounded identity positions such as class and gender 
that provide little opportunity for movement or mobility beyond them. Nevertheless, 
drawing on more fluid mediated systems of representation, these young men and women 
are able to engage in the construction of a more dynamic cosmopolitan imagination that 
allows them to feel part of a broader cultural community which transcends their more 
restricted immediate locality. Hence, I explore how the working class often experience 
an implicit cosmopolitan imagination, which becomes a momentary expression of 
resistance against instances of repression and control in their daily realities. It provides a 
space, not accorded to these young people in their daily family and neighbourhood 
community experiences, where they can draw on a wide repertoire of mediated 
representations of global youth cultural practices, exercising more freedom in how they 
wish to dress and behave. 
 
Whenever the topic of the growing westernization trend in Egypt was raised with this 
working class group, they enthusiastically acknowledged that there definitely is a general 
trend of mimicking the west amongst young Egyptians, although they assertively 
maintain that this definitely does not happen with them. Unlike the lower middle class 
for whom the nation is seen predominantly through the frame of religion, yet informed 
by western ideological values, my initial discussions with many of the working class 
participants reflected a desire to position the nation exclusively within an Islamic frame. 
As 23-year-old Laila commented: 
 
To respect your religion is to respect your nation. If I am a pious Muslim 
and I follow the word of God, then I will no doubt be a productive 
member of my nation as Islam teaches me to work hard, make a positive 
contribution to the place I live in and help those around me. All we ever 
learn from globalization are negative cultural traits that contradict our 
religious identities. Where is God in all of this?   
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Interestingly, Laila's friend, 25-year-old Nagwan, strongly disagreed saying: 
 
Don’t generalize Laila – the west can't be all bad – or else why would 
you wear their clothes and listen to their music? They must have some 
positive attributes, we are all humans and we all have our positive as 
well as negative traits. In the same vein, not all Muslims are good – the 
religion itself is of course – but how people understand and implement it 
is another matter. 
 
Interestingly, Nagwan's words were an important indicator of what was to come, as well 
as a clear reflection of a cosmopolitan imagination that positions the self within the 
context of a common humanity. Her assertion that Laila dresses like the 'west' and listens 
to their music instantly illustrated to me that there was more to this group than they 
chose to initially share. Furthermore, Nagwan’s words did find some resonance within 
the group as a few others told me how their instinctive response is always to criticise 
western culture, as this is what they are brought up to believe is acceptable. For 
instance, 23-year-old Dina informed me how her father has completely banned 
western television channels in the home as to him, they represent the presence of the 
‘devil’. Thus, working class people like Dina are socialised from a young age into 
believing that the west is the focal point of immorality and wrongdoing that is a 
barrier to one becoming a pious and religious Muslim. Although many of the 
working class seemed to verbally agree with their parents that excessive 
westernization is the main culprit behind a lack of religiosity amongst young 
Egyptians, others preferred the view that this is a generational difference. According 
to the latter opinion, their parents’ generation was not really brought up with western 
culture being central to their daily lives, and so this lack of familiarity has made them 
view western culture with suspicion and as a threat to their identity. For the young 
generation, however, the media − especially television – means cross-cultural 
exchanges have become a highly enjoyable daily occurrence, without challenging the 
most essential aspects of their cultural and religious identity. Nevertheless, whatever 
their opinion, most of them seemed to agree that to avoid the wrath and 
disappointment of their parents, they tend to distance themselves from an ‘excessive’ 
engagement with western culture while in the presence of older generations.  
 
In light of the above, many of the young men and women belonging to the working class 
group wasted no time in launching a verbal attack on the visible aspects of western 
culture permeating Cairo's urban spaces. Yet, an observation of their daily behaviour 
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through my ethnographic study, led me to often doubt whether the actual daily practices 
of some of these young people were always in harmony with such zealous religious 
discourse. Indeed, my research findings indicate that for the working class, there is a 
need to abide by familial expectations and social structures that impose Islamic discourse 
as a necessary daily moral and embodied framework. A closer look at this framework, 
however, reveals obvious cracks, as their everyday engagement with, and expression of, 
Islamic customs is often resplendent with tensions and conflicting practices. 
Nevertheless, as will become clear as the discussion progresses, moments of 
cosmopolitan openness towards the world that subjectively transport them beyond local 
and national boundaries, allow them to temporarily overcome the static identity positions 
that shape their everyday experiences of being working class, and specifically, of being 
working class women in Cairo.  
 
Being a Muslim myself, I was able to comfortably talk to the working class about 
religious matters, and I discovered that unlike the lower middle class, their knowledge of 
fundamental Islamic teachings was often underdeveloped. Obviously, one's religious 
knowledge is associated with cultural capital and education. In a context where the 
majority of these young people have basic literacy and education skills, it should be no 
surprise that their familiarity with religious texts and their knowledge of Islamic 
discourse is often poor. Nevertheless, this still leaves a large gap between their assertions 
of how important Islam is in their daily lives, and in reality, how much they actually 
know about it. It is important to note here that the lower middle class are not completely 
free themselves of these religious hegemonic discourses that shape everyday behaviour. 
The difference is that their educational capital has allowed them to comfortably engage 
with religious texts, so that through their own efforts of increasing religious 
understanding and perception, they are able to make more informed and reflexive 
decisions regarding religious practice. Importantly, I do not aspire to make any 
judgments regarding which class is more religious or whose faith is more powerful. This 
is neither my place, nor does it fall within my research aims. What I am trying to say, 
however, is that while Islam is visibly central to the lives of both groups, they have 
developed very different understandings of how religious discourse informs and shapes 
different aspects of their everyday lives. For the working class, for instance, their lack of 
education and thus personal engagement with religious texts means that often, Islam 
becomes associated more with heritage and tradition, than with personal understanding 
and appreciation of Islamic teachings (Deeb, 2006). In this context, Islam becomes 
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transformed into an embodied and physical conformity to a socially constructed 
understanding – by family and community expectations – of what it means to be a 
devout Muslim. I am made aware, for instance, that few of these men and women fulfil 
their daily religious duties such as regular praying, while even more remarkably, a 
number of the women admit that they wear the veil mainly due to pressure from their 
families, and particularly their fathers. As 21-year-old Seham (female nurse) comments: 
 
Most girls like me wear the scarf, but it's mainly just a custom or tradition. 
You don’t even wait to be told to do it, you just do it yourself because you 
know it’s expected. All the women in our family and neighbourhood are 
wearing it, so there's no escaping it. I know that if I didn’t wear it, it would 
be a big argument between me and my father. I know that it mentions 
somewhere in the Quraan that females need to cover up, but classical 
Arabic is too hard for me to understand, so I just take my parents' word for 
it. It doesn’t bother me you know – I'm used to it now and would actually 
feel strange without it. 
 
Another telling statement is given, this time by 22-year-old Ahmed: 
 
We are brought up and told that we are Muslims. We don’t really know 
any other way to be. We are told we have to be Muslims because that is 
what is respectable in our community, not because that is what God 
wants us to be. This is the problem in Egypt as societal pressure is 
enormous – always dictating what we should and shouldn’t do, even if 
we don’t understand the reasoning behind it. I even do that with my sister 
– tell her that she has to be a pious Muslim girl if she wants to secure a 
good marriage opportunity. She once told me that she wants to remove 
her headscarf and I hit her. She's still young and she doesn’t know that by 
doing that, she could risk ruining her reputation and losing the respect of 
our community. 
 
This quotation demonstrates the extent to which Islamic morality plays a crucial role 
within these working class locales. It has become a vehicle for ensuring social 
acceptance, and as a way for women especially to maintain what their social 
environment dictates is a 'respectable' reputation and to hope for a decent marriage 
opportunity. It also confirms that the juxtaposition of class and gender frames everyday 
experiences for the working class. Thus, class needs to be examined in the light of other 
socio-cultural factors, particularly gendered hegemonic relations of power. For the 
working class, therefore, wider social structures and familial rules contribute to the 
development of a very specific interpretation of Islamic discourse that enhances 
patriarchal dominance and supports male forms of authority over women, often enforced 
using physical forms of punishment like slapping. 
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Unsurprisingly, as I mentioned above, not all of the working class participants were 
united in a complete vocal rejection of the west. On numerous occasions some of these 
young people acknowledged that the west may support and uphold important 
humanitarian values such as freedom and democracy they are lacking in Egypt. 
Nevertheless, it was often suggested that ideals of human respect, freedom and dignity, 
which for so long people have believed the west invented, were actually brought to the 
fore by Muslims almost 1,500 years ago. Nevertheless, they admitted that today, it is 
mostly the west which manages to maintain them. As 21-year-old Nadia commented: 
 
All this talk about the west inventing human rights and democracy is just 
propaganda that they circulate to make Muslims look bad. In actual fact, 
long before the west was anything significant, the Quraan discussed all 
these important ideals and that society needs to be based on them. That's 
what a religious scholar once said in his sermon that I heard on the 
cassette player. Thus if we want to live in a world of true equality and 
respect for all, this needs to be based on Islamic teachings –  we need to 
learn more about our own religion. All we have taken from the west 
really is morally corrupt and lax values that contradict the essence of our 
own Islamic culture. 
 
 
Fawzy, 20, made a similar point when he discussed how the Quraan's engagement with 
scientific facts that the west have only discovered in modern times, illustrates how Islam 
is a 'gift' which the west, with its numerous forms of technological and cultural progress, 
is missing. Interestingly, as a contrast to the usual ready acceptance of the US or Europe 
as instigators of all forms of progress and positive evolution, these quotations are 
indicative of a more constructive cosmopolitan outlook that may challenge taken-for-
granted assumptions about the parasitic nature of Egypt or the less developed countries. 
It indicates a realization that although on a global scale of social and technological 
progress their own nation may be lagging behind, their religion has been a propagator of 
important human ideals and social values well before the west claimed to support them. 
Nonetheless, it does also reveal an insistence to constantly justify or almost shyly defend 
any sense of admiration they have for western and global culture. As the above two 
quotations reveal, even when they do admit to respecting any ideals that are particularly 
associated with western culture, it is still encapsulated within an Islamic frame. Again, 
this is evidence of the hegemonic discourses of religious morality they are bound by, 
which require them to constantly 'Islamize' their discourse and public appearances.   
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As I will explore throughout the next two chapters in relation to the working class, 
although discourse reveals dominant ideologies of religious conservatism, everyday 
action demonstrates complex and conflicting practices. I will investigate how this 
insistence on placing themselves within a morally acceptable framework as defined by 
Islam, is relevant in particular contexts, specifically the domestic and community spaces. 
Nevertheless, beyond the inquisitive gaze of the family and neighbourhood, behaviour 
and performance in the wider city often indicate a very different story where the west 
can be transformed from a distanced immoral foe into an enviable friend that heavily 
informs everyday cultural practices. This is perhaps reflected in the television 
consumption practices of the working class that unearth an interest and a sense of desire 
to connect with global culture. I discussed in the first section of this chapter that 
American movies were selected as the most popular genre amongst the whole sample. 
Additionally, however, 'receiving information' was also selected as 'very important' by 
69% of the working class participants. This could illustrate how, through television, 
members of this class develop an interest in what is happening in the rest of the world: a 
sense of being part of this world. Thus, television comes to represent a cheap, readily 
available and easily accessible medium of entertainment, information and connection to 
the wider world. More specifically, 58% reported that they watch television for 'keeping 
up with international cultural changes,' specifically in relation to 'international fashion 
trends,' while 63% selected 'Egyptian news' to be an ‘important’ reason why they watch 
television in relation to 'informational reasons'. Again, this points to the comprehensive 
and broad relevance of television in the everyday lives of these young men and women. 
Television does not perform one single role, but can be an entertainer as much as it is a 
window onto global culture or a vehicle for acquiring knowledge about local and 
regional news events.     
 
My class-specific analysis so far has explored how three different versions of a 
cosmopolitan imagination have emerged in Cairo. Within each cosmopolitan 
imagination, articulated predominantly on the basis of class position, young Egyptians, 
drawing on the media, are reflexively envisioning their own unique frames for 
understanding the nation. This is illustrated in the table below: 
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Upper middle class Lower middle 
class 
Working class 
 
Attitudes towards 
the nation 
Nation imagined 
exclusively through 
western frame 
Nation imagined 
through religious 
frame, but in 
dialogue with 
western modernity 
Nation imagined 
through religious 
frame, but through 
contradictory 
practices/attitudes 
 
Figure 6.3- National attitudes: points of divergence across class  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
My interest in cosmopolitanism is not as a 'fixed conception' (Fine 2003b, 612) 
characterized by a particular definition of what it should or ought to be. Instead, I have 
taken Ong's (2009) approach that locates cosmopolitanism not as a model identity or 
idealistic conception, but as an everyday practiced identity and thus one which is lived, 
embodied and performed. Through ethnographic practices, I have attempted to 
understand how young Egyptians themselves approach and understand the need (or not) 
to be cosmopolitan. Indeed, as this chapter has revealed, three very different versions of 
a cosmopolitan imagination find expression in Cairo, articulated specifically in relation 
to class identity, yet also taking their meanings from within the context of age and 
gender relations. I have examined how, such traditional identity positions, constraining 
and restrictive as they are, form part of the hegemonic structures of daily life that leave 
young Egyptians with little room for mobility. Nevertheless, media practices are 
expanding the subjective interpretations of these young men and women beyond such 
restrictive contexts, allowing them to engage in a symbolic mobility between and within 
different cultural worlds unrestricted by geographical boundaries. It is at this intersection 
of the mediated and the real, the physically constraining and the subjectively mobile that 
young Egyptians are re-evaluating the meanings of the nation in new ways they find 
more satisfying. Thus, by expanding their 'interpretive horizons' (Jansson, 2009: 310), 
the media have facilitated the rise of a cosmopolitan imagination through which young 
Egyptians are actively asserting their presence and belonging to a wider interconnected 
world. This world has become a readily available repertoire of cultural resources that 
these young people are confidently using, critically interpreting and often resisting, in 
ways that allow them to reflexively reinterpret and re-imagine local and national forms 
of belonging. The discussion on the nation illustrates how discourses of self, other and 
world are united in complex and often contradictory ways within young Egyptians' 
cosmopolitan vision. Throughout the next two empirical chapters, I examine how these 
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three unique portraits of cosmopolitan imagination developed so far, are brought to life 
and physically expressed through their consumption practices and everyday mobilities 
within the city.    
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7 Consumer Desires and the Many Young Cosmopolitans of Cairo 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Although residing in London, often deemed to be one of the most important fashion 
capitals in the world, it was actually during my research period in Cairo that I 
acquired most of my knowledge about the latest fashion trends. I learnt that flat 
camel-coloured boots were the hottest fashion accessory at the time, while Louis 
Vuitton handbags were highly sought after. Whether it was the upper, lower middle 
or working class, fashion choices and consumer objects appeared as highly desirable 
and central to the performed identities of these young men and women. Genuine, 
over-priced imports and locally made counterfeits interchangeably represented young 
Egyptians' participation in a global consumer culture.  This chapter examines how 
everyday patterns of consumption provide important routes of expression allowing 
young Egyptians to assert their presence and belonging to a wider world in ways that 
symbolically transcend the immediacy of national and local boundaries. Chapter Six 
explored how different versions of a cosmopolitan imagination are articulated in 
relation to national attitudes and ways in which young Egyptians have developed 
numerous reflexive frames for interpreting the nation. Nevertheless, as I have argued 
previously, cosmopolitanism is not only expressed as a subjective form of 
understanding about the world (both immediate and far away) and one's position 
within it, but is essentially a performance, and thus is embodied – physically and 
visibly asserting its presence in our everyday lives. According to Clammer, 
globalization as a daily lived reality must be approached in its micro political and 
cultural dimensions, since these are the dimensions 'at which globalization is most 
often experienced and at which it is either opposed, integrated into everyday life or 
negotiated.… cities are nested in different national, social and cultural contexts from 
which emerge different strategies for the management of or resistance to 
globalisation' (2003: 404). One of the most important of such modern strategies that 
enable us to position ourselves as citizens of an interconnected world, is the 
engagement in a globally circulating consumer culture, from which young Egyptians 
–  across class –  are not excluded (Abaza 2001, 2005, 2006; Abdelrahman, 2006).  
 
The acquisition of consumer products is an important form of self expression that 
transforms the body into a canvas onto which specific cultural messages and 
206 
 
allegiances are imprinted, as discussed in Chapter Four. Featherstone (1991) argues 
how consumer products have lost their functional or use-value and have come to 
represent commodity-signs. Thus, the importance of acquiring consumer objects is no 
longer necessarily for their practical use, but more so, as vessels onto which 
particular cultural meanings are symbolically communicated and physically asserted. 
Miller's (2008) study on the everyday importance of consumer objects provides a key 
reference. He discusses how, very often, objects, as prevailing forms of outward 
expression, are able to communicate particular social meanings and cultural 
messages that are often more powerful than discourse. I discuss this further below in 
relation to the working class in the way religious attire, particularly for women, 
becomes a way of appeasing dominant social structures that position Islamic practice 
as central to everyday public performances. For lower middle class women, on the 
other hand, embodied religious symbols, when combined with western consumer 
trends, become a way of asserting a religious, yet fashion-conscious and modern 
cosmopolitan identity. In a similar vein, focusing on women's fashion choices in the 
Turkish context, Navaro-Yashin (2002) examines the importance of these embodied 
fashion styles as a physical expression of their affiliation with particular political 
ideologies. Whilst secularist women supporting the Welfare party ruled by Ataturk 
chose to dress in predominantly western fashion trends, Islamists semiotically 
defended their chosen political ideology by wearing the veil, used as a public 
signifier of religious commitment. Thus, the body in all these examples becomes a 
primary locus of consumption onto which selected cultural, political and religious 
modes of belonging are transformed into a highly visible daily display.  
 
My ethnographic methods have allowed me to probe beneath the surface of first level 
appearances and to unearth how the consumer choices of young Egyptians are 
underpinned by desires to position themselves as part of a broader global youth 
culture, as a way of sustaining cosmopolitan aspirations. Operating from within 
repressive and restraining national contexts that allow them little room for social and 
often physical mobility, choices of how to dress and what objects to acquire become 
their (often only) way of symbolically crossing borders. An overarching theme 
running throughout this thesis is the role of television as a primary frame for making 
sense of one's world and, as offering potential for reflexive forms of interpretation 
within its more fluid spaces of mediated representation. Thus, the media expose 
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young Egyptians to distant ways of being, allowing them to engage in cosmopolitan 
performances where they eat, dress and live in ways that symbolize their aspirations 
for a better life as represented elsewhere. Nevertheless, as these consumer desires 
intersect with everyday grounded realities characterized by class polarization and 
unequal gender relations, Cairo witnesses the construction of multiple and diverse 
narratives of consumption that, occurring in parallel, rarely maintain dialogue or 
contact. Thus, these highly charged networks of consumer desire feed into and 
reinforce the closed, implicit and critical cosmopolitan imagination of my young 
Egyptian participants.             
 
I explored in the last chapter how, across class and gender, there is a common 
perception, articulated mainly through mediated representation, that the west 
represents an icon of freedom where values associated with a true cosmopolitan 
ethos such as freedom, democracy and human rights are sustained. Thus, perceiving 
the west to be the main cultural model that supports such humanitarian ideals missing 
from their own local context, cosmopolitanism, for these young people, becomes an 
important space of imagination through which limits to the self are often exposed and 
negotiated. Furthermore, this subjective desire to connect with global culture is 
reflected in the sensual and physical forms of expression these young men and 
women engage with in everyday life. Their everyday consumer practices are an 
important physical and visible assertion of this desired cosmopolitan aspiration. For 
the upper middle class, for instance, global brand names have become a normal part 
of their everyday realities. By associating with such practices, they often informed 
me that they not only felt a part of global cultural realities, but they also (proudly) 
felt that Cairo has come to resemble any typical western metropolis, saturated with 
the symbols of a universally circulating consumer culture. Wafaa, a 21-year-old 
upper middle class woman confirmed this point telling me: 
 
About ten years ago, we had to travel to really witness global culture. 
If we wanted to sit in chic cafés, try international foods or buy our 
clothes from global fashion houses, we tended to travel to France, 
England or the US. Now, most of what we want is available right here 
in Cairo, which is like a really primitive version of New York or 
London. I still travel abroad though, but it's usually to escape the 
pollution and crowd (laughing). 
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This same sentiment was reflected among the two lower class groups, where there 
was a similar desire to engage with global consumer products, although in a way 
suited to their economic limitations and everyday realities. This point was expressed 
by 21-year-old Seham, a female working class nurse: 
 
I see this whole new exciting world on television, and I just want to be 
like them. Beautiful, stylish, healthy people just enjoying their lives as 
they don’t really have any worries. Well, I can't be carefree like them, 
as my reality is a lot worse off than theirs, but at least I can look like 
them. I once saw this dress that I really liked on one of the characters 
in a western serial, and I just wanted it then and there. I don’t know 
how to use the Internet because I don’t have a computer at home, so it 
was my friend who went to the "net café" and searched until she found 
the image of a dress almost like it. I took it to my mother's friend who 
is a dressmaker and asked her to design it for me – obviously for a 
tenth of its original price. My parents were horrified when they saw 
the image of the dress at first, but then when they saw how I adapted 
it, wearing a long sleeved top underneath and my veil also, they said I 
looked chic but respectable. 
 
Essam, a 23-year-old lower middle class male expressed a similar attitude when he 
said: 
 
Being religious is not a barrier to enjoying consumer culture or 
wanting to be a part of it. On the contrary, I think that armed with 
religious knowledge, we are able to make more informed choices 
about what is and what isn’t suitable for us to engage in. For example, 
if I see this guy on a magazine with long gelled hair, a cigarette in his 
mouth and his shirt unbuttoned revealing his chest, I'm well aware this 
is not a respectable image for me to try and imitate. Nevertheless, I do 
like dressing in jeans and T-shirts more than the traditional Islamic 
gallabeya (a long white dress like garment worn by men). As well as 
giving off a perception that this person is modern, global fashion 
trends are also more practical and easier to move around in. I don’t see 
any harm in that.    
 
 
The above quotations demonstrate the fervour that young Egyptians display in 
embracing the visible and embodied symbols of global consumer culture. 
Simultaneously, it also confirms the role of television in establishing consumer 
culture as a central frame that informs the everyday desires and aspirations of these 
young people across class. Nevertheless for the working class nurse Seham, the 
Internet also represents an important point of entry into this world of consumption, 
which, through the open search function accessible by the single click of a mouse, is 
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not so distant anymore. However, her reliance on her friend to search for the dress 
due to Seham's inability to use a computer, and also its unavailability in her home, is 
a stark reaffirmation of the importance of television as an affordable medium for the 
lower classes that requires little financial capital and no prior technical skill. 
Furthermore, Seham's double predicament – her inability to afford the dress of her 
choice as well as lack of technical ability to use the Internet – is an important 
reminder of how both consumers and media users are located within particular socio-
economic networks that constrain and dictate everyday patterns of engagement and 
appropriation. In relation to both the lower middle and working class, as the above 
quotations illustrate, their strong desire to adopt western consumer trends is 
combined with a need to adapt these fashion choices in ways that make them 
'respectable', and thus correspond to religious rules and the values associated with 
Islamic practice. For Essam, the lower middle class male, consumer fashion items 
become especially important as a route to publicly communicating an identity as a 
Muslim, yet a cosmopolitan Muslim who is in touch with global cultural modernity 
and the latest fashion developments of global youth cultures.   
 
As a physical assertion of cultural desires, therefore, consumption has become 
central to how the different versions of a cosmopolitan imagination among young 
Egyptians are articulated on a daily basis. For instance, I have already explored in 
Chapter Six how the implicit cosmopolitan imagination of the working class is 
expressed in complex and often contradictory attitudes. As a further continuation of 
their internal contradictions, selected consumer products became a route towards 
shifting between different social spaces and identities that observe their own rules of 
acceptable conduct. For instance, in domestic spaces where religious hegemonic 
discourse prevail, the mobile phone has become an important marker of piety 
through its regular vocal reminder of the call to prayer. Nevertheless, safely enclosed 
within more liberal educational spaces where this conformity to a religious 
framework is much more relaxed, the mobile phone, for the working class, often 
transforms into a camera that becomes a keeper of much desired private romances. 
These examples confirm that consumer products are not solely desired for their 
material utilities, but can become loaded vessels that are carriers of 'cultural content' 
(Chua, 1998) or reflectors of particular 'identity markers' (Zukin, 1998). Following 
on from the above, therefore, a joint desire for consumer products across class, fuses 
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the diverse experiences of young Egyptians through common points of consumer 
interest. I here build up another layer of my table, which illustrates the common 
points of contact that often unite the experiences of young Egyptians:   
 
 
 
Attitudes towards the 
nation 
 Distrust of the state  
 Highly reflexive 
relationship to national 
community 
 Understood through a 
dialectic relation with 
global culture/ideals 
 
Consumption practices Pursuit of consumer objects 
as an embodied expression of 
cosmopolitan belonging 
 
Figure 7.1- Consumption practices: points of convergence across class 
 
Despite fostering common points of interest, engagement with a global consumer 
culture also intersects with, and takes its meaning from within overbearing power 
structures and ideologies that define the highly unequal realities of the young in 
Cairo. Clammer (2003:404) makes this point when he refers to how urban consumer 
cultures are undoubtedly globalised, yet are subject to endless 'local reinterpretations 
in terms of local values, imagination and desires'. Thus, although cities, as the locus 
of consumption practices, are to a large extent shaped through transnational forces, 
these forces are mediated by the unique social, cultural and economic contexts that 
shape particular localities. In relation to my observations in Cairo, the way consumer 
activities are mediated via the semiotics of local daily life is clearly reflected in the 
above participants' quotations. In the second two quotations, for instance, a desire for 
consumption is in tension with both everyday economic realities, and wider 
hegemonic discourses of Islamic morality, which govern everyday rules regarding 
the body and its appearance in public space. Thus, an ethnographic analysis of 
consumer practices across class is an important reminder that although 'desire' can be 
universal, crossing the boundaries of classed and gendered categories, 'ability' to 
acquire continues to be framed through, and often limited by these social categories. 
This often contributes to many unfulfilled dreams and unearths moments of tension 
in young Cairenes' experiences of consumer culture.  
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As Massey (1998) reminds us, there is a need to focus on how the construction of 
youth cultures is a process highly imbued with unequal relations of power and 
uneven geographical development. This point is reminiscent of  an important thread 
running throughout my discussion, which is that cosmopolitanism and the social 
practices it involves are not benign experiences, but are framed by, and thus 
negotiated through, wider discourses of power and hegemony. This does not mean 
that the experiences of those who do not enjoy abundant levels of socio-cultural and 
economic capital are discounted. Rather, it is they who often display some of the 
most complex, yet fascinating forms of cultural articulation. What is needed is an in-
depth and long term examination of the unique strategies through which these 
diverse groups construct their own particular cosmopolitan routes of belonging vis-à-
vis consumer practices.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will undergo a class specific analysis of the upper, 
lower middle and working class in relation to their everyday consumer practices.   
 
7.2 Elite Consumption and the Exclusive Cultural Worlds of the Upper Middle 
Class 
 
Consumer practices are particularly central to the everyday performances of upper 
middle class participants, allowing them to envelop themselves within an exclusive 
cultural bubble of western modernity associated with 'first world ' sophistication. 
Specifically, these practices are brought to life in their university campus where 
imagination becomes transformed into a daily physical and embodied reality, 
expressed in choices over fashion, cuisine and technology. The acquisition of 
particular consumer goods permits them to undergo a daily performance of 
distinction and symbolically experience a more tangible connection to global cultural 
realities. Indeed, I am frequently informed by members of the upper middle class 
sample of the importance they attach to the ownership of particular consumer 
products. Sahar, 23, a female student at the American University said: 
 
 
I always feel I'm in a fashion show not a university. It's like we are in 
a constant competition to dress in a particular way and always have 
the "right" appearance. Girls have to be seen with the latest designer 
handbags and shoes, while the boys are expected to purchase the latest 
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technological gadgets such as the Blackberry, iPhone or iPod. I mean, 
to win your place in the famous Gucci corner each item of clothing 
you wear has to be an expensive designer brand- no less than Gucci 
obviously. It's hard and very expensive to keep up, but it’s also quite 
exciting and I guess a privilege to feel that you are considered 
amongst the best dressed in Egypt  
 
A fellow student, 21-year-old Zein also discussed this point: 
 
People look at us and think we just have an easy life. Yes, we are 
financially comfortable and thus have a lot of privileges, but at the 
same time there are so many expectations that we have to adhere and 
live up to. I envy that lower class people can just wear anything and 
drive any car – they don’t have an image to constantly maintain. It's 
different for us because if you're not driving one of the latest models 
or wearing designer clothes or are holding a slick mobile phone, 
you're looked down upon. This obsession with physical appearances is 
part of our class culture though. People wouldn't mind abstaining from 
food so they can spend all their money on getting their appearance 
"right".    
 
Interestingly, both of these quotations reveal an underlying tension regarding the 
upper middle class' everyday engagement with consumer culture. As well as these 
consumer products representing objects that they take pleasure in attaining, it is 
almost as if they are sometimes perceived to be a burden which they are coerced into 
visibly displaying as a confirmation of, and conformity to, their elite class identity. 
Indeed, as I discuss below, entry into the exclusive elite world of upper middle class 
Egyptians requires the acquisition of particular products that become symbolic 
markers of a specific class status. There is no stronger indication of their closed 
cosmopolitan imagination than their consumer practices. They emphasize how, for 
the upper middle class, a need to assert their belonging to the world is expressed in 
the acquisition of highly priced and desirable consumer items that mark a clear 
boundary of class identity.     
 
The cultural expectations that the upper middle class often feel obliged to fulfil are 
strikingly impressed upon their everyday university life. Their campus is transformed 
into an important arena through which consumer ideals are expressed, demonstrated 
and appropriated. I remember the first time I walked into the campus of the 
American University being in awe at its physical infrastructure built over a vast 
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space, with a large Olympic size swimming pool, football and basketball courts. 
During one non-participation session, as I walked across the car park towards the 
main gates of the campus, I did not think I had ever seen such a large concentration 
of expensive, chauffeured driven cars depositing students at the main campus gates. 
Not one public bus, taxi or microbus was in sight. Approaching the hordes of young 
men and women sharing morning greetings and heading to their first lectures, I 
instantly knew I had made the wrong choice of dress. Although I was the one who 
lived in the 'west,' I most definitely felt physically out of place with my tired looking 
jeans and worn out trainers. I decided I would have to make more of an effort next 
time in order to avoid appearing starkly out of place.  
 
Fashion choices were heavily indicative of a global consumer influence as expensive 
designer handbags, shoes, sunglasses and jeans were the everyday norm – even 
expected appearance – for this young elite. In what I rather amusingly learned is 
called the Gucci Corner, were the seriously (and willing to spend) fashion-conscious 
students awarded the privilege of being part of this exclusive group. They visibly and 
consciously displayed their bodies adorned with 'Gucci' styles and other top designer 
brands from head to toe as they smoked, gossiped and met up with lovers between 
lectures. As I proceeded further across the campus, I came into contact with hippie-
type students, wearing loose trendy clothing, displaying multiple facial piercings and 
often flaunting unusual hair colours. As I approached closer I saw two men sitting on 
a table strumming their guitars and singing one of Bon Jovi's best hits, while the rest 
of their friends, both men and women, enthusiastically sang along.  
 
Within all these groups, physical contact between genders seemed to be normal – 
even expected – as the often common greeting between men and women was a kiss 
and a hug. Couples could be seen openly walking around displaying romantic acts of 
intimacy. Interestingly, such open gestures of romance would be unacceptable, even 
criminal anywhere else. In the public streets of Cairo, sustained physical contact of a 
sexual or intimate nature between men and women can result in a jail sentence. 
Nevertheless, enclosed within the walls of the American University, other students 
walked past them oblivious that anything unusual, or indeed, unacceptable, was 
taking place. The well-circulated idea that 'anything and everything can happen 
within the gates of the AUC' was not a myth, it appeared. Most of the time, however, 
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when not in lectures, students were lounging about sunbathing on the immaculately 
trimmed lawn and listening to their ipods, or sitting in the canteen, faced with an 
internationally varied menu of McDonalds, sushi, pizza or a coffee and dessert at 
Cinnabon or Ben's Cookies. Using this to my advantage, I would always take a break 
half way through the sessions, treating myself to a double chocolate chip cookie and 
latté that I would take to the benches near the AUC bookstore, positioned 
strategically so as to give a panoramic view of a large part of the campus.  
During one memorable session, biting into my cookie during my short break, I could 
hear the thumping echo of the American rapper 50 Cent blasting out of the stereo 
system located in the main communal area of the campus. Opposite me were also a 
couple embracing, locked in intimate kisses. In the midst of all this, a very strange 
incident took place, largely unconnected to its surroundings.  
 
At the highest point of the campus, where an open walk-on bridge links two separate 
buildings, a young bearded man appeared out of nowhere, and in what appeared to be 
an all familiar routine, he performed the azaan or Islamic call to prayer. I looked in 
amazement at what to me was a very unexpected incident. Although hearing the call 
to prayer five times a day, everyday, blasting out of Cairo’s numerous mosques is 
normal, I certainly found it almost at odds with the general atmosphere of the AUC. 
However, I seemed to be the only one amazed: the music continued to thump and the 
couple continued to embrace obliviously, and just as suddenly as he appeared, the 
unknown bearded man disappeared. His mission was complete: the call to prayer was 
announced. Asking about this mystery figure who I often glimpsed around the 
campus, I was told he was a student of Engineering who only ever appeared to 
perform the azaan. I sometimes caught him walking hastily to his lectures – gaze 
lowered, trousers rolled up (an Islamic tradition observed by some strict religious 
men where lower garments are expected to be above the ankles), displaying a visible 
lack of interest in the buzzing student activities going on around him. Although 
intrigued to understand more about this young man, I sensed he would not really 
appreciate talking to a woman he did not know, so I avoided approaching him.  
 
Despite this young student and his endeavours going largely unnoticed by his 
colleagues, this incident illustrates that religion is not completely absent from the 
everyday lives of the upper middle class, thus reminding us of the tensions and 
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internal contradictions that exist within class. Although to many of my participants in 
the upper middle class religion did not appear to be a priority, for some, their faith 
was core to their identity. Indeed, as a person who regularly prays, the first thing I 
asked about when I began my sessions at the AUC, was a prayer room. I was 
directed to the last floor of one of the buildings, where I found two segregated prayer 
rooms – one for men and one for women. Although the women's room never really 
contained more than a handful of people who came to pray at any one time, it 
illustrated that religion was not completely absent from the social worlds of the upper 
middle class, and still informed some of the daily practices of this young elite. 
Whereas for the two lower classes, religion is an important and very visible marker 
of their class identity, for the upper middle class, religion can be seen to influence the 
lives of particular individuals within this class group, rather than represent a common 
thread of identity across the whole class. Although the veil was visible at AUC, it 
was much less common than in the working and lower middle class institutions. 
Nevertheless, religious symbols and Islamic codes of dress were no barrier to 
interpersonal relations at the AUC, as the veiled woman, and the woman in the short 
skirt or the sleeveless top socialized in the same group and were often best friends. 
Thus, religious symbols remained only that – symbols that were engaged with (or 
not) strictly as a personal choice and not expected social obligations, as was often the 
case with women in the two lower classes. Furthermore, I witnessed how, for the 
upper middle class, a religious Islamic affiliation remained independent of, and 
unconditioned by dress choice. It would often be the girl in the short skirt who would 
trek up to the prayer room, cover herself in one of the body gowns provided, and 
fulfil her daily prayers. What united members of this group was not a common 
religious identification, but their class status and the fact that veiled or unveiled, they 
both owned the latest Louis Vuitton handbag and were wearing the latest Ray Ban 
sunglasses.  
 
The above illustration of everyday life in the AUC is indicative of the closed 
cosmopolitan imagination of the upper middle class that is based predominantly on 
securing a specific class status linked exclusively to western lifestyles. As one young 
student there told me:  
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It's like America has been picked up and transported to Cairo. The 
way students dress, the food choices or the university building itself. 
It really is like you're in a completely different world – one that is a 
lot more sanitized and ordered. It's a shame what you have to see 
once you move out of the gates though – a complete culture shock. I 
always dread the journey home from the university: the horrendous 
traffic, the heat and the stupid people – all three can be avoided in the 
campus. I guess it's just a more comfortable environment to be in.  
 
Thus, these young people desire to position themselves as members of a universal 
elite upper middle class through consumer practices associated with global forms of 
cultural consumption. They want to create their own 'America in Cairo'. 
Nevertheless, this desire to assert their belonging to a wider world is located very 
specifically within a constricted class understanding. This understanding conceives 
of the upper classes of Egypt as being stylish, modern and educated, compared to the 
ignorant and 'stupid' (lower class people as described by the student above) people of 
Cairo excluded from such pristine worlds.   
 
By entering the gates of their campus, therefore, students of the American University 
are not only entering an educational institution, but are symbolically entering into a 
very specific articulation of cultural globalisation. Globalisation for them is 
represented and embodied in selected fashion, food and leisure practices, which are 
able to transform their campus into an enclave within which being global becomes a 
daily achievement. This desire and achievement has become even more apparent 
after the American University's relocation. Recently, in 2008, the campus moved 
from the hustle and bustle of Al-Tahrir, one of the busiest and most crowded districts 
in central Cairo, surrounded by local supermarkets, traditional food-stalls and local 
cafés, to the remoteness of a new desert-surrounded campus. During a discussion 
with one of the lecturers at the university, I was told how the embodied appearance 
and fashion choices of the students have changed dramatically, as the secluded 
location of the new campus has allowed them to experience a new found freedom in 
relation to more liberal forms of dress and performance. The lecturer on American 
studies at the university told me: 
 
Students at the American University have always been known for their 
really daring, westernized forms of dress. This is especially true of the 
women whose appearance I sometimes find to be quite provocative. 
Things got worse after the campus moved to El Tagamo' El Khames. 
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It's mainly surrounded by desert and so it gives a kind of exclusivity to 
the campus. Thus, female students have become less conscious of the 
disapproving looks of more modest Egyptians who don’t commend 
this sort of dress. It's like the barrier of shame has suddenly been 
removed.       
 
Although at the start of my research the university had only just undergone its 
relocation , some classes still operated from the old campus. Thus, in the first month 
of my research, my observation sessions alternated between both campuses. I 
witnessed for myself how the old campus in Al-Tahrir was particularly constraining 
in relation to the desired public performances of women. After completing one non-
participant observation session and waiting for my lift home, I came across a group 
of female students walking out of the safety of the campus into the crowded main 
street. Heads down, the women hastily walked past the garlic whiff of traditional 
kushari (an Egyptian pasta and rice based dish with a tomato sauce) cafeterias and 
the honking sounds of cars trapped in endless traffic jams, in order to reach their 
chauffeur driven vehicles.  
 
In an attempt to secure their modesty, shawls were wrapped around bare shoulders, 
while long jackets were used to cover exposed knees. Even so, this did little to spare 
them from the prying gazes of harassing taxi drivers, manual workers and shop 
owners who, in a state of excitement, started whistling and clapping. Angered by 
their giddy and uncomforting reaction, one of the women shouted out: 'ignorant 
people – when will you learn to act like civilized humans'. This tension seems to 
have been relieved in the new campus which, located in one of Cairo's new remote 
satellite cities, means students – surrounded only by desert – are not forced to 
acknowledge the perceived 'ignorance' of working class Egyptian labourers. The way 
upper middle class women are forced to adapt their embodied dress choices to suit 
different urban locations, resonates with the experiences of working class women 
who move between different performances and bodily appearances to suit the 
educational/non-educational environment as I document in section 7.4. This is 
evidence of the porosity of classes that are not rigid or homogenous social groupings, 
but allow for contradictions and overlaps between their boundaries. Despite their 
vastly differing class status, what unites these women is the perceived sexualisation 
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of the female body and thus how it needs to be controlled and covered (albeit in very 
different ways) while in public and particularly in the presence of men.   
 
As I discussed in Chapter Four, in his ethnographic analysis of Cairo's Qassr Nile 
bridge, Sabry (2010) questions what kind of public space the bridge has come to 
represent. 'Could it be a different kind of public space, a private-public space, an 
inbetween space or even a hyper-real space?' (Sabry, 2010: 69). In the same vein, 
what type of space is the AUC campus? It is intended to be an institution where 
everyday educational knowledge is acquired. Nevertheless, its students have 
converted the university into a lived space (Lefebvre, 1991) of symbolic meaning 
and interpretation, to borrow Lefebvre's term. The campus represents an imagined 
cultural enclave where America has become 'transported to Cairo' as the young man 
told me above, allowing a very specific articulation of cosmopolitanism to be 
asserted. This is a closed cosmopolitanism that has become a strong confirmation of 
how, for the upper middle class, cosmopolitanism is strongly related to selected 
consumer practices and the expression of individual identities that locate them as 
members of a global transnational elite. Bonds of class, therefore, have come to 
transcend national boundaries and social relationships based on geographical 
proximity. On an everyday class-identity basis, these privileged individuals consider 
themselves to be more on a par with young people of a similar class status living in 
the west, than of fellow Egyptian nationals from a lower socio-economic 
background.                            
 
7.3 Divine Consumption? The Lower Middle Class between Consumer Desires 
and Religious Obligation 
 
Fashion choices, in particular, are central to the consumer practices of the lower 
middle class, with selected objects defining embodied appearance becoming an 
important mode of socio-symbolic communication. I discussed in the last empirical 
chapter how the lower middle class are occupying a complex, hybrid critical 
cosmopolitanism that blends acceptance of global culture with a religiously 
analytical attitude. Significantly, the body emerges as central to this process where 
its adornment represents a highly visible route (Chua, 1998) for the combined 
expression of both religious and global cultural forms of belonging. A particular 
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strategy, especially relevant for women, through which they are able to incorporate 
an Islamic morality within their consumer practices, is the engagement in an 
'embodied piety' (Deeb, 2006: 103). This involves the way the body becomes a 
canvas onto which personal and religious piety is transformed into a highly visible 
demonstration of faith. The adoption of the veil especially, emerges as important to 
the daily lives of young lower middle class women. Indeed, a large number of them 
commented on how they are able to maintain a comfortable urban mobility through 
the veil, as they feel protected from the male gaze and instances of verbal sexual 
harassment common in the streets of Cairo.  
 
Of the 100 lower middle class young people I asked in the questionnaire, 36% use 
the underground metro system for transport, 25% use the microbus, and 32% use 
more than one means of public transport. In this context, where the seclusion of a 
private car is beyond their limited economic means, Islamic dress plays a vital role in 
enabling these women to move around the city with relative freedom. Specifically, 
the veil performs the function of a religious banner, signalling that this particular 
woman is a pious Muslim, thus not interested in any form of flirtation or male 
attention. In this way, veiling becomes a protecting socio-spatial practice undertaken 
by women in light of their very particular daily urban experiences in Cairo (Macleod, 
1992; Hoodfar, 1991). Indeed, during the group discussions, many of the lower 
middle class women comment that as a result of the veil and their conservative dress 
choices, they feel able to negotiate the streets of Cairo with much more confidence. 
If they happen to be recipients of any unwanted male attention or verbal harassment, 
then they could not be blamed for it. As 22-year-old Dina informed me: 
 
Even while wearing the veil, I do still receive attention from men in 
the streets. However, it's now their problem not mine. I've covered my 
body and made sure that I don’t look overly attractive, so there's 
nothing more that I can do. Therefore, I have the right to walk in the 
streets proudly knowing that I'm not doing anything to provoke 
negative attention. But men, or at least Egyptian men, are still men at 
the end of the day and they will probably continue to look at a woman 
even if she covered herself with a tent. 
 
Maysa, a 21-year-old student at the Faculty of Education also made a similar point 
when she declared: 
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I just feel more comfortable wearing the veil. I can't imagine going out 
without it, my head would just feel so bare. Anyway, the streets of 
Cairo have become a jungle full of wild animals. Obviously by wild 
animals I'm referring to men who just insist on flirting and teasing any 
girl who walks by. It makes me feel very nervous and uneasy and so I 
prefer the confidence and sense of freedom I get when I'm modest and 
covered up. However, that doesn’t mean I have to be scruffy or dress 
in a gallabeya (traditional long dress like garment). I like to wear 
jeans, colourful cardigans, boots and dresses. I always make an effort 
to try to research the latest trends – what people are wearing in the 
fashionable places outside of Egypt. I might be a Muslim who dresses 
conservatively, yet I like to think of myself as a trendy and modern 
one.  I think any Muslim woman is obliged to be a positive 
ambassador of her religion. 
 
  
It seems, therefore, that as well as lower middle class women choosing to wear the 
veil as an expression of embodied piety and as a form of public protection, there is 
often a desire to merge this with global fashion trends. Indeed, this corresponds to 
responses collected through the television consumption survey in relation to the 
lower middle class, where 66% of women in this group selected keeping up-to-date 
with 'international cultural changes' through 'international fashion trends' as an 
‘important’ reason for watching television. I saw for myself during the non-
participant observation sessions in their university campus how branded veils 
emerged as central to their everyday fashion choices. Whereas shoes, handbags and 
their attire in general did not really reflect any particular desire for branded designs, I 
very commonly saw counterfeits of Burberry, Valentino and Fendi headscarves. In 
one instance, two women engaged my interest as they walked around the campus in 
their very locally made cotton Egyptian tracksuits and matching Adidas headscarves. 
Significantly, these consumer choices are indicative of the critical cosmopolitan 
imagination displayed by members of this class. Such consumer objects represent an 
important form of visible expression allowing these women to blend their religious 
identity with western symbols of global modernity. It is interesting how the veil, 
perhaps more than any other item of clothing, emerges as their chosen embodiment 
of the global brand. By wearing these branded veils, these young women are publicly 
demonstrating that they are devout Muslims. Yet by visibly adorning their bodies 
with these branded (although counterfeit) consumer objects, they are also 
symbolically positioning themselves beyond local and national boundaries, locating 
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everyday symbols of devout religiosity within wider discourses of global consumer 
modernity and youth identity.  
 
Such hybridized fashion choices were not only relegated to the women, but were 
also highly desired by men in this group. They also seek to maintain an image of 
Islamic piousness, yet also to select trends which signify that these are modern, 
fashion-conscious individuals, up to date with global consumerism and youth 
identities. For instance, in one focus group discussion with lower middle class men, 
the renowned City Stars Mall was a topic that raised a lot of interest, as the exchange 
below illustrates: 
 
Mohammed: I like going to City Stars. It's clean, spacious and well 
thought out. I like to have a bite at the food court with my friends and 
then have a walk around – especially in the summer when we can take 
advantage of the air conditioning. 
 
Interviewer: Are there any shops in particular that you enjoying going 
to or purchasing from? 
 
Mohammed: Well, I wouldn’t really say that I go to City Stars to buy 
anything. It's impossible – the prices are unbelievably expensive. I 
mainly just go window shopping to get ideas about the latest fashion 
trends and to try out the latest technological gadgets. Sometimes, if 
there's an item of clothing I like, I search for it at my local mall that 
sells some similar designs but at much cheaper prices. Even the 
restaurants are ridiculously priced and so sometimes we bring our own 
sandwiches and eat them in the food court and just buy a drink. We do 
get stared at though by the upper classes who find our behaviour quite 
vulgar. I mean, for people who find no problem in splashing a 
considerable amount out on a single meal, I'm not surprised they find 
it strange that we bring our own food! But then again, it’s not like we 
are doing anything against the law, is it? 
 
Ayman: I agree, I mean why can't they just let us be. I hate the way I 
walk into a clothes shop to try something on and the assistant is just so 
rude and patronizing, silently implying I should leave because I 
wouldn’t be able to afford anything. But then she's suddenly so 
friendly when a family from the Gulf walk in dressed in their designer 
clothes and diamond watches. She follows them round like a dog, all 
smiles. Sometimes I avoid going into shops, and just look from the 
outside. Anyway, even if I had the money, I wouldn’t buy many of the 
things ridiculously expensive items sold in City Stars. Allah says in 
the Quraan that those who overspend are brothers of the devil.  
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Following on from the above, it is clear how City Stars is an important consumer 
outlet that allows these men to familiarize themselves with the latest fashion trends 
and designs, and with a global culture they desire to become a part of. It is 
noticeable, however, as the last quotation reflects, that desires fostered through 
consumer products often remain untouchable goods. Although these consumer 
objects flagrantly displayed in the mall, are very much desired by these men, they 
sometimes remain unreachable; distanced physically by shop windows in outlets they 
feel too intimidated to enter, and symbolically through the class prejudices of shop 
assistants. Thus, it seems that in City Stars, it is ideas rather than products that are 
consumed, which are then realized in cheaper outlets where similar, more affordable 
versions are widely available. This confirms Schielke's (2007:3) thesis that 
cosmopolitanism in Cairo, as a desire to position oneself in the world, provides at 
once 'for moments of hope and moments of tremendous pressure and 
disappointment'. Thus, cosmopolitanism, as a daily lived reality, is an experience 
highly imbued within unequal relations of power and takes its meanings via 
grounded local experience that intersects with systems of class, gender and religion. I 
have already explored how the fashion choices of lower middle class women are 
informed by a desire to engage with global trends, yet are framed by religious 
discourses of morality. Additionally, for both men and women in this group, socio-
economic capital shapes their access to a restricted set of consumer products. 
Nevertheless, these limited socio-economic and religious realities do not discount the 
experiences of these groups or exclude them from developing cosmopolitanism 
aspirations. Rather, although operating from within restrictive everyday realities, 
these young men and women have become skilled at negotiating and discovering 
their own unique roots of cosmopolitan expression.  
 
My ethnographic fieldwork also unearths how the media play a very particular and 
central role for lower middle class women. In the absence of an economic ability to 
directly engage in consumer practices, media representations themselves become 
products that are consumed. Thus, my analysis of young Egyptians' consumer 
practices, has led me to the observation that consumerism takes on two distinct forms 
in Cairo. Engagement in a consumer world can either take place directly through the 
material acquisition of consumer objects, or via the media, which themselves become 
consumed as primary means of symbolic connection with an unreachable, yet desired 
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global consumer world. Focusing on China, Schein (1999) has also argued how 
television can often provide a point of entry into an imagined global consumer 
fantasy, from which financially disadvantaged viewers would otherwise be excluded. 
In relation to my own research, the centrality of television to the consumer desires of 
lower middle class women, is demonstrated in the popularity of Turkish drama 
serials. Seventy four percent of women in this class category revealed through the 
survey that they are regular fans of Turkish serials, specifically the soap opera named 
Noor. Its plot focuses on a romantic love story – including the struggles and 
tribulations – between the blond haired, blue eyed stud Mohannad and his 
independent fashion designer wife, Noor. When I asked these women during the 
focus group sessions why this serial is so popular, it seems that the marital 
relationship between the main actor and actress is the main attraction. Specifically, 
the way the lead actor treats his wife with so much compassion, love and respect is a 
point of great admiration. The words of Amany, a 22-year-old woman, demonstrate 
this: 
 
Mohannad is just so gentle with Noor, and always takes into 
consideration how she's feeling and what she wants. Even when he 
does upset her, he makes a great effort to apologize and show her how 
much he regrets it. Generally, however, he is such a gentleman with 
her, always buying her presents, hugging her, saying nice things and 
just being really nice. They both really appreciate each other and 
demonstrate how marriage isn’t the end of love as Egyptian men tend 
to think, but that it should be the beginning of a long romantic life. 
 
It appears, therefore, that Turkish serials have become an important catalyst allowing 
these women to negotiate key gender roles that affect their everyday lives. The 
married women of the group informed me that such storylines have opened their eyes 
to aspects that they felt were missing from their own relationships such as romance 
and respect. Thus, these fictional storylines have become an important medium 
through which they have aspired to change and perfect their relationship. Taking this 
into consideration, however, I was quite surprised when I watched this Turkish serial 
for myself as drinking of alcohol, extra marital relationships and on-screen kissing 
were common features of these serials; the same features which are usually 
condemned when viewed in American media. Why is it that that they are accepted in 
a different context? The answer seems to lie once again with Islam: these fictional 
characters may drink or engage in 'unlawful' relationships, but at the end of the day, 
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they are Muslims just like them. Frames with Quraanic verses hung on the walls of 
the characters' homes, the frequent appearance of mosques in the streets, some of the 
female actresses wearing the headscarf, and the occasional character praying, seems 
to make up for the morally unacceptable behaviour that often occurs. As 22-year-old 
Amna said: 
 
These Turkish characters are western in many ways: they drink and 
have relationships outside of marriage and go to nightclubs, but at the 
end of the day they are still Muslims. We all make mistakes, but 
eventually we return to God, and that does happen in this serial. For 
instance, whenever the characters have a major crisis such as someone 
in hospital, they turn to God, speaking to Him and praying that things 
go well. I think that’s a really good morale: even if you generally 
forget God in your everyday life, you will eventually return to Him in 
the end! This shared moral framework makes it easier for us to 
identify with the characters on-screen; to immerse ourselves in the 
storylines and compare our own realities to what occurs in the serial. 
 
Amna's friend, 21-year-old Noorhan also enjoys Turkish serials immensely. She told 
me: 
 
Mohannad is so romantic. I mean he's better looking than his wife but 
still treats her like a princess. Where is this passion and romance in 
martial relationships in Egypt? I'm not married, but after watching this 
serial, I will accept nothing less than Mohannad (laughing). I also love 
Noor's clothes though, she is so pretty and elegant. Also the big 
mansion they live in which is just magnificent….and the picturesque 
images of Turkey……it's beautiful, like a piece of Europe!  
 
 
These Turkish serials, therefore, have encouraged their female viewers to push the 
boundaries of what has been previously been regarded as acceptable. What they may 
find intolerable in the context of a western or American programme, seems to be 
almost unnoticeable in these Turkish serials as it takes place within the confines of a 
more 'respectable' Islamic framework. These young women accept that the behaviour 
of the characters may not always respect the boundaries of Islamic morality, but their 
identity as Muslims and their realization that ultimately, their fate is in the hands of 
Allah, appear to compensate for this. Thus, it seems that the global has become 
indigenized through the regional and the Islamic, and this is evident in the way 
characters in the Turkish serial have become Arabic personalities. For instance, the 
serial is translated through the dubbed voices of Arabic actors, while the identities of 
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the real Turkish actors have become almost completely unknown as they are now 
considered to be Arab figures, recognized by their Arabic names of 'Mohannad' and 
'Noor'. Once again, this is indicative of a critical cosmopolitan imagination where 
religious identities do not prevent lower middle class participants from developing a 
desire to engage with aspects of global cultural modernity, as long as they are 
enveloped within, and filtered through Islamic discourse. Furthermore, the above 
discussion demonstrates that consumption does not only take precedence in the form 
of material products that adorn the body. Indeed, it is not only physical products that 
are consumed, but immaterially, mediated dreams, aspirations and perceptions of an 
ideal life and romantic relationships on the screen are also consumed, allowing 
participants to reflect upon, and redefine the limits of their identities and imagine the 
self in new ways.  
 
7.4 The 'Beckham' Hairstyle and Egyptianized Burgers: Working Class and 
Implicit Consumerism   
 
Although discourse unveiled through my discussions with the working class reveals a 
commitment to dominant discourses of religious morality alone, direct observation 
and examination of their everyday lives unearth paradoxical performances. In this 
discussion, I explore how an everyday acquisition of consumer products has become 
an important route allowing the working class to sustain these performances. 
Selected consumer objects allow some of the young working class participants to 
subjectively transport themselves between different cultural worlds, and to physically 
alternate between different performances that conform to the requirements of both 
domestic and public spaces. This is strongly indicative of their implicit cosmopolitan 
imagination where the acquisition of consumer objects allows them a moment to 
claim their belonging to a broader cultural context and global youth practices that 
transcend the restricted boundaries of morality established by the family and nation. 
In this context, selected consumer objects permit the working class to articulate 
implicit moments that often allow them to subvert and symbolically contest the 
familial and religious systems of power that constrain and control their daily realities. 
According to Abaza (2001:117), the working class of Cairo is occupying parallel 
worlds, constantly negotiating different lifestyles. They are forced to adapt to the 
'two worlds, the inside/outside- the dense, highly socially controlled, poor popular 
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quarters versus the modern public spheres' (emphasis in original). This duality of 
everyday performance in the realities of the working class of Cairo, is in need of 
further research, Abaza argues.  In this context, by ethnographically examining a 
snapshot of the daily lives of working class Egyptians, I can illustrate more clearly 
how the balance between local particularity, religious morality and a global 
articulation of culture is actually implemented and maintained in an everyday 
context. I find their university/educational campus to be one of the most fascinating 
spaces to observe and understand attitudes, as being with their peers, free of the 
scrutinizing eyes of family and community expectations, they tend to perform youth 
identities that are highly globalised.  
 
 
The first time I walked into Madina Institute, my ears were instantly offended by the 
raucous Arabic music blasting out of the small canteen. I looked around me to find 
men and women comfortably standing around in mixed-gendered groups laughing, 
gossiping and often teasingly chasing each other around. Although the vast majority 
of the young women were veiled, I was rather surprised at the quite daring attire that 
was often combined with the veil. Although Islamic discourse dictates that the veiled 
woman wear loose, non-revealing, non-transparent clothing, what I saw around me 
was often the exact opposite. Tight, figure-hugging outfits appeared to be an 
accepted norm. One woman walked passed me wearing a short, fitted dress, 
combined with silver high heeled knee boots and a matching silver sparkling veil. I 
also noticed that heavy make-up was acceptable. Fashion choices were also an 
important part of the everyday visible performance of men who were predominantly 
dressed in imitated copies of western designer brands such as Converse trainers, 
Diesel jeans and Lacoste T-shirts. One of the men I got to know during my sessions 
at the institute asked me what I thought of his 'Beckham' hairdo that he had changed 
from his previous 'zbiky' look (a spiky haircut that is heavily gelled). There appeared 
to be no shyness between men and women as during break times, mixed gendered 
groups often headed off together outside of the campus to grab a bite to eat.  
 
During one session, a female student I had become acquainted with at the institute, 
insisted on buying me lunch from the canteen. I sensed she was trying to impress me 
when she happily declared that she would bring me (as she pronounced it) 
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'cabatsheeno we borgar zay el andoko barra' (cappuccino and a burger like you have 
"outside" i.e. in foreign countries). I was impressed, although eventually, when my 
lunch arrived, I discovered it to be a very Egyptian interpretation of a burger and 
cappuccino. The latter was a normal cup of coffee blended with a hand-held, battery-
operated whisk to create a cappuccino-imitating froth on the surface. Unwrapping the 
'borgar' was a bit of an anti-climax as it turned out to be a hawawshy. This is a well-
known, locally made mince-meat sandwich cooked with onions and spices to give 
more bulk, thus requiring less meat, making it much more affordable. Apart from 
food, mobile phones represented multi-tool media both for communicating and for 
entertainment during lunch-time breaks and between lectures. They are referred to as 
el-camera when they want to take group pictures with friends, or el-iPod when they 
wish to use their phones as miniature stereos where, along with their friends, they 
listen to western and Arabic music, while walking around the campus. Furthermore, 
as my relationship with women from this class grew stronger, they often excitedly 
showed me the latest 'secret' photos of their lovers or still-to-be love interests that 
they kept recorded on their mobile phones. Nadia, 21, told me how the secret world 
of her mobile phone was the only place she could store such photos digitally as she 
would be too scared to keep hold of any hard copies. She was worried such pictures 
would be discovered by her three siblings with whom she shares a room. 
Additionally, I witnessed frequently across the working class how their mobile 
phones were often programmed at set times to act as a vocal reminder for the Islamic 
call to prayer. This is a strong confirmation of the way the working class constantly 
move between different performances, constantly negotiating their identities as 
Muslims, but also as members of global youth cultural practices. The multiple uses 
they make of technology, as observed above, often supports this transition process.         
 
As I discussed in Chapter Six, during the early stages of my research, young men and 
women in the working class sample seemed intent on constantly placing themselves 
almost exclusively with an Islamic framework of acceptability. The west was often 
vocally attacked as a source of corruption and moral laxness that needed to be 
distanced. Nevertheless, I was conducting my non-participant observation sessions in 
parallel to these early discussions, and so I was aware from the start, through an 
observation of their everyday behaviour, of the visible gap that existed between their 
discourse, and between actual daily practice. Thus, although discourse during the 
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early stages of my research revealed dominant ideologies of religious conservatism, 
everyday action, which emerged as the fieldwork progressed, demonstrated complex 
and often conflicting practices. As the scene from their campus demonstrates, the 
signs and symbols of global consumer culture are deeply entrenched in their 
everyday realities, and are very much enjoyed. This is reflected in the fashion 
choices of these young students, in their desire to listen to American rap music, and 
in their ability to buy a cappuccino and burger from their canteen. It is also affirmed 
by the multiple uses they make of their mobile phones, both as cameras and mini-
stereos, as secret photo albums and prayer alarms. Members of the working class 
sample may have declared to me initially that they morally reject the west, choosing 
instead a lifestyle inspired by Islamic morality and practice. Yet, my observations of 
their actual daily behaviour, led me to question whether these vocal aspirations are 
entirely reflective of their actual desires and realities, or are about conformity to the 
demands of dominant social and religious expectations. 
 
Despite an insistence on constantly placing themselves within an Islamic frame of 
reference by, for example, wearing the veil, can it be fair to say that other aspects of 
their behaviour often challenge the boundaries of Islamic acceptability? I witnessed 
this very visibly during one of my non-participant observation sessions after 
receiving a text message from my friend telling me to re-schedule my weekly visit to 
the campus to 9am instead of 2pm. She told me to meet her near the campus toilets. 
Intrigued by her request, I was there on time. As she opened the door that led to the 
unusually small, unhygienic toilet, I was instantly taken aback by the strong whiff of 
perfume, and the sight of a number of women standing opposite the mirror 
adjusting/changing their clothing and applying make-up. It almost looked as if they 
were preparing themselves for a fashion parade, with some women taking off jackets 
to reveal tight clothing underneath, while others removed the veil altogether. 
Observing their cosmetic products on the toilet counter, they were all mainly cheap 
counterfeits of western brands. For example, I saw J'adore mascara wands (J'adore is 
a perfume by Christian Dior and does not officially have a make-up range) and 
Kinzo perfume (packaged to look and smell like the original Kenzo). After spending 
about 20 minutes in the toilet watching the different faces appear and disappear 
smelling and looking very different, I decided I needed some fresh air. I went back to 
the campus courtyard with my friend and instantly asked her to explain why she 
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thinks this masquerade of performances and appearances happens. Anan, 21, said in 
response: 
 
Well, most of these girls are not really allowed out anywhere else 
other than to the institute, so they take full advantage of this 
opportunity to dress up in ways they wouldn’t normally be allowed to. 
I see girls every morning coming into the toilets applying make-up, 
taking off jackets to reveal more fashionable types of clothes. A few 
of them have even gone to the extent of taking the veil off altogether 
when they are at the institute. I know some of these girls and they 
often tell me how they feel very controlled in their daily lives, 
especially if they have strict older brothers. They just want to live 
these moments of freedom, feel that they have some sort of liberty to 
make their own decision. 
 
 I asked Anan to introduce me to these friends of hers, and although for a significant 
period of time during the early part of my research they were very reluctant to allow 
me to accompany them on their social outings, eventually, through Anan's 
intervention, one of them gave in. After several meetings of trying to establish 
rapport with Fatma, I felt she began to relax around me and Anan eventually told me 
in a telephone conversation that she thinks her friend would be ready to answer some 
of the questions that she knows I have been longing to ask. Indeed, meeting them one 
evening in a coffee shop near their institute, I asked 23-year-old Fatma what she 
thinks of the women who undergo these contradicting performances and adopt 
multiple appearances. She told me: 
 
You may not understand and you may have another opinion, but when 
you're always told what to do in every aspect of your life, always 
commanded how to dress and behave, sometimes its good to feel you 
have a choice. I don’t directly disobey my parents, I would never do 
that and I don’t think I really disobey Allah. I mean, it's all harmless 
really – a bit of makeup, a nice dress, some perfume. It's not like I'm 
walking around naked. I want to feel I'm a young woman like any 
other – like I can dress nicely, look pretty, and have fun. Isn't all this 
normal, isn’t that what young people my age do in the world?  
 
Interviewer: By the 'world,' are you referring to the people of your 
age you see on television? 
 
Well, I guess so. Actually, I had an argument with my mum the other 
day because I wanted to go to my friend's birthday party and she 
refused to let me go. I told her I was really bored, plus they are all 
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girls. She told me to just watch television if I'm bored- "Isn’t that why 
you wanted a TV in the first place?" she said. I felt like saying that 
television actually makes it worse. What's the point of seeing how the 
world lives, how they eat and dress and have happy lives if we can't do 
the same. It's not just a matter of entertainment. I mean, you see how 
these people live and only then do you realize how bad your own 
situation is. It's not just television. I live very near to El Mohandeseen 
(a wealthy district of Cairo) and have to go through it every day to 
reach my institute. I see all the rich people getting in their expensive 
cars and eating in fancy restaurants and the worst thing is, you know 
you will never have half of what they do – but you have to see them 
every single day of your life. Can you imagine that? Sometimes I just 
want to shut myself off from the world and get rid of the television.   
 
This powerful quotation demonstrates the extent to which young working class 
women often feel that they are repressed, afforded little room to move between or 
beyond the rigid social categories of class and gender that structure their daily lives. 
This sense is strengthened through their exposure to television representations, as in 
the abundant media spaces they have access to, more opportunities for reflection and 
interpretation are made possible where the self is constantly seen in light of both 
socially and geographically distant others. The above quotation is also a strong 
reaffirmation of the fact that television plays a paradoxical role: as much as its 
representations can expose these young people to the dreams of a better life they 
aspire to, these very same representations become mirrors that reflect the sordid 
reality of their own everyday lives. Furthermore, the above attitudes and expressions 
are indicative of the implicit cosmopolitan imagination of the working class where 
the engagement with selected consumer practices reflects a desire to position 
themselves inside the boundaries of a larger globally interconnected world. This 
often represents a moment of resistance and a temporary breathing space against the 
everyday repressive power structures they are forced to abide by in their locales.  
 
Physically, and in terms of public performance, the discourses that shape working 
class identities, especially for young women, fall predominantly within the limited 
boundaries of the neighbourhood and family expectations. In the more private 
subjective spaces of interpretation fed by the media, as juxtaposed with the physical 
spaces of educational institutions where youth identities are performed, these 
established notions of identity are being challenged. In the context of a youth 
consumer culture, a sense of connection to a wider world is formulated where 
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boundaries of acceptable conduct fall far beyond the limits of established local 
structures and Islamic morality. This constant move between physical forms of 
control and subjective spaces of interpretation encourages these young women to 
move in and out of contradictory performances on a daily basis. It is important to 
mention that although these contradictory behaviours I have recorded were the 
prevalent norm visible in my visits to the institute, I was told that a number of 
students have actively distanced themselves from these practices. Twenty-two year 
old Huda, for instance, informed me how one of her good friends now avoids 
socialising on campus, as she disapproves of the activities that take place there, and 
is worried she will be tempted to take part in them. She also told me that a group of 
what are known as ‘good girls’ spend break and lunch times in one of the cafes 
outside the campus, as they strongly condemn the excessive integration between men 
and women that takes place at the institute. Additionally, although it was a rare 
occurrence, a few times I saw a group of bearded men try to interrupt the football 
match that regularly takes place in the open courtyard, insisting that this space should 
be prioritised for praying and not sport.   
 
In most cases, therefore, the institute campus is an important space where strict moral 
codes and religious doctrines that govern everyday behaviour are often relaxed. An 
identification with the symbols of consumer modernity associated with the practices 
of global youth cultures allows members of the working class to display moments of 
freedom, pleasure and choice, which they often feel are missing from their everyday 
realities. Significantly, however, before leaving the campus to head home, I often see 
these young people return to their socially acceptable state of appearance and 
conduct for the non-educational environment. This is a reminder of how their 
implicit cosmopolitan imagination truly is implicit, not able to subvert dominant 
forms of control, but forced to operate from within them, leading to the articulation 
of limited assertions of cosmopolitanism encapsulated within temporally and 
spatially bounded contexts.  
 
I started this chapter by exploring how the experiences of young Egyptians are united 
through the way the media represent platforms for formulating joint consumer 
desires. Nevertheless, in my class specific analysis, my discussion has revealed that 
mediated desires for consumption intersect with everyday hegemonic discourses of 
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class, religion and gender that shape daily lives in Cairo. In this context, young 
Egyptians have constructed three unique narratives of consumer identities and 
desires that reflect the diverse orientations of their cosmopolitan imagination. This is 
illustrated in the table below: 
 
 
 
 Upper middle 
class 
Lower middle 
class 
Working class 
 
Attitudes towards 
the nation 
Nation imagined 
exclusively 
through western 
frame 
Nation imagined 
through religious 
frame, but in 
dialogue with 
western modernity 
Nation imagined 
through religious 
frame, but through 
contradictory 
practices/attitudes 
Consumption 
practices 
Exclusive 
engagement with 
western consumer 
products 
Religion central to 
consumer practices 
Consumer products 
supporting daily 
contradictory 
performances 
 
Figure 7.2- Consumption practices: points of divergence across class  
 
 
7.5- Conclusion 
 
The above analysis has illustrated how television is central to the consumer practices 
of young Egyptians, framing a consumer world as part of their everyday familiar 
cultural desires. Nevertheless, although mediated representations can potentially 
offer an open-ended world of imaginative possibilities, it is important to 
acknowledge how mediated desires intersect with everyday realities dominated by 
socio-cultural divides and hegemonic discourses of power. This unearths a tension 
between a desire to have, and the ability to acquire. As I have discussed, there is a 
displayed self-awareness by the two lower class groups regarding their exclusion 
from the exclusive elite networks of upper middle class worlds. Thus, as well as 
being a catalyst through which aspirations are formulated and promises are often 
realized, consumer worlds can also represent a container of suppressed desires.  
 
Despite both their unprivileged economic realities and restrictive religious discourses 
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that can often confine their engagement with a consumer world, the working and 
lower middle class participants are intelligently working from within their own 
repressive contexts to include themselves. They negotiate their own strategies and 
form their own unique cosmopolitan networks of belonging. Mignolo (2000:736) 
argues how 'a right' to be included or not is no longer satisfactory when talking about 
cosmopolitanism as a daily lived reality for different groups. As he writes: 'today, 
silenced and marginalized voices are bringing themselves into the conversation of 
cosmopolitan projects, rather than waiting to be included'. Thus, through dynamic 
processes of 'border thinking' (Mignolo, 2000) individuals and groups are able to 
actively attach themselves to their self-constructed cosmopolitan projects. This 
corresponds to my discussion in Chapter One of how cosmopolitanism today takes 
place through a process of internal heterogeneity where we are no longer required to 
go out to the world in order to engage with it, but the world comes to us via our 
computer and television screens, and is therefore sensed and shaped in everyday 
spaces and in the midst of our own particular experiences. Embedded in specific 
localities, therefore, people coalesce the local and the global in unique ways that lead 
to new avenues for imagining the self. In this context, with consumer practices 
representing primary routes of expression, global cultural modernity has become both 
internalized and appropriated.  
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8 A Tale of Three Cities? Cairo at the Juxtaposition of Urban Divisions and 
Media Practices 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The city, manifested in all Cairo's complexities, divisions and contradictions, 
emerges as central to the ways in which cosmopolitanism is lived and articulated in 
Egypt. I have discussed how a fascination with global culture as a symbol of freedom 
and the bearer of cosmopolitan ideals, is translated by young Egyptians into an 
acquisition of selected consumer symbols as an expression and embodiment of this 
desired cultural identification. Thus, I have approached the city so far as the main 
'engine' of consumption (Zukin, 1998) where the various socio-economic groups in 
Cairo are often divided on the basis of different consumer driven lifestyles, 
representing visible markers of social difference and distinction. Nevertheless, Cairo 
is more than a container of consumer practices. Cairo is the location of everyday life 
for these young people. It is where they live, work, consume, negotiate its 
horrendous traffic, breathe in its pollution, socialise with friends, pray in the mosque, 
visit family, escape from family, look for love and resist authority. In a place like 
Cairo where endless worlds exist within one city and where appearances are 
deceivingly never what they seem, what the city represents is an endless list of 
complex experiences and embodied articulations of urban identities. This chapter 
examines how the city as a space of imagination is shaped by, and emerges through 
everyday media practices. More specifically, I suggest that as increased opportunities 
for mediated connection define daily realities in Cairo, this leads to a redefinition of 
the meanings of space and place within everyday experiences of the metropolis. 
 
Egypt is a country where the signs of repression and brutal authority are 
unswervingly and overtly displayed. It is seen in the way a policeman can physically 
assault a citizen without facing repercussions, or in the way a rich woman safely 
enclosed within an air conditioned brand new Mercedes, can verbally assault and 
mock the 10-year-old street worker for attempting to wipe the windows with his 
sullied cloth. Cairo is also a city of vast differences where everyday urban life is 
highly fragmented, and physically demarcated on the basis of classed and gendered 
realities. Thus, young Egyptians are not only forced to negotiate an 'other' who is 
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geographically distant and bought closer through the media, but an 'other' who is 
geographically close yet socially distant and inaccessible. According to Chin 
(2009:5), 'as media participants have more opportunities than resources to engage 
with diverse 'others', they must choose who to engage with, as well as how, when, 
and why to engage'. Thus, faced with increased mediated opportunities for 
connection, those geographically and physically proximate – perhaps sometimes too 
proximate – may be shunned in favour of a distant 'other'; an other who is 
geographically remote, yet perceived to be socially closer and more relevant to 
everyday experiences.  
  
Cairo is a city of consumption, of oppression, of difference, yet also of creativity, 
imagination and opportunity. I discussed in Chapter Two how the everyday is a space 
of negotiation that takes place between discourse and lived practice. Thus, 
experiences of the everyday in Cairo are partly associated with the constricting city 
that cannot be escaped – the city underwritten by debilitating class polarization, a 
monopolization of state control, and unequal gender relations. Yet, there is also a 
more creative 'everyday' from below where a cosmopolitan imagination, drawing 
primarily on the more fluid systems of mediated representation, transforms the 
everyday into a more dynamic space of negotiation and reflexive interpretation. 
Importantly, this space of creativity cannot transcend structured control from above, 
but can allow citizens to develop new tactics to interpret, challenge and often resist 
such structured strategies in different ways (De Certeau, 1984).  
 
It is Lefebvre's Production of Space (Lefebvre, 1991), however, that provides my 
main inspiration for how I understand the city, discussed also in Chapter Four. 
Lefebvre does not approach the city as a passive backdrop or a space already 
existing, but as an active surface that is constructed within the realms of everyday 
experience. Specifically, Lefebvre's triadic model for understanding the production 
of urban space allows us to bring together three unique dimensions of space: space as 
imbued with power and thus produced to fit the vision of dominant elites (conceived 
space), the physical aspect of the city grasped by the senses (perceived space) and 
everyday life in the city as it is experienced and subjectively understood by citizens 
from below (lived space). In this context, Lefebvre recognizes the city not only as a 
physical space with a material infrastructure, but by focusing on the subjective 
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understandings that people make of urban space, he emphasizes the city's symbolic 
and imaginary dimensions. In this respect, as cultural windows and everyday 
resources for connecting to a wider world, the media are considered important 
'representational registers' (Jansson, 2009: 309) through which imagination is formed 
and filtered, thus allowing 'built environments and infrastructures (to) become 
communicative, that is, socially and culturally meaningful' (ibid.). In this respect, I 
use Lie's (2003) approach, according to which space is perceived as 'lived' place: 
through interaction and mediated communication, everyday experiences of bounded, 
territorial place transform into more boundless, imaginative communication spaces 
(Lie, 2003). Thus, as a contrast to the everyday, sometimes disillusioned realities of 
metropolitan place, often designed solely to fit the constricted vision of state elites 
(Lefebvre's conceived space), urban spaces of mediated imagination can offer 
inhabitants of the city representation, meaning and inclusivity (Lefebvre's lived 
space). The city, therefore, as a vessel for the everyday expression of cosmopolitan 
imagination, becomes a creative urban terrain that young Egyptians of different class 
backgrounds can often reclaim (or many times cannot) and negotiate in a way they 
find more satisfying, thus making it their own. 
 
As subsequent sections of this chapter will illustrate, by drawing on mediated 
representations, young Egyptians have transformed the material topography of Cairo 
into multiple spaces of imagination. With reference to Freitas' (cf. Abaza, 2001) 
notion of imaginaire, I argue that young Egyptians are united in their desires to 
construct their own subjectively conceived 'ideal' city within the larger city. This 
represents an important point of contact that brings together the diverse experiences 
of young Egyptians. I illustrate this by building up the final layer of my table: 
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Attitudes towards the 
nation 
 Distrust of the state  
 Highly reflexive 
relationship to national 
community 
 Understood through a 
dialectic relation with 
global culture/ideals 
 
Consumption practices Pursuit of consumer objects 
as an embodied expression of 
cosmopolitan belonging 
 
Urban mobilities 
City as a space of 
imagination and identity 
negotiation 
 
Figure 8.1- Urban mobilities: points of convergence across class 
 
As much as the joint experience of constructing mediated spaces of imagination 
across class represents an important point of contact for young Egyptians, it also 
further polarizes their already fragmented daily realities. Cairo remains an urban 
arena of oppression, incapacitating divisions and repressive forms of control from 
which these spaces of mediated imagination cannot escape, yet are forced to operate 
within. Hence, while physically positioned in Cairo, yet subjectively shifting 
between different systems of mediated representation, young Egyptians are engaging 
in the construction of urban spaces of imagination that take their meaning from 
within, and continue to be framed by structured discourses of unequal classed and 
gendered realities. As urban dwellers who are city-savvy, these young men and 
women have developed a strong self-awareness of the spaces that welcome them, yet 
also boundaries that they are not permitted to overstep. My class-specific analysis of 
the urban experiences of young Egyptians, which makes up the remainder of this 
chapter, reveals the realities of life in Cairo today.   
 
8.2 'I Look at the Lower Class and Remember I'm in Egypt': The Selective 
Mobilities of the Upper Middle Class 
 
The city is an important expressive arena for the upper middle class, allowing them 
to sustain their desired standards of 'first world' superiority and belonging by 
selecting very specific venues of socialization (De Koning, 2009; Abaza, 2005). 
There is also a desire to support social hierarchies that exclude the presence of lower 
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class Egyptians. The previous empirical chapters have explored how upper middle 
class attitudes reflect the desire for a symbolic disconnection from local forms of 
identification. This involves a constant trivialization and attitude of nihilism towards 
these more immediate forms of belonging, although at the same time, they 
simultaneously display an enthusiastic engagement with global culture. By turning to 
an analysis of their everyday highly selective mobilities within the city, I explore 
how symbolic forms of disconnection to particular classed groups based on a 
constricted class-prejudice, is translated into an everyday tangible reality. As they 
move in the city, the upper middle class participants transform a symbolic 
detachment from lower class groups into a real and physical distance, leading to a 
further crystallization of socio-cultural hierarchies.  
 
Cosmopolitanism, to these young elite men and women, is primarily a way of 
asserting their belonging to the 'first world', understood by them as a class status and 
not a geographical positioning (Schielke, 2007). Thus, I have used the term closed 
cosmopolitanism in relation to how their cosmopolitan orientations primarily become 
associated with elite status and a way of securing social distinction.  In this 
discussion, I explore how, as a further continuation of such a constricted articulation 
of cosmopolitanism, the upper middle class are able to transform urban place into 
exclusive spaces of mediated imagination that expel the lower class other. These 
urban spaces, drawing heavily on the media, offer young Egyptian elites room for 
identification and subjective imagination in ways that transcend the realities of urban 
place, which do not always conform to their very particular standards of class elitism. 
For the upper middle class, therefore, place and space are positioned against each 
other, as by engaging in their chosen urban spaces of imagination, they attempt to 
transcend what they perceive to be the inelegance of local culture and city life, and 
instead, envelop themselves exclusively within a more sophisticated global cultural 
imagination. These selective patterns of urban mobility emphasize the closed 
cosmopolitan positions of the upper middle class. By engaging in the construction of 
these very particular mediated imaginative spaces, they are able to challenge the 
physical realities of metropolitan place, and transform them in ways that reflect 
idealized standards associated exclusively with a global cultural modernity. 
    
In my conversations with these young elite Egyptians, it is clear that they are 
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involved in a constant performance of distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) that is grounded 
in their everyday urban experiences. The way young upper middle class men and 
women selectively choose to move within the city, stems out of a desire to secure a 
very specific form of habitus (ibid.). Primarily, one of the most important 
requirements of the spaces they choose to socialize in, is that they exclude members 
of the lower classes. This class segregation is achieved when the selected urban 
outlets they socialise in, employ particular strategies to limit who is and who is not 
granted access. For instance, these outlets often introduce unreasonably high 
minimum charges, ensuring that only those of a particular socio-economic status can 
afford to enter; enlist rules about certain prohibited dress, particularly targeting 
Islamic forms of embodied expression such the veil or beards; and employ security 
guards who eject individuals that do not match entry requirements in terms of 
'acceptable' appearance and conduct. 
 
Through my discussions with the upper middle class, and observation and often 
participation in their social outings, I became aware how they chose to socialise in a 
select number of cafés and restaurants around Cairo that sustain very particular 
characteristics associated with their constricted and classed interpretation of the 
world around them. In one instance, I accompanied a group of upper middle class 
participants on a weekend evening outing to Sangria, a restaurant/bar located on the 
Nile bank facing Cairo's elite district of Zamalek. After meeting the group outside 
the restaurant, 20-year-old May informed me that we would have to sit in the garden 
area as opposed to the inside seating space, as rules of the establishment dictate that 
veiled women (myself and two other women in the group) are banned from entering 
the inside bar. We proceeded to the garden area and crossed the long stone passage 
adorned with trees and flowers, where the waiter showed us to our seating place: a 
modern cubed style table placed in the centre of two very large white modern leather 
sofas. 
 
The view of the Nile was breathtaking, the complementary appetizers tasty and the 
company was entertaining. Nevertheless, the 'secretive' indoor seating area from 
which I was banned because of my veil, dominated my thoughts. Excusing myself 
for a few minutes, I decided to investigate. I walked up the cobbled stairs towards 
the indoor seating area and peered from the outside through the window, seeing what 
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was basically a bar. I could immediately hear western pop music and inhale the 
choking whiff of cigarette smoke as women in cocktail dresses and men in smart 
shirts were sitting on modern high stools, some drinking juices, but many sipping 
glasses of wine and champagne. I caught sight of the bouncer guarding the door that 
led into the exclusive inside area, and asked him if I could enter. He quite 
patronizingly replied: 'Ya anesa (miss) how do you want to enter a bar if you're 
wearing a veil? This is for your own good, you know. Do you think God would 
approve it?' Realizing it was a useless endeavour to try and enter, I returned to the 
group. I was very intrigued as to why these young men and women had chosen this 
particular location. An interesting dialogue ensued: 
 
 
May: I come here as a way of escaping the pollution and crowd of 
Cairo. I mean, sat up here by the Nile next to all the five star hotels, 
international menu and well dressed people, it's like you're not even in 
Egypt. I have Canadian friends who come to holiday in Egypt and say 
that places like Sangria are very similar to the types of cafés they 
socialise in back home. 
 
Ahmed: Yeah, this is like our own Central Perk (the fictional café 
where many scenes of the sit com Friends is filmed) in Egypt 
(laughing). 
 
 
Asking them whether they think it is ethical for cafés to apply minimum charges to 
keep certain people out, I was told: 
 
Hassan: Yes, I think it’s right. Not because I have any sense of 
prejudice towards them, but because we are different, and they will 
always feel inadequate around us. For example, when my friends and I 
come here, we often get really serious and discuss the latest episode of 
Al Ashera Masa'an (10pm, a popular political television programme). 
We generally have an interest in these issues. The lower classes 
though don’t care about such things, they just want to be vulgar and 
flirt with girls. Our interests are just too different!  
 
May: What?! And men from the middle class don’t tease girls and can 
be vulgar too? Sexual harassment is related to our whole culture, not 
to a particular class. I think that’s quite unfair. They should be able to 
make a free decision of where they would like to socialize regardless 
of whether we like that or not. I guess the reality is though, even if 
they are given the choice, they wouldn’t be able to afford socializing 
in the places we go to.   
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Lina: It's not just about flirting, though. Our lifestyles are very 
different as well. I don’t personally drink alcohol, but many of my 
friends do, and that’s their choice isn’t it? You probably respect that 
because you live in the west and know what freedom of choice is, and 
I know that too. But the lower classes don’t accept that, and they find 
it offensive or they look at us like we are completely immoral. Also, 
I'm dressed in tight jeans and I might like to wear a short dress next 
time, again that’s my choice. But they wouldn’t accept that and they 
look at me like I'm a prostitute. At the end of the day, isn’t it just 
easier if they socialized in places they find acceptable and leave us to 
do what we want to? They can wear the veil or do what they want to 
do – I have lots of veiled friends and have nothing against it. But I 
should have the right to wear what I want to as well. Isn't that what 
liberalism is all about? 
 
May: Oh really Lina? So why is it becoming a big trend in Egypt to 
ban veiled girls from entering cafés in Cairo, like here? Is that 
liberalism? Stop being hypocrites guys, please. Like you said, we have 
veiled friends and it has become a nuisance now when we want to go 
out with them because there are places that restrict their entry. Why 
though? The strange thing is, it has become normal in Egypt, and even 
the veiled girls themselves have just come to accept it.  
 
Although May's words reflected a minority opinion in this group, her bold statement 
seemed to create a moment of discomfort as no-one appeared to have a reply or 
comment. Eventually, the non-alcoholic cocktails and garlic bread that arrived took 
over their interests. May's words may not have rested comfortably with the rest of the 
group, yet they raised a point of extreme importance. It is evident with the majority 
of participants in this group, once, again, that values intrinsic to cosmopolitanism are 
very much sought, yet are interpreted in ways that narrowly locate them as part of a 
particular elite class category. To be elite, you have to be liberal. To be liberal, you 
have to be able to exercise freedom in what you wear and what you drink. Therefore, 
they enjoy the idea of liberalism in that it awards them certain rights. Yet doesn’t a 
true cosmopolitan ethos dictate that there are also responsibilities to respect the 
choices of others? Surely, agreeing to ban women wearing Islamic attire from 
entering certain public spaces is antithetical to the true meaning of liberalism. It is 
important to note that I am not suggesting that all of the upper middle class were 
united in their desire to exclude veiled girls or the lower classes from engaging in the 
spaces they like to socialize in. What I found quite surprising, however, was the 
complacent outlook and passive acceptance that many of them have developed in 
relation to this issue. As one young man told me: 'it's no big deal really – there are 
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plenty of other places they can go to, aren't there'? Isn't such an attitude that 
disregards the liberty of others to dress how they wish, where they wish, a 
misinterpretation of the true meaning of liberalism?  
 
The quotation by Ahmed in the exchange above supports what was said in Chapter 
Six about the upper classes perceiving themselves to be the leading generation of 
Egypt. The quotation also confirms the importance of the media in sustaining this, as 
chosen programmes expand their horizons regarding certain political issues that only 
they (as members of the 'educated' middle class) have a valid interest in. Thus, there 
is continuity between the media and urban spaces of socialization in the way they 
interwine to create specific imagined performances of distinction. Again, this is 
strongly indicative of the closed cosmopolitan positions of these young men and 
women that are articulated through a very narrow lens of class elitism. As May said 
above, the fact the places they meet in resemble venues located in any typical 
western metropole, seems to increase their worth and appeal to an even greater 
extent. It appears that by enclosing themselves within these exclusive urban enclaves, 
surrounded by icons of 'first world' modernity such as five-star hotels, the wider 
reality of Cairo as a poor 'third-world' city is rendered abstract. Thus, just the mere 
presence and visibility of the local other is a stark physical reminder that they are not 
in America or in Central Perk as Ahmed discussed in relation to the characters of 
Friends, but in a poverty stricken city of the developing south. Unsurprisingly, not 
all of the upper middle class in my sample are united in an acceptance of this class 
exclusion, as on some occasions, voices of dissent are raised. Taking part in the 
above exchange, Sameh declares that this class segregation has gone too far in Egypt 
and needs to be challenged. May, who seemed to have a much less socially-
prejudiced view from the beginning, was the only one who agreed with him.  
However, Sameh's argument was quickly countered, and he was jokingly referred to 
as 'Sameh the socialist'. Nothing more was said of it.   
 
When it came to ordering food, I rather excitedly imagined our table to be a feast of 
international cuisine that would reflect the diverse menu offering almost everything 
from pizza to paella to crème brûlée. Instead, I was more surprised than disheartened 
when the waiter laid down a range of starters including: homous, tabbouleh 
(Lebanese salad), mozzarella sticks and sogo' (Egyptian sausage) – all served with 
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traditional, freshly baked Arabic bread. It was hardly the international feast I had 
imagined, as most of these dishes actually consisted of local Egyptian and Arabic 
cuisine. This was even more apparent when the main dishes arrived, as most of them 
ordered shawerma (traditional Arabic dish consisting of shredded meat or chicken in 
a wrap) or grilled kofta (minced meat) and chicken. The only exception to this 
Arabic theme was myself and Reem who both ordered sea food pasta. I was initially 
confused as to why they would make the effort to come all the way to Zamalek in 
order to socialise in a place that has a western ambiance, and then order Arabic food. 
I was even more surprised that they chose to socialize in Sangria that employs a 
minimum charge of 100LE (as an interesting point of comparison, some of my 
working class participants had a monthly family income of 700LE to support five 
people), while the local dishes they ordered could easily be eaten in any traditional 
Egyptian café/restaurant for a quarter of the price.  
 
What the above incident demonstrates is that the upper middle class often continue to 
enjoy cultural products associated with their national and regional culture, just as 
long as they are packaged in a way that competes with the standards of a pristine and 
modern western culture with which they like to associate themselves. Homous and 
Arabic bread is much more desirable when eaten in the wealthy district of Zamalek, 
on a white leather couch, opposite the Nile and in the company of Cairo's most well-
connected elite. The fact that it is almost laughably over priced, is beside the point 
for these young people. As Abaza (2006:172) argues, there has been a noticeable 
'folklorization of culture' in Egypt where traditional symbols of local culture are 
being incorporated within more modern forms of western consumerism, making 
them a lot more attractive both to foreigners and the wealthy classes. Indeed, sitting 
with another group of upper middle class participants in Costa Café, 24-year-old 
Hany and his friend, 23-year-old Mohammed, both decided that they wanted shisha. 
Using a newly downloaded application on his latest iPhone, Hany searched for 
nearby places that served shisha, and was able to read reviews of these places left by 
young people like himself. Again, this demonstrates the continuity between media, 
and particularly in this case new media, and the city in creating at their intersection 
particular spaces and performances of distinction. Hany's iPhone application 
(available only in English and thus used predominantly by the upper classes), as well 
as the desires of the rest of the group, pointed them towards Sequoia, another open 
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air restaurant on the Nile in the elite district of Zamalek. 'There's a high minimum 
charge, though' Ahmed informs us all, 'is everyone ok with that?' Asking them why 
they don’t just go to any nearby traditional café that serves shisha at reasonable 
prices, Hany replied: 'these places aren’t exactly suitable when we are with girls – the 
men there aren’t civilized. Plus, the cafés aren’t clean'. Ahmed added: 
 
Do you want us to end up with TB? These places know nothing about 
hygiene. I want to smoke shisha, but I don’t want to die doing it. I also 
don’t want to sit and hear old unemployed men gossiping and 
complaining. It's about the atmosphere and the ambience more than 
anything else. I want nice scenery, decent people and a relaxing 
environment.  
 
Sequoia, with its white drapes, candle lit tables and direct Nile view, did indeed have 
wonderful scenery. Even the fancy, expensive and 'modern' shisha, all plastic bulbs 
and flashing lights, was an interesting sight to look at.             
 
In the following sections, I will focus on how, for the working and lower middle 
class, religious discourses and rules are central to everyday decisions regarding 
cultural practices and mobility beyond the home. For instance, some working class 
families ban their daughters from socializing in cafés where there is unregulated 
mixing between genders or where shisha is smoked. Upper middle class women are 
not completely free of these familial forms of regulation on their mobility as hinted 
above in Hany's words. I am often told by upper middle class women how their 
families do not allow them to drive unaccompanied through certain districts and 
areas of Cairo they perceive to be 'dangerous'. Interestingly, this 'danger' was 
embodied in the figure of the working class man, and thus is related to a classed 
perception of how he would respond inappropriately to the presence of these young 
women. It is commonly believed by upper middle class families, that spaces 
dominated by those from a lower socio-economic strata are characterized by raucous 
behaviour and vulgar actions which could jeopardise the safety of their daughters. As 
24-year-old Dalia said: 
 
My mum is always wary of me driving through particular 
neighbourhoods or socializing in cafés in specific districts of Cairo. 
Obviously these are predominantly working class neighbourhoods that 
aren't used to women driving cars alone and wearing tight jeans or 
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showing their hair. I don’t blame her as once my car broke down in 
such an area, and I was verbally harassed by a group of males who 
kept whistling and shouting out really offensive, sexually explicit 
comments. 
 
This attitude was echoed in 22-year-old Mohammed's words: 
 
Dalia is right as I wouldn’t really be comfortable with my own sister 
going to these lower class areas. They are really male-dominated 
neighbourhoods, and they are used to girls covering up and staying 
home. I mean there's this really nice café that my sister likes going to, 
but you have to walk through this bad area to reach it. She complained 
of how men started to follow her and make really dirty gestures. I told 
her not to go there again. I don’t know why they are so vulgar…..why 
can't they just act like civilized people? I feel embarrassed that 
Egyptians are like this.  
     
As we can see from these two quotations, the mobility of upper middle class women 
is often controlled due to concerns over their safety as a result of the unpredictable 
behaviour and threat posed by lower class men. This is in direct contrast to women 
from the two lower classes whose mobilities are also heavily restricted, yet primarily, 
as a result of the rules of religious morality, and women's presence in the public 
space within this controlled framework of moralities. This is an important illustration 
of the fact that class cannot be analysed outside of gender. Although occupying very 
different social positions and cultural worlds, what unites these women across class, 
is their gender identity, and thus the various ways their urban mobilties are regularly 
conditioned to protect their dignity, reputation or safety. Furthermore, the above 
quotations illustrate that the lower classes do not only symbolically 'taint' the image 
of western superiority that the upper middle class attempt to sustain, but they are 
sometimes perceived as a physical threat and danger to these pristine worlds, 
especially to the women. This highlights the multifaceted nature of mobility within 
the city, and that as different classed worlds – that usually remain segregated – 
intersect, power(lessness) can become employed and expressed in multiple ways. 
Whereas the privileged status and abundant access to resources enjoyed by upper 
middle class Egyptians means they may consider themselves to be the ultimate 
power holders, as they move within the city and come out of their urban comfort 
zones, these established structures of power may often become displaced in new 
ways. The mobility of upper middle class women exemplifies the sense of threat 
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often associated with the city and class.  
 
The above discussion confirms the point made in the introduction to this chapter in 
relation to mediated spaces of imagination allowing young Egyptians to negotiate 
their 'ideal' cities within the city (Freitas cf. Abaza, 2001) while remaining in 
dialogue with established structures of power. This means that although an imagined 
city is negotiated, it remains bound by the wider city that cannot be escaped, with all 
its inequalities and disappointments. In relation to their closed cosmopolitan 
imagination, therefore, upper middle class participants are engaged in the 
construction of a mediated urban imagination that draws predominantly on global 
cultural modernity, while physically excluding the lower classes for whom these 
repertoires are not an everyday reality. Nevertheless, as we have seen, attempts to 
maintain spatial demarcation can never be fully impermeable. However much the 
elite may try, 'the presence of the local other could not be fully bracketed' (Saldanha, 
2002: 344).   
 
8.3 Reputation and Virtue in the Urban Mobilities of the Lower Middle Class  
 
The experiences of the lower middle class, and indeed the working class as will be 
discussed in the next section, demonstrate the centrality of gender stratification as a 
system of restricting and organizing public mobility in Cairo. Hence, as class is 
constantly in dialogue with other socio-cultural formations, the next two sections 
examine how everyday experiences of the city, particularly for the two lower classes, 
often involve a highly gendered use of space. As I mentioned in Chapter Two in 
relation to my discussion on Egypt, assertions of complete exclusion of women from 
the public space fall contrary to everyday realities in the Arab world and more 
conservative societies in general. Women do indeed remain visible within developing 
cities, yet their visibility is often a highly conditional and restricted one (Phadke, 
2007; De Koning, 2009). I suggest, therefore, that urban experiences for both the 
lower middle and working class revolve around restricted-selective mobilities.  
 
Although fully aware of structures of power that control and restrict their everyday 
mobility, the lower middle and working class are able to negotiate their own forms of 
resistance. Although these moments of resistance remain encapsulated within larger 
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hegemonic discourses and established structures of power that constrain their 
movement within the city, members of these two classes are still able to articulate a 
limited presence and position in the city. The role of religion is examined as an 
important mediator that influences how the lower middle and working classes shift 
between different urban spaces. As I discussed in Chapter Seven, for the lower 
middle class, Islamic discourses are intricately incorporated within everyday social 
practices and decisions, and are unconsciously embedded in the routines, decisions 
and assumptions of everyday life. This devout commitment, shaping the orientations 
of both men and women, yet particularly relevant to women, influences patterns of 
everyday mobility within the city. Ideals of 'respectability' 'virtue' and 'reputation', 
articulated predominantly through their desire to ultimately fulfil the role of pious 
Muslim wives and daughters, influence everyday public performances and, 
specifically, where and how they are seen in the city.  
 
For the lower middle class, priorities and desires are quite different to those of the 
upper middle class. Rather than searching for venues that solely maintain global 
standards of superiority and sophistication, these young men and women constantly 
emphasize how they need reassurance that the places they choose are 'respectable' 
and of 'good reputation'. When asked in the survey where they spend most of their 
free time, 62% of the lower middle class responded 'in the home/around local 
neighbourhood'. Of these, 56.4% were women. Additionally, less than 22% of 
women in this group responded that they visit cafés regularly compared to 54% of 
men. As 22-year-old Safaa declared during a focus group discussion: 
 
I don’t really socialise much outside my local neighbourhood. I prefer 
to stay around my familiar community, either at the homes of family 
and close friends or at the mosque. The mosque isn’t just a place to 
pray and worship, but is also an important social area where people 
can come together and engage in activities that benefit the wider 
community. I teach Quraan to children in the mosque and sometimes 
meet my friends there.  
 
 
When I asked lower middle class women whether their mobility away from the local 
community is restricted, I was told by 23-year-old Nadia:  
 
My family doesn't really say that I can go to a certain café, and not 
another. My mum just always reminds me that we are a family with 
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little means, who don’t have much but our reputation. We live in a 
close knit community where all the neighbours are friends, and we 
have always been known to be a respectable, religious family. Thus 
she wants me to always retain this good reputation and to make sure 
that when I'm out in public, I'm a good ambassador for my family, 
neighbourhood and religion. I must not shame my family or Allah in 
any way. 
 
After hearing this, I then asked Nadia if she thinks the same rules and expectations 
are equally placed on men. She informed me: 
 
 
Obviously men still have to act respectfully. If they don’t, their family 
will be accused of not bringing them up properly, of not teaching them 
to be good Muslims. However, men are not under the same pressure as 
women. They can make mistakes and then redeem themselves later on. 
We are not allowed a second chance so we have to be very careful 
when out in public. Anything a girl says or does can immediately be 
taken against her. 
 
 
Mustafa, 21, makes a similar point when he discusses family and societal 
expectations that are placed on young lower middle class men like himself: 
 
Society is very harsh towards women. Unfortunately we live in a very 
judgemental, very nosey society. If a girl does something wrong then 
that's it – she is tainted forever. However, society is much more 
forgiving of men as their mistakes are almost always erased and 
forgotten about.  
 
According to the above, it seems that for lower middle class women, the urban 
spaces they choose to become involved in are an extension of their domestic and 
semi-private neighbourhood places. The venues they socialise in need to be zones of 
'respectability', which will not in any way taint their reputation as pious Muslim 
women. For instance, although I am informed that they sometimes like frequenting 
cafés – a relatively contemporary western inspired development in Egypt – they are 
very particular about the ones that are suitable and conform to their religious ideals 
as I will discuss below. This relates to Phadke's (2007:1512) analysis of everyday 
mobilities among Indian women in Mumbai. According to Phadke, these women are 
burdened with the requirement to maintain 'sexual safety', where the female body is 
demanded to police its own virtue and honour while out in public.  Thus, in the case 
of the lower middle class, place and space mirror each other as individuals attempt to 
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carve out spaces within the city that serve the same requirements and expectations of 
'virtue' and 'good reputation' that are values central to the local neighbourhood 
communities they are associated with.  Nevertheless, as well as being influenced by 
hegemonic discourses of religious morality, the everyday urban mobilities of both 
men and women from this class are also shaped and articulated through their 
exposure to mediated representations of a global cultural modernity.  
 
Even though the majority of these young people have never travelled outside Egypt, 
this does not deter them from perceiving global culture as a familiar and desirable 
reference informing their everyday. Their daily exposure to western media products 
means that decisions about where to socialise are placed within an Islamic 
framework, yet underpinned by a desire for engagement with a western inspired 
consumer culture. Thus, daily media practices can often become an important 
window through which these young people are able to shift imaginatively between 
and within different cultural worlds. During a focus group session, young lower 
middle class women proudly referred to how they often visit cafés – 'just like the 
ones on television' – with English names such as Green Village (although they 
usually cannot pronounce these names properly). Indeed, I once accompanied a 
group of lower middle class women on one of their outings to Green Village, a 
restaurant/café in the Maadi district of Cairo. The café was actually a large white 
marquee where the interior was surrounded with artificial plants and trees, thus 
almost imitating a jungle-like ambiance. The menu offered a wide variety of local 
choices including traditional kofta sandwiches, grilled chicken, and ta'ameyya 
(falafel), while also a range of international cuisine such as pastas and burgers. 
Drinks like lattés, cappuccinos and Nescafé were also available. Strangely, I could 
see a security guard roaming around the café rather aimlessly. Asking Laila, 23, 
about his unusual presence and about her reasons for coming to this café in general, 
she told me:     
 
I love coming to Green Village. It's nice to sit in a place that seems 
really sophisticated like the ones we see barra (literally 'outside': 
foreign countries) where you can just drink cappuccinos, relax and 
chat with your friends. The fact there is a security guard here makes 
me even more comfortable, as I can be confident that no unacceptable 
behaviour will take place. Once, this guy was trying to flirt with me 
and he kept throwing bits of paper over with his number on it. I went 
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and complained to the security guard and he warned the guy that if he 
does it again, he'll be kicked out. So why shouldn’t I sit in these cafés? 
I know the Quraan very well and nothing in its texts tells me that I 
can't enjoy being part of a larger world and alternative cultures, just so 
long as I always maintain my identity as a devout Muslim woman. 
 
Thus, although these young women enjoy socializing in western style cafés, they 
make an effort to select ones which allow them to maintain what they regard as 
'respectability'; an important part of the reputation of any good Muslim woman This 
is an important indicator of the critical cosmopolitan imagination of the lower 
middle class where a desire to engage in symbols and cultural practices they 
associate with global culture, is interlaced with a critical and dynamic attitude. A 
moral positioning, as framed by their religion, filters norms and rules of what is and 
what is not acceptable. In relation to mobility within the city, they enjoy cafés that 
adopt a western inspired ambiance in relation to interior design, menu choices and 
music. Yet at the same time, these choices also include a moral dimension, as 
selected spaces are required to fulfil religious expectations of 'respectability' in 
relation to appropriate boundaries of interaction between men and women, and 
acceptable fashion choices. As 22-year-old Ahmed told me in relation to the 
introduction of western inspired cafés into Cairo's public spaces: 
 
I think the introduction of such cafés into Egyptian culture is 
important as it gives the decent youth who just want to chat and grab a 
bite to eat, somewhere reputable and acceptable to socialise. They are 
also different to the ahwa balady (traditional Egyptian coffee shops) 
which collect the vulgar unemployed men who have nothing better to 
do than sip tea, play back-gammon and talk about other people. You 
know, as the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) said, cleanliness is a part 
of faith, so it’s a responsibility to choose a clean and healthy 
atmosphere to socialise in. The places you sit in reflect on you as a 
person, and we should always be striving to show the world that 
Muslims are not ignorant or live in isolated caves, but that we are also 
modern, well informed about the world and enjoy globalization.  
 
According to the above quotations, therefore, driven by their identity as Muslims, the 
lower middle class often search for particular urban venues that sustain desirable 
ideals such as cleanliness and sophistication, that they consider to be more visibly 
reflected in global leisure spaces. Additionally, the young lower middle class seek to 
position themselves somewhere in between the perceived shortcomings of the other 
two classes. They seek to constantly distance themselves both from the vulgarity and 
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crudeness of the 'unsophisticated' working class as Ahmed discusses in the quotation 
above, but also from the 'looseness' and 'moral corruptness' they associate with the 
upper classes. I am often told by the young lower middle class how they feel the 
upscale venues and spaces of Cairo, usually frequented by the upper classes, to have 
become zones where immoral behaviour, such as intimacy between the genders and 
provocative fashion choices are unquestioningly accepted. In response, lower middle 
class youth attempt to construct their own socialization networks, which allow them 
– to an agreeable extent – to experience an affiliation with global cultural modernity, 
while always maintaining a much needed Islamic reference point.  
 
The above is indicative of the critical cosmopolitan imagination that young lower 
middle class Egyptians articulate. It demonstrates how, with the media at the heart of 
their everyday social practices, these young people are dynamically moving between 
different cultural worlds and modes of belonging where local particularity, religious 
attitudes and a global articulation of culture are in constant dialogue. They refuse to 
commit exclusively to one or the other worldviews. Interestingly, both Laila and 
Ahmed stress above how they perceive themselves to be citizens of a much larger 
interconnected world that they have the right to enjoy and take pleasure from in ways 
that conform to their identities as primarily devout Muslims. This is indicative of a 
definite cosmopolitan moment where these young lower middle class Egyptians are 
actively asserting themselves as members of a world that exists beyond local and 
national boundaries.  
 
Furthermore, these young people have a strong class awareness of how they are 
purposefully excluded from urban places that are dominated by the upper middle 
class. Nevertheless, I am told that even if they do have the opportunity to go to these 
places, they would choose not to because of what they perceive to be the 
unacceptable behaviour that takes place there. As 24-year-old Ragaa says: 
 
I know that people like me are unwelcome in these places; people who 
are veiled and don’t wear the latest fashion brands or don’t conform to 
a particular westernized image. Even if I was able to go, however, I 
wouldn’t because I don’t approve of the behaviour that goes on there. 
I once went past such a café and was completely shocked by what I 
saw through the window. Men and women are mixing freely, girls are 
smoking, couples holding hands, drinking alcohol. I couldn’t believe I 
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was in Egypt! Why would I want to go to these sorts of places and be 
associated with this type of behaviour?  
 
A similar point is made by 21 year-old-Wael when he says: 
 
I see these youth (upper middle class) and I just feel like I have 
nothing in common with them. I mean, we live in the same country 
but it's like we are worlds apart. Sometimes I watch Iqraa (Islamic 
channel), and particularly this programme called Yalla Shabab (Lets 
Go Youth) where all these young Muslims from across the Arab world 
take part to discuss relevant Islamic issues. I actually feel I have more 
links and more commonalities with these young people, often from the 
Arab Gulf or from Yemen, than the young in my own country. These 
are the types of people I can connect with, as our beliefs and values, 
our sense of right and wrong are very similar. It means we could aid 
each other in worshiping Allah and being good Muslims.    
 
Thus, as we can see from this example, the media create spaces where places of the 
city do not offer them. Indeed, in relation to the survey question on channel 
preference, Islamic channels came in at a close second behind commercial 
entertainment (MBC channels). Seventy percent of the lower middle class responded 
that they regularly watch the Islamic channel Al-Nass, compared to 72% who watch 
Iqraa. Sixty four percent also confirmed that religious programs are a 'very 
important' part of their media consumption practices. In this light, although these 
young lower middle class Egyptians feel marginalized and excluded from the more 
elite urban youth cultures existing adjacent to them in Cairo, through the 
consumption of Islamic media, they are able to connect themselves more inclusively 
to transnational Islamic networks elsewhere.  Thus, despite feeling unwelcome in 
particular places of the city, on the basis of class identity, they are able to engage in 
the construction and negotiation of more spiritually meaningful mediated 
connections beyond the city and the nation. Thus as much as we focus on the 
divisions created by the drawing of boundaries in contemporary cities, it is also 
significant to always recognize the development of new and often unpredictable 
networks that transcend national boundaries, and the role the media play in forging 
such connections.  
 
Significantly, the above discussion demonstrates how the construction of 
cosmopolitan imagination involves very dynamic negotiations of both social and 
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physical space. Perceptions of 'otherness' and 'sameness' are never complete, but are 
in a constant process of being articulated as these young people shift between 
different urban milieux and alternative media spaces. For instance, I have explored 
how, in an aesthetic or stylistic context, the west is positioned as a proximate frame 
of reference. Yet, in a moral and religious context, the west is often positioned as an 
immoral other that needs to be distanced and replaced by a more acceptable religious 
Islamic lifestyle. This is reflected in the way there is often a desire to disengage from 
spaces occupied by the upper middle class who are perceived to be an everyday 
embodiment of immoral practices extracted unreflexively from the west. In order to 
compensate for a geographically proximate, yet socially distant upper middle class, 
mediated connections are formed with a transnational Islamic youth culture, where 
religious bonds are closer to their everyday desires, identities and concerns.           
 
8.4 'I Don't have Money, But I Can Still be Part of the "Real" Egypt': The 
Working Class and Open Public Space 
 
The working class represents the group that displays the most complex and 
contradictory orientation. Despite their discourse through which they constantly 
attempt to frame themselves as being obedient to a moral framework defined solely 
by Islam, a close examination of everyday performances reveals alternative and often 
conflicting practices. This has been explored in the last chapter, particularly in 
relation to embodied appearance and everyday consumption patterns. Furthermore, 
evidence from my research reveals that these ambivalent patterns of everyday 
behaviour, that dynamically shift between different frameworks of morality befitting 
both the private and public spheres, are extended to their daily urban mobilities. I 
argue that the working class' everyday experiences of urban place are framed through 
a dual form of control and restriction: firstly at the level of the micro locale where 
behaviour within family and community spaces is restrained through an expected 
conformity to hegemonic discourses of religious morality, and secondly, in relation 
to their engagement with the wider city, where their mobility is constrained through 
classed forms of segregation and exclusion from public space. By exploring their 
restricted-selective mobilities, I explore how open spaces such as public parks 
become important urban spaces of imagination where, beyond the critical gaze of 
family and neighbourhood communities, established norms and imposed rules can 
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often be relaxed, replaced instead by more liberal forms of practice. Young couples, 
for instance, often meet for romantic strolls of intimacy where this would not be 
approved in the neighbourhood spaces supervised by family members.  
 
Being well aware that they are excluded from places in the city frequented by the 
middle classes, urban zones negotiated by the working class become important 
spaces of inclusivity that allow them to often reclaim the city as their own. This 
further emphasizes the implicit cosmopolitan imagination of the working class where 
cosmopolitanism, in the form of a mediated desire to be part of the practices of 
global cultural modernity, becomes a temporary moment of resistance allowing them 
to negotiate and often challenge repressive forms of control and exclusion they face 
in their immediate everyday lives. In this context, I propose that spaces of urban 
belonging are different to place, as although these working class participants are 
embedded within very local neighbourhood experiences from which they cannot 
escape, they are also engaged in the construction of more dynamic spaces of 
imagination, heavily informed by the media. These spaces provide opportunities for 
the negotiation of, and resistance to, imposed limits placed on their everyday urban 
experiences in Cairo. These spaces allow them, albeit temporarily, to develop ways 
of resisting religiously-conceived forms of restriction and control that dictate the 
norms of public performance.  
 
During my initial focus group sessions with members of this group, I frequently 
asked them about the types of places they enjoy socializing in. Women, in particular, 
usually answered that they spend most of their time at home or at the houses of 
family and friends due to parental restrictions. I was told that fathers and older 
brothers are quite authoritarian, restricting the mobility of their daughters and sisters 
beyond the local neighbourhood. There seems to be a general preference by families 
that these young women remain within the 'safe' and predictable environment of the 
immediate family and neighbourhood community where they can be easily 
monitored. As 19-year-old Sumaya told me: 
 
I'm not really given a chance to do much, as my father and older 
brother always tell me that the streets are dangerous and that I 
shouldn’t go out alone. You know, we don’t have cars and have to use 
public transport, and that just makes them worry even more because 
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they hear stories about girls getting harassed or even kidnapped on the 
microbus. They tell me that if I want to socialise, I should visit family 
and friends in our local neighbourhood, or else take my younger 
brother with me. That way, they will be reassured I am safe, and that 
no-one in the community can say anything negative about me for 
going out alone.   
 
 
Similarly, when I asked the men, they also maintained that they only really socialise 
in the nearby neighbourhood cafés or that they play football in the local community 
sports club. As 24-year-old Walid said: 
 
I come back from work and I just want to do something different, to 
take my mind off the stress and strains of the day just passed. The 
problem is, I'm saving up to get married, and so I don’t always have 
spare cash to go anywhere too far or too pricey. Usually, my 
neighbours and I just smoke shisha in the local café or play football in 
the free sports club.   
 
These descriptions of daily mobility, or lack of it, make me realize the extent to 
which the micro-locale is of importance to this group. It is clear that the young 
working class participants are deeply embedded in local community networks and 
that women, especially must adhere and live up to their expectations. During my 
research period, I became quite close to Kariman, one of the female students at 
Madina Institute. She once insisted on inviting me to her home for dinner, telling me 
that her mother wanted to meet the 'Doctor' that Kariman was always telling her 
about. Indeed, a date was arranged and it was decided that after one of the sessions in 
the institute, I would go home with Kariman who lived in Ahmed Zaki, a well known 
working class street located in the wealthy district of El Maadi. This street is 
renowned for selling car parts and mobile phone accessories. Sitting on the 
overcrowded microbus on the way to Kariman's house, she seemed intent on 
preparing me for the fact that her neighbourhood was quite humble, cramped, and 
told me not to pay much attention if any of the men in the street tried to flirt. 
Approaching the apartment block where she lived, I realized why we had descended 
from the microbus so far away. The roads around Kariman's flat were so narrow that 
the microbus would not be able to drive through. The houses were in such close 
proximity that I could see women standing on the balconies of opposite apartment 
blocks having a normal face-to-face conversation. As we walked up to the apartment 
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entrance, women appeared from the balconies above, greeting Kariman and asking 
why she was home later than usual, while another intriguingly inquired about her 
'new friend.'  
 
Kariman's mum was waiting for us on the stairs and warmly embraced and kissed 
me, saying: 'welcome Doctor, I know the house isn’t really up to standards.' Her 
whole family, including three siblings, fussed around me, providing me with endless 
cups of tea and cocka (Coke) as I sat in the cramped living room (that also 
functioned as a bedroom for the brother) which was separated from the kitchen by a 
yellow floral curtain. Standing on the tiny balcony to gain a more panoramic view of 
the neighbourhood in which Kariman lives her everyday life, I could see several 
local amenities such as a mosque, café and vegetable stall that also seemed to 
function as meeting points where members of the community meet up to gossip and 
exchange news. What I found most intriguing, was the way the whole apartment 
block, consisting of five floors, acted like one big family. The door to Kariman's 
house was never quite closed, as women from the adjacent flats knocked briefly and 
walked straight in, retuning empty pans they had borrowed, or bringing round food 
they had cooked. As Kariman and I were having dinner, her mother walked in 
informing us that Om-Ayman and Nada from the adjacent apartment block saw me 
walking in with Kariman and asked her across the balcony who I was. At 9pm I 
decided it was time to leave and thanking them for their welcoming hospitality, 
Kariman's mother insisted that Aly, her eldest sibling, walk me to the street to catch a 
taxi. I tried to decline as not to put them to any trouble, although she silenced me 
with a defiant 'that’s not possible here. A girl can't walk in the streets alone at this 
time of night. Also, Kariman will come with you so that you're not seen with a man 
alone. Reputation is very important in this area'.       
 
As the above scene illustrates, the close-knit, self-contained nature of these local 
communities means that the majority of families are well acquainted with each other. 
In this context, 'reputation' becomes a central means by which individuals in such 
local communities are judged, and in turn, reputation is dependent upon the public 
conduct of that individual within the community. As 23-year-old Sameh (man) told 
me: 
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It might be different for you, but in our poor communities, a woman 
isn’t judged by her career, but by her reputation, respectable behaviour 
and the strength of her religious faith. These factors guarantee she will 
one day be a good wife and mother. If a woman doesn’t have these 
traits, then she probably wouldn’t get married or have much of a 
future here.     
 
As the last quotation demonstrates, an adherence to Islamic discourse is very 
important in such local communities. The worth of a person's reputation, particularly 
a woman's, is judged by the perceived strength of her religious orientations and 
publicly observed behaviour. How a woman behaves, dresses and where she goes are 
all factors that influence how the community judges her, and the extent to which she 
is considered to be 'respectable' in their eyes. In turn, the way a young woman is 
perceived by her local community, and how her manners and behaviour are assessed, 
impact strongly on her eventual marital opportunities.  
 
In the last section, I discussed how the idea of 'reputation' is also central to the 
everyday outlooks of young lower middle class women. Nevertheless, for the 
working class women, any discussion regarding their appearance, conduct or 
physical mobility was always framed solely in relation to a need to maintain a good 
reputation in their community. This ideal of 'reputation' is very forceful amongst the 
working class as the public appearances and performances of these women have an 
important impact on their future life opportunities. For instance, these working class 
women often tell me how they feel they have nothing to offer in a marriage but their 
honour and reputation. Most of these young women have no stable careers, as their 
basic levels of education only permit them to undertake unskilled work that offer 
meager wages. Thus, in the absence of any career and thus monetary value, these 
women are aware that they are assessed for marriage almost solely on the basis of 
their virtue and untainted reputation. One explanation for why lower middle class 
women are less obsessively conscious of the need to perform the role of the 
'obedient' Muslim woman in relation to their family and neighbourhood community, 
could be their status as professional working women. Becoming university educated, 
most of these young women intend to embark upon professional careers, and thus 
they are aware that their value in the eyes of any potential suitor is partly shaped by 
the financial contribution they can offer to a marriage. Also, I was often informed 
how marriage, for the lower middle class women, was not always necessarily their 
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ultimate life goal. Some of them declared how they wish to establish careers and earn 
money before they settled down, and importantly, to settle down with a man who 
would be supportive of their decision to take up paid employment outside the home. 
This option is not always available to working class women. Very often, their 
families endeavoured to marry them off at a relatively early age in order to be 
released from the burden of having to financially support them.       
 
Despite the centrality of the local neighbourhood to the working classes, and as the 
research progressed, I came to realize claims that they spend all their social time 
within their micro locale is not the full reality of their daily practices. As relations 
between participants and myself grew stronger, discussions and observations 
regarding their socialization activities increased in honesty. It seemed that although 
they may be forced to adhere to particular rules within their neighbourhood, any 
chance to move beyond the gaze of family members and to explore a world beyond 
their local community, meant rules were sometimes broken and an imposed norm 
often challenged. I witnessed this gap that often existed between ideal discourse and 
actual daily practice during my non-participant observation sessions in one of Cairo's 
most popular public parks: Al-Azhar Park. The cheap entrance fee of the park, almost 
3L.E (approximately 30pence) means its open greenery is accessible to young 
working class men and women who mostly occupy it. Walking around, I could not 
help but notice the contradictions that existed between conservative religious 
appearance and more liberal performances. One girl was wearing the isdal (long 
black Islamic cloak only revealing the face) while holding hands with a young male 
companion. In another instance, a veiled girl and her boyfriend were huddled under a 
tree while a friend took photos of them as they posed with happy smiles; records that 
were to become reminiscent of stolen romantic moments.  
 
While in the park, I often saw single gendered groups of men and women strolling 
around lazily yet raucously, always on the lookout for opportunities to flirt and 
exchange telephone numbers. After two hours of walking around the park one 
afternoon, I decided to sit on a bench and have some lunch. A few minutes later a 
young woman approached and asked if she could sit next to me. I accepted, and, 
while wearing the isdal that revealed only a shy bespectacled face, she sat down 
anxiously waiting for someone. About ten minutes later, a smiling young man of her 
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age appeared and handed her a can of coke and a pre-packed slice of cake. They 
seemed very familiar with each other and started to chat enthusiastically, and after 
noticing my presence, the man asked if I would like a piece of cake. Being the ever 
opportunistic researcher, I attempted to start a conversation with them. We began 
talking about the park and how it is progressively getting dirtier and more crowded, 
which eventually led me on to the question of why they come to the park in the first 
place. After about one hour of general talk and what I could sense was hesitation, the 
young woman, Sarah, finally opened up to me saying: 
 
Actually we are very much in love and have been for two years. We 
really want to get married so we can be together, but my family won't 
accept as they have someone else in mind who they want me to marry 
– someone with more money. They have even banned me from talking 
to Emad altogether, but we come here in the weekends to meet. I 
know it's not right but I can't help it. If my family was a bit more 
flexible or understanding, then I would have met up with him under 
their supervision, but unfortunately I have no other choice but to meet 
him in parks and other public places.    
   
As we can see from the above example, the wider city becomes an opportunity for 
young working class women to escape the restrictions placed on them by their 
families. According to Abaza (2001), an 'Islamic' label becomes a protective 
mechanism for the working class, which permits further mixing of the sexes, and 
which allows young women to be less constrained. Islamic attire, in particular, 
becomes a shielding urban mechanism which appeases families and neighbourhood 
communities, thus permitting young Egyptians to undertake more liberal practices 
while they are away from domestic and familial spaces. Hence, although the woman 
in the example above wears an Islamic dress, the extent to which her actual daily 
conduct corresponds to the norms of Islamic acceptability as dictated by the 
environment she lives in, may sometimes be questionable. Thus, it appears that 
pressures by families and wider social structures to conform to a particular image of 
respectability defined through an association with Islamic practice, create a gap 
between how these young people are forced to publicly perform, and between their 
private desires as young people to love and be loved. This point is confirmed by 19-
year-old Yasmine who said: 
 
My parents need reassurance that I look a certain way and act a certain 
way in my community so that they can always be seen as a good, 
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respectable family who have bought their kids up well. I would never 
do anything to change this image as it is everything my parents live 
for, and all that I have. But also, they have to realize that I am young. 
Like any other young person in the world I have my own desires and 
my own thoughts about what I want. I want to live like a young girl – 
to dress nicely, to have fun and be in love. I want to do all that – but at 
the same time I want to be obedient to my family and religion. Just 
because we are poor it doesn’t mean we don’t desire or have the right 
to engage in the activities enjoyed by young people everywhere.   
 
 
 
This same point is emphasised by 20-year-old Noha: 
 
The problem is that our parents come from a different generation 
where a girl wasn’t allowed out of the house because it could ruin her 
reputation. Girls weren’t allowed to be educated or even choose their 
husbands. We live in a different world now, but parents still want to 
impose the same rules. Women across the world are nuclear scientists 
and taking up positions as Prime Ministers, while my dad doesn’t 
allow me to go to the cinema alone. What can I say to them though? 
Sometimes I tell my parents I have lectures until the evening and go 
out briefly with my girlfriends to the cinema or to a café. I'm not a bad 
person you know, I'm well aware of the limits of right and wrong. But 
it's just my family being over-cautious because they care about me.  
 
 
The above quotation demonstrates the importance of the media as frames exposing 
these young women to a wider world beyond her own, allowing them to reflect back 
upon and interpret their own constraining reality in often challenging ways. Although 
Noha is embedded in everyday local experiences that remain bounded by very rigid 
customs and traditions, the media open up spaces for imagining the self through on-
screen representations of empowered women across the globe. This is also reflected 
in the words of Yasmine who, befitting a true cosmopolitan logic, symbolically 
positions herself beyond local and national boundaries as a young citizen of the 
world who shares the legitimate and natural desires of love and romance that any 
other young person does. This reflects the implicit cosmopolitan imagination of the 
working class that allows for moments of reflection and identifications with other 
members of the human race across the world, which transcends constricted 
frameworks of morality imposed in the immediate locale. 
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Although for women such as Noha and Yasmine television was an important tool for 
imagining an alternative reality beyond the restrictions of parental and societal rules, 
for some in the working class, television was the main culprit behind parents losing 
control over their children’s upbringing. For instance, 21-year-old Shaimaa told me: 
Previous generations had no choice but to listen to their parents as 
they were their only source of information about the world. Now we 
are the ‘generation of television’ as we would rather copy what we see 
on television than follow what our parents tell us. Parents nowadays 
don’t have much control over what their kids do and don’t know, as 
there is a whole other world they are exposed to beyond the family 
home.  
Twenty-three year old Omar had a similar point-of-view as television for him did 
more harm than good. Rather than young people being loyal to their parents or the 
word of God, they are now slaves to the latest songs, fashion trends and cultural 
products they are exposed to on screen. Thus, while for the majority of the working 
class television represented an important space for imagination, some targeted their 
frustration towards television for diluting religious values and weakening long 
established forms of parental control.   
 
Feelings of bitterness documented above, which have arisen as a result of control 
over their mobility are not only limited to young working class women, but also 
extend to male participants. Rather than control here being associated with gender 
and being imposed by families, it has more to do with a classed awareness that as a 
working class group their everyday experiences of city life are characterized by 
social exclusion and marginalization. In particular, there is a perception that the 
upper middle class are attempting to exclude the lower classes from their urban 
world because they fail to fit in with a desired 'image' of sophistication and 
modernity that the middle classes uphold. As 24-year-old Ahmed said: 
 
The upper classes try to create this image of themselves as being 
progressive and up-to-date with global standards. They try to exclude 
us from their worlds because we can't maintain this image, or actually, 
we taint it for them. They have their own cafés, malls and cinemas that 
they make sure we can't enter. We are the riffraff of the country that 
they want to keep away- it’s almost as if we don’t even exist. 
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In response to such attitudes, these young people often claim that they like to spend 
time in the 'real' spaces of Cairo that make them feel like they truly are part of their 
society. For instance, I am told in many instances how open spaces like the river 
banks of the Nile, public parks (such as Al-Azhar park I discussed previously), 
bridges and open spaces around the pyramids are all popular arenas of socialization 
for these young people. Firstly, these spaces are free or incur a minimal charge, 
which they can comfortably afford. Additionally, they often discuss how an 
engagement in these spaces allows them to overcome feelings of exclusion they are 
exposed to in their daily lives as they are able to feel that they are part of the 
'authentic' Egypt. For instance, 25-year-old Emad, the male friend of Sarah who I 
encountered at Al Azhar Park, told me about the park: 
 
Look at the stunning view. You can sit here during sunset and, as it's 
high up, look over the whole of Islamic Cairo including its lighted 
mosques and minarets. Isn't it just wonderful? Why would I want to sit 
in an air conditioned mall or between the four walls of a café when I 
could witness and admire the real Egypt. Plus, a lot of rich people 
enter the park to access the expensive international restaurants that are 
here. However, these expensive establishments are located on the far 
side of the park and you have to go through security to access them. 
Still, they always make sure to keep the park clean and presentable at 
all times as not to deter the elite from coming here, so I guess that’s 
beneficial to us. 
 
It seems, therefore, that the working class participants are often able to negotiate for 
themselves spaces on the fringes of the upper middle class worlds from which they 
can also benefit. Additionally, 22-year-old Samah said in relation to the upper 
middle class: 
 
You know, you just watch these American movies and you see these 
people who have no worries. All they care about is being in love and 
looking good. Life is just so beautifully simple for them, The wealthy 
people in Egypt live like this – what troubles do they have to keep 
them awake at night? Even when I do meet up with my fiancé Ahmed 
I can never relax as I'm always worrying that someone I know will see 
me and tell my parents who don’t usually allow us to go out alone. 
When I'm with Ahmed I like to forget everything else that goes on in 
my life, all the hardships and the things that I don’t like. We stand on 
the bridge in the wind overlooking the Nile and I like to imagine that 
we are a couple like those in American movies who will be together 
despite anything, who won't let anyone get in the way of their love for 
each other. I just admire their (west) determination and strength of 
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character, but I can never be like them – our society is just too 
different – so judgmental. It's not wrong to dream though is it? I just 
sometimes wish I could be with Ahmed in public and with the 
permission of my family. But I have no other option but to sneak off 
like this.    
        
 
In contrast to earlier assertions during my research where working class participants 
tried to constantly position the west as an immoral entity that needed to be distanced, 
this quotation illustrates another layer of their reflections and engagements with the 
west. Although influenced by the norms of Islamic morality they may often feel 
obliged to maintain their aversion to western culture, an analysis and observation of 
their everyday urban practices reveals a different story. The city is transformed into a 
space of imagination where, drawing predominantly on their media practices, the 
west becomes a desired symbolic reference point of freedom, romance and individual 
expression that these young men and women affiliate themselves with.   
 
The above also illustrates that, armed with the media, it is often the ability of those, 
with the least means, to negotiate their own 'spaces of hope' (Harvey, 2000b) that 
become unique moments of freedom where they can regain some sort of control and 
impose some form of meaning over their lives. Battesti similarly investigates how the 
working classes in Cairo use open spaces, particularly the Giza Zoo, to construct a 
new kind of unique urban, recreational ambiance. 'When the popular classes are at 
the zoo, it belongs to them....They have partially imported, expanded upon, and 
reinvented the urban models of their quarter of origin' (2006:509). Thus by engaging 
in such spaces like the zoo and Al-Azhar Park in the example from my fieldwork 
above, while drawing on a mediated repertoire of desired cultural images, the 
working class are able to imagine themselves to be part of particular cultural 
experiences from which their classed and gendered realities usually exclude them. 
They are able to enjoy the city, engage in global youth cultural practices and perform 
much desired acts of love. This is indicative of their closed cosmopolitan imagination 
where a subjective openness towards the world, drawing primarily on the media, 
becomes an important breathing space and moment of resistance against everyday 
constrained realities.  
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Drawing the strands of this chapter together, it seems that that the cosmopolitan 
imagination of the three classed groups is united in the way the city becomes 
transformed, for each one of them, into a joint space of mediated imagination, 
allowing them to subjectively construct and negotiate their ideal city. As spaces of 
mediated imagination intersect with urban spaces of experience, the overbearing city 
that cannot be escaped, at particular moments, gives way to a more dynamic urban 
terrain. Young Egyptians of different backgrounds attempt to reclaim the city in 
multiple ways and shape it as their own. From this, three very diverse urban 
narratives emerge that feed into the three different versions of cosmopolitan 
imagination constructed by young Egyptians. I illustrate this as I add the final layer 
of my table: 
 
 
 
Upper middle 
class 
Lower middle 
class 
Working class 
 
Attitudes towards 
the nation 
Nation imagined 
exclusively 
through western 
frame 
Nation imagined 
through religious 
frame, but in 
dialogue with 
western modernity 
Nation imagined 
through religious 
frame, but through 
contradictory 
practices/attitudes 
Consumption 
attitudes 
Exclusive 
engagement with 
western consumer 
products 
Religion central to 
consumer practices 
Consumer products 
supporting daily 
contradictory 
performances 
 
Urban mobilities 
Creation of 
western inspired 
urban enclaves 
Religion central to 
negotiation of 
urban spaces 
Spaces of urban 
imagination as 
escape from locale 
 
Figure 8.2- Urban mobilities: points of divergence across class 
 
 
8.5 Conclusion     
 
This chapter, making up the third and final part of my triadic structure for 
understanding cosmopolitanism amongst young Egyptians, has examined the range 
of classed and gendered mobilities within the city. Whereas Chapter Seven explored 
the city predominantly as a site for everyday consumption, this chapter has expanded 
further on the role of the city, investigating it as the complete arena of everyday life 
where young Egyptians live, move, shape their identities and come into contact with 
different forms of authority. Indeed, negotiating Cairo's terrain means negotiating its 
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multiple forms of control manifested in strict family moral frameworks, state 
repression and classed-forms of exclusion and marginalization. At the same time, the 
discussion has illustrated how Cairo is not only a city of repression, but also a 
dynamic urban terrain where limits to the self are creatively negotiated. As young 
Egyptians physically move in the city, they also move subjectively between and 
within the rich mediascapes they have access to. This has facilitated the rise of three 
different forms of cosmopolitan imagination that offer more potential for reflexive 
interpretation and a negotiation of the self and others.  
 
In this context, as increased opportunities for mediated connection have become an 
everyday reality for young Egyptians, articulations of social space within the city 
have become complex and increasingly unpredictable. Social proximity is no longer 
based solely on the familiar and the geographically close, but often on the 
symbolically mediated and thus geographically distant (Saldanha, 2002; Jansson, 
2009). I have examined this in the way bonds of class have allowed the young upper 
middle class in my sample to feel closer to the everyday experiences of young people 
of a similar class status living in the west. At the same time, religious bonds have 
also allowed the lower middle class to develop a sense of imagined belonging to 
transnational religious networks, especially through the consumption of regional 
Islamic television channels. Thus, Cairo looked at from 'below', or through the 
analysis of the city as lived space (Lefebvre, 1991) to borrow Lefebvre's term, 
reveals three very different urban narratives. Everyday experiences of bounded place 
as restricted and controlled intersect with the possibility of expression, creativity and 
freedom, enabled especially through mediated forms of imagining the self beyond a 
narrow local framework of morality. Thus, young Egyptians are united through their 
desire for imaginaire (Freitas cf. Abaza, 2006) or a need to construct their own 'ideal' 
cities within the larger city. Nevertheless, Cairo, with all its paradoxes, complexities 
and multiple forms of authority is also a city that cannot always be fully escaped. As 
De Certeau (1984) reminds us, urban inhabitants may be able to develop tactics to 
resist or challenge forms of authority or control, but these will always remain framed 
by dominant strategies which are only rarely subverted.       
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9 Conclusion 
 
Cosmopolitan Imagination as a Reality: Egypt's Revolution and the 
Dream of a Better Tomorrow 
 
 
The Egyptians have changed the world and the world took note  
 
(Barack Obama, February 2011). 
 
The world only gets better because people risk something to make it 
better. Thanks to the Egyptians!  
 
(Paulo Coelho, February, 2011). 
 
 
'Al Sha'ab yoreed iskat al nitham'. 'The people demand the fall of the regime'. 
Although it would have been hard to imagine, while conducting my fieldwork in 
2008, that I would ever hear these words in the near future, as the skies of Cairo and 
the ground of Tahrir Square shook angrily with the loud echoes and assertive 
demands of millions of Egyptians in early 2011, I knew Egypt would be changed 
forever. As the revolution broke out, I had already completed my fieldwork and 
analysis, and thus I was not initially sure how my empirical findings would be 
positioned in relation to these new historic political events. Would they seem 
outdated, uninteresting, irrelevant, even? Reading back through my ethnographic 
analysis and participants' words, I felt that, in fact, the revolution breathed new life 
into my results confirming the cosmopolitan aspirations of young Egyptians, the 
centrality of the nation to their sense of identity, but also the significance of the 
media in sustaining processes of identity construction across local, national and 
transnational boundaries. Significantly, the revolution was a true manifestation of the 
cosmopolitan orientations I had detected amongst young Egyptians. The domino-
effect of the Arab Spring was a reminder of how, in our increasingly interconnected 
world, it is not only electronic wires and Facebook friends that are linked, but as 
befitting a cosmopolitan logic, the fates of individuals are united through a common 
desire for basic humanitarian values. In a true transnational movement that connected 
revolutionary groups across Cairo, Damascus, Yemen, Wisconsin and Madrid, what 
united these cities despite their very different socio-cultural and geographical 
contexts, was the desire for democratic participation, social equality and the demand 
for a dignified life. 
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An intense ethnographic analysis over a period of nine months has allowed me to 
give space to young Egyptians, and to hopefully represent fairly the many and 
complex layers of their everyday life, especially as those are framed within systems 
of class, gender, religious and urban organization and control. A cosmopolitan 
framework allowed me to challenge preconceptions about the linearity of the 
relations between a society such as Egypt and global culture. In addition, my micro 
analysis of everyday life in Cairo was sensitive to the complex and multifarious ways 
in which the global is produced from within, and thus takes its meaning only through 
the local. Thus, I have avoided what Beck and Sznaider (2006:5) refer to as the 
'onion model' of the world, which assumes that the local and the national form the 
core or inner layer, while the international and the global are relegated to the outer 
layers. Such a thesis, according to Beck and Sznaider (2006), which views the world 
through discrete and disconnected layers characterized by static levels of power, 
reduces the global to an external and abstract force existing 'out there,' impacting 
upon people's intimate spaces or localities in a one-way flow of influence. Carpentier 
(2008:247) maintains that the term translocal better captures the complex 
relationship between the local and the global that 'allows taking the local as the point 
of departure, and adding the global as a second component'. In this context, 
Carpentier argues, we can avoid seeing the global always as the natural starting 
point, and the local in a reactive position.  
 
In the light of such a premise that evades positioning the local and global necessarily 
as dialogical counterpoints, I have formulated a third-order framework for 
cosmopolitanism. While recognizing both unequal relations of power and influence 
on a sub-national scale and transnational level, this framework has also brought to 
the fore ideologies and practices of everyday life in Cairo that construct a 
cosmopolitan imagination. Thus, while remaining sensitive to established hierarchies 
and unequal relations of power, I have explored the multiple ways in which young 
Egyptians from three different class backgrounds live with, and internalise distance 
and difference on a daily basis. Through a cosmopolitan framework, I have 
recognized the internal heterogeneity of the society where my study took place. I 
explored how, for young Egyptians, new relations between the local and the global, 
self and others, distance and proximity, the virtual and the immediate coalesce in the 
spaces of everyday life, creating alternative avenues for imagining the self. In this 
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context, as the taken-for-grantedness of territorial limits are increasingly challenged 
through intense processes of transnational mediated connections, cosmopolitanism 
becomes a heuristic concept that captures the ability of young Egyptians to form their 
own unique and complex understandings of a world close by, and one far away. The 
case of young Egyptians demonstrates that, although bodily existence often remains 
bound within a specific geographical location, as socio-spatial transformations are 
bolstered through television, cognitive experiences including 'structures of feeling' 
and 'mental geographies' (Sabry, 2005) are increasingly shaped by what occurs 
beyond immediate boundaries. This confirms Beck's (2004:153) notion of dialogic 
imagination which conceives of cosmopolitanism as an 'internalized otherness of 
others, the co-presence or coexistence of rival lifestyles, contradictory certainties 
within the space of individual and social experience'. 
 
Cosmopolitanism in Cairo, as it has emerged in my study, is a comprehensive 
cultural, moral and economic apparatus; a multipronged process comprising both a 
subjective as well as physical and embodied dimension. Articulated at the 
intersection of a complex interplay between consumer culture, urban realities and 
national identities, the multiple modes of cosmopolitan expression I have witnessed 
amongst young Egyptians fall beyond any simplistic assumption of blind mimicry or 
linear westernization. To some readers, it may seem that in a study on 
cosmopolitanism, there is too much of a focus on 'western' culture emerging from 
within my empirical data. Nevertheless, as Hall (2008) observes, there is never a 
benign cosmopolitanism, but cosmopolitanism as an everyday lived reality is always 
caught up in, and only emerges from within transnational divides and unequal 
relations of power and influence that shape the exchange of global cultural flows. In 
this context, the power and universal spread of hegemonic forms of western 
consumer capitalism and its monopolization of transnational cultural exchange 
cannot be downplayed. Albeit, through ethnographic practices, I have been able to 
delve beneath the first level of appearances associated with the public construction of 
identities, from which it is often easy to make the assumption of cultural 
homogenization. As rich ethnographic data in the empirical discussion reveal – 
articulated at the intersection of national experiences, religious identities and a global 
articulation of culture – there is often a much deeper philosophy and critical 
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reasoning that drives the way young Egyptians construct their own unique 
cartographies of the world, and which surpasses any form of direct emulation.  
 
Schielke (2011) argues that rather than a direct emulation of goods and ideas 
associated with global culture, what appears to be going on are attempts by 
Egyptians 'to transform their own world to make it seem valuable in the face of these 
powers and promises'. Recent research on cosmopolitan orientations in Cairo, has 
increasingly begun to document how Egyptians are choosing to emigrate to rich oil 
producing countries of the Arab Gulf to secure better job opportunities and a higher 
standard of living (Ghannam, 2006; Schielke, 2011). Representing a geographical 
destination that is often more culturally and physically accessible than Europe or the 
US, these studies document how the social and economic opportunities that life in 
the Gulf represents, have allowed many Egyptians to partake in consumer desires to 
afford a car, house and comfortable life, not always possible in their homeland. This 
illustrates that the privileges, dreams and comforts associated with global culture are 
no longer exclusive property of the west, but as they have become universalized, they 
are now embodied in the local and the regional. Thus, in their attempts to claim their 
belonging to the wider world, and as it becomes regionalized, nationalized and often 
Islamized, young Egyptians seek to make global cultural modernity their own.  
 
In their narratives and discussions, these men and women often described a process 
of worldliness and modernization: a desire to feel part of a wider global community 
that surpasses the constraints and limitations of the immediate locale. They also 
displayed a desire to partake in global youth cultural practices, which positions these 
young men and women at the centre of a universal experience of being young, 
modern and worldly.  Young Egyptians' often critical stance towards what they 
perceived to be the immorality and religious laxness of the west, indicates not an 
unreflexive articulation of western culture, but an ability to sustain different loyalties 
and shift between multiple associations to their nation, religion and to global culture 
simultaneously. I subscribe here to Gable's (2010:88) assertion that youth 
populations outside the west display their own unique, critical visions of how they 
hope to transform the world 'and influence us to join us in this transformation' 
(Gable, 2010: 88). Hence, similar to participants in Gable's study, young Egyptians 
acquire global symbols and consumer objects that on the surface make them appear 
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'like us,' (west) and thus we often assume that their ambition is to always 'be us,' 
although the world for them is a more complex shared space we all mutually make.  
    
However, to suggest that no element of western cultural domination shapes young 
Egyptians' cosmopolitan orientations, would be a naïve assumption. A third-order 
framework captures how cosmopolitanism in Cairo, forced to pass through a strict 
filtering mechanism at the national and transnational level, was destined to take on a 
very limited form before it even began. A fascination with western culture is not a 
modern process articulated solely through the media, but has a long established past, 
deeply rooted and internalized in local and regional culture through colonial links. 
Additionally, in a highly constrained milieu such as Egypt, many of my participants 
were restricted by limited forms of social mobility, a lack of cultural and economic 
resources, and not many opportunities for travel beyond the nation-state. 
Furthermore, Cairo, although the most ethnically diverse of Egypt's cities, remains 
predominantly culturally and religiously homogenous, meaning an interaction with 
cultural difference is not a customary part of Cairenes' daily experiences, as it may be 
in many urban centres of the west. In this context, cosmopolitanism as I have 
documented it in Cairo is articulated mainly through television consumption, 
although my empirical discussion also records the daily presence and importance of 
new media, particularly mobile phones and the Internet in sustaining these young 
Egyptians' sense of connection to the world.  
 
Despite the democratizing potentials of television in broadening the cultural 
repertoires of these men and women, it must be recognized that their cosmopolitan 
vision remains dependent upon a limited menu of media offerings, mainly American 
productions, preset by rich businessmen associated with transnational media empires. 
As Morley and Robins (1995:32) argue, such mega-corporations, where 'co-financed 
and co-produced products are made on a global assembly line' are almost single 
handedly shaping a global space of image flows. Thus, as the third-order framework 
illustrates, the west remains an undeniable and overwhelming reference within an 
established world order, no doubt strongly influencing young Egyptians' 
cosmopolitan aspirations. With his anthropological research in an Indian steel town, 
Parry (2008) argues against any form of romantic optimism that regards 
cosmopolitanism as entirely value-neutral, positioning all cultures as equal in their 
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differences without any degree of universalism. Such a hopeful 'salad bowl' mixing 
of cultural difference, Parry argues, is antithetical to the reality of a world society 
that is partly founded on the ideology of 'progress' and the idea that countries outside 
the west have something 'to learn from other 'more advanced' industrial nations' 
(Parry, 2008: 328).            
 
9.1 Cosmopolitan Imagination through Distance and proximity 
 
My ethnographic research with young Egyptians reveals how their everyday lives 
and subjectivities partly take their shape within an omnipresent media space. 
Television, as documented in my study, not only provides an important source of 
pleasure and entertainment, but representations of distant lives consumed by young 
Egyptians allow them to manage and often define their relation to their city, nation, 
religion, but also to the wider world. Thus, with television at the centre of their 
everyday lives, young Egyptians of different backgrounds have become active agents 
of a mediated globalization. They have come to imagine their selves, the social and 
economic limits imposed upon their immediate experiences, and the rest of the world 
through mediation. This illustrates the increasing levels of interdependencies (Hall, 
2008) that have come to shape social and cultural relations in the age of intense 
mediated connections, which can no longer remain encapsulated solely within the 
nation's territorial limits. As documented by the case of young Egyptians, mediation 
of everyday life that expands the horizons of their cultural repertoires beyond 
national space, makes distant systems of meaning relevant to their own everyday 
articulations of their lives located in the city, and their religious and national 
identities. Indeed, the discussion in Chapter Six illustrates the importance of the 
nation in the Egyptian context, not as a self-enclosed or pre-determined entity, but 
the idea of the nation as relevant in its globality. Young Egyptians' national 
experiences are redefined and revaluated in relation to mediated socio-spatial 
transformations that locate bounded identities in the midst of a larger world context.  
 
The complex and often ambivalent relationship of young Egyptians to the nation 
complements Hannerz's (1996:5) observation that often, the biggest threat and 
challenge to the nation comes 'mostly from below' rather than from an external or 
alien global force. Indeed, as I have recorded in Chapter Six, young Egyptians' sense 
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of disillusionment and disappointment with the nation-state stems from the reality of 
a repressive government, class oppression, the lack of opportunity for dissent or 
opposition and the unequal distribution of economic and cultural resources. On the 
other hand, the global provides an important resource, not for challenging the 
importance of the nation, but for re-imagining and re-interpreting the nation in new 
ways. Young Egyptians, therefore, may routinely draw on a highly stylized and often 
idealized view of global culture, although this is not necessarily out of a desire to 
imitate it, but rather, to extend the range of cultural possibilities that may shape and 
inform their own national or religious identity (Latham, 2006).  
 
The discussion on the nation within the context of my study is an important 
illustration of how a cosmopolitan imagination in Cairo is articulated at the 
intersection between distance and proximity, between a world close by and far away, 
especially as this is negotiated by mediation. Thus, although difference or an 'other' 
as represented in the media may remain geographically distant, it often becomes 
socially proximate; intensely relevant to a greater interpretation and understanding of 
the self and the worlds individuals occupy. In this context, in the articulation of their 
cosmopolitan imagination, young Egyptians have become skilled negotiators, 
moving within and between mediated and non-mediated discourses. They move 
physically within a bounded place that sets the conditions for bodily existence, yet 
shift subjectively between disembedded spaces of mediated representation, often 
providing the contexts for meaning and inclusivity. In light of this dialectical 
interplay between proximity and distance, television, in exposing young Egyptians to 
representations of different cultural worlds, often provides a sense of distance from 
the immediate, although not as a way of transcending it, but in providing a new lens 
and context for imagining and re-imagining proximate social experiences. 
 
9.2 Asymmetrical Interdependencies in Transnational Media Flows 
 
The continuing importance and relevance of the nation to young Egyptians' identities 
is an important indicator that a cosmopolitan orientation and sense of openness to the 
world can be sustained alongside local and national particularities. I discussed in 
Chapter Six how a seemingly inconsequential football match between Egypt and Algeria 
became a major event for many young Egyptians, awakening common national 
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sentiment and inspiring them to fill the streets in large crowds armed with flags and 
patriotic T-shirts. The recent revolution, particularly in the global following and 
appreciation of its unfolding events, also became a catalyst for Egyptians to celebrate 
a sense of pride and loyalty towards the nation, and an opportunity to display to the 
world that Egypt has achieved what the west, with all its power and leadership, never 
could have. Although I did not manage to travel back to Cairo after the revolution, I 
have been able to conduct a number of online and phone interviews. Wafaa, 24, a 
newly qualified doctor and participant in this study, told me: 
 
We feel an immense sense of pride. I mean, it's not us trying to copy 
America or the west anymore, but for the first time, it's them glued to 
their television screens, watching and learning from our revolutionary 
practices. Maybe it was the west who built the technology and 
invented Facebook, but it was us who recently taught them how to 
really use it. Unfortunately, the youth in Egypt always looked at the 
world and felt left out. But at this moment, and after what we have 
achieved with the revolution, I have never felt prouder at being 
Egyptian. Actually, I want the whole world to know I am Egyptian. 
 
 
I discussed above how the media are not only regarded by young Egyptians as sources of 
entertainment and pleasure, but their appropriation has become an important resource 
allowing them to negotiate their relation to the city, nation and world. Furthermore, 
Wafaa's words are also an indicator of the centrality of the media as tools for gaining 
confidence, a voice and presence in a world that usually excludes them. Social 
networking sites, particularly Facebook and Twitter, gave young revolutionaries in Cairo 
an opportunity to mobilize, assert their demands and thus directly challenge repressive 
state authority. Furthermore, young Egyptians' knowledge that the world was 'glued to 
their television screens' watching and learning from them as they demonstrated how 
Facebook 'should really be used', as Wafaa said, allowed them to confidently locate 
themselves on a global map of influence, on which they are usually relegated a bottom 
position, if placed at all. These words demonstrate how the media grant spaces of 
inclusivity and meaning – not available to young Egyptians in their everyday lives – 
where the social and political spheres often fuse. In this context, whereas young 
Egyptians are usually excluded from any form of political participation or citizen 
engagement within the nation-state, new media have provided important points of 
entry, allowing everybody in every part of the world to potentially become a player 
in global politics. Although the relevance of the Internet became especially prevalent 
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during the recent revolutions, my findings draw attention to how it is not only new 
media that provide these spaces of political and cultural inclusivity. As I argue 
below, television played an important role in the years leading up to the revolution, 
with representations of a distant world consumed by young Egyptians exposing the 
limits and restrictions placed on the self and nation. In this context, as a daily cultural 
transporter shifting these young men and women between different worlds, television 
has allowed them to partake in the construction of a cosmopolitan imagination in 
which the dream of a better life in Egypt is embedded in the vision of the world as 
represented on screen.      
 
The quotation above supports findings presented in my empirical discussion, of the 
complex relations of 'asymmetrical interdependence' (Straubhaar, 1991:43) that 
characterize transnational media relations. Although most media technologies and 
television content are invented and originate in the west, they are widely distributed 
to, and used in different socio-cultural and political milieux, other than in the context 
of their origin. Indeed, if we were to adopt a macro perspective, mapping the 
transnational flow and exchange of the media from a largely western perspective 
(Boyd-Barrett, 1977; Schiller, 1991), then we may be faced with a pessimistic and 
highly unequal reality of terms of production, distribution and influence of global 
media. This inequality could lead to the assumption of a reaffirmation of western 
dominance through the widespread distribution of media content and technologies 
whose meanings are set and concentrated in a limited number of western countries 
and transnational corporations. Nevertheless, as the last quotation illustrates, 
departing from a global south perspective, the analysis of transnational media flows 
unearths an intricate web of media interdependencies with complex systems of 
meaning constantly defining levels of production and consumption.  
 
This intricate web of media interdependencies is observed in the way Facebook and 
Twitter, both invented in the west for purposes of social networking, were then 
redefined as revolutionary technologies by young Arabs who appropriated these 
social networking platforms in their struggles to topple their dictatorial governments, 
who, ironically, were supported mainly by western regimes. This illustrates the 
complex nature of co-dependent relations that shape transnational media flows, and 
that although technologies may be packaged and defined in a particular way at their 
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point of origin, as they shift globally, their meanings are constantly being defined 
and redefined in relation to their different uses and appropriations in different 
contexts. For instance, in response to the needs and demands of Egyptian protestors 
to make their voice heard by the world during the revolution, Google and Twitter 
launched the 'voice-to-tweet' software. After the Egyptian government cut off access 
to the main Internet service providers, this new service gave Egyptian revolutionaries 
the ability to 'tweet' voiced live updates, without the need for an Internet connection.     
 
In light of the above discussion, my empirical data does not support concerns about 
an overarching and ever present media imperialism, which assumes that the universal 
spread of western media is homogenizing local cultural values. Findings from my 
research capture a complex picture of audience tastes and preferences that although 
do not conform to a complete domination by, and dependence on, western media, 
also challenge the counter assumption that audiences are inclined to seek mainly 
local productions (Straubhaar, 1991). My ethnographic engagement with young 
Egyptians has revealed that they display a more intricate set of preferences towards 
the diverse media they have access to, which centres around the content and values 
represented and associated with particular genres, rather than being based solely on 
the national origin of the media. As I discussed in my empirical chapters, the 
majority of young men and women in my sample display a strong preference for 
western movies, which they argue expose them to a global culture they correlate with 
freedom, individuality, and the dream of a better life they do not have in Egypt. 
Nevertheless, it is through Turkish serials that lower middle class women prefer to 
negotiate the more intimate issue of marital relationships that are highly relevant to 
their everyday concerns and aspirations. Thus, whereas in the context of general 
political ideologies and humanitarian values, western media provide a relevant and 
desired frame of reference, in terms of moral values associated with their everyday 
experiences, regionally or locally proximate media are often preferred, especially by 
young Egyptian women. Indeed, Turkey is an Islamic country and thus the everyday 
realities and lifestyles of the characters on screen are closer to the moral and 
religious values of young lower middle class women.  
 
In a more recent reworking of the cultural proximity theory, Straubhaar and La 
Pastina (2005) maintain that although audience desires still continue to fall within the 
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framework of cultural proximity, media preferences must be recognized to take place 
at multiple levels that conform to the different religious, cultural and political aspects 
that shape people's complex and multilayered identities. This illustrates how young 
Egyptians are media-savvy audiences, operating from within complex, multilayered 
everyday lives, and shifting between different transnational outlets, programmes and 
genres that often conform to, and at other times challenge different aspects of their 
identities. Nevertheless, as Morley (2006) emphasises, we should never conflate 
'active' audiences with 'powerful' audiences. Indeed, my ethnographic findings reveal 
that young Egyptians are actively making informed choices from a range of diverse 
media available to them, yet my study also reveals that the MBC channels, most 
popular amongst my participants, mainly consist of a constricted diet of North 
American productions or Arabic productions adopting western formats. Thus, 
selection from what is already a restricted menu predetermined by a limited number 
of media moguls is in itself a 'very limited form of power' (Morley, 2006: 115). What 
can be gleaned from the above discussion, however, is that localized appropriation of 
the media never remains a process that is completely local, but is strongly linked to, 
and dependent upon the origins of technology, the flows of programmes from the 
west, and significantly, the meanings embedded in these technologies and 
programmes at the level of production. 
 
9.3 Negotiating Borders in a 'Borderless' World: The Continuing Importance of 
Class 
 
According to Ohmae (1994), we are now inhabiting a 'borderless world' where the 
flow of people, technology and information across national borders has rendered 
territorial boundaries as obsolete. Nevertheless, to what extent do such idealistic 
claims of hypermobility and transnational movement (Hannerz, 1996) across a 
'borderless' world actually correlate with everyday experiences as I have documented 
them in this study? Perhaps it is ironic that in a world theorized to be without the 
constraint of predetermined borders, thus sustaining intense movement and mobility, 
Egyptians are more static than ever, both socially and physically. Nevertheless, as 
my main conceptual framework, imagination has allowed me to explore how 
contemporary identities are shaped in ways that fall beyond the specificity of the 
locale and the immediacy of everyday experience, with mediated representation often 
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challenging the boundaries of rigid social structures. Thus, an enlargement of young 
Egyptians' cultural horizons through the media, translates into a sense of imagination. 
This locates the self at the centre of a broader interconnected world, thus sustaining 
the possibility of subjective border crossing and the engagement with political, 
cultural and moral ideologies and movements beyond immediate national borders. In 
this context, the case of young Egyptians illustrates that it is not about movement in a 
world with no borders. On the contrary, their world is one full of borders, 'inhabited 
by people who try to cross them' (Schielke, 2011: 4), although a sense of imagination 
fed by the media provides an important resource for negotiating the multiple borders 
and constraints young Egyptians face in their daily lives. Thus, especially for those 
located away from global centres of power, with no access to global cultural 
institutions or influence on global political relations, the media have become 
particularly important, endowing them with the possibility of envisioning an 
alternative reality, and thus providing a sense of hope in what often seems to be a 
hopeless world. Some of the everyday borders young Egyptians face have been 
physical such as the exclusion of the working class from particular public urban 
spaces, or forms of family and community control, while others have been symbolic 
such as their own self-awareness that they are excluded from global forms of power 
and influence. In particular, my empirical findings indicate the continuing 
importance of class, functioning as a rigid border of oppression and inequality that 
shapes and regulates the everyday experiences of young Egyptians.  
 
My research confirms that class in Egypt plays a central role in shaping young 
people's access to systems of power, education, cultural and economic capital, urban 
space and even marital choices. Nevertheless, my work does not ascribe to class-
determinism. I recognize that class does not operate alone, but its meanings and 
consequences only become apparent as it intersects with a broader socio-cultural 
framework. This research has particularly focused on urban encounters, gender 
relations, Islamic identities, age and educational experiences revealed in the study of 
three educational institutions. Perhaps one of the limitations of my study was that is 
was quite an ambitious project, ethnographically examining three different classes in 
a limited period of time, through three separate methods, as a sole researcher. This 
limitation in time and resources meant that it was often difficult for me to 
systematically follow expressions of dissent that went against the 'norm' which was 
278 
 
visible and more accessible to me as a researcher. For instance, I discussed in 
Chapter Seven how I came across a young man in the American University who 
distanced himself from the normal activities and 'westernized' leisure practices 
associated with everyday life in the campus. Instead, he adopted what appeared to be 
a very Islamic appearance and inclination. Similarly, in Madina Institute, attracting 
working class students, I often witnessed a group of bearded men who openly prayed 
in the campus, and, I was told, severely reproached the behaviour of their colleagues 
who engaged in the contradictory performances I documented in previous empirical 
chapters. Such practices are evidence of the internal contradictions of the global 
condition, where individuals appropriate knowledge of the 'other' or of each other in 
multiple ways. For the lower middle class, for instance, spirituality was essential to 
their sense of identity, as they saw themselves as global Muslims, wanting to partake 
in the construction of a transnational Umma, yet an Umma in touch with global 
cultural and technological developments. Nevertheless, in the unconventional 
examples I have described above, religious identity often becomes a form of closure 
and a way of retreating from and distancing the omnipresent infiltration of global 
culture. 
 
My identity as a female researcher was an obvious barrier in the instances I described 
above, as it hindered me from directly engaging with these men; I was warned that 
they would not welcome direct interaction with a woman. Although these instances 
remain exceptions that do not conform to the norm publicly visible in the two 
campuses, they are nevertheless part of these different classed worlds, and thus a 
reminder of how differences exist within, and not only across classes. A focus on 
these unconventional practices can further our understandings of how class is a 
dynamic and not static category, differentially lived and shaped on a daily basis, 
without assuming that people's experiences must be placed in standardized or pre-
determined moulds. Indeed, as Harindranath (2009:53) argues, socio-economic 
position remains a fundamental marker that helps create and maintain interpretive 
frameworks, while transcendentally ‘shaping the subjects’ horizons of knowledge 
and behaviour’.   Nevertheless, even while acknowledging this, Harindranath warns, 
it is important to avoid subscribing to any deterministic cause-effect notion that 
places people into ‘watertight compartments’ (ibid.). Furthermore, although focusing 
on gender, Butler (1990) makes an important contribution that explores how the 
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socially constructed nature of identities has a tendency to place people’s 
subjectivities within restrictive fixed moulds.  
According to Butler (1990), as our perceptions of gender are linked to relations of 
power within society, we have come to think of gender through a naturalised 
heterosexual matrix; a binary frame of compulsory heterosexuality that presumes, 
thus reducing the many possibilities of what it actually means to be a woman. Rather 
than thinking through such ‘rigid and hierarchical sexual codes’ (Butler, 1990: x) that 
consolidate bodily categories, Butler proposes that gender is performatively 
produced, thus becoming a site of multiple contested meanings.  Applying Butler’s 
approach to gender to my own research, it is essential not to regard class categories 
as solid groupings that imprison people, banally sculpting their actions, discourse and 
beliefs in an inevitable linear cause-effect notion. Indeed, the examples of dissent I 
referred to just above, as well as the frequent disagreements  and disputes between 
members of the same class recorded throughout the empirical discussion, illustrate 
that class continues to matter as a category of analysis, without requiring complete 
unity or coherence between its members.  
My ethnographic analysis of the three classes on which this research was based is 
evidence of the flexibility and permeability of class boundaries, illuminated through 
the frequent overlaps, fluidity and contradictions between participants’ responses. 
For example, in the upper middle class group, although many shared quite an elitist 
liberal standing, some members often voiced their objection to such classist attitudes 
that demonized the lower classes. Additionally, others were vehemently   against the 
common sentiment expressed by members of this class that supported the eradication 
of embodied Islamic symbols such as the veil and beards in particular public spaces. 
With the working class, although a vocal rejection of the west seemed to be the 
prevalent norm, a few individuals demonstrated their rejection of such a 
homogenizing view that fails to acknowledge the many positive aspects of western 
culture. Furthermore, I was told that there is a sizeable body of students at Madina 
College who refuse to socialise on campus as they seek to distance themselves from 
the general behaviour that takes place there, which they strongly disapprove of. In 
this context, any class analysis should avoid boxing groups off into particular social 
categories, or examining the way behaviour unfolds in predictable or standardized 
ways as a result of set social formations.  
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According to Savage (2000b:38), class undisputedly remains a ‘major organizing 
feature of social life,’ and thus, rather than theoretical contributions that argue for the 
relevance of class, we are in need of models that help us understand how it is, and in 
what ways class continues to matter and shape our subjectivities. Discussing Beck 
and Giddens’ theory of individualization, Savage argues how it fails to capture the 
complex interweaving of class and individual identity. According to the authors, in 
an age of reflexive modernization, traditional collectivities such as class and religion 
have lost most of their significance and relevance. The individual, freed from the 
confines of these collectivities, becomes the most important unit and basis of social 
life. Nevertheless, in an attempt to rework this thesis, Savage (2000b) contends that 
society is both individualised and class divided. According to this approach, class 
remains a central feature of society not as a deterministic or mechanical collectivity, 
but as an important mode of differentiation whereby individuals within the class 
system make sense of their subjectivities in multiple ways, and thus distinguish 
themselves from other groups and people in society − both above and below them.  
In light of the above, and as results from my empirical analysis demonstrate, people 
are not passive in the face of class as a unanimous force and category, but individuals 
are active inhabitants of their class status, seeking to constantly make sense of their 
location and position in society. Similarly, examining how class processes operate 
through the actions of rational individuals rather than homogenized social groupings, 
Bottero (2004) argues that the relevance of class is maintained in its daily 
reproduction of hierarchy and thus in the continuation of inequality. To grasp the 
importance of class, therefore, we need to appreciate how it is deeply embedded in 
daily social practice as ‘the reproduction of hierarchy is carried out every day, by us 
all, in the most banal and mundane of activities. The results of such activities are the 
continuation of inequality’ (Bottero, 2004: 995). In this context, as a contrast to the 
usual macro analyses that have monopolized our understandings of class, Bottero 
calls for more ethnographic approaches that engage directly with people, examining 
in detail how class is ‘lived,’ and thus how it is experienced and sustained over time 
and across different spaces. In light of the above discussion, in the absence of 
ethnographic studies that offer clear class based analyses, particularly in Egypt 
(Inhorn, 1996), I believe my research has opened up important avenues for recording 
and documenting the complex and contradictory ways class is lived and experienced 
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on a daily basis in Cairo. The findings unearthed in this project provide important 
insights, which can be further explored in more depth within future research that may 
focus on each class separately. 
Following on from the above discussion, class is not a socio-economic blueprint of 
behaviour and lifestyle, but is about the way individuals who cannot be disassociated from 
the hierarchies and inequalities of the class system, perceive and make sense of 
them‘sevles’ and their subjectivities. Such an approach makes relevant not only 
differences across classes, but also brings to the fore the internal contradictions that 
inevitably exist between people within class categories. Indeed, as Butler (1990:14) 
importantly argues in relation to gender identities, the body should not be perceived as a 
passive medium or instrument onto which cultural meanings are inevitably inscribed. 
Instead, it is important to focus on a ‘set of dialogic encounters by which variously 
positioned women articulate separate identities within the framework of an emergent 
coalition’. Skeggs (1997:2) makes a similar point in relation to class when she argues how 
women on which her research were based are not submissive ‘ciphers form which subject 
positions can be read-off’. Thus, although subject positions such as class partly pre-exist 
their agency, these women actively engage in producing and reproducing the meanings of 
the positions they inhabit. Importantly, my ethnographic portraits have revealed how the 
'fuzzy boundaries' (Skeggs, 2004: 5) of class are made and re-made, existing in a state of 
'continual reproduction' (ibid.:3). 
 
I subscribe to Skeggs' (2004) understanding of class, which she regards as being part 
of a dominant symbolic exchange that attributes bodies with particular levels of 
symbolic and moral value. Sometimes these ascribed forms of value become 
institutionalized. For instance, I have described how it is common for cafés in Cairo 
to exclude the working class, particularly men sporting beards or women wearing the 
veil, as their bodies become ascribed with a value-less and regressive Islamic 
working class identity, thus contradicting the 'modern' and globalised image such 
cafés aspire to maintain. Nevertheless, on the level of everyday micro practices, 
Skeggs (1997) also argues that classed groups are involved in material and symbolic 
struggles to create alternative systems of value and a sense of self-worth, leading to 
performances of 'respectability' across different spatio-temporal contexts. I have 
documented this in relation to the working class in the way family and 
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neighbourhood community spaces require public performances of class respectability 
that, especially for women, communicate virtue and honour as the only way of 
sustaining value in the context of limited everyday resources and economic means. 
Within peer and educational spaces, however, value, for both men and women, 
transcends a limited framework informed by a gendered norm of Islamic morality. 
Value in these spaces becomes associated with an ability of these underprivileged 
young people to display an awareness and appropriation of global youth practices 
often informed by the media. Additionally, for the upper middle class, I have shown 
how, within their educational spaces and exclusive urban enclaves, a sense of value 
and class worth is expressed in their ability to acquire expensive consumer products 
and to keep up with global codes of dress that pertain to a universal middle class 
lifestyle. Nevertheless, especially for women, when away from these protected urban 
niches and negotiating the public streets of Cairo, particularly in the presence of 
working class men, more traditional forms of public appearance and behaviour are 
valued and conformed to. Modesty is secured through alternative codes of 
conservative dress that communicate a middle class respectability (De Koning, 
2009). These examples illustrate that as much as class shapes people by giving them 
restricted or much broader access to particular cultural codes and economic capital, 
people themselves also shape the daily lived meaning of class, associating it with 
different forms of value in different contexts (Skeggs, 2004).              
 
My choice of methods has been especially relevant to the different ways in which 
class is performed. According to Skeggs, Thumim and Wood (2008), class is not 
something naturally found through research, but is made within each research 
encounter. In this context, a multilayered methodology has been an important choice 
in allowing me to access the different ways in which class is articulated and 
communicated by the three classed groups. If I had depended solely on information 
acquired through focus groups, then I might have discovered a very constricted 
understanding of class, as with such methods, people articulate their responses 
reflexively, meaning I would have had access only to what participants had 
consciously decided I should  know. For example, through focus groups I was told 
by the working class that it is religious discourse which informs their identity the 
most, while they often chose to verbally distance the global or the west as being 
something evil or corrupt. Obviously, my identity as a middle class woman and 
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academic played an important role here, as they may have been trying to construct a 
respectable image of their class identity in my presence, based on a dedicated 
conformity to religious practice.  
 
An ability to observe the behaviour of participants free from researcher influence 
through non-participant observation, and also, by gaining rapport with them and a 
sense of trust over time through participant observation, meant a rounder and more 
complex understanding of their class and gender identity began to emerge. This need 
for a multi-pronged methodological approach is essential to a greater understanding 
of the complex nature of modern identities that are formed in layers (Georgiou, 
2006) and informed by multiple attachments and connections 'of different types and 
at different levels' (Morley, 2000:232). Thus, my combination of methods has 
allowed me to examine how the identities of young Egyptians are articulated at the 
intersection of dominant religious expectations, global youth practices, family and 
community rules, educational environment, state control and televised representation.  
 
9.4 Spaces of Hope: Television as a Tool for Social and Political Change? 
 
A focus on class confirms how socio-economic disparities continue to regulate and 
shape the unequal experiences of everyday life in Cairo. Writing from a Marxist 
perspective, Harvey (2000b) has documented that as the twentieth century drew to a 
close, cities were more unequal than ever: the poor were getting poorer and the rich 
were getting richer in what he names an 'uneven temporal and geographical 
development' (Harvey, 2000b:60), otherwise known as globalization. Nevertheless, 
Harvey takes issue with the claim that there are no alternatives or opportunities to 
envision a different, more equal form of existence.  He refers to these as 'spaces of 
hope' that allow us to become 'conscious architects of our fates rather than as 
'helpless puppets' ' of the worlds we are forced to inhabit. I have documented this in 
my analysis of Cairo's dual-face, both as a bounded place regulated through state 
control, government repression and class exclusion, but from below, also a creative 
urban terrain of imagination, cultural possibilities and a space for envisioning 
alternatives that provide representation, meaning and inclusivity. This illustrates how 
young Egyptians are simultaneously constrained, yet creative; repressed, yet 
constantly on the lookout for moments of emancipation that allow them to take some 
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sort of control over their lives. The recent revolution is also partly the product of 
imagination; a physical reminder of what collective dreams of an alternative life and 
more dignified future can eventually achieve. This confirms Appadurai's (1996) 
conceptualization of imagination, which he conceives of as a collective force; a 
staging ground for action, and not only for individual escape and fantasy.  
 
Harvey's (2000b: 195) words on the power of imagination are haunting in relation to 
recent events in Egypt, as he observes how 'alternative visions, no matter how 
fantastic, provide the grist for shaping powerful political forces for change'. In this 
context, I believe the strength of my thesis lies in its exploration of the important role 
that television played in the years leading up to the revolution, shaping the 
imagination, dreams and aspirations of young Egyptians in relation to what was 
occurring in a broader world. To suggest that the revolution in Egypt was spur of the 
moment, or simply a duplication of neighbouring Tunisia's uprising, would be a 
drastic oversimplification. Egypt experienced a revolutionary moment underpinned 
by a complexity of multiple motivating factors pertaining to economic, political and 
socio-cultural inequalities deeply embedded in Egyptian culture. This is an important 
reminder of Kraidy's (2011) observation that we need to guard against any form of 
media-centrism when discussing the Arab Spring. The revolutions, Kraidy argues, 
were a host of reactions to long systems of repression and not just a single product of 
the moment driven by the media. With this warning in mind, the fascinating way the 
Internet and social networking sites were used by citizens and revolutionaries of the 
Arab Spring, allowing them to directly challenge their dictatorial governments, may 
alter the course of media and communications research for years to come.  
 
One can only predict the array of journal papers, books and doctoral theses that will 
take recent political events in the Middle East as points of analyses, focusing 
particularly on the Internet and new media as representing 'new found' tools of 
citizen power and political participation. Although the importance of the Internet 
within the context of recent Arab political change cannot be denied, my thesis 
demonstrates how, on a more long-term and day-to-day basis, television has partly 
contributed towards laying down the foundations of dissent that have slowly 
contributed to demands for social and political change, eventually erupting in the 
recent uprising. As Morley (2006:104) observes, the impetus for political 
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transformation often comes from the many 'micro instances of "pre-political" attitude 
change' articulated through long term media consumption. In light of Morley's thesis, 
findings from my study illustrate that beyond the Internet's role within the immediate 
moment of radical revolutionary change, the less glamorous, mundane ordinariness 
associated with television consumption as a daily practice, should not disguise its 
potential as a vehicle often establishing the conditions for change. As my research 
findings document, through mediated representation, young Egyptians were exposed 
to the weaknesses of their nation-state, to a lack of liberal and democratic values in 
their everyday lives, to gender inequalities and lack of women's rights, and to a 
limited cultural presence and influence within a global cultural stage.  In such a 
situation, one can only assume that social and political demands which drove 
January's revolution were being gradually composed well before 2011.  
 
Despite my argument in support of television, the growing relevance and popularity 
of the Internet in the context of Egypt's recent political instability, particularly in the 
public claims it has made in challenging government authority and censorship, 
means it cannot be ignored in future research. Amusingly, an Egyptian girl was the 
first ever baby to be  named 'Facebook' in honour of the role that the social 
networking site played in allowing protestors to organize and disseminate their 
message to the world (Hartley-Parkinson, 2011). In this context, with the 
revolutionary potentials of the Internet being recently discovered by many Arab 
citizens, how will new media shape or alter their daily media practices?  Kraidy 
(2007:139) has documented the rise of what he names a 'pan Arab hypermedia 
space', combining the impact of satellite television and other types of new media. 
Thus, I suggest future research could investigate how the daily importance of 
television, documented in this study, may change along with Egypt's highly volatile 
social and political context. Will the Internet overtake the daily importance of 
television as a more trusted source of information? Or will the relevance of television 
and the Internet appear only in their convergence, and as each medium continues to 
provide a specific function in relation to particular informational, political or 
entertainment needs? Despite optimistic claims that the popularity of the Internet will 
rise as a result of recent events, I continue to maintain that the financial resources, 
skills and infrastructure required to fully benefit from the potentials of the Internet, 
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will be unlikely to pose a serious challenge to the universality and spread of 
television in Egypt. 
 
This study illustrates that without the media, both old and new, imagination, and the 
dream of a better life in Egypt would have been very difficult to find the expression 
that we have recently observed. Nevertheless, in a recent television interview, an 
Egyptian political scientist, Saeed Sadek (Al Jazeera, 2011), commented on the 
tricky nature of imagination, often a double edged sword that may raise too many 
unrealistic expectations. Egyptians are currently in a state of disillusionment he 
observed, because the revolution did not bring about the social, cultural and 
economic promises they imagined it instantaneously would. Egyptians expected too 
much too soon, wanting to implement democratic and cultural models they have seen 
elsewhere in the world, while failing to realize that the fall of Egypt's dictator and 
corrupt regime alone, was not enough. Egypt was not only characterized by an 
authoritarian figurehead, but also by social and cultural forms of dictatorship, both 
amongst family relations and within the class system, which will require decades to 
change. Significantly, however, Sadek (Al Jazeera, 2011) asserts that without the 
power of imagination and without the dream of a better life that was the main driving 
force for change, the revolution could never have happened.  
 
I started thinking about this study within the political instability and changes taking 
place in 2005, and I end it six years later in 2011. Although tremendous developments 
have taken place politically within this period, recent sectarian violence and the 
continuation of political corruption, means a sense of disenchantment and often fear 
about what the future holds for them, still remains visibly palpable amongst 
Egyptians. I write at this moment not as a researcher who has maintained objectivity 
or avoided 'going native' for four years, but also as a young Egyptian, who felt an 
overwhelming and unparalleled sense of pride and emotion as I witnessed my family, 
friends, and even this study's participants turn imagination into reality; risking their 
lives on the streets of Cairo earlier this year to shape a more promising future for us 
all. With them I have dreamed, and after witnessing first-hand the power of 
imagination, will continue to dream of a better Egypt. Our home in a cosmopolitan 
world. 
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  Working Class L. Middle Class U. Middle 
Class 
Income(LE) 
 
10 LE = 
approx.£1 
Family income 
 
500- 1,500 
 
1000-2,5000 
 
10,000-
15,000 and 
over 15,000 
     
Occupation Parents' 
occupation 
Unskilled labour e.g. 
domestic servants, 
cooks, porters 
Skilled professional, 
mainly public sector 
e.g. teachers, clerks 
Skilled 
professional, 
mainly 
private sector 
e.g. doctors, 
lawyers, 
accountants 
 % of 
respondents in 
paid 
employment 
alongside study 
75% 
 
Mainly unskilled jobs 
e.g. assistant, cashier 
30% 
 
Administrative jobs 
in government 
institutions 
17% 
 
Paid training 
in private, 
multinational 
firms 
     
Education Secondary 
education 
Secondary vocational 
education 
Egyptian secondary 
high school 
certificate (ESHSC) 
ESHSC, 
IGCSE, 
American 
Diploma, IB 
 Higher/further 
education 
 
Further;  intermediate 
vocational institutes 
Higher; public 
institutions 
Higher; 
private 
institutions 
     
Lifestyle Ownership of 
car  
2% 20% 96% 
 Num. of cars 
p/family 
1 1 3 or more 
 Num. of TV's in 
home 
1 1 3 or more 
 Ownership of 
summer chalet 
0 13% 90% 
 Destination of 
summer travel 
Day trips at local 
seaside 
Weekly trips to 
Alexandria, Ismalia, 
Hurghada 
Hurghada, 
North Coast,  
Europe and 
US 
 Preferred 
leisure spaces 
Mosque, public 
spaces, local café, 
home/neighborhood 
Home/neighborhood 
café 
Global café 
chains, bars, 
cinema 
 Use of public 
transport 
100% 
Microbus, metro, 
public bus 
85% 
Microbus, metro, taxi 
20% 
Taxi 
 
 
 
APPENDIX- Figure 1: Class profiles in relation to income, occupation, education and 
lifestyle. Based on Ibrahim's (1982) model of socio-economic divisions in Cairo 
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APPENDIX- Figure 2: Focus group prompts. 
 
 
 
1.Prompt relating to media consumption.  
 
- Has anyone seen (refer to popular programme available at the time)? What do you 
think of it? (Use it as a point of departure to explore more deeply their general 
television consumption practices. Ask about preferred channels, genres and attitudes 
towards terrestrial broadcasting).  
 
 
 
2.Prompt relating to identity/cosmopolitanism 
 
- The most recent World Values Survey conducted in Egypt shows that Egyptians 
continue to strongly identify with a national and religious identity the most. Based on 
your own experiences, do you feel these findings are accurate and reflective of 
people's allegiances in Egypt? (Ask about opinions towards an identification with 
world culture. Does such a cosmopolitan orientation necessarily contradict religious 
and national allegiances?) 
 
 
3.Prompt relating to class. 
 
- Recent statistics suggest that over 40% of Egyptians are living in poverty, while a 
growing number of Egyptians are living luxury lives, similar to people in the west. 
What are your views on this? (What are their attitudes towards phenomena such as 
gated communities, minimum charges and rules that prohibit certain classes from 
entering public spaces? What do they conceive to be the reasons for this stark 
polarization in lifestyle and what could be a solution?) 
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